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

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THE

WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;

NINE OF THE DIALOGUES BY THE LATE FLOYER SYDENHAM,

AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR:

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM,

AND

COPIOUS NOTES,

BY THE LATTER TRANSLATOR;

81446

IN WHICH IS GIVEN

THE SUBSTANCE OF NEARLY ALL THE EXISTING GREEK MS. COMMENTARIES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO,

AND A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF SUCH AS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. V.

ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ ΤΥΠΟΝ ΦΑΙΗΝ ΑΝ ΕΓΩ ΕΙΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ ΕΛΘΕΙΝ ΕΠ' ΕΥΕΡΓΕΣΙΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΗΔΕ ΨΥΧΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΕΡΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΟΛΗΣ ΑΣΕΒΕΙΑΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑΣ ΑΡΧΗΓΟΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΓΕ ΝΥΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΙΣΑΥΘΙΣ ΓΕΝΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ.

PROCL. MS. COMMENT. IN PARMENIDEM.

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1804.

God
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THE EUTHYPHRO:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

SANCTITY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EUTHYPHRO.

THE whole of the Euthyphro of Plato, ſays Ficinus, is employed in confutation; whence ſome Platoniſts have called this dialogue, as well as the Euthydemus and Greater Hippias, elenctic. However, as he juſtly obſerves, while Socrates confutes the falſe opinions which Euthyphro entertained of holineſs, he preſents certain veſtiges of the truth to its inveſtigators. We may collect therefore from this dialogue and the Gorgias that holineſs according to Plato is that part of juſtice which attributes to Divinity that which is his own. But as man is a compoſite being, and the different parts of his compoſition were produced, according to the Platonic theology, from different divinities, perfect piety will conſiſt in conſecrating to each deity that part of us which he immediately gave. This definition being premiſed, what Plato ſays here and elſewhere reſpecting holineſs will be apparent. Hence, when it is ſaid that holineſs is that which is beloved by Divinity it is true; but it is beloved by Divinity becauſe it is holineſs, and is not holineſs becauſe it is beloved by him. Likewiſe becauſe it is beloved by him it may be beloved, but is not beloved becauſe it may be beloved: for the holy is not in every reſpect the ſame with that which may be beloved; ſince neither does the eſſence of holineſs conſiſt in being the object of love, but rather in retribution and devotion.

Again, when it is ſaid that holineſs is that which is miniſtrant to the operations of Divinity, this alſo is truly ſaid: for it is miniſtrant to the converſion to Divinity of that which we receive from him. And the work of Divinity

is to produce, convert, purify, illuminate, and perfect. Hence it is beautifully obſerved by Porphyry, "that being conjoined and aſſimilated to the higheſt God, we ſhould offer the elevation of ourſelves to him as a ſacred ſacrifice; for thus we ſhall celebrate him and procure our own ſalvation." He adds, "In the ſoul's contemplation therefore of this Divinity, unattended by the paſſions, the ſacrifice to him receives its completion; but his progeny, the intelligible gods, are to be celebrated vocally by hymns[1]." Laſtly, when it is ſaid that holineſs is the ſcience of requeſting and giving to the gods, this likewiſe is true, though it is not a perfect definition of ſanctity. For he who properly prays to Divinity, will requeſt him to impart that by which he may be enabled to offer himſelf to him in the moſt acceptable manner.

[1] For the ſake of the Platonic reader I will give the whole of this very beautiful paſſage. Θυσομεν τοινυν και ημεις· αλλα θυσομεν, ὡς προσηκει, διαφορους τας θυσιας, ως αν διαφοροις δυναμεσει προσαγοντες. Θεῳ μεν τῳ επι πασιν, ὡς τις ανηρ σοφος εφη, μηδεν των αισθητων, μητε θυμιωντες, μητε επονομαζοντες· ουδεν γαρ εστιν ενυλον ὁ μη τῳ αυλῳ ευθυς εστιν ακαθαρτον. Διο ουδε λογος τουτῳ ο κατα φωνην, οικειος, ουδ' ὁ ενδον, οταν παθει ψυχης ἡ μεμολυσμενος· δια δε σιγης καθαρας και των περι αυτου καθαρων εννοιων θρησκευομεν αυτον. δει αρα συναφθεντας, και ομοιωθεντας αυτῳ, την αυτων αναγωγην θυσιαν ιεραν προσαγαγειν τῳ θεῳ, την αυτην δε και υμνον ουσαν και ημων σωτηριαν. εν απαθει αρα της ψυχης τουδε του θεου θεωρια, ἡ θυσια αυτη τελειται. Τοις δε αυτου εγγονοις, κοινοις δε θεοις, ηδη ναι την εκ του λογου υμνωδιαν προσθετεον. Απαρχης γαρ εκασῳ ων δεδωκεν ἡ θυσια, και δι ων ημων τρεφει, και εις το ειναι συνεχει εις την θυσιαν. Ως ουν γεωργος δραγματων απαρχεται και των ακροδρυων, ουτως ημεις απαρξομεθα αυτοις, εννοιων των περι αὐτων καλων, ευχαριστουντες ων ημιν δεδωκασι την θεωριαν, και οτι ημας δια της αυτων θεας αληθινως τρεφουσι, συνοντες και Φαινομενοι και τῃ ημετερᾳ σωτηριᾳ επιλαμποντες. Porphy. de Abſtinentia, lib. ii. p. 165, 4to. 1767: i. e. "Let us also sacrifice, but let us ſacrifice in ſuch a manner as is proper, offering different ſacrifices to different powers. To that God, indeed, who is above all things, as a certain wiſe man ſays, neither fumigating nor conſecrating any thing ſenſible. For there is nothing material, which, to an immaterial nature, is not immediately impure. Hence neither is external language adapted to him, nor that which is internal when it is defiled by any paſſion of the ſoul; but we ſhould adore him in pure ſilence, and with pure conceptions concerning him. It is neceſſary, therefore, that, being conjoined and aſſimilated to him, we ſhould offer the elevation of ourſelves to Divinity as a ſacred ſacrifice; for thus we ſhall both celebrate him and procure our own ſalvation. In the ſoul's contemplation, therefore, of this Divinity, unattended by the paſſions, the ſacrifice to him receives its completion; but his progeny, the intelligible gods, are to be celebrated vocally by hymns. For to each of the gods the firſt fruits are to be ſacrificed of what he imparts to us, and through which he nouriſhes and preſerves us. As, therefore, the huſbandman offers his firſt fruits from handfuls of fruits and acorns, ſo alſo we ſhould ſacrifice from beautiful conceptions concerning the gods, giving thanks for thoſe things of which they have imparted to us the contemplation, and that, through the viſion of themſelves, they truly nouriſh us, aſſociating with and appearing to us, and ſhining upon us for our ſalvation."

THE

THE EUTHYPHRO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

EUTHYPHRO, SOCRATES.

EUTHYPHRO.

WHAT novel circumſtance has happened, Socrates, that you, leaving the diſcuſſions in the Lyceum, are now waiting about the porch [1] of the king? For you have not an action with the king, as I have.

Soc. The Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an accuſation.

Euth. What do you ſay? Some one, as it ſeems, has accuſed you. For I ſhould not think that you would accuſe another.

Soc. I ſhould not, indeed.

Euth. Has, then, another accuſed you?

Soc. Certainly.

Euth. Who is he?

Soc. I do not, Euthyphro, perfectly know the man: for he appears to me to be young, and of no note. But they call him, I think, Melitus; and he is of the town Pittheus: if you have in your recollection one Melitus, a Pitthean, who has long hair, a thin beard, and an aquiline noſe.

Euth. I do not recollect him, Socrates. But what is his accuſation of you?

Soc. What is it? Not an ignoble one, as it appears to me. For it is no

[1] The king's porch was a place on the right ſide of the Ceramicus, where the ſecond of the nine archons, who was called the king, preſided for the ſpace of a year. See Pauſanias in Attic. lib. i. p. 5, and Meurſius in Attic. Lect. lib. vi. c. 27.

deſpicable thing, for one who is a young man, to be knowing in a circumſtance of ſuch a magnitude. For he knows, as he ſays, how the youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt them. And he appears to be a certain wiſe man; and ſeeing my ignorance, and conſidering me as one who corrupts his equals in age, to have accuſed me to the city, as to a mother. In conſequence of this, he only of the citizens ſeems to me to have begun rightly. For it is right to pay attention to youth, in the firſt place, that they may become the moſt excellent characters: juſt as it is reaſonable that a good huſbandman ſhould firſt take care of the young plants, and after this of the others. Thus alſo Melitus perhaps will firſt cut us up who corrupt the bloſſoms of youth, as he ſays, and afterwards he will certainly pay attention to thoſe of a more advanced age, and thus will be the cauſe of the moſt numerous and the greateſt goods to the city. This is what may be expected to happen from one who makes ſuch a beginning.

EUTH. I ſhould wiſh it were ſo, Socrates; but I tremble, leſt the contrary ſhould happen. For, in reality, he appears to me, by trying to injure you, to begin to hurt the city from the Veſtal hearth [1] itſelf. But tell me by what part of your conduct it is that he ſays you corrupt the youth?

SOC. The things of which he accuſes me, O wonderful man, muſt be conſidered, when they are heard, as abſurd. For he ſays that I am a maker of gods; and, as if I introduced new and did not believe in the ancient gods, has brought this accuſation againſt me.

EUTH. I underſtand you, Socrates; it is becauſe you ſay that a dæmoniacal [2] power is every where preſent with you. This accuſation, therefore, is brought againſt you as one that introduces novelties in divine affairs; and as well knowing that the multitude are always diſpoſed to receive ſuch kind of calumnies. For indeed they ridicule me as one inſane, when I ſay any thing in a public aſſembly concerning the gods, and predict to them future events; though I do not predict to them any thing which is not true. At the ſame time, however, they envy all ſuch as we are. But indeed it is

[1] The hearth, among the Greeks, contained the houſehold gods, of whom Veſta was the chief. Hence *to begin* from the Veſtal hearth was a proverbial expreſſion, when they ſpoke of beginning with what is moſt excellent and ſacred.

[2] This perfectly accords with what we have cited from Xenophon, in the Introduction to the Apology of Socrates.

not

not fit to pay any attention to them; but we ſhould ſtill go on in our own way.

Soc. But, dear Euthyphro, to be ridiculed is perhaps a trifling thing. For the Athenians, as it appears to me, are not very much concerned whether or not a man is ſkilful in any thing, ſo long as he is not a teacher of his wiſdom; but they are indignant with him whom they think makes others to be ſuch, whether this is from envy, as you ſay, or from ſome other cauſe.

Euth. With reſpect to this circumſtance, therefore, how they may be affected towards me I am not very deſirous to try.

Soc. For perhaps you exhibit yourſelf but rarely, and are not willing to teach your wiſdom; but I fear leſt, through philanthropy, I ſhould appear to diſcloſe, with too much freedom, to every man whatever I poſſeſs, not only without taking a reward, but even willingly adding one, if any perſon is willing to hear me. As I therefore juſt now ſaid, if they were only to ridicule me, as you ſay they do you, there would be nothing unpleaſant in paſſing the time in a court of juſtice, jeſting and laughing; but if they are in earneſt, how this affair may terminate is immaniſeſt, except to you diviners.

Euth. Perhaps, however, Socrates, the affair will be nothing; but you will plead your cauſe ſucceſsfully, and I alſo think that I ſhall mine.

Soc. But what is the cauſe, Euthyphro, which you have to plead? Are you defendant or plaintiff?

Euth. I am plaintiff.

Soc. Whom do you proſecute?

Euth. One whom, by proſecuting, I appear to be inſane.

Soc. What, then, do you purſue one that flies?

Euth. He is very far from flying; for he is very much advanced in years.

Soc. Who is he?

Euth. My father.

Soc. Your father? O beſt of men!

Euth. He is, indeed.

Soc. But what is the crime, and of what do you accuſe him?

Euth. Of murder, Socrates.

Soc.

Soc. O Hercules! The multitude, Euthyphro, will be ignorant how this can ever be right. For I do not think it is the province of any caſual perſon to make ſuch an accuſation with rectitude, but of one who has made a very great proficiency in wiſdom.

Euth. Very great indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Is it any one of your relations who has been killed by your father? Though it certainly muſt be ſo; for you would not proſecute your father for the murder of a ſtranger.

Euth. It is ridiculous, Socrates, if you think it makes any difference whether he who is ſlain is a ſtranger or a relation, and are not perſuaded that this alone ought to be attended to, whether he who committed the murder did it juſtly or not; and, if juſtly, that he ſhould be diſmiſſed; but, if unjuſtly, that he ſhould be proſecuted, even though he ſhould be your domeſtic, and partake of your table. For you become equally defiled with him, if you knowingly aſſociate with ſuch a one, and do not expiate both yourſelf and him, by bringing him to juſtice. But to apprize you of the fact: The deceaſed was one of our farmers, who rented a piece of land of us when we dwelt at Naxus. This man, having one day drank too much wine, was ſo tranſported with rage againſt one of our ſlaves, that he killed him. My father, therefore, ordered him to be caſt into a pit, with his hands and feet bound, and immediately ſent hither, to conſult one of the interpreters of ſacred concerns what he ſhould do with him; and in the mean time neglected this priſoner, and left him without ſuſtenance as an aſſaſſin, whoſe life was of no conſequence; ſo that he died. For hunger, cold, and the weight of chains killed him, before the perſon my father had ſent returned. Hence my father and the reſt of my relations are indignant with me, becauſe I, for the ſake of a homicide, accuſe my father of murder, which, as they ſay, he has not committed; and if he had, ſince he who is dead was a homicide, they think I ought not to be concerned for the fate of ſuch a man. For they ſay it is impious for a ſon to proſecute his father for murder; ſo little do they know the manner in which a divine nature is affected about piety and impiety.

Soc. But, by Jupiter, Euthyphro, do you think you poſſeſs ſuch an accurate knowledge about divine affairs, and how things holy and impious are circumſtanced,

circumſtanced, that theſe things having taken place as you ſay, you are not afraid, leſt in proſecuting your father you ſhould commit an impious action?

Euth. My profeſſion, Socrates, would be of no advantage to me, nor would Euthyphro ſurpaſs in any reſpect other men, unleſs he accurately knew all ſuch particulars.

Soc. O wonderful Euthyphro, it will therefore be a moſt excellent thing for me to become your diſciple, and before the determination of my proceſs to let Melitus know that I have hitherto conſidered the knowledge of divine concerns as a thing of the greateſt conſequence; and that now, ſince he ſays I am guilty of acting in a raſh manner, and introducing novelties concerning divine natures, I am become your diſciple. If, therefore, I ſhall ſay, you acknowledge, O Melitus, that Euthyphro is wiſe and thinks rightly in ſuch affairs, think and judge alſo the ſame of me; but if you do not entertain this opinion, call him, my preceptor, to account before you call me, as one who corrupts elderly men, viz. me and his father; me by inſtructing, but him by reproving and puniſhing. And if he is not perſuaded by me, but ſtill continues his proſecution, or accuſes me inſtead of you, it will be neceſſary to ſay the very ſame things on the trial, to which I ſhall have previouſly called his attention.

Euth. It will ſo, by Jupiter, Socrates; and if he attempts to accuſe me, I ſhall find, as I think, his weak ſide, and he will be called to account in a court of juſtice long before me.

Soc. And I, O my dear aſſociate, knowing theſe things, deſire to become your diſciple, as I am perſuaded that no one, and not even Melitus himſelf, dares to look you in the face, though he ſo accutely, inartificially, and eaſily ſees through me, that he has accuſed me of impiety.—Now therefore, by Jupiter, tell me that which you now ſtrenuouſly contend you clearly know, viz. what kind of thing you aſſert holineſs to be, and alſo unholineſs, both reſpecting murder and other things? Or is not holineſs the ſame with itſelf in every action? And again, is not unholineſs, which is perfectly contrary to holineſs itſelf, ſimilar to itſelf? And does not every thing which it will be unholy to do, poſſeſs one certain idea according to unholineſs?

Euth. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. Tell me, then, what you ſay holineſs, and alſo what unholineſs is?

Euth. I ſay, therefore, that holineſs is that which I now do, viz. to proſecute him who acts unjuſtly either with reſpect to murder or ſacrilege, or any thing elſe of a ſimilar nature; whether the offending perſon be a father or mother, or any other whatever; and that not to proſecute ſuch a one is impious. For ſee, Socrates, what a great proof I will give you in law that it is ſo, and which I have alſo mentioned to others, viz. that it is right not to ſpare an impious man, whoever he may be. For men are firmly perſuaded that Jupiter is the beſt and moſt juſt of gods, and yet they acknowledge that he put his father in chains, becauſe he unjuſtly ſwallowed his children; and again, that Saturn caſtrated [1] his father, through other things of a ſimilar nature: but they are indignant with me, becauſe I proſecute my father who has acted unjuſtly; and thus theſe men aſſert things contrary to each other in what they ſay concerning the gods and concerning me.

Soc. Is this the thing then, Euthyphro, on account of which I am brought to the bar, becauſe when any one aſſerts things of this kind concerning the gods, I admit them with pain; and through which, as it ſeems, ſome one calls me an offender? Now, therefore, if theſe things thus appear alſo to you who are well acquainted with ſuch particulars, it is neceſſary, as it ſeems, that we alſo ſhould admit them. For what elſe can we ſay, who acknowledge that we know nothing about ſuch things? But tell me, by Jupiter, who preſides over friendſhip; do you think that theſe things thus happened in reality?

[1] For the ſignification of bonds and caſtrations, when applied to divine natures, ſee p. 141 of the Introduction to the Second Book of the Republic. I ſhall only obſerve here with Proclus, that Plato was of opinion that all ſuch narrations as theſe will be condemned by the multitude and the ſtupid through ignorance of their arcane meaning, but that they will indicate certain wonderful conjectures to the wiſe. Hence, though he does not admit this mode of mythologizing, yet, as is evident from what he ſays in the Timæus, he thinks we ought to be perſuaded by thoſe antients who were the offspring of the gods, and to inveſtigate their occult conceptions. Hence too, though he rejects the Saturnian bonds, and the caſtrations of Heaven, when diſcourſing with Euthyphro and the auditors of his Republic, yet in his Cratylus, when he inveſtigates names philoſophically, he admits other ſecondary bonds about the mighty Saturn and Pluto. Plato, therefore, by no means ridicules the religion of his country in what he here ſays, as ſome moderns have pretended he does; but he admits ſuch relations as theſe with pain, becauſe he well knew that they would only be impiouſly perverted by, and were far beyond the comprehenſion of, the vulgar.

EUTH. Yes, and things ſtill more wonderful than theſe, Socrates, of which the multitude are ignorant.

SOC. Do you therefore think that the gods *in reality* wage war with each other, and that there are among them dire enmities and battles, and many other ſuch like particulars as are related by the poets, with the repreſentation of which by good painters our temples are decorated; and in the great Panathenææ a veil [1] full of ſuch like variegated ornaments is carried into the Acropolis. Muſt we ſay, O Euthyphro, that theſe things are true?

EUTH. Not theſe only, O Socrates; but, as I juſt now ſaid, I can relate to you many other things concerning divine affairs if you are willing, which when you hear I well know that you will be aſtoniſhed.

SOC. I ſhould not wonder; but you may relate theſe things to me hereafter, when you are at leiſure. Now, however, endeavour to tell me more clearly that which I juſt now aſked. For you have not yet, my friend, ſufficiently anſwered my queſtion what holineſs is, but you have only told me that this which you are now doing is holy, viz. to proſecute your father for murder.

EUTH. And I ſpoke the truth, Socrates.

SOC. Perhaps ſo. But, O Euthyphro, do you not alſo ſay that many other things are holy?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Recollect, therefore, that I did not requeſt you to teach me one or two from among many holy things, but what that form itſelf is by which all holy things are holy. For you have ſaid that things unholy are unholy by one idea; and alſo that things holy are holy by another. Or do you not remember?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Teach me, therefore, what this very idea is, that looking to it, and uſing it as a paradigm, I may ſay that whatever thing of this kind you or any other does is holy, and that whatever is not of this kind is unholy.

EUTH. But if you wiſh it, Socrates, I will alſo tell you this.

SOC. I do wiſh it.

[1] For the explanation of this veil, ſee the Additional Notes on the Republic, vol. i. p. 520.

EUTH. That, therefore, which is dear to the gods is holy, but that which is not dear to them is unholy.

SOC. You have now anſwered, O Euthyphro, moſt beautifully, and in ſuch a manner as I wiſhed you to anſwer. Whether truly or not however, this I do not yet know. But you will doubtleſs in addition to this teach me that what you ſay is true.

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. Come then, let us conſider what we ſay. That which is dear to divinity, and the man who is dear to divinity, are holy; but that which is odious to divinity, and the man who is odious to divinity, are unholy. But the holy is not the ſame with the unholy, but is moſt contrary to it. Is it not ſo?

EUTH. It certainly is ſo.

SOC. And theſe things appear to have been well ſaid.

EUTH. I think ſo, Socrates.

SOC. But has it not, O Euthyphro, alſo been ſaid that there is ſedition among the gods, and that they oppoſe and are enemies to each other?

EUTH. It has been ſaid.

SOC. But let us thus conſider, excellent man, about what particulars diſcord produces enmity and wrath. If, therefore, I and you differed in opinion concerning numbers, which of them were more in quantity, would this difference make us enemies, and ſhould we be enraged with each other? Or, betaking ourſelves to computation about things of this kind, ſhould we not be quickly liberated from this diſſenſion?

EUTH. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Hence alſo, if we differed concerning the greater and the leſſer, ſhould we not, by applying ourſelves to meaſuring, ſoon bring our diſagreement to an end?

EUTH. We ſhould.

SOC. And, as I think, by betaking ourſelves to weighing, we ſhould be able to judge concerning the heavier and the lighter.

EUTH. Undoubtedly.

SOC. About what then diſagreeing, and not being able to recur to a certain criterion, ſhould we become enemies to, and be enraged with, each other?

other? Perhaps you cannot readily inform me; but conſider whether they are ſuch as theſe, viz. the juſt and the unjuſt, the beautiful and the baſe, good and evil. Are not theſe the things about which diſagreeing, and not being able to arrive at a certain judgment of them, we become enemies to each other, when we do ſo become, you and I, and all other men?

EUTH. This, Socrates, is indeed the diſſenſion, and it is about theſe things.

SOC. But what? Do not the gods, O Euthyphro, if they diſagree in any reſpect, diſagree on account of theſe very things?

EUTH. By an abundant neceſſity.

SOC. Different gods, therefore, O generous Euthyphro, according to your aſſertion, think different things to be juſt, beautiful, baſe, good and evil. For they never would oppoſe each other unleſs they diſagreed about theſe things. Or would they?

EUTH. You ſpeak rightly.

SOC. Do they not ſeverally, therefore, love thoſe things which they think to be beautiful, good and juſt, but hate the contraries of theſe?

EUTH. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But with reſpect to theſe very things, ſome of the gods, as you ſay, think them to be juſt, and others unjuſt; about which alſo being dubious, they oppoſe and wage war with each other. Is it not ſo?

EUTH. It is.

SOC. The ſame things therefore, as it ſeems, are hated and loved by the gods; and the things odious to and dear to the gods will be the very ſame.

EUTH. So it appears.

SOC. Hence alſo the ſame things will be holy and unholy, O Euthyphro, from this reaſoning.

EUTH. It ſeems ſo.

SOC. You have not therefore, O wonderful man, anſwered my queſtion. For I did not aſk you this, to whom the ſame thing is both holy and unholy: but, as it ſeems, that which is dear is alſo odious to divinity. So that, Euthyphro, there is nothing wonderful if in this which you are now doing, viz. puniſhing your father, you ſhould do that which is pleaſing to Jupiter, but odious to Saturn and Heaven; and which is pleaſing to Vulcan, but odious to Juno: and if any other of the gods differs from another about this

this very circumſtance, you ſhould in like manner do that which is approved by the one and hated by the other.

Euth. But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will differ from another in this affair, and aſſert that it is not proper for him to ſuffer puniſhment who has unjuſtly ſlain any one.

Soc. But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, O Euthyphro, whether he who has unjuſtly ſlain another, or has done any thing elſe unjuſtly, ought to be puniſhed?

Euth. They never ceaſe doubting about theſe things, both elſewhere and in courts of juſtice. For thoſe that act unjuſtly in a very great degree, ſay and do every thing in order to eſcape puniſhment.

Soc. Do they alſo, O Euthyphro, confeſs that they have acted unjuſtly? And confeſſing this, do they at the ſame time ſay, that they ought not to be puniſhed.

Euth. They by no means ſay this.

Soc. They do not, therefore, ſay and do every thing. For I think they dare not ſay, nor even doubt this, that if they act unjuſtly puniſhment muſt be inflicted on them: but, as it appears to me, they deny that they have acted unjuſtly. Do they not?

Euth. You ſpeak the truth.

Soc. They are not, therefore, dubious about this, whether he who acts unjuſtly ought to be puniſhed; but they perhaps doubt who he is that acts unjuſtly, and by what action, and when, his conduct may be conſidered as unjuſt.

Euth. True.

Soc. Will not, therefore, the very ſame things happen to the gods if they oppoſe each other concerning things juſt and unjuſt, according to your aſſertion; and will not ſome of them ſay, that they act unjuſtly by each other, and others again deny this? Since, O wonderful man, no one, either of gods or men, dares to aſſert that puniſhment ought not to be inflicted on him who acts unjuſtly.

Euth. They will: and what you now ſay, Socrates, is ſummarily true.

Soc. But thoſe who are dubious, as well gods as men, will be dubious reſpecting each of the tranſactions; if the gods diſagree about any action,

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and ſome of them ſay that it is done juſtly, but others unjuſtly. Is it not ſo?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Come, then, my dear Euthyphro, teach me alſo that I may become more wiſe, what proof you have that all the gods think that he unjuſtly died, who having ſlain his fellow-ſervant, and being put in chains by the maſter of the deceaſed, periſhed before he that bound him received the anſwer from the interpreters, which was to inform him how he ought to act; and that, on account of ſuch a man, it is right for a ſon to proſecute his father and accuſe him of murder. Come, endeavour to demonſtrate to me ſomething clear about theſe things, and that all the gods conſider this action to be right more than any thing. And if you demonſtrate this to me ſufficiently, I will never ceaſe praiſing you for your wiſdom.

Euth. But perhaps, Socrates, this is no trifling employment, otherwiſe I could clearly demonſtrate it to you.

Soc. I underſtand you: I appear to you to be more dull of apprehenſion than the judges; ſince you will evidently prove to them that your father's conduct was unjuſt, and that all the gods hate ſuch-like actions.

Euth. I ſhall demonſtrate this very clearly, Socrates, if they will only hear what I have to ſay.

Soc. But they will hear, if you ſhall appear to ſpeak well. However, while you was juſt now ſpeaking, I thus thought and conſidered with myſelf: If Euthyphro ſhould eſpecially convince me that all the gods think a death of this kind to be unjuſt, in what reſpect ſhall I have the more learned from Euthyphro what the holy is, and alſo the unholy? For this action, as it appears, will be odious to divinity. It has not, however, yet appeared from this, what is holy, and what not. For that which is odious has alſo appeared to be dear to divinity. So that I will grant you this, Euthyphro, and if you pleaſe let all the gods think it to be unjuſt, and let them all hate it. Shall we, therefore, now make this correction in the definition, that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love is holy; but that what ſome of them love, and others hate, is neither, or both? Are you willing that at preſent we ſhould thus define concerning the holy and unholy?

Euth. What ſhould hinder, Socrates?

Soc. Nothing hinders me, Euthyphro; but do you, as to what relates to yourſelf,

yourſelf, conſider whether, admitting this, you can ſo eaſily teach me what you promiſed?

Euth. But I ſay the holy is that which all the gods love; and its contrary, the unholy, that which all the gods hate.

Soc. Shall we not therefore conſider, Euthyphro, whether this is well ſaid? Or ſhall we diſmiſs this conſideration, and thus grant both to ourſelves and others, that if any one only ſays that a certain thing is ſo, we ſhall admit that it is ſo? Or ſhall we conſider what he who ſpeaks ſays?

Euth. Conſider it certainly; though I think that this is now well ſaid.

Soc. Perhaps, O good man, we ſhall know this more clearly. For conſider as follows: Is the holy, becauſe it is holy, beloved by the gods; or becauſe it is beloved by them, is it holy?

Euth. I do not know what you ſay, Socrates.

Soc. But I will endeavour to ſpeak more clearly. We ſay that a thing may be carried, and that a thing carries; that a thing may be led, and that a thing leads; that a thing may be ſeen, and that a thing ſees; and every thing elſe of this kind. Do you underſtand that theſe are different from each other, and in what they differ?

Euth. I appear to myſelf to underſtand this.

Soc. Is therefore that which is beloved a certain thing, and that which loves another different from this?

Euth. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Tell me, therefore, whether that which may be carried, may be carried becauſe it is carried, or for ſome other reaſon?

Euth. For no other reaſon but for this.

Soc. And is this the caſe with that which may be led, becauſe it is led; and with that which may be ſeen, becauſe it is ſeen?

Euth. Entirely ſo.

Soc. A thing therefore is not ſeen becauſe it may be ſeen; but, on the contrary, becauſe it is ſeen, on this account it may be ſeen. Nor becauſe a thing may be led, on this account is it led; but becauſe it is led, on this account it may be led. Nor becauſe a thing may be carried, is it carried; but becauſe it is carried, it may be carried. Is then what I wiſh to ſay evident, Euthyphro? But what I wiſh to ſay is this: If any thing is making,

ing, or ſuffers any thing, it is not making becauſe it may be made; but becauſe it is making it may be made. Nor becauſe it may ſuffer does it ſuffer; but becauſe it ſuffers it may ſuffer. Or do you not admit this to be the caſe?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Is not this therefore alſo the caſe with that which is beloved, or making, or ſuffering ſomething from ſome one?

EUTH. Entirely ſo.

SOC. This therefore ſubſiſts in the ſame manner as the things before mentioned: it is not beloved by thoſe by whom it is beloved, becauſe it may be beloved; but becauſe it is beloved, it may be beloved.

EUTH. It is neceſſary.

SOC. What then do we ſay concerning holineſs, O Euthyphro? Is it not this, that it is beloved by all the gods, according to your aſſertion?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. Is it therefore beloved on this account, becauſe it is holy, or for ſome other reaſon?

EUTH. For no other reaſon but on this account.

SOC. Becauſe it is holy, therefore, it is beloved; but not becauſe it is beloved, on this account it is holy.

EUTH. It appears ſo.

SOC. Becauſe however it is beloved by the gods, it may be beloved, and be dear to divinity.

EUTH. Undoubtedly.

SOC. That which is dear to divinity, therefore, is not holy, O Euthyphro, nor muſt holineſs be defined to be that which is dear to divinity as you ſay, but it is ſomething different from this.

EUTH. How is this, Socrates?

SOC. Becauſe we have acknowledged that holineſs is on this account beloved becauſe it is holy; and not that it is holy becauſe it is beloved. Did we not?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. But that which is dear to divinity, becauſe it is beloved by the gods, from this very circumſtance that it is beloved, is dear to divinity; but not becauſe it is dear to divinity, on this account is it beloved.

EUTH. True.

SOC. But, my dear Euthyphro, if that which is dear to divinity were the ſame with that which is holy, if holineſs were beloved through its being holineſs, that alſo which is dear to divinity would be beloved through its being dear to divinity. But if that which is dear to divinity were dear to divinity through being beloved by the gods, that which is holy would alſo be holy through being beloved. Now, however, you ſee that they are contrarily affected, as being perfectly different from each other. For the one, viz. what is dear to the gods becauſe it is beloved, is a thing of that kind that it may be beloved; but the other, viz. holineſs, becauſe it is a thing which may be beloved, on this account is beloved. And you appear, O Euthyphro, when you was aſked what holineſs is, to have been unwilling to manifeſt the eſſence of it to me, but to have mentioned a certain affection pertaining to it, which this ſame thing holineſs ſuffers, viz. the being beloved by all the gods; but you have not yet told me what it is. If therefore it is agreeable to you, do not conceal this from me, but again ſay from the beginning what holineſs is, whether it be beloved by the gods, or has any other property whatever pertaining to it. For we ſhall not differ about this. But tell me readily what the holy, and alſo what the unholy is?

EUTH. But, Socrates, I cannot tell you what I conceive. For whatever poſition we adopt, is always ſome how or other circumvented, and is not willing to remain where we have eſtabliſhed it.

SOC. The things which you have aſſerted, O Euthyphro, appear to be the offspring of our progenitor Dædalus[1]. And if I indeed had ſaid and adopted theſe things, perhaps you would have derided me, as if my works alſo, which conſiſt in diſcourſe, through my alliance with him, privately eſcaped, and were unwilling to remain where they were placed. But now (for they are your hypotheſes) the raillery of ſome other perſon is neceſſary. For they are unwilling to abide with you, as it alſo appears to you yourſelf.

EUTH. But it appears to me, Socrates, that what is ſaid ought to be expoſed to nearly the ſame ridicule. For I am not the cauſe of the circuitous

[1] Dædalus was a moſt ingenious ſtatuary, and is ſaid to have made figures which moved of themſelves, and ſeemed to be endowed with life. Socrates, therefore, calls Dædalus his progenitor, becauſe his father was a ſtatuary, and he himſelf when young exerciſed his father's art.

wandering of theſe aſſertions, and of their not abiding in the ſame place; but you appear to me to be the Dædalus. For ſo far as pertains to me, theſe things would have remained firm.

Soc. I appear therefore, my friend, to have become ſo much more ſkilful than that man in this art, in as much as he only made his own productions unſtable; but I, beſides my own, as it ſeems, make thoſe of others to be ſo. And moreover, this is the moſt elegant circumſtance pertaining to my art, that I am unwillingly wiſe. For I had rather that my reaſonings ſhould abide, and be eſtabliſhed immoveable, than that the riches of Tantalus, together with the wiſdom of Dædalus, ſhould become my poſſeſſion. But enough of this.—Since, however, you appear to be delicate, I, in conjunction with you, will endeavour to ſhow how you may teach me concerning holineſs, and not be weary till this is accompliſhed. For ſee whether it does not appear to you to be neceſſary that every thing holy ſhould be juſt.

Euth. To me it does.

Soc. Is therefore every thing juſt alſo holy? or is every thing holy indeed juſt; but not every thing juſt holy, but partly holy, and partly ſomething elſe?

Euth. I do not comprehend, Socrates, what you ſay.

Soc. And yet you are younger no leſs than you are wiſer than I am; but, as I ſaid, you are delicate through the riches of your wiſdom. However, O bleſſed man, collect yourſelf: for it is not difficult to underſtand what I ſay. For I aſſert the contrary to the poet[1], who ſays,

> You Jove, the ſource of all, refuſe to ſing:
> For fear perpetually reſides with ſhame.

I therefore differ from this poet. Shall I tell you in what reſpect?

Euth. By all means.

Soc. It does not appear to me, that wherever there is fear, there alſo there is ſhame. For there are many, as it ſeems to me, who fear diſeaſes, poverty, and many other things of this kind, but who by no means are aſhamed of theſe things which they fear. Does not the ſame thing alſo appear to you?

[1] The name of this poet appears to be unknown.

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. But wherever ſhame is, there alſo is fear. For is there any one who is aſhamed of and bluſhes at any thing, but who does not at the ſame time fear and dread the opinion of improbity?

EUTH. He will certainly dread this.

SOC. It is not therefore right to ſay, that where there is fear, there alſo there is ſhame; but we ſhould ſay that where there is ſhame, there alſo fear reſides. For wherever there is fear, there is not alſo ſhame. For I think that fear extends further than ſhame; ſince ſhame is a part of fear, juſt as the odd is a part of number. So that it does not follow that wherever there is number, there alſo is the odd; but wherever there is the odd, there alſo there is number. Do you now apprehend me?

EUTH. Perfectly ſo.

SOC. Reſpecting a thing of this kind, therefore, I inquired above, when I aſked you whether where the juſt was, there alſo the holy was; or whether where the holy was, there alſo the juſt was, but the holy was not to be found every where in conjunction with the juſt. For the holy is a part of the juſt. Does it appear to you that we ſhould thus ſpeak, or otherwiſe?

EUTH. Not otherwiſe; but thus. For you appear to me to ſpeak rightly.

SOC. See then what follows: for, if the holy is a part of the juſt, it is neceſſary, as it ſeems, that we ſhould diſcover what part of the juſt the holy will be. If therefore you ſhould aſk me ſome of the things juſt now mentioned, as, for inſtance, what part of number the even is, and what number it is, I ſhould ſay that it is not ſcalene, but iſoſceles[1]. Or does it not appear ſo to you?

EUTH. It does.

SOC. Do you therefore alſo endeavour in like manner to teach me what part of the juſt the holy is, that we may tell Melitus he muſt no longer act unjuſtly by us, nor accuſe us of impiety, as having now ſufficiently learnt from you what things are pious and holy, and what not.

EUTH. This part then, Socrates, of the juſt, appears to me to be pious

[1] Socrates calls the even number iſoſceles, becauſe it can be divided into two equal numbers as if they were ſides; but this is not the caſe with the odd number, which may therefore be compared to a ſcalene triangle, becauſe as in this all the ſides are unequal, ſo all the parts of an odd number are unequal.

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and holy, viz. that which is converſant with the culture of the gods; but that which is converſant with the culture of mankind is the remaining part of the juſt.

Soc. And you appear to me, Euthyphro, to ſpeak well. However, I am ſtill in want of a certain trifling particular. For I do not yet underſtand what culture you mean. For you certainly do not ſay that ſuch as is the culture about other things, ſuch alſo is that which pertains to the gods. For inſtance, we ſay not every one knows the culture of horſes, but he who is ſkilled in equeſtrian affairs. Do we not?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. For equeſtrian ſkill is the culture of horſes.

Euth. It is.

Soc. Nor does every one know the culture of dogs, but this belongs to the huntſman.

Euth. It does.

Soc. For the art of hunting is the culture of dogs.

Euth. It is.

Soc. But the grazier's art is the culture of oxen.

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. But holineſs and piety are the culture of the gods, O Euryphro. Do you ſay ſo?

Euth. I do.

Soc. All culture, therefore, effects the ſame thing, viz. the good and advantage of that which is cultivated. Juſt as with reſpect to horſes, you ſee that being cultivated by the equeſtrian art, they are advantaged by it and become better. Or does it not appear ſo to you?

Euth. It does.

Soc. Dogs alſo are benefited by the huntſman's art, and oxen by that of the grazier, and all other things in a ſimilar manner. Or do you think that culture is the injury of that which is cultivated?

Euth. Not I, by Jupiter.

Soc. But the advantage therefore?

Euth. How ſhould it not?

Soc. Is holineſs, therefore, ſince it is a culture of the gods, an advantage

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to the gods, and does it make the gods better? And do you admit this, that when you perform any thing holy, you render ſome one of the gods better?

EUTH. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. Nor do I, O Euthyphro, think that you ſay this: it certainly is far otherwiſe. And for this reaſon I aſked you what this culture of the gods is, not thinking you would ſay a thing of this kind.

EUTH. And you thought rightly, Socrates: for I do not ſay any ſuch thing.

SOC. Be it ſo. But what culture of the gods will holineſs be?

EUTH. That culture, Socrates, which ſlaves pay to their maſters.

SOC. I underſtand. It will be a certain ſubſerviency as it ſeems to the gods.

EUTH. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Can you then tell me, with reſpect to the art ſubſervient to phyſicians, to the accompliſhment of what work it is ſubſervient? Do you not think it is ſubſervient to health?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. But what? with reſpect to the art ſubſervient to ſhipwrights, to the accompliſhment of what work is it ſubſervient?

EUTH. Evidently, Socrates, to that of a ſhip.

SOC. And is not the art ſubſervient to architects, ſubſervient to the building of houſes?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. Tell me, then, O beſt of men: with reſpect to the art ſubſervient to the gods, to the accompliſhment of what work will it be ſubſervient? For it is evident that you know, becauſe you ſay that you have a knowledge of divine concerns beyond that of other men.

EUTH. And I ſay true, Socrates.

SOC. Inform me then, by Jupiter, what that all-beautiful work is which the gods effect, employing our ſubſerviency.

EUTH. They are many and beautiful, Socrates.

SOC. The generals of an army too, my friend, accompliſh many and beautiful things; but at the ſame time you can eaſily tell what that principal thing is which they effect, viz. victory in battle. Or can you not?

EUTH.

EUTH. How is it poſſible I ſhould not?

SOC. Huſbandmen alſo, I think, accompliſh many and beautiful things; but at the ſame time the principal thing which they produce is aliment from the earth.

EUTH. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Of the many and beautiful things then which the gods accompliſh, what is the principal?

EUTH. I told you a little before, Socrates, that to learn accurately how all theſe things ſubſiſt is an arduous undertaking; but I now tell you ſimply this, that if any one knows how to ſay and do things acceptable to the gods, praying and ſacrificing to them, theſe things are holy. Things of this kind alſo preſerve both private houſes and cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to the gods are impious, and theſe ſubvert and deſtroy all things.

SOC. You might, if you had been willing, Euthyphro, have told me the ſum of my inquiries in a much ſhorter manner. But it is evident that you are not readily diſpoſed to inſtruct me. For now when you drew near for this purpoſe you receded; though if you had anſwered, I ſhould before this perhaps have learnt from you what holineſs is. But now (for it is neceſſary that he who interrogates ſhould follow him who is interrogated wherever he may lead) what do you again ſay the holy, and holineſs, is? Do you not ſay it is a certain ſcience of ſacrificing and praying?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Is not to ſacrifice to offer gifts to the gods; but to pray to requeſt ſomething of the gods?

EUTH. Very much ſo, Socrates.

SOC. From this it follows that holineſs will be the ſcience of requeſting and giving to the gods.

EUTH. You have very well underſtood, Socrates, what I ſaid.

SOC. For I am very deſirous, my friend, of your wiſdom, and I pay attention to it; ſo that what you ſay does not fall to the ground. But tell me what this ſubſerviency to the gods is? Do you ſay it is to requeſt of them and to give to them?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Will it not follow, therefore, that to requeſt rightly, will be to requeſt of them thoſe things of which we are in want?

EUTH.

EUTH. What elſe can it be?

SOC. And again, will not to give rightly conſiſt in giving to them in our turn ſuch things as they are in want of from us? For it would not be conformable to art to beſtow upon any one thoſe things of which he is not in want.

EUTH. You ſay true, Socrates.

SOC. Holineſs, therefore, O Euthyphro, will be a certain mercantile art between gods and men.

EUTH. Let it be mercantile, if it pleaſes you ſo to call it.

SOC. But it is not pleaſing to me unleſs it be true. Tell me therefore what advantage the gods derive from the gifts which they receive from us? For the advantage ariſing from their gifts is evident to every one; ſince we have not any good which they do not impart. But in what reſpect are they benefited from what they receive from us? Or have we ſo much the advantage in this merchandiſe, that we receive every good from them, but they receive nothing from us?

EUTH. But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

SOC. What is the uſe then, Euthyphro, of theſe our gifts to the gods?

EUTH. What other uſe do you think except honour and reverence, and, as I juſt now ſaid, gratitude?

SOC. Holineſs then, Euthyphro, is that which is acceptable to the gods, but not that which is profitable to, or beloved by them.

EUTH. I think it is the moſt of all things beloved by them.

SOC. This then again is as it ſeems holineſs, viz. that which is dear to the gods.

EUTH. Eſpecially ſo.

SOC. Aſſerting theſe things, can you wonder that your diſcourſe does not appear to be fixed, but wandering? And can you accuſe me as being the Dædalus that cauſes them to wander, when you yourſelf far ſurpaſs Dædalus in art, and make your aſſertions to revolve in a circle? Or do you not perceive that our diſcourſe, revolving again, comes to the ſame? For you remember that in the former part of our diſcourſe, the holy, and the dear to divinity, did not appear to us to be the ſame, but different from each other: or do you not remember?

EUTH.

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Now, therefore, do you not perceive that you ſay the holy is that which is beloved by the gods? But is this any thing elſe than that which is dear to divinity?

EUTH. It is nothing elſe.

SOC. Either therefore we did not then conclude well, or, if we did, our preſent poſition is not right.

EUTH. It ſeems ſo.

SOC. From the beginning, therefore, we muſt again conſider what the holy is. For I ſhall not willingly, before I have learnt this, run timidly away. Do not then deſpiſe me, but paying all poſſible attention, tell me the truth in the moſt eminent degree. For you know it, if any man does; and you will not be diſmiſſed like Proteus till you have told me. For if your had not clearly known what the holy, and alſo the unholy is, you never would have attempted, for the ſake of a man who is a hireling, to accuſe your father of murder, when he is now advanced in years; but you would have dreaded (leſt you ſhould not act rightly in this affair) the danger of incurring the anger of the gods, and the reproach of men. But now I well know that you clearly *ſuſpect* [1], that you have a knowledge of what the holy and its contrary are. Tell me, therefore, moſt excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal from me what you think it to be?

EUTH. It muſt be at ſome other opportunity then, Socrates: for now I am in haſte, and it is time for me to leave you.

SOC. What do you do, my friend? By your departure you will throw me from the great hope I had entertained of learning from you what things are holy, and what are not ſo, and of liberating myſelf from the accuſation of Melitus, by ſhowing him that I was become wiſe through Euthyphro in divine concerns; that I ſhall no longer ſpeak raſhly, nor introduce any novelties reſpecting them through ignorance; and alſo that I ſhall act better during the remainder of my life.

[1] Plato here very properly uſes the word *oiei*, *you ſuſpect*, becauſe Euthyphro not being freed from two-fold ignorance, or, in other words, being ignorant that he was ignorant, had nothing more than a *ſuſpicion* of the nature of holineſs.

THE MENO:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

VIRTUE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MENO[1].

THIS Dialogue has been always juſtly entitled "Concerning Virtue." For the true ſubject of it is the nature and origin of virtue. The queſtion, indeed, propoſed to Socrates by Meno in the very outſet of the Dialogue, is this other, "How virtue is acquired." But Socrates immediately waves the queſtion, and draws the converſation to an inquiry "what virtue is," as of neceſſity previous to the inquiry, "whence it comes." However, from the reſult of the reaſoning, we ſhall perceive both theſe queſtions anſwerable together: we ſhall be convinced, that none can know the nature and eſſence of virtue, without knowing the fountain whence it is derived; and that whoever knows what this is, cannot fail of knowing at the ſame time what that is in which virtue conſiſts. For, if we attend cloſely to the ſteps or gradual advances made in theſe inquiries, through the courſe of this Dialogue, we ſhall diſcover that virtue conſiſts in that kind of knowledge and that kind of power, taken together, the capacity of both which is in the human, as ſhe partakes of a divine intellect, whoſe eſſence is its own object, and whoſe energy is the contemplation of itſelf, and the government of the univerſe. That kind of knowledge, therefore, which belongs to virtue is the knowledge of true good; and that kind of power in the ſoul, through which, joined to that knowledge, a man is virtuous, is the power of the

[1] The whole of this Introduction is extracted from the Argument of Mr. Sydenham to this Dialogue; excepting a few paſſages, which, from his not being ſufficiently ſkilled in the more profound parts of Plato's philoſophy, it was neceſſary to alter.—T.

intellect

intellect over the inferior part of the ſoul, the imagination and the paſſions. The gradual advances made toward this diſcovery form the conduct of this divine Dialogue. And the firſt ſtep is to ſhow, that virtue, though it ſeems to be a very complex idea, and made up of many virtues, different in their natures, and reſpectively belonging to different perſons, is but one ſimple idea, though called by different names, as the particular ſubjects on which it operates, or the particular objects which it has in view, differ one from another. In the next ſtep, we find that this idea includes power and government, to which account immediately are ſubjoined, by way of explanation, theſe reſtrictions, power well and wiſely exerciſed, and government well and juſtly adminiſtered. Here then we diſcover that the Well, the Wiſely, and the Juſtly, are eſſential to the idea of virtue. Next, we march in ſome obſcurity: for here we ſee only by help of a metaphor, ſeemingly introduced, but in the way of a ſimilitude, to illuſtrate a point ſufficiently made clear already, that is, the wholeneſs or rather oneneſs of the idea of virtue. The metaphor is taken from outward figure, the definition of which being given, that it is bound, the bound of ſolid bodies, ſuggeſts to every diſciple or ſtudious reader of Plato, that virtue itſelf is bound, that virtue intellectual is the bound of things within the mind, and that virtue practical is the bound of human actions and human manners[1]. We then move a ſtep further, in the ſame manner, by the light only of metaphor. The metaphor here is taken from the corpuſcular philoſophy, then newly brought into vogue by Protagoras, who had learnt it from Democritus, and by Gorgias, who who had learnt it from Empedocles. And Socrates here proſecutes the ſubject of inquiry in this dialogue, under a pretence of giving a definition of colour, according to the doctrine of this philoſophy which Meno had imbibed. Colour, he ſays, is owing to effluvia from the ſurfaces of bodies entering the pores of the organs of ſight; theſe being exactly fitted for the reception of ſuch effluvia: by which means thoſe effluvia, being commenſurate

[1] Our explication of this part of the Dialogue may perhaps appear fanciful to readers unacquainted with Plato. To obviate this appearance, we are to obſerve, that, as Pythygoras uſed to illuſtrate things mental by mathematical numbers, ſo Plato frequently illuſtrates them from the principles of geometry, and frequently alſo through ſenſible images, or things corporeal. And perhaps theſe two ways of illuſtration are the eaſieſt and the plaineſt ways, through which we can at firſt be led to conceive things purely abſtract, the objects of intellect.—S.

with

with theſe pores, become the objects of ſight. Thus the philoſopher plays with the prejudices of Meno, a diſciple of the ſophiſts, and therefore not a proper ſubject for his inſtruction; and introduces, with a profeſſed view of only gratifying him, a point which ſeems very foreign to the ſubject, and not at all neceſſary to illuſtrate his meaning. But to his own friends and followers, who were acquainted with his doctrine, and were then near him, he thus ænigmatically inſinuates that virtue and vice are as it were the colours of human actions; that by the light of mind we are able to diſtinguiſh them; that the ſcience of virtue is as natural to the human underſtanding, as the perception of outward objects is to the eye of ſenſe; that the mental eye is exactly adequate to its objects; and that all truth in general, and moral truth in particular, the preſent ſubject, is commenſurate with the mind. The next advance we make diſcovers to us that virtue conſiſts in a love and deſire of true good, and true beauty, neceſſarily conſequent to the knowledge of what is truly good and truly beautiful: it being impoſſible to forbear loving what appears beautiful, or deſiring what appears good. And having already found that the idea of virtue includes power and government, we find that the whole idea of virtue is the power of preſerving or of recovering true good and beauty, known to be ſuch, and loved and deſired becauſe known. The next ſtep brings us to the end of our journey in this inquiry concerning virtue; by ſhowing us that the knowledge of all truth, and conſequently of true good and beauty, is connatural to the ſoul of man: and is ſo, becauſe her origin is divine, and her eſſence immortal. Now, the demiurgic intellect, the ſource of her being, is immortal and divine, and truth eternally there reſides, the ſtable and invariable object of intellect. Plato, therefore, in proving to us, as he does in this part of the Dialogue by an inconteſtable inſtance, that the ſoul of man naturally aſſents to and embraces truth, when fairly preſented to her, and exhibited in a clear light, proves to us at the ſame time, that ſhe participates of this eternal intellect and truth.

Thus much concerning the firſt part, about one-half the Dialogue. In the latter half the inquiry into the nature of virtue is reſumed, but in a different way. For Meno, having here urged the conſideration of his firſt queſtion, "how virtue is acquired," Socrates, in pretending to yield at length to this inquiry, brings us round by another road to the end, which he

himſelf had all along in view, the teaching "what virtue is." And here it is ſuggeſted, through a geometrical enigma, in the firſt place, that not every ſoul is capable of virtue; that a certain prediſpoſition is requiſite; that the parts of the ſoul muſt be well proportioned to each other, in their natural frame, in order that the whole man may, through virtue, be made totus teres atque rotundus. In the next place, we find, that virtue conſiſts not in any particular virtuous habit or habits of the ſoul, whether intellectual or moral, but in the prudential uſe and exerciſe of them; whence it follows, that virtue is not acquired by mere practice or habit. Thirdly, we find that virtue conſiſts not merely in a good diſpoſition, without being well cultivated, and conſequently comes not by nature. Fourthly, that it conſiſts not in any particular ſcience or ſciences, and therefore is not acquired by learning, and is not to be taught in the ordinary method of inſtruction or diſcipline. Preparatory to this part of the inquiry, a new character is introduced into the Dialogue, Anytus, (a great enemy to the ſophiſts, and deſirous of being thought a politician,) as a neceſſary perſon to ſhow, that neither the profeſſed men of wiſdom, the ſophiſts, nor the allowed men of virtue, the preſervers of the Athenian ſtate through their good government, were fit maſters or teachers in the ſcience of virtue. At length, by the help of all theſe negatives, we find in what it poſitively doth conſiſt, that is, in true wiſdom, not only derived originally from the divine mind by participation, but alſo inſpired immediately by it through continual communication; preſuppoſing, however, as a neceſſary foundation, or fit ſubject for the reception of this wiſdom, a ſoul well diſpoſed by nature, cultivated by right diſcipline, and ſtrengthened by conſtant care and attention. But as the two firſt requiſites, a good natural diſpoſition, and right inſtitution, depend on the divine Providence; and as the laſt, the conſtant practice of virtue, depends on the divine aſſiſtance; all theſe co-operating cauſes of virtue are, in the concluſion of this Dialogue, ſummed up by Plato in one word, θεια μοιρα, the divine portion or allotment to men juſtly ſtyled divine. Thus much may ſuffice at preſent for unfolding the ſubject, and delineating the parts of this Dialogue. What is here wanting in clearneſs, or in fulneſs, we ſhall endeavour in the notes to illuſtrate and to amplify. The end and deſign of the Dialogue is to excite men, well-diſpoſed by nature, and prepared by the rudiments of good education, to the aſſiduous culture and improvement of their minds by thinking

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ing and reaſoning. This deſign appears, firſt, from the uncommon warmth and zeal with which Socrates is repreſented in the latter half of the Dialogue, preſſing an inquiry after loſt knowledge, and an endeavour to diſcover latent truths. The ſame deſign appears further from the long time taken up in recounting many ſad inſtances of a neglect of virtuous ſtudies in the youths of higheſt rank in Athens; the enumeration of which, being ſo prolix, can have no other view than to deter us from the ſame neglect. But the tendency of the Dialogue beſt appears from that effect, which the grand doctrine of it, as before explained, naturally muſt have on every docile and candid mind. For, if the human partakes of a divine intellect, and of all therefore which is of its eſſence; if truth has thus deſcended from Heaven into the ſouls of men, and Divinity himſelf be there, ready to communicate more and more the heart-felt knowledge of things divine and eternal to every ſoul which retires within itſelf; who would not wiſh thither to retire, and there, in that ſacred ſilence, the ſilence of the paſſions, in that ſacred ſolitude, the abſence of all the objects of imagination, that flight of the alone to the alone, φυγη μονου προς μονον[1], to enjoy the preſence and converſe of the divinely ſolitary principle of things? Agreeably to this deſign of Plato, and alſo on account of the audience, which was compoſed partly of ſtrangers, and partly of the friends and followers of Socrates, (as uſual in that place where the converſation was held,) the inquiſitive turn is given to this Dialogue, partly exciting and partly aſſiſting, by means of leading queſtions, every where propoſed by Socrates, and of hints thrown in here and there of his profound meaning. Meno is repreſented but as an humble diſciple of the ſophiſts, and preſumes not to diſpute or to argue like his maſters. And Anytus appears as an enemy to all philoſophical diſputation. There is not ſo much as the ſhadow of a ſkirmiſh throughout the Dialogue. Yet the diviſion of Plato's Dialogues, made by Thraſyllus, and followed by Albinus, led them to number it amongſt thoſe of the Peiraſtic kind, as not knowing where elſe to place it with leſs impropriety. The outward form of it is purely dramatic; and the character of Anytus, as here exhibited, affords a juſt ſpecimen of the part he ſoon afterwards acted in the accuſation of Socrates, and the bringing him to a public trial as a malefactor.

[1] Thus Plotinus, in the cloſe of his laſt Ennead, very finely and juſtly expreſſes our ſenſe.—S.

THE MENO:

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

MENO [1], SOCRATES,

A Servant Boy of Meno's, ANYTUS [2].

SCENE.—The LYCÆUM [3].

[1] This is the ſame Meno mentioned by Xenophon, in his expedition of Cyrus the Younger, as one of the generals of the Grecian allied army in that expedition. Plutarch, in his Life of Phocion, relates, that Meno commanded all the cavalry. Certain it is from Xenophon, that he had the command of the forces ſent from Theſſaly. Near the end of the ſecond book of that incomparable hiſtory above mentioned, the elegant and faithful writer of it, having before given us an inſtance of Meno's baſeneſs, preſents us with a portrait of him drawn at full length, the features of which are odious. But at the time of his converſation with Socrates, recited in this Dialogue, he was ſo young, that his mind and true character could not as yet have appeared openly, or have been known in the world. He firſt made a figure in the expedition with Xenophon, whilſt he was ſtill in the flower of his youth; but he was ſoon taken priſoner, and brought to Artaxerxes, by whoſe orders he was put to a lingering and ignominious death, not as an enemy but as a malefactor. Some ſlight ſtrokes, however, appear even in this Dialogue, giving us a ſketch of his turn of mind; as will be obſerved in their proper places.

[2] Enough has been ſaid of this fellow, in the Introduction to this Dialogue, to prepare the reader for his appearance in the figure he there makes.

[3] The following circumſtances, conſidered together, evince the ſcene to be laid in the Lycæum. Firſt, it was the place ordinarily frequented every day by Socrates, with his diſciples and followers. Next, it was the place of reſort for all ſtrangers, eſpecially the young and noble, ſuch as Meno was, to ſee the Athenian youth exerciſe themſelves, and to hear the ſophiſts, if any happened to be at Athens, diſpute and harangue. See note on the ſcene of the Greater Hippias. Laſtly, it cannot be ſuppoſed, that Socrates ſhould meet with Anytus, his enemy, at any other than a public place, free to all men.—S.

MENO.

CAN [1] you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue [2] is to be taught; or whether it is acquired, not through teaching, but through exerciſe and habit;

[1] The reader will obſerve this to be a very abrupt way of beginning a converſation, eſpecially with a ſtranger, known only by his name and character. What makes it the more remarkable is, that a young perſon, but juſt arrived at the age of manhood, ſhould thus accoſt an old man in his ſeventieth year, venerable from his known wiſdom and a long life of virtue. Some may think that Plato intended here to paint the inſolent familiarity of young men of large fortune and bad education, in their manner of addreſſing their inferiors in point of wealth. Such a thought has, perhaps, ſome foundation in truth. But Plato's principal purpoſe, in beginning the Dialogue with an impertinent queſtion from the mouth of Meno, is, as appears plainly from the reply of Socrates, to exhibit to us the arrogant pretenſions of the ſophiſts, and particularly of Gorgias, in taking upon themſelves to anſwer every philoſophical queſtion propoſed to them. Meno had in his own country been uſed to this behaviour of theirs; and Socrates had, long before this, acquired a diſtinguiſhed character for his ſuperior ſkill in philoſophical diſputations. Meno, therefore, who knew no difference between Socrates and the ſophiſts, attacks him directly, without the ceremony of a preface, with a queſtion, point blank, on one of the moſt knotty ſubjects of inquiry in all philoſophy. For he preſumed that Socrates was ſitting in the Lycæum, like one of the ſophiſts, ready to anſwer all ſuch queſtions. The only other dramatic Dialogue of Plato which begins thus abruptly is the Minos. There is the ſame kind of propriety in both. The only difference is this, that in the Minos, a Dialogue between Socrates and a ſophiſt, Socrates is the queſtioner; and in the Meno, he is the perſon queſtioned.—S.

[2] Many years before the time of this Dialogue, Socrates had held a diſputation with Protagoras on this very point, whether virtue could be taught; a diſputation, recited by Plato in a Dialogue called after the name of that great ſophiſt. The queſtion was then debated before a numerous audience of ſophiſts and their followers, as well as of the friends and diſciples of Socrates himſelf. The diſputants, however, came to no agreement on the matter in diſpute. The reſult of their converſation was only this, that Protagoras, the prince of ſophiſts, was ſo generous as to beſtow his commendations on the great philoſopher, and was graciouſly pleaſed to ſay, that "he ſhould wonder if Socrates in time did not become conſiderable in fame for wiſdom." The commendations of a ſophiſt, no leſs renowned for his philoſophical knowledge, than venerable on account of his experienced age, (for he was then about 75 years old,) increaſed the reputation of Socrates amongſt the tribe of ſophiſts; and it is probable that theſe men ſpread the fame of that diſputation throughout all Greece. It ſeems, therefore, as if Meno, an admirer of the ſophiſts, and bred up under one of their diſciples, was deſirous of hearing Socrates himſelf ſpeak on that celebrated ſubject of former debate. Accordingly, meeting with Socrates in a convenient place, he attacks him at once with a queſtion on that very point. We may obſerve, however, that Meno here ſtates the queſtion in a more ample manner than that in which it had been conſidered in the debate between Socrates and Protagoras: for he particularly mentions all the other ways, beſide that of teaching, in which it ever was ſuppoſed that virtue was attainable. So that this Dialogue, The Meno, though not ſo entertaining as The Protagoras, is more comprehenſive and affords a wider field for ſpeculation.—S.

or whether it comes neither by exerciſe, nor yet by teaching, but is by nature with thoſe who are poſſeſſed of it; or comes it to them by ſome other way?

Soc. You Theſſalians, Meno, have been of old eminent among the Grecians [1]. You have been long admired for your ſuperior ſkill in horſemanſhip [2], and famed for the great wealth you are poſſeſſed of [3]. But I think you have now acquired no leſs fame for wiſdom [4]. And amongſt others of you, the fellow-citizens of your friend Ariſtippus [5] of Lariſſa have diſtinguiſhed themſelves not a little in this reſpect. Now this is entirely the work of Gorgias. For in his travels, when he came to their city, he drew the chiefs of the Aleuadian family [6] (one of whom is your friend Ariſtippus), and indeed all of higheſt quality in the other ſtates of

[1] The Theſſalians were the moſt antient inhabitants of Greece; and from time to time ſending out colonies from their own country, Theſſaly, ſpread themſelves by degrees over all the reſt of Greece; as we are told by the old geographers.—S.

[2] The people who lived in Theſſaly had the reputation of being the beſt horſemen, and in war the beſt cavalry, in the world. See Suidas in voce Ἵππεις λευκοθώρακες. This was owing to their breeding of excellent horſes, which were every where valued as the beſt, both for ſervice and for beauty; as may be ſeen in the Ζεῦξις and the Ἔρωτες of Lucian, and in a note to The Greater Hippias. And this valuable breed of horſes was favoured by the ſoil of their country, which was partly mountainous, and partly well watered by fine rivers running through the midſt of ſpacious and open plains.—S.

[3] In the time of Plato theſe people were grown very rich; but were thought to have acquired their riches chiefly by very unjuſt means, by fraud, by theft, and by kidnapping and ſelling free men as ſlaves: for which crimes they were infamous throughout the reſt of Greece. See Xenophon. Memorabil. lib. i. cap. 2. § 24.—S.

[4] Meaning the pretended wiſdom taught by the ſophiſts.—S.

[5] This Ariſtippus was a man of the higheſt rank and power in the city of Lariſſa. We here find him to have been ſophiſticated by Gorgias: and it may juſtly be inferred, from the mention of him in this manner, that he himſelf had ſophiſticated Meno. But it appears in the higheſt degree improbable that he ſhould be the ſame perſon with an Ariſtippus mentioned by Ariſtotle in the beginning of the third Book of his Metaphyſicks: for this latter was a ſophiſt by profeſſion; and the profeſſion of a ſophiſt was no more becoming to men of high birth and quality, than that of an itinerant quack-doctor or ſtrolling ſtage-player is now-a-days amongſt us. See Plato in Protag.—S.

[6] This was the nobleſt family in Lariſſa. They were deſcended from Aleuas, one of the kings of Theſſaly, of the race of Hercules; and were at this time the oligarchic tyrants of their country. Meno is here complimented in the ſeemingly honourable mention thus made of his friend, whom we preſume to have been alſo his immediate inſtructor. For at the time ſuppoſed in this Dialogue, Gorgias was upwards of ninety years of age, and Meno a very young man.—S.

Theſſaly,

Theſſaly, to be the admirers of his wiſdom[1]. From him you Theſſalians learned the habit of anſwering to any queſtion whatever with an undaunted and a noble confidence, ſuch indeed as becomes thoſe who have a thorough knowledge of the ſubject propoſed to them. For he[2] in the ſame manner offered himſelf to be freely interrogated by any one of the Grecians, whom it ſhould pleaſe to aſk him, concerning any point which the party queſtioning might chooſe: and to no queſtion of any perſon did he ever refuſe an anſwer. But we in this place, my friend Meno, are in a condition quite the contrary. Amongſt us there is a dearth, as it were, of wiſdom; which ſeems to have forſaken our country, and to have fled to yours. So that if you ſhould take it into your head to propoſe to any one here the queſtion you have propoſed to me, there is not a man of us who would not laugh and ſay, "Friend ſtranger, you muſt think me wonderfully wiſe, to know whether virtue is a thing which can be taught, or by what other means it is

[1] The great reputation of Gorgias appears to have had its firſt riſe in Theſſaly. For thus Philoſtratus, in the Proem to his Lives of the Sophiſts,—ηρξε της αρχαιοτερας [ſc. σοφιστικης] Γοργιας ὁ Λεοντινος εν Θετταλοις. Indeed Theſſaly was the moſt proper of all places for Gorgias to diſplay his art in, and by that means to acquire reputation. For his art was the art of deluding through ſophiſtical oratory and ſophiſtical argumentation; and theſe are the fitteſt and moſt ſucceſsful engines that can be employed for the purpoſe of deceiving. If therefore the people of Theſſaly were ſuch as they are repreſented, Gorgias could not fail of meeting there with a multitude of followers and admirers. In fact, theſe people became ſo great proficients in the art of deceiving, and ſo famous for the practice of it, that every ingenious or dextrous ſtroke of deceit was proverbially called Θετταλον σοφισμα, a Theſſalian ſophiſm. In Athenæus, p. 308, Myrtilus, the ſophiſt of Theſſaly, is called Θετταλον παλαισμα, a cunning and crafty wreſtler in diſputation; or, as Euſtathius explains the term, Θετταλος ελεγκτικος, ſubtle in refuting any argument. The ſame Myrtilus is called jocoſely by the ſame author, p. 11, himſelf Θετταλον σοφισμα, a Theſſalian cheat (in his way of arguing).

[2] Plato, in his Dialogue named Gorgias, uſhers in this great father and prince of ſophiſts by relating, that he had juſt now, at a private houſe, challenged any of the company to interrogate him on whatever point they pleaſed, and had undertaken to anſwer all ſorts of queſtions. This appears to have been uſual with him. For Philoſtratus reports, that when he came to Athens he had the confidence to preſent himſelf in the midſt of the theatre, and to ſay to the whole aſſembly Προβαλλετε, "propoſe," meaning, any argument for him to diſſert on: agreeably to which is the account given of him by Cicero in the beginning of his ſecond Book de Finibus, that he was the firſt that ever dared *in conventu poſcere quæſtionem*, in public to demand the queſtion, *id eſt*, ſays Tully, *jubere dicere quâ de re quis vellet audire*, to bid any man declare what ſubject he choſe to hear a diſcourſe upon.—S.

attained:

attained: when I am ſo far from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I have not the good fortune to know ſo much as what virtue is." Now this, Meno, is exactly my own caſe. I am in the ſame poverty of knowledge as to this affair, and confeſs myſelf to be totally ignorant concerning the eſſence of virtue. How then ſhould I be able to ſay what qualities are to be attributed to that which is utterly unknown to me? Or do you think it poſſible for a man, wholly ignorant who Meno is, to know whether Meno is a man of honour, a man of fortune, a man of a generous ſpirit, or whether he is the reverſe of all theſe characters? Do you think it poſſible?

MENO. I do not. But in good earneſt, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? and do you give me leave to carry home ſuch a character of you, and to make this report of you in my country?

SOC. Not only that, my friend, but this further—that I never met any where with a man whom I thought maſter of ſuch a piece of knowledge.

MENO. Did you never then meet with Gorgias, during his ſtay in this city?

SOC. I did.

MENO. And did you think that he knew nothing of the matter?

SOC. I do not perfectly remember, Meno, and therefore am not able to ſay directly what I then thought of him. But perhaps not only was he himſelf knowing in the nature of virtue, but what he uſed to ſay on that ſubject you alſo know. Do you then remind me what account he gave of virtue; or, if you are unwilling ſo to do, give me an account of it yourſelf; for I ſuppoſe you agree with him in opinion.

MENO. I do.

SOC. Let us leave him, therefore, out of the queſtion, eſpecially conſidering that he is abſent. But what you yourſelf think virtue to be, tell me, Meno, and freely communicate your knowledge of it, that I may be happy in being convicted of having uttered what is ſo happily an untruth, when I ſaid that I never any where met with a man who knew what virtue was; when, at the ſame time, both yourſelf and Gorgias ſhall appear to have been ſo well acquainted with the nature of it.

MENO. Whatever you may imagine, Socrates, it is by no means difficult to tell what you deſire to know. In the firſt place, to inſtance in the virtue

virtue of a man, nothing is eaſier to tell than that a man's virtue conſiſts in his ability to manage affairs of ſtate, and, in managing them, to be of ſervice to the public and to its friends, to diſtreſs its enemies, and to guard, at the ſame time, with vigilance and circumſpection, againſt any harm that might ariſe from thoſe enemies in their turn. Then, if you would know what is the virtue of a woman, it is eaſy enough to run over the particulars: it is to manage well the affairs of her family, carefully to keep ſafe all that is in the houſe, and to hearken with due obſervance to her huſband. Another kind of virtue belongs to a child, different too in a girl from what it is in a boy: ſo is it likewiſe of the aged. And if you chooſe to proceed further, the virtue of a free man is one thing, that of a ſlave is another thing. Many more virtues are there, of all ſorts; ſo that one cannot be at a loſs to tell, concerning virtue, what it is. For in every action, and in every age of life, with reference to every kind of buſineſs, ſome peculiar virtue belongs to each perſon: and in vice alſo, I ſuppoſe, Socrates, there is the ſame reſpective difference, and the ſame variety.

Soc. I think myſelf much favoured by Fortune, Meno; for, when I was only in queſt of one virtue, I have found, it ſeems, a whole ſwarm of virtues hiving in your mind. But, to purſue this ſimilitude, taken from bees:—Suppoſing, Meno, I had aſked you what was the nature of a bee, and you had told me that bees were many and various, what would you have anſwered me if I had demanded of you further, whether you called them many and various, and differing one from another, in reſpect of their being bees; or whether you thought they differed not in this reſpect, but with regard to ſomething elſe, as beauty, or ſize, or other thing of like kind, accidental? What anſwer would you have made to ſuch a queſtion?

Meno. I ſhould have anſwered thus; that ſo far as they were bees, and in this reſpect, they differed not at all one from another.

Soc. Suppoſe, then, that I had afterwards ſaid, Tell me, therefore, Meno, concerning this very nature of bees, in reſpect of which they do not differ, but all agree and are alike; what ſay you that it is? Should you have had any anſwer to have given me to this queſtion?

Meno. I ſhould.

Soc. Juſt ſo is it with the virtues. Many indeed are they, and of various kinds: but they all agree in one and the ſame idea; through their agree-

ment in which they are, all of them alike, virtues. This idea the man, who is aſked the queſtion which I have aſked of you, ought to have in his eye when he anſwers it; and, copying from this idea, to draw a deſcription of virtue. Do you not apprehend the meaning of what I ſay?

MENO. Tolerably well, I think I do. But I am not in the poſſeſſion of it ſo fully as I could wiſh.

SOC. Take it thus then.——Do you think after this manner concerning virtue only, that the virtue of a man is one thing, the virtue of a woman another thing, and ſo of other reſpective virtues, that they are all different? or have you the ſame way of thinking as to the health, ſize, and ſtrength of the body? Do you think the health of a man to be one thing, the health of a woman to be a thing different? or is the ſame idea of health every where, wherever health is, whether it be in a man, or in whatever ſubject it be found?

MENO. The health of a man and the health of a woman, I think, are equally and alike health, one and the ſame thing.

SOC. Do you not think after the ſame manner with regard to ſize and ſtrength; that a woman, if ſhe be ſtrong, is ſtrong according to the ſame idea, and with the ſame ſtrength, which gives a ſtrong man the denomination of ſtrong? By the ſame ſtrength I mean this, that whether ſtrength be in a man, or in a woman, conſidering it as ſtrength, there is no difference; or do you think that there is any difference between ſtrength and ſtrength?

MENO. I think there is not any.

SOC. And will any difference, think you then, be found in virtue, with reſpect to its being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an aged perſon, in a woman or in a man?

MENO. This caſe of virtue, Socrates, ſeems ſomehow to be not exactly parallel with thoſe other inſtances.

SOC. Why? Did you not tell me that the virtue of a man conſiſted in his well-managing of civil affairs, and that of a woman in the well-managing of her houſehold?

MENO. I did.

SOC. I aſk you, then, whether it is poſſible to manage any affairs well, whether civil or domeſtic, or any other affairs whatever, without a prudent and a juſt management?

MENO.

MENO. By no means.

SOC. If then the management be juſt and prudent, muſt not the managers manage with juſtice and with prudence?

MENO. They muſt.

SOC. Both of them, therefore, have occaſion for the ſame things, to qualify them for being good managers, both the woman and the man, namely, juſtice and prudence.

MENO. It appears they have.

SOC. And how is it in the caſe of a child, or that of an old man? Can theſe ever be good, if they are diſſolute and diſhoneſt?

MENO. By no means.

SOC. But only by their being ſober and honeſt?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. All perſons, therefore, who are good, are good in the ſame way; for they are good by being poſſeſſed of the ſame qualities.

MENO. It ſeems ſo.

SOC. Now if virtue were not the ſame thing in them all, they would not be good in the ſame way.

MENO. They would not.

SOC. Seeing, therefore, that virtue is the ſame thing in all of them, endeavour to recollect and tell me, what was the account given of it by Gorgias, which was the ſame, it ſeems, with the account you would give of it yourſelf?

MENO. What elſe is it than to be able to govern men? If you are in ſearch of that, which is one and the ſame thing in all perſons who have virtue.

SOC. It is the very thing I am in ſearch of. But is this then the virtue of a child, Meno? And is it the virtue of a ſlave, to be able to govern his maſter? Do you think him to be any longer a ſlave, when he can govern?

MENO. I think he is then by no means a ſlave indeed, Socrates.

SOC. Neither is it proper, my friend, that he ſhould be ſo. Conſider this alſo further. You ſay it is virtue to be able to govern. Should we not immediately ſubjoin the word *juſtly*, and ſay, to govern juſtly? For you would not ſay, that to govern unjuſtly is virtue.

MENO. I think we ſhould. For juſtice, Socrates, is virtue.

Soc. Virtue is it, Meno, or ſome certain virtue?

MENO. How mean you by this diſtinction?

Soc. I mean no otherwiſe than as every thing elſe whatever is diſtinguiſhed: to inſtance, if you pleaſe, in roundneſs. Of this I ſhould ſay that it is ſome certain figure, and not thus ſimply and abſolutely that it is figure. And for this reaſon ſhould I expreſs myſelf in that manner, becauſe there are other figures beſide the round.

MENO. You would thus ſpeak rightly. And indeed, to ſay the truth, I myſelf not only call juſtice a virtue, but ſay that other virtues there are beſide.

Soc. Say, what theſe other virtues are. As I would recount to you, were you to bid me, other figures beſide the round; do you recount to me, in like manner, other virtues beſide juſtice.

MENO. Well then; courage I think to be a virtue, and temperance another, and wiſdom, and magnanimity, and a great many more.

Soc. Again, Meno, we have met with the ſame accident as before; we have again found many virtues, while in ſearch of one only; though then indeed in a different way from that in which we have now alighted on them: but the one virtue, which is the ſame through all theſe, we are not able to find.

MENO. For I am not able as yet, Socrates, to apprehend ſuch virtue as you are inquiring after, that one in all, as in other things I am able.

Soc. Probably ſo; but I will do the beſt I can to help us onward in our inquiry. Already you apprehend, in ſome meaſure, that thus it is in every thing. For ſhould any perſon have aſked you what was figure, the thing I juſt now mentioned, and you had ſaid it was roundneſs; were he then to aſk you, according to the ſame diſtinction which I made concerning juſtice, whether roundneſs was figure, or ſome certain figure; you would anſwer, it was ſome certain figure.

MENO. Without all doubt.

Soc. And would you not anſwer thus for this reaſon, becauſe there are other figures beſide the round?

MENO. For that very reaſon.

Soc. And were he to aſk you further, of what ſort thoſe other figures were, you would tell him?

MENO.

MENO. I ſhould.

SOC. Again; queſtioned in the ſame manner concerning colour, what it is? had you anſwered, It is whiteneſs; ſhould the queſtioner immediately proceed to this further queſtion, whether whiteneſs is colour, or ſome certain colour? you would ſay, Some certain colour; becauſe there happen to be other colours.

MENO. I ſhould.

SOC. And if he were to bid you enumerate thoſe other colours, you would ſpeak of colours, which happen to be colours no leſs than the white.

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. If then he were to proſecute the argument, as I do, he would ſay, We are always getting into multitude [1]; deal not with me in this manner: but ſince to all this multitude you give one common name; ſince you tell me there is none of them which is not figure; and that, notwithſtanding, they are contrary ſome to others [2]; what is this which comprehends the round as well as the the ſtraight, this thing to which you give the name of figure, and tell me that the round is figure not more than is the ſtraight? or do you not ſay this?

MENO. I do.

SOC. I aſk you, then, whether when you ſay this, you mean it in reſpect

[1] For the ſenſes are always drawing us into multitude; which, conſidered as multitude, belongs only to ſenſible and outward things. But as ſoon as any multitude, or many, are conſidered together, and comprehended in one idea, they become the object of mind, and are then one and many; ſenſe and imagination being now accompanied by mind. To this conſideration of things, this comprehenſion of many in one, Socrates here endeavours to lead Meno in the ſame way in which he elſewhere leads Theætetus, that is, by means of mathematical objects, to which his mind was familiarized; this being a ſtep the eaſieſt to him, and perhaps naturally the firſt toward the attainment of univerſal ideas, things purely mental. For the opening of the mind is in the firſt place to numbers; thence ſhe proceeds to figures as the bounds of body, and is at firſt ſight delighted with figures mathematical. If afterwards ſhe is taught the mathematical ſciences, then in proportion as her powers open more and become enlarged, ſhe eaſily attains to view many in one; to view, for inſtance, the properties of all triangles contained in the triangle itſelf. And in the circle, the ſquare, the pentagon, and all other figures, ſhe has the ſame comprehenſive view. With theſe mathematical figures Meno was well acquainted; and upon this foundation did Socrates propoſe to him to conſider the nature of figure in general, or that one thing in which all figures agree and are the ſame.—S.

[2] As rectilinear figures are contrary to circles; the whole periphery of theſe latter being a curve line.—S.

of roundneſs, and that the round is not more round than is the ſtraight? or with regard to ſtraightneſs, and that the ſtraight is not more ſtraight than is the round?

MENO. I mean not thus, Socrates.

SOC. But it is with a view to figure, that you aſſert the round not more to be figure than is the ſtraight, nor the ſtraight more than is the round.

MENO. True.

SOC. Try then if you can tell me, what that thing is which is called by this general name of figure. Now ſuppoſe, that to an inquirer in this way concerning figure, or concerning colour, you were to ſay, I do not comprehend what it is you would have, man; nor do I know what it is you mean: he perhaps would wonder; and would ſay, Do you not comprehend that I am inquiring, what is the ſame in all theſe? Would you have nothing to ſay neither after this, Meno, were you to be aſked, what that was in the round, in the ſtraight, and in the other things you call figures, in all of them the ſame? Endeavour to find out and tell me what it is; that you may the better afterwards conſider of, and anſwer to, the like kind of queſtion concerning virtue.

MENO. Not ſo, Socrates; but do you yourſelf rather ſay what figure is.

SOC. Would you have me oblige you in this point?

MENO. By all means.

SOC. Shall you then be willing to tell me what virtue is?

MENO. I ſhall.

SOC. Let us then do our beſt; for the cauſe deſerves it.

MENO. Without all doubt.

SOC. Come then; let us try if we can tell you what figure is. See if you can accept the following account of figure. Let us ſay, figure [1] is that which of all things is the only one that always accompanies colour. Are you ſatisfied with this account? or do you inquire any further? For my part, I ſhould be well contented if you would give me but as good an account of virtue [2].

MENO.

[1] In this firſt definition of figure, Socrates conſiders it only as it belongs to body; that is, not mathematical figure, but corporeal; figure which always accompanies colour, becauſe it is always ſeen by the ſame outward light, which exhibits to us the different colours of all bodies, and without which they have indeed no colour at all.—S.

[2] Socrates was very ſenſible, that his definition had not explained the nature of the thing, and that he had only deſcribed it by that which Porphyry terms συμβεβηκος αχωρ.στον, an inſepar-

able

MENO. But, Socrates, this is weak and ſilly.

Soc. How ſo?

MENO. According to your account, that is figure which always accompanies colour.

Soc. Well.

MENO. But ſhould any perſon now reply, that he knew not what colour was, and was equally at a loſs concerning colour and concerning figure, what could you think of the anſwer that you had given to his queſtion?

Soc. I?—that I had anſwered with truth. And if my queſtioner happened to be one of your wiſe men, your diſputers and contenders, I would tell him [1], that I had ſpoken; and that, if I had not ſpoken rightly, it was his buſineſs to take up the argument, and to refute what I had ſaid. But if two parties, ſuch as you and I here, as friends, and in a friendly way, were inclined to have diſcourſe together, their anſwers to each other's queſtions ought to be made in a milder manner, and to be more rational. Now it is perhaps more rational, that an anſwer ſhould not only be agreeable to truth, but beſides, ſhould be conceived in terms confeſſedly underſtood by the party queſtioning. Accordingly, I ſhall now attempt to make you ſuch a kind of anſwer. For tell me; do you not call ſome certain thing by the name of end, ſpeaking of ſuch a thing as bound or extreme? For by all theſe words I mean the ſame thing. Prodicus, indeed, might poſſibly diſpute it with us: but you would uſe theſe expreſſions indifferently, that ſuch or ſuch a thing is bounded, or, that it has an end. This is all I mean; nothing of ſubtle diſquiſition, or nice diſtinction.

able accident of it, that is, a circumſtance which, though accidental, or not of neceſſity attending on its eſſence, yet in fact always did attend on it, namely, the accompaniment of colour. And he here profeſſes, that he would be ſatisfied with ſuch a deſcription of virtue denoting any circumſtance which always attended on her: as if we deſcribed virtue thus; Virtue is that which always accompanies wiſdom.—S.

[1] Socrates, in converſing with the ſophiſts, never uſed λογον διδασκαλικον, the inſtructive method of delivering his doctrine: becauſe, fancing themſelves ſufficiently knowing and wiſe already, they were not diſpoſed to learn. Nor did he ever take the truly dialectical way with them; or make uſe of λογον διαλεκτικον: becauſe they were not concerned about truth in any argument; and becauſe alſo they either had not, or would not, acknowledge any firſt principles to argue from. But he diſputed with them always in their own way, δια λογων ερισικων; confuting them from their own conceſſions, and reducing to abſurdities the anſwers which they gave to his queſtions.—S.

MENO.

MENO. Well; there is ſomething which I call end: and I think I underſtand what you mean.

SOC. And is there not ſomething which you call ſuperficies? another, which you call ſolid? ſuch as thoſe, I mean, which are the ſubjects of geometry.

MENO. I call certain things by the names you mention.

SOC. Now then, from theſe premiſes which you admit, you may underſtand what I mean by figure in general. In every figure, that which bounds the ſolid, I call figure. And to expreſs this in one ſhort propoſition, I ſhould ſay that figure is the bound of ſolid.

MENO. And what ſay you colour is?

SOC. You uſe me ill now, Meno. You put an old man to the taſk of anſwering, yet are unwilling yourſelf to take the trouble only of recollecting and telling me what Gorgias ſaid that virtue was.

MENO. But I will; after you have told me what colour is.

SOC. A man with his eyes hoodwinked might perceive from your way of converſing, Meno, that you are handſome, and ſtill have your admirers.

MENO. How ſo?

SOC. Becauſe you do nothing but command in converſation, as fine ladies do, that are uſed to have their wills in all things; for they tyrannize ſo long as their beauty laſts. At the ſame time too, perhaps, you have diſcovered me, how eaſy I am to be ſubdued by beauty, and how apt to ſtoop to it. I ſhall do therefore as you would have me, and ſhall anſwer to your queſtion.

MENO. By all means do, and gratify my requeſt.

SOC. Do you chooſe that I ſhould make my anſwer in the ſtyle of Gorgias[1], that by this means you may apprehend it the more eaſily?

MENO.

[1] Gorgias, as appears from what follows, accounted for all the ſenſible qualities of things, that is, for every thing perceived through any of the five outward ſenſes, by corpuſcular, or little inviſible bodies, continually ἀπορρέοντα, flowing forth, or emitted, from all larger, viſible, and apparently figured bodies, and ſtriking the ſenſe of all ſenſible animals within their reach. With regard to one kind of the ſenſible qualities of bodies, namely, odours, whether the fragrant or the fœtid, the ſame account is given of them by moſt of the modern philoſophers. For they are generally held to be the effluvia of bodies odoriferous, ſtriking and affecting either agreeably or

MENO. I ſhould be glad that you would do ſo, moſt undoubtedly.

Soc. Do you not hold, you and Gorgias, that certain effluvia flow forth from bodies, agreeably to the doctrine of Empedocles[1]?

MENO. We hold that doctrine ſtrongly[2].

Soc.

diſagreeably the olfactory nerves, where the particular ſenſe of ſmell is ſuppoſed to be ſeated. We ſhall preſently obſerve, in what manner the antient Corpuſcularians, whoſe ſyſtem was more uniform and ſimple than that of the moderns, extended the power of theſe effluvia to all the reſt of the outward ſenſes.—S.

[1] Empedocles was a Pythagorean philoſopher of Agrigentum in Sicily; and wrote a poem in three books, concerning Nature, on the principles of Pythagoras. For this great founder of the Italic ſect, though he applied himſelf chiefly to the ſtudy of mind, the governing principle in nature, as the only way to underſtand nature rightly, yet philoſophized alſo on the outward and corporeal part of the univerſe: the elements of which, conſiſtently with his notions of mind, he held not to be irregular and infinite, as the Atomic and Atheiſtic philoſophers imagined: but to be formed by rule in number, and in meaſure, as being the work of mind. Plato, in his Timæus, hath introduced the Pythagorean, from whom that dialogue takes its name, telling us the meaſures and proportions of theſe elements. It ſufficeth at preſent to ſay of them, that they are the four generally conſidered ever ſince as the elements of nature, fire, air, water, and earth. On this foundation Empedocles built his poem, explaining all the appearances of outward nature from the combination and motion of theſe four elements. His poetry was deemed by the antients, in point of verſification, equal to that of Homer. And he ſeems to have been a celebrated poet, before he commenced philoſopher. For though it does not appear that in this poem he divulged any of the Pythagorean ſecrets, yet his brothers of that ſect, who were all ſtrictly united together in fellowſhip, did, on the publication of his poem, as fearful of the precedent (and no writings had till then been ever publiſhed by any Pythagorean), expel him from their ſociety; at the ſame time making a law, that from thenceforth no poet ſhould ever be admitted amongſt them as a member of their body.—S.

[2] Empedocles differed from the Atomic philoſophers of old in this, that he held all natural bodies, and even their minuteſt parts, ſo long as they remained parts of thoſe bodies, to be compoſed of the four elements. Now as air and fire, two of thoſe four, are active elements perpetually in motion; and as all compound bodies are more or leſs porous; he ſuppoſed a continual efflux of igneous and aërial particles from thoſe bodies into whoſe compoſition they had entered, through ſuch meatuſes or pores, whether ſtraight or winding, as were fitted for their paſſage and their exit. To ſupply the place of theſe departed particles, and to maintain the ſame ſtate in the compoſition of the bodies they had quitted, he ſuppoſed a continual influx of freſh air and fire from without, uniting themſelves to their congenial elements within, and thus becoming ingredients in the frame of the compounded or mixt bodies into which they had entered. Theſe freſh ſtreams he held to be almoſt pure and elementary air and fire, as pure however as the circumambience. But the particles, ſtreaming forth from thoſe bodies, he ſuppoſed to be impure, and to be mixed or combined with aqueous particles, and alſo with earthy ones of various kinds, according to the

nature

Soc. And do you not hold certain pores [1], into which and through which thoſe effluvia paſs?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. And that ſome of thoſe effluvia [2] are adapted to ſome of theſe pores, but are either leſs or greater than other pores?

Meno.

nature of the body from which they iſſued. For the union of the four elements in compound bodies he held to be ſo intimate, and the particles of different elements to adhere ſo cloſely one to another, that none paſs out pure as they entered; but that every particle of the ſubtler and lighter elements, in departing, carries along with it ſome particles of the groſſer and heavier, earth and water. Now this is obvious to ſight in moiſt bodies, vehemently heated by fire from without acting on them; that is, in bodies into which ſo great a number of igneous particles have entered as tend to operate the diſſolution of thoſe bodies. For we here ſee the aqueous particles, pregnant with air and fire, iſſuing forth and aſcending in the form of ſteams and vapours. And that earthy particles are combined with them, we may reaſonably conclude from the different colours of theſe ſteams or vapours. For the ſteam, which ariſes from pure water heated, hath always the ſame uniform colour. The difference therefore of colour in ſteams or vapours muſt be derived from the different kinds of earthy particles, or, as the chemiſts love to expreſs themſelves, the different ſalts, in thoſe liquors and thoſe moiſt bodies, from which the diverſe coloured ſteams or vapours ariſe. The like appearances may be obſerved in the perſpiration of animal bodies, when they ſuffer a higher degree than uſual of inteſtine heat; that is, when the igneous particles within are put into vehement commotion, and ſet looſe through violent exerciſe of the body: the perſpired moiſture we may then ſee, by retaining it on linen, to be tinged with the colour of thoſe ſalts, which are conſtantly ſeparated from the blood by the kidneys and thrown off in urine. It may perhaps not be impertinent to take notice here by the way, that Empedocles, and the reſt of the antient Elementarian phyſiologers, attributed this difference of earth or earthy ſalts, from whence they ſuppoſed all bodies to derive the difference of their colours, to different mixtures of the four elements conſtituting thoſe very minute earthy particles; the mere earthy part of which is the *caput mortuum* of the chemiſts, if this be indeed elementary pure earth. From hence the Corpuſcularians, by parity of reaſon, drew this concluſion; that as, in all appearance, bodies derived their different colours from the different kinds of earth which made the groſſer part of their compoſition, the colours which reached our eyes, and which we ſaw, were the fineſt earthy particles of thoſe bodies, combined with particles of elementary fire, the eſſence of light uncoloured of itſelf, continually ſtreaming forth in effluvia too minute for the eye to diſcern their figures, and viſible only in the colour.—S.

[1] Meaning here the pores of other bodies, ſurrounding thoſe which emit the effluvia, and either cloſe to them in contact, or at leaſt near to them enough to be reached by thoſe effluvia, before their combination is quite broken, and they are reſolved into their pure elements.—S.

[2] The Elementarian phyſiologers held, that the effluvia of all compound bodies were of different figures and dimenſions, according to the natures and different proportions of their compoſing elements. And conſequently to this they muſt have held, that the pores of theſe bodies were

MENO. Things are ſo framed.

SOC. And do you not admit of ſomething which you call ſight?

MENO. I do.

SOC. Theſe premiſes being granted, "Now let your mind accompany my words [1]," as Pindar ſays. Colour then is the flowing off from figures, commenſurate with the ſight, and by that ſenſe perceived [2].

MENO.

were large enough for the paſſage and emiſſion of their own effluvia, as well as for the admiſſion and reception of other particles from without to ſupply their places. But this was not ſufficient to account for the different kinds of ſenſation, ariſing in the ſeveral ſenſes of ſentient animals, from the operation and effect of the effluvia of other bodies tranſmitted to them. They ſuppoſed, therefore, that the pores of the organs of ſenſe were exactly adequate, in figure and dimenſion, to theſe foreign effluvia; not all of thoſe pores adequate to all of theſe effluvia indiſcriminately; for this is impoſſible, unleſs the ſouls of any animals had the power of adapting the pores of their organs of ſenſation, occaſionally, to the reception of all kinds of effluvia: and in this caſe, all ſuch animals would be like Milton's angels, all eye, all ear: and would feel, at pleaſure, the other various kinds of ſenſation in all parts of their bodies indifferently. But the hypotheſis of thoſe phyſiologers we are ſpeaking of was this, that the organs of each ſenſe had their pores reſpectively fitted to admit thoſe effluvia which were the objects of that ſenſe, and none other; the eye, for inſtance, thoſe effluvia which gave colour; the ear, thoſe which made ſound; and that the organs of the other ſenſes were framed in like manner. The heterogeneous effluvia, therefore, which could not enter, as being either too large for the pores, or elſe figured differently, paſſed by; and the too minute paſſed in and through, without affecting the ſenſe.—S.

[1] Socrates here cites a verſe from Pindar, to uſher in his definition with ſolemnity, as if it was to be ſomething very fine. But this ſolemnity is merely burleſque: for it is in mimickry of the ſophiſts, who valued at a high rate their doctrines of this kind, and taught them to their diſciples as wonderful diſcoveries and pieces of profound wiſdom.—S.

[2] Ariſtotle tell us, in his treatiſe *περι αισθησεως και αισθητων*, that Empedocles held the eye, that is, the ſight of the eye, to be fire; meaning pure elementary fire collected in the pupil of the eye; as appears from Timæus in Plato's dialogue of his name; and that he ſuppoſed viſion to be performed by the emiſſion of light from the eye, as from a lantern. In proof of which he cites a paſſage out of the fine poem of Empedocles, mentioned in a preceding note. We preſume it may be agreeable to many of our learned readers, if we here preſent them with that beautiful paſſage at full length; and the more ſo, becauſe Stephens has ſtrangely omitted it, with many other choice fragments of the philoſophic Greek poets, in that ſlender collection of his which he entitles Poeſis Philoſophica. The verſes are theſe:

Ὡς δ' ὁτε τις, προοδον νοεων, ὡπλισσατο λυχνον,
Χειμεριην δια νυκτα, πυρος σελας αιθομενοιο,
Ἀψας παντοιων ανεμων λαμπτηρας αμοργους, [f. απειργους]
Οἱ τ' ανεμων μεν πνευμα διασχιδνασιν αεντων·

MENO. In this anſwer, Socrates, I think you have anſwered as well as poſſible.

SOC.

Φως δ' εξω διαθρωσκον, οσον ταναωτερον ηεν,
Λαμπεσκεν κατα βηλον ατειρεσιν ακτινεσσιν.
Ὡς δε τοτ', [f. ποτ'] εν μηνιγξιν ερεγνεον, ωγυγιον πυρ
Λεπτησιν οθονησιν εχευατο κυκλοπα κουρην·
Αι δ' ὑδατος μεν βενθος απεστεγον αμφιναοντος·
Πυρ δ' εξω διαθρωσκον, [f. διεθρωσκεν] οσον ταναωτερον ηεν.

We are unable to do juſtice to theſe elegant lines in a literal tranſlation. Inſtead of it, therefore, we hope our Engliſh readers will not refuſe to accept of the following paraphraſe:

As when the trav'ler, in dark winter's night,
Intent on journey, kindles up a light,
The moon-like ſplendour of an oil-fed flame;
He ſets it in ſome lantern's horny frame.
Calm and ſerene there ſits the tender form,
Screen'd from rough winds, and from the wintry ſtorm.
In vain rude airs aſſault the gentle fire:
Their forces break, diſperſe, and they retire.
Fences ſecure, though thin, the fair encloſe;
And her bright head ſhe lifts amid her foes.
Through the ſtraight pores of the tranſparent horn
She ſhoots her radiance, mild as early morn.
Forth fly the rays; their ſhining path extends;
Till, loſt in the wide air, their leſs'ning luſtre ends.
So when the fire, freſh lighted from on high,
Sits in the circling pupil of an eye;
O'er it, tranſparent veils of fabric fine
Spread the thin membrane, and defend the ſhrine;
The ſubtle flame encloſing, like a mound,
Safe from the flood of humours flowing round.
Forth fly the rays, and their bright paths extend;
Till, in the wide air loſt, their luſtres end.

After citing theſe verſes, Ariſtotle is pleaſed to ſay, ὁτε μεν ουν ουτως ὁραν φησιν· ὁτε δε ταις απορρὁιαις ταις απο των ὁρωμενων. "Sometimes he [meaning Empedocles] accounts for viſion in this manner; at other times, by the effluvia which proceed from the object." Now, in truth, theſe two ſeemingly different accounts are not only very conſiſtent, the one with the other, but neither of them is ſufficient, without the other, to explain how the objects of ſight are ſeen, according to the mind of Empedocles. We ſay this on ſuppoſition that he agreed with Timæus, a philoſopher of the ſame ſect, who, if Plato repreſents him rightly, accounted for viſion in the ſame way. He ſuppoſes, that part of the pure element of fire is ſeated in the eye; that the rays iſſuing

Soc. It may be that you think ſo, becauſe you are accuſtomed to a language of this kind; and becauſe at the ſame time you perceive yourſelf, as I imagine, able from thence to account in the ſame way for ſound [1], and ſmell, and many other things of like kind.

MENO. It really is ſo.

Soc. The anſwer, Meno, was theatrical and pompous; and ſo it pleaſed you more than that which I gave you concerning figure.

MENO. Indeed it did.

Soc. And yet I perſuade myſelf, O ſon of Alexidemus, that not this, but that other, was the better anſwer. I think too, that you yourſelf would be of the ſame opinion, if you are not, as you ſaid you were yeſter-

iſſuing from it are, in the darkneſs of night, extinguiſhed by the air, which is then void of that element; but that as ſoon as the air, from the return of day, is filled with light, whoſe eſſence is the ſame pure element of fire, the rays of light, iſſuing from the eye, unite themſelves to their kindred element without; and being in motion themſelves, put into the ſame motion thoſe particles of outward light with which they are united: that rays of light are in this manner extended from the eye to all bodies within a certain diſtance, wherever the eye directs the motion of her own rays; that theſe rays of light, thus extended to the ſurface of thoſe bodies, meet there with the fineſt effluvia iſſuing from them, which are particles of the ſame element of fire, mixed and coloured with particles of the other elements, carried with them out of the ſame bodies; a mixture or compoſition by the chemiſts called oil: that theſe effluvia naturally unite themſelves with the rays of light falling on the ſurfaces of thoſe bodies whence they are emitted, as being chiefly of the ſame nature; ſo that thoſe rays of light, pure and uncoloured of themſelves, participate now of the colour of theſe effluvia; and being reflected back from bodies, into which the effluvia, ſtreaming forth, hinder them from entering, communicate their colour, in returning, to all thoſe continuous particles of light between the object and the eye, with which they unite themſelves; forming continued rays coloured by thoſe effluvia, and reaching home to the eye, whoſe pores they thus enter. Modern philoſophers account for colour from different refractions of the rays of light reflected.—S.

[1] As thus; that ſound was air, violently forced out of ſome body ſtricken, and propagating its motion by ſtrokes continually repeated along the element of air, until it reach the ear; in the ſame manner as colour along the rays of light, until it reach the eye: that odours were the ſubtle oily effluvia of bodies, united with the aërial, emitted together with them, and therefore mixing with the element of air, and conveyed along it to the organ of ſmell: that from moiſt bodies, applied to the palate, juices were expreſſed, a groſſer oil, inſinuating themſelves immediately into the pores of the organ of taſte: that the cauſes of heat and cold were the ſulphureous and the nitrous particles of body, or of the circumambient air, penetrating the pores of the ſkin, and thus affecting with thoſe different ſenſations the ſenſe of feeling.—S.

day, under a neceſſity of going away before the myſteries, but could ſtay and be initiated.

MENO. But if you would tell me many other things ſuch as this, I would certainly ſtay and hear them.

SOC. My beſt endeavours to ſay other ſuch things ſhall certainly not be wanting, for my own ſake as well as yours. But I fear I ſhall not be able to utter many ſentences of that kind. But now it comes to your turn to try if you can perform your part of the engagement, in giving me an account of what virtue is, virtue in general, the ſame in all particular virtues. And do not go on, making many out of one; as is often ſaid jocoſely of thoſe who pound or beat any thing to pieces. But leaving virtue as it is, whole and entire, define the nature of it, and tell me what it is. Patterns of ſuch a definition you have had from me.

MENO. I think then, Socrates, that virtue is agreeably to that of the poet,

> To feel a joy from what is fair,
> And [o'er it] to have pow'r[1]——

and accordingly I ſay, that virtue is this; having the deſire of things that are fair, to have it in our power to gain them.

SOC. I aſk you then, whether you ſuppoſe the perſons who deſire things that are fair, to deſire things that are good?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. In giving that definition of virtue then, did you ſuppoſe that ſome men there were who deſire things which are evil, others who deſire things which are good? Do you not think, my friend, that all men deſire things which are good?

MENO. I do not.

SOC. But that ſome deſire things which are evil?

MENO. I do.

SOC. Think you that theſe men deſire things evil, with an opinion of

[1] This ſcrap of poetry is taken from ſome old lyric poet, whoſe works are not remaining: it is cited for this purpoſe, to prepare us for a matter of great importance, to be next brought upon the carpet.—S.

their

their being good? or that, knowing them to be evil, yet they nevertheleſs deſire them?

MENO. I anſwer Yes to both thoſe queſtions.

SOC. Is there any man then, do you imagine, who knowing the things which are evil to be what they are, that is, evil, yet nevertheleſs deſires them?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. What do you mean, when you ſay he deſires them? Do you not mean, that he deſires to have them?

MENO. To have them. For what can I mean beſides?

SOC. Does he deſire them, think you, imagining that evil things are advantageous to the perſon who has them, or knowing that evil things are hurtful wherever they are?

MENO. There are perſons who imagine of things which are indeed evil, that they are advantageous; and there are who know them to be hurtful.

SOC. Do you think that they know the evil things to be evil, thoſe who imagine ſuch evil things to be advantageous?

MENO. By no means do I think that.

SOC. Is it not then evident, that ſuch perſons deſire not things evil, ſuch as know not the nature of thoſe things which they deſire; but rather, that they deſire things which they imagine to be good, but which in reality are evil? So that thoſe who are ignorant of them, and falſely imagine them to be good, plainly deſire good things. Do they not?

MENO. Such ſort of perſons, I muſt own, ſeem to be deſirous of good things.

SOC. But thoſe others, thoſe who deſire things which are evil, as you ſay, and who at the ſame time know that evil things are hurtful to the poſſeſſor, do they know that they themſelves ſhall receive harm from thoſe evil things in their having them?

MENO. It is clear that they muſt know it.

SOC. But know they not, that ſuch as receive harm are in evil plight, ſo far as harm has befallen them?

MENO. This alſo muſt they know.

SOC. And know they not beſides, that ſuch as are in evil plight are unhappy too?

MENO.

MENO. I preſume they do.

Soc. Is there any man then, who chooſes to be in evil plight [1], and to be unhappy?

MENO. I ſuppoſe there is not any, Socrates.

Soc. No man, therefore, O Meno, wills or chooſes any thing evil; if it be true, that no man wills or chooſes to be in evil plight, or to be unhappy. For indeed what elſe is it to be thoroughly unhappy, than to deſire things which are evil, and to have them our own?

MENO. I ſuſpect that what you ſay, Socrates, is true. And no man wills or chooſes any thing evil.

Soc. Did you not ſay juſt now, that virtue conſiſted in the willing or deſiring things which are good, and in the having it in our power to gain them?

MENO. I did ſay ſo; it is true.

Soc. Is not this will or deſire [2] according to what has been ſaid in all men? ſo that, in this reſpect, one man is not at all better than another man.

MENO. It appears ſo.

Soc. It appears, therefore, that if one man is better than another, he muſt be ſo in reſpect of his power.

MENO. Undoubtedly.

Soc. This therefore, as it ſeems, according to your account, is virtue, the power of gaining things which are good.

MENO. The caſe ſeems to me, Socrates, to be entirely ſo, as you now ſtate it.

[1] This is referable to that verſe of an old poet, cited by Ariſtotle in his Nicomachean Ethicks, lib. iii. cap. 5.

Ουδεις εκων πονηρος, ουδ' ακων μακαρ.

No man in evil willingly can reſt:
No man with good unwillingly is bleſt.—S.

[2] In the Greek τουτου λεχθεντος. But it appears from Ficinus's tranſlation, that in his manuſcript it was read εκ του λεχθεντος. The ſenſe requires this reading; and we preſume, therefore, that it ought to be ſo printed. We have followed both the Baſil editions, and all the tranſlations, in making the ſentence interrogative: and in all future editions of Plato we hope it will be ſo marked.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Let us examine then if this account of yours be true: for perhaps it may be ſo. You ſay, that to be able to gain good things is virtue.

Meno. I do.

Soc. Good things do you not call ſuch things as health and riches, that is, the poſſeſſion of gold and ſilver, honours alſo in the ſtate, and offices in the government? You do not ſpeak of any other things as good, beſide things of this kind?

Meno. No other; I mean all ſuch ſort of things.

Soc. Well then, to get money [1] is virtue; as ſays Meno, the hereditary gueſt of the great king [2]. But let me aſk you a queſtion concerning this point; whether you would chooſe to add ſomething to this account of virtue, and to ſay that virtue is to get money honeſtly and religiouſly? or whether this addition makes no difference in your account; but that, however unjuſtly it be acquired, you call the mere acquiſition of money, equally in any way, virtue?

[1] We learn from Xenophon (in Expedit. Cyri, lib. ii.) that the paſſion predominant in Meno's ſoul was the love of money; that his deſire of honours and of power in the ſtate was ſubſervient to that other his maſter-paſſion; for, that he regarded power and honour no otherwiſe than as the means of accumulating wealth. In the paſſage, therefore, before us, it ſeems as if Plato meant, ſlily and indirectly, to exhibit to us this ſtrong feature in the character of Meno, or rather as if Socrates had a mind, in his uſual jocoſe manner, to exhibit to Meno a true picture of himſelf.

[2] In the more antient times of Greece, whenever men, illuſtrious for their birth or ſtation in life, travelled from one Grecian ſtate or kingdom to another, or croſſed the ſea to Aſia, with a view of obſerving the manners of other people, or of learning the policy of other governments (and they ſeldom travelled with any different view), they were always nobly entertained at the houſe of ſome great man in every country to which they came. Perſons of inferior rank, whenever they travelled, which they rarely did, were everywhere treated courteouſly at the public coſts. In the former caſe, that of private entertainment, not only the noble hoſt himſelf became entitled to the ſame hoſpitable reception from his gueſt, if ever he ſhould return the viſit on a like occaſion; but the rights of mutual hoſpitality accrued alſo from thence to the deſcendants of both the parties. Meno it ſeems had this connection with the Perſian monarch, being himſelf, probably, as well as his friend Ariſtippus, deſcended from one of the antient kings of Theſſaly. However this was, that his family was very noble appears from his appointment to the command of the forces which his country ſent to the aſſiſtance of Cyrus, in his youthful time of life.——Thus much for the explication of the paſſage now before us. The beauty of it ariſes from the oppoſition here ſeen between Meno's high rank, naturally productive of high ſpirit, and his ſordid avarice, that paſſion of the meaneſt ſouls.——S.

MENO. By no means; for, to acquire it unjuſtly, I call vice and wickedneſs.

SOC. By all means, therefore, as it appears, this acquiſition of money ought to be accompanied by honeſty, or prudence, or ſanctity, or ſome other part of virtue; for otherwiſe it will not be virtue, notwithſtanding it procures for us good things.

MENO. For without that how ſhould it be virtue?

SOC. And if a man forbear to gain money, whether for himſelf or others, when he cannot gain it without diſhoneſty, is not the forbearance of this gain alſo virtue?

MENO. It is apparent.

SOC. Not the gaining of theſe good things, therefore, muſt be virtue, more than the forbearance of that gain; but, as it ſeems, that which comes accompanied by honeſty is virtue; that which is without any thing of that kind is vice and wickedneſs.

MENO. I think it muſt of neceſſity be as you ſay.

SOC. Did we not ſay, a little while ſince, that honeſty and prudence, and every thing of that kind, was a part of virtue?

MENO. We did.

SOC. Then, Meno, you are in jeſt with me.

MENO. How ſo, Socrates?

SOC. Becauſe, when I had deſired you, as I did juſt now, not to ſplit virtue into pieces, and had given you patterns to copy after, that you might anſwer as you ought; you, without paying any regard to them, tell me that virtue is the power of gaining good things with honeſty or juſtice; yet this, you ſay, is only a part of virtue.

MENO. I do.

SOC. It is to be collected then, from your own conceſſions, that with a part of virtue, to do whatever one does, this is virtue. For juſtice, you ſay, is but a part of virtue, and ſo of every other thing of like kind.

MENO. What then? granting that I ſay this.

SOC. It follows that, having been requeſted to tell me what the whole of virtue is, you are far from giving ſuch a complete account of it: for you ſay, that every action is virtue which is performed with a part of virtue; as though you had already told me what virtue was in the whole, and that I

ſhould

ſhould now know it when you come to ſplit it into parts. We muſt therefore, as it ſeems to me, take the matter again from the beginning, and recur to this queſtion, What is virtue? Or ſhould every action, accompanied with a part of virtue, be ſaid to be virtue itſelf? For it is ſaying this, to ſay that every action, accompanied with juſtice, is virtue.——Do you think there is no occaſion for us to reſume the ſame queſtion; but that a man may know a part of virtue, what it is, without knowing what virtue is itſelf?

MENO. I think he cannot.

SOC. For, if you remember, when I anſwered juſt now your queſtion concerning figure, we rejected ſuch a kind of anſwer as aimed at explaining the propoſed ſubject in terms not as yet confeſſedly underſtood, but whoſe meaning was ſtill the ſubject of inquiry.

MENO. And we did right, Socrates, in rejecting ſuch an anſwer.

SOC. I would not have you imagine then, while we are as yet inquiring what virtue is, the whole of it, that by anſwering in terms which ſignify the parts of virtue, you will be able to explain to any man the nature of virtue; or, indeed, that the nature of any other thing can be explained in ſuch a way, but that ſtill there will be need of repeating the ſame queſtion what virtue is, that which is the ſubject of our converſation. Or do you think that I ſpeak idly and nothing to the purpoſe?

MENO. I think you ſpeak rightly.

SOC. Begin again, therefore, and tell me what it is you hold virtue to be, you and your friend Gorgias?

MENO. Socrates, I heard, before I had converſed with you, that the only part you take in converſation is this:—You pretend to be at a loſs and doubtful yourſelf upon all ſubjects, and make others too no leſs to be at a loſs what to think and ſay. You ſeem to be now playing the ſame conjurers tricks upon me; you manifeſtly uſe incantations to bewitch me, and to fill me with ſuch perplexity that I know not what to ſay. If you will allow me to joke a little, I think you reſemble exactly, not only in form but in other reſpects alſo, that broad ſea-fiſh called the cramp-fiſh; for that too never fails to give a numbneſs to every perſon who either touches or approaches it [1]. You ſeem to

[1] The benumbing faculty of this fiſh, by which it is enabled to catch its prey, is mentioned by Ariſtotle, in his Hiſtory of Animals, b. ix, c. 37, where he tells us that ſome perſons have been

to have done ſome ſuch thing at preſent to me, and to have benumbed me. For I actually ſuffer a kind of numbneſs and ſtupidity, both in mind and body, and find myſelf diſabled from giving you any anſwer; and yet have I a thouſand times diſcourſed much about virtue, and to many perſons, and extremely well too, as I thought; but I am now not in the leaſt able to tell ſo much as what virtue is. I think that you have acted very prudently in never going out of your own country either by ſea or land. For if you was to behave in this manner in any other city where you are a ſtranger, you would run a riſque of being driven thence as a magician or enchanter.

Soc. You are full of craftineſs, Meno; and I was very near being deceived by you.

Meno. Tell me how, Socrates, I pray you?

Soc. I know with what deſign you brought a ſimile to which you likened me.

Meno. With what deſign now, do you imagine?

Soc. That I, on my part, might bring ſome ſimile or reſemblance of you. For this I know to be true of all handſome perſons, they love to have images and pictures made of them. And indeed it is their intereſt; for of handſome perſons the pictures are handſome too. But I ſhall forbear the drawing of your picture in return. And as to that which you have produced of me, if the cramp-fiſh be itſelf numb, and through its numbneſs benumb others alſo, then am I like to it, but otherwiſe I am not. For I do not lead others into doubtfulneſs on any ſubject, and make them be at a loſs what to ſay; when at the ſame time I can eaſily explain the matter in hand, and have no doubts at all within my own mind: but as I am entirely diſtreſſed for true definitions of things myſelf; in this condition I involve in the ſame diſtreſſes thoſe with whom I am converſing. Thus at preſent concerning the nature of virtue; what it is, I, for my part, know not: you indeed knew formerly, perhaps, before that you had touched me; but now you are like one [1] who knows

eye-witneſſes of the manner in which it is done. Plutarch, in his Treatiſe of the Sagacity of Animals, relates the matter more circumſtantially; and farther aſſures us, that this power of the numb-fiſh not only operates on other fiſh, but on men too; and that it acts at ſome ſmall diſtance, as well as through immediate touch.—S.

[1] In all the editions of the Greek, we here read νυν μεντοι ομοιος ει και ειδοτι. This reading we have

knows nothing of the matter. I am deſirous, however, of conſidering it together with you, and of our ſearching out jointly what kind of a thing virtue is.

MENO. But in what way, Socrates, will you ſearch for a thing of which you are entirely ignorant? For by what mark which may diſcover it will you look for it when you know none of the marks that diſtinguiſh it? Or, if you ſhould not fail of meeting with it, how will you diſcern it, when met with, to be the very thing you was in ſearch of, and knew nothing of before?

SOC. I apprehend, Meno, what it is you mean. Do you obſerve how captious a way of reaſoning you introduce? For it follows from hence, that it is impoſſible for a man to ſeek, either for that which he knows, or for that of which he is ignorant. For no man would ſeek to know what he knows, becauſe he has the knowledge of it already, and has no need of ſeeking for what he has. Nor could any man ſeek for what he is ignorant of, becauſe he would not know what he was ſeeking for.

MENO. Do you not think then, Socrates, that this way of reaſoning is fair and right?

SOC. Not I, for my part.

MENO. Can you ſay in what reſpect it is wrong?

SOC. I can. For I have heard the ſayings of men and women who were wiſe, and knowing in divine things?

MENO. What ſayings?

SOC. Such as I think true, as well as beautiful.

MENO. But what ſayings were they? and by whom were they uttered?

SOC. Thoſe who uttered them were of the prieſts and prieſteſſes, ſuch as made it their buſineſs to be able to give a rational account of thoſe things in which they were employed. The ſame ſayings are delivered alſo by Pindar, and many other of the poets, as many as are divine. The ſayings are theſe;

have followed in our tranſlation, as thinking it to be right: but it is to be obſerved, that Ficinus ſeems, from his tranſlation, to have read in his manuſcript copy of Plato, νυν μεντοι εμοι ομοιος ει μη ειδοτι. And as this reading produceth a ſenſe agreeable to that maſk of ignorance worn by Socrates throughout this dialogue, and wherever elſe he is introduced converſing with any of the ſophiſts, or of their diſciples, it deſerves a place amongſt the various readings which it will become a future editor of Plato to collect and publiſh.—S.

but do you conſider with yourſelf whether you think them true. Theſe perſons then tell us that the ſoul of man is immortal; that ſometimes it ends [1], which is called dying; and that afterwards it begins again, but never is diſſolved; and that for this reaſon we ought to live, throughout our lives, with all ſanctity. For

STROPHE.

[2] When guilt of leſſer crimes the ſoul hath ſtain'd,
Not meriting ſharp pains for aye;
And eight dark dreary years ſhe hath remain'd
In Hades, barr'd from gladd'ning day;
Preſerving all that time her ſenſe
Of good, lamenting her loſt innocence;
With ſorrow if her guilt ſhe rue,
And Proſerpine ſhould deem that ſorrow true,
She accepts in full atonement ſuch repentance due.

ANTISTROPHE.

Then the ninth year ſends back the ſoul to light,
And former objects here on earth:
Of theſe, thro' death, again ſhe loſes ſight;
Again to life renews her birth.
[3] At length, two trials well endur'd,
The ſoul, to leſſer virtues well inur'd,
Is born ſome king, for good renown'd;
Or ſage, well learn'd in wiſdom's lore profound;
Or hero, by his proweſs ſpreading peace around.

EPODE.

[1] That is, ends its preſent life, and begins a new life. For as Plato obſerves juſtly in his Phædo, life and death ſucceed each other alternately throughout nature. In the paſſage, however, now before us, the ending of the human ſoul and its beginning again may be taken in different ſenſes. The moſt obvious meaning is the diſſolution of that body which it inhabits, and its departure into the ſeeds of a new body, which it then animates, and gradually forms ſuitable to its own temper and diſpoſition. This ſenſe is agreeable to thoſe verſes immediately after cited out of Pindar.—S.

[2] In tranſlating the fine fragment of Pindar, which Plato has here preſerved to us, we found ourſelves under a neceſſity of paraphraſing very largely, to free it from that obſcurity in which it would otherwiſe appear to an Engliſh reader, partly becauſe of the conciſeneſs of Pindar's ſtyle, and partly becauſe of the ſentiments, taken from the antient mythology, with which our age is little acquainted. However, we have adhered cloſely to the ſenſe of our original, completing it only from the ſame mythology, without adding any new thoughts or concetti of our own.—S.

[3] In this place we have made our tranſlation conformable to the reading found, as we preſume, by Ficinus in the manuſcript from which he tranſlated, and taken notice of by Stephens in the margin.

EPODE.

Thro' goodneſs, wiſdom, virtue, truly great;
And greatly meriting advancement high;
Looſen'd from body, wing'd and fleet,
Freely ſhe mounts to pureſt ſky;
Ne'er more on earth to live, ne'er more to die.
Amongſt the gods in ſtarry ſheen,
Far off and wide thro' Nature ſeen,
She fixes her abode;
Aſſuming her celeſtial throne,
To godlike ſtate of being grown,
A deathleſs demi-god.
Thence thro' the reſt of time,
In hymns religious and in holy rhyme,
Mortals below ſhall lift their lays,
The deathleſs demi-god to praiſe;
Who, freed from earthy droſs,
And ev'ry element of body groſs,
To intellectual bliſs in heav'nly ſeat could climb.

The ſoul then being immortal, having been often born, having beheld the things which are here, the things which are in Hades, and all things, there is nothing of which ſhe has not gained the knowledge. No wonder, therefore, that ſhe is able to recollect, with regard to virtue as well as to other things, what formerly ſhe knew. For all things in nature being linked together in relationſhip, and the ſoul having heretofore known all things, nothing hinders but that any man, who has recalled to mind, or, according to the common phraſe, who has learnt, one thing only, ſhould of himſelf recover all his antient knowledge, and find out again all the reſt of things; if he has but courage, and faints not in the midſt of his reſearches. For inquiry and learning is reminiſcence[1] all. We therefore ought not to hearken to that ſophiſtical way of reaſoning afore-mentioned; for our believing it to be true would make us idle. And, accordingly, the indolent, and ſuch as are averſe to

margin of his edition. Not only the ſenſe of the fragment is bettered by that reading, but Plato's illuſtration of it evidently ſhows that he read it ſo himſelf.—S.

[1] For a defence of reminiſcence, which Plato juſtly conſiders as ranking among the moſt important doctrines of philoſophy, ſee the notes on the Phædo.—T.

taking pains, delight to hear it. But this other way of thinking, which I have juſt now given you an account of, makes men diligent, ſets them at work, and puts them upon inquiry. And as I believe it to be true, I am willing, with your aſſiſtance, to inquire into the nature of virtue.

MENO. With all my heart, Socrates. But ſay you this abſolutely, that we do not learn any thing; and that all, which we call learning, is only reminiſcence? Can you teach me to know this doctrine to be true?

SOC. I obſerved to you before how full you are of craftineſs, O Meno. And, to confirm my obſervation, you now aſk me if I can teach you; I, who ſay that there is no ſuch thing as teaching, but that all our knowledge is reminiſcence; that I may appear directly to contradict myſelf.

MENO. Not ſo, Socrates, by Jupiter. I did not expreſs myſelf in thoſe terms with any ſuch deſign; but merely from habit, and the common uſage of that expreſſion. But if any way you can prove to me that your doctrine is true, do ſo.

SOC. This is by no means an eaſy taſk. However, for your ſake, I am willing to try and do my utmoſt. Call hither to me then one of thoſe your numerous attendants, whichever you pleaſe, that I may prove in him the truth of what I ſay.

MENO. I will, gladly. Come hither, you.

SOC. Is he a Grecian, and ſpeaks he the Greek language?

MENO. Perfectly well. He was born in my own family.

SOC. Be attentive now, and obſerve whether he appears to recollect within himſelf, or to learn any thing from me.

MENO. I ſhall.

SOC. [1]Tell me, boy; do you know what a ſquare ſpace is? Is it of ſuch a figure as (fig. 1) this?

BOY.

[1] The beſt explanatory notes to this part of the Dialogue will be mathematical figures, drawn after the manner of thoſe uſed in demonſtrating geometrical propoſitions. Socrates is here ſuppoſed, in the firſt place, to draw a ſquare; and afterwards, while he is putting queſtions to the boy, he is ſuppoſed to be drawing new lines, ſuch as form and bound the ſeveral other figures of which he ſpeaks. But, in reading, the figures muſt be repreſented as already drawn; and therefore, in every part of the proceſs, a new figure is neceſſary. All theſe we have exhibited together, printed from a copper plate; numbering each figure, and referring to each, in its proper place, by the ſame number. Such figures ought to have been printed in the editions of Plato himſelf. The editors

Boy. It is.

Soc. A ſquare ſpace then is that which has (fig. 2) all theſe lines equal, A B, B C, C D, D A, four in number.

Boy. It is ſo truly.

Soc. Has it not alſo (fig. 3) theſe lines, which are drawn through the middle of it, A C and B D, equal each to the other?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Cannot you imagine a ſpace, ſquare like this, but larger; and another ſuch, but leſſer?

Boy. Yes, for certain.

Soc. Now if (fig. 2) the ſide A B ſhould be two feet long, and the ſide A D ſhould be two feet long alſo, how many feet ſquare will the whole ſpace contain? Conſider it in this manner. If, in the ſide A B, the ſpace ſhould be two feet long, and in the ſide A D it ſhould be but one foot; would not the ſquare be that of two feet once told?

Boy. It would.

Soc. But ſince it is two feet this way as well as the other way, is it not a ſpace of two feet twice told?

Boy. Juſt ſo.

Soc. It is then a ſpace of two feet[1]?

Boy. So it is.

Soc. How many feet are twice two? reckon them, and tell me.

Boy. Four feet, Socrates.

Soc. May not a ſpace be made (fig. 4), E F G H, double to that other in ſize, but of the ſame kind, having, like that, all its ſides equal?

Boy. Yes, ſure.

Soc. How many ſquare feet then will this ſpace be of?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Come now, try and tell me, of what length is each of the ſides in this ſquare ſpace. Now the ſides of that ſquare, you know, we have ſup-

editors of Ariſtotle have not been ſo much wanting in this reſpect, where it was neceſſary: though ſometimes indeed, through careleſſneſs, they have printed wrong figures, which are worſe than none; as, for inſtance, equilateral triangles inſtead of right-angled.—S.

[1] Meaning ſquare feet.—S.

poſed to be two feet long. Of what length then are the ſides of this ſquare, which is double in largeneſs to that other?

Boy. It is plain, Socrates, that they are twice as long.

Soc. You ſee, Meno, that I teach him none of theſe things which he aſſerts; I only aſk him queſtions. And now this boy imagines that he knows of what length the lines are which contain a ſpace of eight ſquare feet. Do you not think he does?

Meno. I do.

Soc. And does he really know?

Meno. Certainly not.

Soc. But he imagines them to be twice as long as the lines, which contain a ſpace of four ſquare feet.

Meno. He does.

Soc. I now view him ready to recollect, from this time forward, rightly and as he ought. Now hear me, boy. You ſay that lines, double in length to the ſides of the ſquare A B C D, contain a ſpace double to it in largeneſs: I mean a ſpace of the ſame kind; not one way long, the other way ſhort; but every way of equal length, like the ſpace A B C D, only twice as large, that is (fig. 4), a ſpace of eight ſquare feet[1]. Conſider now whether you ſtill think this ſquare E F G H to be meaſured by a line twice as long as the line which meaſures the ſquare A B C D.

Boy. I do.

Soc. Suppoſe we add to the line A B, from hence, from the point B, another line of equal length (fig. 5), the line B I. Is not the line A I of a length double to that of the line A B?

Boy. Yes, ſure.

Soc. Now, from the line A I, do you ſay that a ſpace will be made of eight ſquare feet, if four lines, each of them as long as the line A I, be drawn ſo as to contain ſpace?

Boy. I do.

Soc. Let us then draw (fig. 6) theſe four equal lines ſo as to contain ſpace, A I, I K, K L, L A. Is this ſpace now any other than that which you ſay is of eight ſquare feet?

[1] Meaning a ſquare equal in largeneſs to eight ſquare feet.

Boy.

Boy. No; it is the very ſame.

Soc. Are there not in this ſpace A I K L theſe (fig. 7) four ſpaces, A B M O, B I P M, M P K N, N L O M, each of which is equal to that ſpace of four ſquare feet, A B C D?

Boy. So there be.

Soc. How large is the whole ſpace A I K L? Is it not four times as large as the ſpace A B C D?

Boy. To be ſure it is.

Soc. Is it only double now to the ſpace A B C D, when it is four times as large?

Boy. No, by Jupiter.

Soc. What proportion then has it to the ſpace A B C D?

Boy. A quadruple one [1].

Soc. From a line, therefore, double in length, is drawn a ſquare ſpace, not double, but quadruple, in largeneſs.

Boy. Why, it is very true.

Soc. Four times four make ſixteen: do they not?

Boy. They do.

Soc. But from a line of what length is to be drawn a ſquare, ſuch a one as we ſuppoſe (fig. 4) the ſquare E F G H to be, that is a ſpace of eight ſquare feet? You ſee that from the (fig. 6) line A I is drawn a ſquare, quadruple in largeneſs to the ſquare A B C D.

Boy. I ſee it.

Soc. And from the line A B, which is half of the line A I (fig. 6), a ſquare, you ſee, is drawn, which is but the fourth part of the ſquare A K.

Boy. It is.

Soc. Well; but that ſquare of eight feet E F G H, is it not twice as large as the ſquare A B C D, and half as large as the ſquare A I K L?

Boy. It is ſo, to be ſure.

[1] We may obſerve that this boy, whom Meno ſeems to have choſen out from his retinue on account of his ignorance and total want of education, is repreſented as not wholly ignorant of common arithmetic. Perhaps Socrates meant to gain ſome ground in his argument by this circumſtance; inſinuating, that the principles of the art of numbering were natural to man, and required no teaching. Accordingly we find that the moſt barbarian nations, and the moſt unlettered perſons in thoſe which are civilized, acquire of themſelves ſo much of that art as is neceſſary for the uſes of common life.—S.

Soc. Muſt it not then be drawn from a line longer than the line A B, and ſhorter than the line A I?

Boy. I think it muſt.

Soc. You ſay well; for ſpeak that only which you think. And tell me, was not the line A B ſuppoſed to be two feet long, and the line A I four feet long?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. The ſide therefore of the ſquare E F G H muſt be ſhorter than a line of four feet, and longer than a line of two feet.

Boy. It muſt ſo.

Soc. Try now, and tell me how long you think it is.

Boy. Three feet long.

Soc. If then it be ſo, let us take half of the line B I (fig. 8), namely, B Q, and add it to the line A B; and now this line A Q will be ſuch a line as you ſpeak of, a line three feet long. For the lines A B, B I, are each of them two feet long, and the line B Q is half of the line B I, and therefore is one foot long. In the ſame manner, let us take half of the line O L, namely O R, and add it to the line A O; and thus the line A R will be three feet long alſo. For the lines A O, O L, are each of them two feet long, and the line O R is one foot long. From theſe two lines, A Q, A R, let us complete the ſquare A Q S R; and it is ſuch a ſquare as you was ſpeaking of, the ſquare of a line three feet long.

Boy. It is ſo.

Soc. If then the whole ſpace be three feet long and three feet broad, it is a ſpace of thrice three feet.

Boy. It appears ſo to be.

Soc. And how many feet are thrice three?

Boy. Nine.

Soc. But how many feet were there to be in a ſquare twice as large as the ſquare A B C D?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. It is not true then that from a line three feet long is to be drawn a ſquare containing only eight ſquare feet.

Boy. It is not.

Soc. Try and tell us then exactly how long the line muſt be from which

ſuch a ſquare is to be drawn. Or, if you chooſe not to tell us the meaſure of it in numbers [1], at leaſt point out to us from what line it may be drawn [2].

Boy. Now, by Jove, Socrates, I do not know.

Soc. Do you obſerve, Meno, what progreſs this boy has already made, and whereabouts he is, in the way to recollection? You ſee that, from the beginning of his examination, he knew not from what line a ſquare eight feet large was to be drawn; as indeed neither does he yet know; but he then fancied that he knew, and anſwered boldly as a knowing perſon would, without ſuſpecting that he ſhould ever be at a loſs for a true anſwer. But he now finds himſelf at a loſs, and thinks himſelf as ignorant as he really is.

Meno. You ſay what is true.

Soc. Is he not then in a better diſpoſition with regard to the matter which he was ignorant of?

Meno. I agree with you in this too.

Soc. In making him therefore to be at a loſs what to anſwer, and in benumbing him after the manner of the cramp-fiſh, have we done him any harm?

Meno. I think, we have not.

Soc. And more than this, we have advanced him a little, as it ſeems, in the way of finding out the truth in the ſubject laid before him. For, being now ſenſible of his ignorance, he is prepared to ſeek and to inquire. But he then fancied, that he could readily, at any time, and in the preſence of any number of people, ſhow with certainty, that a ſquare, twice as large as ſome other ſquare, was produced from a line twice as long.

Meno. So it ſeemed.

Soc. Think you then, that he would have ſet about ſeeking or learning that, which, however ignorant of it, he fancied that he knew; till he had

[1] If Socrates had not added this, he would ſeem to have put the boy on telling what was impoſſible for him to tell. For how long the ſide is of a ſquare, equal in largeneſs to eight ſquare feet, is impoſſible to be told in any whole number.—S.

[2] For it lay before his eyes; being the line A C (fig. 3), the diameter of the ſquare A B C D.—S.

found himſelf at a loſs, and felt his ignorance; and was become therefore deſirous of finding it out?

MENO. I think, Socrates, that he never would.

SOC. The benumbing him then was of advantage to him.

MENO. I think it was.

SOC. Now obſerve how, from this ſenſe of his ignorance, he will find out the truth in ſearching for it with me; though the part which I ſhall bear in the inquiry will be merely to aſk queſtions, and not to teach. But be ſure to mind, if any where you can catch me teaching or telling him any thing, inſtead of aſking him his own opinions. Now, boy, tell me, is not this ſpace (fig. 2) ABCD our ſquare, four feet large?. Do you apprehend me?

BOY. I do.

SOC. Suppoſe we add to it this other ſquare (fig. 9) BTUC, equal to it in largeneſs?

BOY. Well.

SOC. And a third ſquare too, this (fig. 10), DCWX, equal in largeneſs to either of the others?

BOY. Very well.

SOC. What, if we add another ſquare of equal ſize, to fill up the corner here, this (fig. 11), UCWY?

BOY. Very well: and ſo it does.

SOC. Are not then theſe four ſquares equal all, ABCD, BTUC, CDXW, WYUC?

BOY. Yes.

SOC. This whole large ſquare then, ATYX, how much larger is it than the ſquare ABCD?

BOY. Four times as big.

SOC. But we wanted a ſquare only twice as big. Do you not remember?

BOY. I remember it very well.

SOC. Do not theſe lines, which I draw from corner to corner in each of theſe ſquares (fig. 12), BD, BU, DW, WU, cut each ſquare in half?

BOY. They do.

SOC.

Soc. Are not theſe four lines drawn of equal length, theſe, which encloſe the ſquare ſpace, BDWU?

Boy. They be ſo.

Soc. Now conſider, how large this ſquare is which is encloſed by thoſe four lines.

Boy. Why, I do not know.

Soc. Are not thoſe four ſquares (fig. 12), ABCD, BTUC, CDXW, WYUC, cut each of them in half by theſe four lines, BD, BU, DW, WU, drawn within them; or are they not?

Boy. They be.

Soc. In the ſquare (fig. 12), ATYX, how many ſpaces are there then, as large as the ſpace ABCD?

Boy. Four.

Soc. And how many ſuch in the ſquare (fig. 12), BDWU, from which half the other is cut off?

Boy. Two.

Soc. How many more are four than two?

Boy. Twice as many.

Soc. How many ſquare feet then doth this ſquare, BDWU, contain?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. From what line is it drawn?

Boy. From this here.

Soc. From (fig. 12) the line BD, do you ſay, reaching from corner to corner of the ſquare ABCD, which contains four ſquare feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. The ſophiſts call ſuch a line the diameter. If the diameter then be its name, from the diameter of a ſquare, as you ſay, you boy of Meno's, may be drawn a ſquare twice as large as the ſquare of which it is the diameter[1].

Boy.

[1] This theorem, ſaid to have been diſcovered by Pythagoras, is perhaps the moſt beautiful of all ſimple theorems in geometry: and yet is not to be found, in expreſs terms, among thoſe fundamental theorems, demonſtrated in Euclid's Elements. It is cited, however, in the demonſtration of the laſt propoſition in the tenth book: and a reference is there made to the 47th propoſition of the firſt book; in which indeed this fine theorem is implicitly contained: for

Omne

Boy. It is ſo, Socrates, for certain.

Soc. Well; what think you, Meno? Has this boy, in his anſwers, given any other opinion than his own?

Meno. None other: he has given his own opinion only.

Soc. And yet, but a little before, as we both obſerved, he had no knowledge of the matter propoſed, and knew not how to give a right anſwer.

Meno. True.

Soc. But thoſe very opinions, which you acknowledge to be his own, were in him all the time: were they not?

Meno. They were.

Soc. In a man therefore, who is ignorant, there are true opinions concerning thoſe very things of which he is ignorant.

Meno. It appears there are.

Soc. Thoſe opinions then are ſtirred up afreſh in the mind of that boy, as fancies are in dreaming. And if he ſhould frequently be queſtioned of theſe things, and by many different perſons, you may be aſſured he will at length know them with as much certainty as any man.

Meno. Indeed, it ſeems ſo.

Soc. Will he not then know them without being taught them, having only been aſked queſtions, and recovering of himſelf from within himſelf his loſt knowledge?

Meno. He will.

Soc. But our recovery of knowledge from within ourſelves, is not this what we call reminiſcence?

Meno. Without doubt.

Soc. And this knowledge, which he now has, muſt he not at ſome time or other have acquired it, or elſe have always been poſſeſſed of it?

Meno. Certainly.

Omne majus continet in ſe minus.—Proclus, in his Commentary on the Firſt Book of thoſe Elements, admires Euclid, becauſe the noble theorem, introduced here by Plato, relating only to right-angled iſoſceles-triangles, is by Euclid extended to all right-angled triangles, ſcalene as well as iſoſceles. We heartily join with him in this admiration; but could wiſh that the original theorem of Pythagoras had been ſubjoined, as a corollary, to that truly admirable propoſition, the 47th.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Now if he was always poſſeſſed of it, he was always a perſon of knowledge. But if at any time he firſt received it, was it not in this preſent life? unleſs ſome perſon has taught him the ſcience of geometry. For he will make his anſwers with no leſs certainty in every part of geometry, and indeed in all the other mathematical ſciences [1]. Is there any one, then, who has taught the boy all this? I aſk you; becauſe you ought to know, ſince he was born and bred up in your family.

Meno. I am certain that no perſon has ever taught him thoſe ſciences.

Soc. And yet he entertains thoſe opinions, which he has juſt now declared: does he not?

Meno. It appears, Socrates, that he muſt.

Soc. If then he had this knowledge within him [2], not having acquired it in this preſent life, it is plain that in ſome other time he had learnt it and actually poſſeſſed it.

Meno. It appears ſo.

Soc. And was not that time then, when he was not a man?

Meno. Certainly.

Soc. If true opinions then are in him, at both theſe times, the time when he is [3], and the time when he is not a man; opinions which, awakened and rouſed by queſtions [4], riſe up into ſcience; muſt not his ſoul be well furniſhed with this diſcipline [5] throughout all ages? for it is plain, that in every age he either is, or is not a man.

Meno. In all appearance it muſt be ſo.

[1] For every mathematical demonſtration depends on viewing equal and unequal, like and unlike, in all computations, in all diagrams, and in all meaſures, whether of ſound or of motion.—S.

[2] In the Greek we here find a negative, *ει—ουκ ηδει τουτο*, which, however, if it be retained, alters not the ſenſe upon the whole; but the ſentence is then to be tranſlated thus; "If then, not having acquired this knowledge in the preſent life, juſt now he had it not," (becauſe he had forgotten it;) &c. But the meaning ſeems eaſier to be conceived, if the *ουκ* be omitted.—S.

[3] Future editors of Plato may conſider, whether we ought not here to read *ὁν αν η χρονον*, inſtead of *ὁταν η χρονον*. Cornarius alſo, we find, has made this emendation.—S.

[4] We have here ſuppoſed, that the Greek of this place ſhould be thus read, *αι αν' ερωτησεις επεγερθεισαι*.—S.

[5] That is, with the principles of ſcience eſſential to the ſoul of man.—S.

Soc.

Soc. If the truth of things [1] therefore is always in the ſoul, the ſoul ſhould be immortal. So that whatever you happen now not to know, that is, not to remember, you ought to undertake with confidence to ſeek within yourſelf, and recall it to your mind.

Meno. You ſeem to me, Socrates, ſome how or other to ſpeak rightly.

Soc. As to my own part, Meno, I would not contend very ſtrenuouſly for the truth of my argument in other reſpects; but that in thinking it our duty to ſeek after the knowledge of things we are at preſent ignorant of, we ſhould become better men, more manly, and leſs idle, than if we ſuppoſe it not poſſible for us to find out, nor our duty to inquire into, what we know not; this I would, if I was able, ſtrongly, both by word and deed, maintain.

Meno. In this alſo, Socrates, you ſeem to me to ſay well.

Soc. Since then we are agreed in this point, that what a man knows not, he ought to inquire after and ſeek to know, are you willing that we attempt jointly to inquire into the nature of virtue?

Meno. By all means, willing. Not but that I ſhould have moſt pleaſure in taking into conſideration, and hearing what you have to ſay on the queſtion I firſt aſked you, whether, in ſetting about our inquiries concerning virtue, we ſhould conſider it as a thing that may be taught, or as being by nature with thoſe who have it, or as attainable by ſome other means, and what they are.

Soc. Were I to govern not only myſelf, Meno, but you too, we would not conſider whether virtue could be taught or not, before we had inquired, in the firſt place, what virtue was. But ſince you, without ſo much as attempting to govern yourſelf, for fear (I ſuppoſe) of being leſs free and leſs a gentleman, undertake however to govern me, and actually do govern me, I ſhall yield to you. For indeed how can I help myſelf? or what is to be done without it? We are to conſider then, it ſeems, what belongs to ſome certain thing, whilſt yet we know not what the thing is. But if you

[1] The words of Plato are αληθεια των οντων.——The truth or reality of all things which are, depends on the truth of the firſt principles of things. For truth metaphyſical is here meant. But in truths logical it is the ſame: all theſe depend on the truth of the firſt principles of ſcience.—S.

ſtill

ſtill perſiſt, however relax a little the ſtrictneſs of your command, and ſuffer the queſtion, whether virtue can be taught a man, or how otherwiſe it is attained, to be conſidered hypothetically. By hypothetically I mean in the ſame manner as geometricians often treat a queſtion; for inſtance, when they are aſked concerning ſome geometrical figure [1], whether it is poſſible for (fig. 13) ſuch a particular triangle to be inſcribed [2] in (fig. 14) ſuch a particular circle. A geometrician would anſwer,—I know not [3] as yet, of what kind this triangle is [4]. But I can make a ſuppoſition, which I think may be of uſe in anſwering your queſtion,——this;———Suppoſing the triangle to be of ſuch a kind, as that a circle being drawn about [5] a given ſide of it, the whole ſpace of the triangle be included within the circular ſpace deſcribed around it [6], the conſequence will then be one thing; but quite another conſequence will follow, if it cannot be ſo included [7]. Laying

[1] Or rather the largeneſs of the ſpace contained in that figure. The words of Plato are περι χωριου. And χωριον was a term uſed by the old Greek mathematicians to ſignify the ſpace comprehended by the lines of any geometrical figure.——S.

[2] The Greek word here is ενταθηναι, that is, *to be extended within*. The meaning of which words ſeems, at firſt ſight, to be the ſame with that of εγγραφεσθαι in Euclid's Elements, Lib. iv. Def. 3. But probably there is a difference between them, as will preſently be remarked.—S.

[3] The angles of this triangle being not, as yet, either meaſured or ſuppoſed.—S.

[4] Whether right-angled, obtuſe, or acute-angled.—S.

[5] It ſeems neceſſary here to make a ſmall alteration in the text as it is printed: by reading ΠΕΡΙ την δοθεισαν αυτου γραμμην ΠΕΡΙ τεινανται, inſtead of παρα and παρατεινανται.——Περιτεινειν ſeems, at firſt view, to have the ſame meaning with περιγραφειν in the fourth book of Euclid's Elements. The difference between them, as alſo between εντεινειν and εγγραφειν, will be conjectured in a ſubſequent note.—S.

[6] If the alteration, made in the preceding note, be juſt, we are obliged, in conſequence of it, to read here ΠΕΡΙτεταμενον in the Greek, inſtead of παρατεταμενον, the word in Stephen's edition. The former editions, by a miſtake ſtill greater, give us παρατεταμενων. For want of this ſmall emendation, Grynæus, who undertook to amend Ficinus's tranſlation, was led to fancy I know not what parallelograms; which throw ſo much obſcurity over this whole paſſage, that the true meaning of it has never ſince been ſo much as conjectured. Ficinus himſelf indeed ſeems to have had a ſhrewd gueſs at it, even without making the emendation; as appears by his marginal reference to the fourth book of Euclid's Elements, and by the triangles he preſents us with.—S.

[7] That is, if it be impoſſible to include the whole triangle within that circle, which is drawn about one of its ſides. And impoſſible this is, when ſome part of the circle υπερβαλλει *exceeds*, or reaches beyond the circle; and ουκ ελλειπει *does not fall within it*; as it does in the other, the caſe put firſt. See the figures referred to. It ſeems to be ſuppoſed in both the caſes, that it may appear by inſpection, or be found by menſuration of the diameters, whether a circle, drawn about the given ſide of the triangle, be equal or unequal to the circle given.—S.

down therefore theſe two hypotheſes diſtinctly, I can tell you what will follow, in each of theſe caſes[1], as to the inſcribing that triangle within the circle, whether it be impoſſible or poſſible. Now the ſame way ſhall we take in our inquiry concerning virtue: ſince we know not, either what it is, or what is to be attributed to it, we ſhall lay down an hypotheſis concerning it; and, on the footing of that hypotheſis, ſhall conſider whether it is to be taught or not. Let us then ſtate the queſtion thus: Suppoſing virtue to be in that order of things which belongs to the ſoul, is virtue, on this hypotheſis, to be taught, or not to be taught? In the firſt place, it is either a different kind of thing from knowledge, or a thing of the ſame kind with knowledge: and on each of theſe hypotheſes let us inquire, whether virtue is or is not to be taught, or (as we lately expreſſed it) recalled to mind; for whichever of theſe expreſſions we uſe, let it make no difference to us. The queſtion is then, whether virtue is to be taught. Now is it not evident to every one, that man is taught no other thing than knowledge?

MENO. To me it ſeems ſo.

SOC.

[1] In ſtating the queſtion, it muſt be ſuppoſed as evident, that the given ſide of the triangle is not greater than the diameter of the given circle. For if it be greater, no ſuch queſtion can be propoſed by any man; the abſurdity of it, or impoſſibility of the thing propoſed to be done, appears too plainly.—It ſhould ſeem alſo, that this given ſide is to be made the diameter of the circle to be drawn, by taking the middle point of this ſide for the centre. For thus, and thus only, can the circle properly be ſaid περιτεινεσθαι περι την δοθεισαν γραμμην, *to be drawn around* or about *the given ſide*. If this be granted; then, in the caſe which is put firſt (the poſſible one), that angle of the triangle, which is ſubtended by the given ſide, muſt be either (fig. 15) a right angle, or (fig. 16) an obtuſe angle: in the other (the impoſſible) caſe, that angle muſt be (fig. 17) acute. If the angle be ſuppoſed a right angle, then will the circle drawn be περιγραφομενον, *circumſcribed* about the triangle; and the triangle may alſo εγγραφεσθαι, be *inſcribed* within the equal given circle: for every angle of it would touch the circumference of that circle. Now in the caſe, firſt ſuppoſed by Plato, had he meant this only, we preſume he would have uſed thoſe very words of Euclid, περιγραφομενον and εγγραφεσθαι. For Euclid, the author of the Elements, was one of Plato's diſciples; and it is probable, beſides, that the terms of geometry were ſettled before the time of Plato. But if the angle in queſtion be ſuppoſed (fig. 18) an obtuſe angle, then though the triangle may εγγραφεσθαι, *be inſcribed* in a circle, whoſe diameter is greater than the ſide ſubtending the obtuſe angle; yet it cannot εγγραφεσθαι, *be inſcribed* (fig. 16) in a circle, whoſe diameter is equal to that ſide. However, it may properly enough be ſaid ενταθηναι, *to be extended within* ſuch a circle; becauſe the utmoſt extent of it is included within that circle. And juſt in the ſame manner, though ſuch a circle (fig. 16) cannot be ſaid, in ſpeaking ſtrictly, and according to Euclid's definition, περιγραφεσθαι, *to be circumſcribed* about it; yet is the circle περιτεινομενον, *ſtretched*

Soc. If virtue, therefore, be a certain kind of knowledge, it is evident that virtue is to be taught.

Meno. Undoubtedly.

Soc. We have quickly then diſpatched this part of the inquiry; and are fairly come to this concluſion, that if virtue be a thing of the ſame kind with knowledge, it is to be taught; otherwiſe not.

Meno. Very true.

Soc. Next after this, it ſeems, that we ſhould conſider whether virtue be knowledge or of a kind different from knowledge.

Meno. We ought, I think, in the next place to conſider this.

Soc. Well now; ſhall we ſuppoſe that virtue is a thing which is good; and ſhall we abide by this hypotheſis, laying it down for certain that virtue is ſomething good?

Meno. By all means.

Soc. Now if there be alſo any other good ſeparated from knowledge, then perhaps virtue may not be a certain kind of knowledge. But if there be no ſort of good which is not comprehended under knowledge, then a ſuſpicion that virtue was knowledge of a certain kind would be a juſt ſuſpicion.

Meno. What you ſay is true.

Soc. But further; is it not through virtue that we are good?

Meno. It is.

Soc. And if good, then advantageous. For all things that are good are advantageous: are they not?

Meno. They are.

Soc. Virtue then is a thing advantageous too.

ſtretched around it, and contains it. So by the Greek hiſtorians is a wall ſaid περιτεινεσθαι, around a camp or a city, when the wall ſurrounds and encloſes it, although no tent or houſe ſhould touch the wall. But Plato's meaning is, we think, put out of diſpute by the word ελλειπειν, which agrees not to a triangle that touches the circle by every one of its angles; and is compatible only to a triangle, one angle of which, at the leaſt, falls ſhort of the circumference of that (fig. 16) circle drawn around it. Ελλειπειν is alſo oppoſed to ὑπερβαλλειν. And in the latter caſe, ſuppoſed by Plato, where the whole triangle cannot be contained within the (fig. 17) circle drawn about the given ſide, the angle, which is ſubtended by this ſide, muſt be an acute angle; and the ſides, which contain this angle, will, to meet and form the angle, reach beyond the circumference of the circle.—S.

MENO. It follows of neceſſity from what we juſt now granted.

SOC. Now let us conſider what ſort of things thoſe are which profit and are advantageous to us; enumerating the particulars: health, we all ſay, and ſtrength, and beauty, and riches. Theſe things and others of like kind we call advantageous: do we not?

MENO. We do.

SOC. And ſay we not, that theſe very things are ſometimes hurtful to us? or do you pronounce otherwiſe?

MENO. No otherwiſe; I ſay the ſame.

SOC. Conſider now, what is the leading cauſe when any of theſe things profit us; and[1] what when they hurt us. Is it not, when right uſe preſides in the management of them, that they profit us, and when right uſe is wanting, that they hurt us?

MENO. Certainly ſo.

SOC. Further then, let us conſider things belonging to the ſoul. Do you admit that temperance is ſomething in the ſoul; and ſo of juſtice, and fortitude, and docility, and memory, and magnanimity, and all things of like kind?

MENO. I do.

SOC. Now conſider ſuch of theſe things, as you think not to conſiſt in knowledge, but to be of a kind different from knowledge. Do not theſe procure us ſometimes hurt, and ſometimes advantage? for inſtance, fortitude; unleſs fortitude is not where prudence is wanting: let our inſtance then be boldneſs. When a man is bold without reaſon or underſtanding, does he not incur miſchief? And when he is bold rationally and wiſely, does he not gain advantage?

MENO. It is true.

SOC. Is it not true of temperance alſo, and docility, that to a man who

[1] We have made our tranſlation here conformable to the text of Plato, as printed by Stephens, and explained in the margin of his edition, ὁταν τι, βλαπτει. But we ſuſpect an error in thoſe words, and that the right reading is, ὁταν μη, βλαπτει. For if Plato wrote τι, *wrong uſe* ought to be mentioned in what immediately follows. But it is not; and rightly not: becauſe wrong uſe is nothing poſitive, and can manage nothing; it is only the want of right uſe. As a crooked line is nothing certain or determinate; it is a deviation only from a ſtraight line.—S.

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has learnt and is provided with them, if his ſoul at the ſame time be fraught with underſtanding, they are advantageous; but, if he wants underſtanding, they are hurtful?

MENO. Moſt undoubtedly.

SOC. In a word, all the abilities of the ſoul, whether they be of he active kind or of the paſſive, under the conduct of prudence, do they not tend to happineſs; but managed with imprudence, do they not produce the contrary effect?

MENO. It is probable they do.

SOC. If virtue then be one of thoſe things belonging to the ſoul, and if it be of neceſſity, as you ſay, always advantageous, virtue muſt be prudence: for we ſee, that all other things belonging to the ſoul are of themſelves neither advantageous nor hurtful; but let there be added to them imprudence or prudence, and they thus become either hurtful or advantageous. Now according to this reaſoning, virtue being always advantageous, muſt be ſome kind of prudence.

MENO. To me it ſeems ſo.

SOC. Now then as to thoſe other things, which we ſaid juſt now were ſometimes beneficial and ſometimes hurtful, riches, and the reſt of external goods; I aſk whether or no as prudence, preſiding in the ſoul, and governing her other powers and poſſeſſions, applies them to our advantage; and as imprudence, having the lead, turns them all to miſchief; whether in the ſame manner the ſoul, rightly uſing and adminiſtering thoſe outward things, employs them for our benefit, but by a wrong uſe renders them prejudicial and pernicious?

MENO. Moſt certainly.

SOC. And are not things adminiſtered and uſed rightly by a ſoul poſſeſſed of prudence; but amiſs and ill by a ſoul poſſeſſed with folly?

MENO. They are.

SOC. Thus then we may pronounce it to hold good univerſally: to man all external things [1] depend on his ſoul; and all things belonging to the ſoul itſelf depend on prudence for their being good and beneficial to him. Now

[1] In the Greek τα αλλα, all *other things*; all which are not within the ſoul. The ſtoical word we have uſed is exactly agreeable to the mind of Plato.—S.

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it follows from this reaſoning, that prudence is always advantageous. But did we not juſt now ſay the ſame of virtue too?

MENO. True.

SOC. We conclude, therefore, that prudence is virtue; either the whole of virtue, or ſome part at leaſt.

MENO. What has been ſaid ſeems to me, Socrates, to have been well ſaid.

SOC. If then it be ſo, the good are not good by nature.

MENO. It ſeems to me, they are not.

SOC. For then, this too would follow. If the good were good by nature we ſhould have, ſomewhere or other, perſons who knew which of our youth were good and virtuous in their natures; and theſe, when they had diſcovered them to us, we ſhould take and guard in the citadel, putting our ſeal on them more carefully than we ſhould on gold; that no perſon might corrupt them, and that when they arrived at the age of manhood, they might become uſeful to the ſtate.

MENO. It is likely, Socrates, that in that caſe this would be done.

SOC. Since the good, therefore, are not good by nature, whether are they good by teaching or not?

MENO. I think it now neceſſary to hold this in the affirmative. And it is plain, Socrates, that if virtue be knowledge, according to our hypotheſis before, then it may be taught.

SOC. Perhaps ſo, by Jove. But I fear we did amiſs in admitting that hypotheſis.

MENO. And yet very lately it ſeemed to be maintained fairly.

SOC. But I ſuſpect, it ought not only to have lately ſeemed to be maintained fairly, but to ſeem ſo at preſent, and hereafter too, if there be any thing in it ſound or faultleſs.

MENO. What is the matter now? in what reſpect do you find fault with it? and why doubt of its being true, that virtue is a kind of knowledge?

SOC. I will tell you, Meno. That virtue is to be taught, ſuppoſing it to be a ſcience, or ſome kind of knowledge, this poſition of ours I call not into queſtion, nor have any doubt of its being true. But conſider whether I appear not to have reaſon for doubting the truth of the ſuppoſition, that

virtue is a kind of knowledge. For anſwer me to this queſtion; whatever is taught, I ſpeak not of virtue only, but of every other ſubject of diſcipline or teaching, muſt there not be of neceſſity both teachers of it and ſcholars?

MENO. I think there muſt.

SOC. That thing, therefore, on the contrary, of which there are neither teachers nor ſcholars to be found, ſhould we not think rightly, in thinking it probable that it is not the ſubject of teaching?

MENO. True. But do you really think that no maſters are to be found who teach virtue?

SOC. Though I have often ſought about, and inquired if there were any teachers of virtue, with my utmoſt endeavours I cannot find any. And yet I invite many perſons to join with me in the ſearch, eſpecially ſuch as I might preſume to have the moſt experience in that affair. And juſt now, Meno, in happy time, is this man [1] ſat down by us, who may be a party in our inquiry. And it ſhould ſeem reaſonable for us to make him a party: for, in the firſt place, he is the ſon of the wealthy and the wiſe Anthemion, a man who is become rich, not by accident, nor yet by legacy, as he has done to whom the riches of Polycrates [2] are now of late devolved, Iſmenias [3] of Thebes, but having acquired his wealth through his own wiſdom and induſtry; and then as to his other good qualities, he is a citizen who is thought neither contemptuous and inſolent, nor oſtentatious and giving

[1] Shewing Anytus to Meno, without mentioning his name, becauſe Meno was well acquainted with him, as being at that time entertained at his houſe. It is probable, that Anytus had now ſeated himſelf cloſe to Socrates, to catch at ſome words or other in his diſcourſe with Meno, for a better handle to the accuſation he was now meditating againſt him.—S.

[2] The Polycrates, whom we preſume to be here meant, was tyrant of Samos, ſo famous for ſucceeding in every affair that he engaged in, (as we learn from Herodotus, lib. iii.) that Lucian, in his Charon, calls him πανευδαιμων, *fortunate in all things*; and ſo immenſely rich, that the ſame Lucian, in his πλουτον, ranks him with Crœſus in that reſpect. The unhappy end he met with, in being murdered by one of his ſlaves, at the procurement of one of his courtiers, Orontes, a Perſian nobleman by birth, who ſeized on all his vaſt riches, was fortunate for Iſmenias, to whom at length they came by legacy.—S.

[3] Iſmenias was commander in chief of all the Theban forces, and ambaſſador from Thebes at the court of Artaxerxes; where he ingratiated himſelf ſo much by his addreſs, in complying with the ceremonial of that haughty court, without departing from the dignity of a free Grecian, that he not only met with ſucceſs in the public ends of his embaſſy, but obtained that prodigious increaſe

giving trouble to all about him, but behaves decently and conducts himself like a modeſt and frugal man. And beſides all this, he has educated and inſtructed his ſon here excellently well, in the opinion of the Athenian multitude; for they elect him to the higheſt offices in the ſtate. Such men it is right to make of our party, when we are inquiring after maſters who teach virtue, whether any are to be found and who they are. Join yourſelf therefore, Anytus, to us, to me, and Meno here, your gueſt at Athens, in our inquiry concerning virtue, who are the teachers of it. And conſider the queſtion thus; Suppoſe this Meno had an inclination to be made a good phyſician, and applied to us for our advice in the affair, to what maſters ſhould we ſend him? ſhould we not ſend him to the phyſicians?

ANY. By all means.

SOC. And to make him a good currier[1], ſhould we not ſend him to the curriers?

ANY. To be ſure.

SOC. And in all other ſubjects of inſtruction, ſhould we not take the ſame way?

ANY. Without doubt.

SOC. But concerning this point, let me aſk you another queſtion. In ſending him to the phyſicians, we ſay we ſhould do well, if we intended the making him a good phyſician. Now when we ſay this, do we not mean, that we ſhould act with prudence in ſending him, not to any who profeſs not the art of healing, but to thoſe who make it their profeſſion; and who, beſides, are paid for teaching[2] it to others; and thus, by this very acceptance of pay, take upon themſelves to teach any one who is willing to come and

increaſe of his private fortune, the inheritance of Orontes, left to him probably by the laſt of Orontes's deſcendants. That piece of addreſs, however, as related by Plutarch in his Life of Artaxerxes, and more fully by Ælian in his various hiſtories, was no other than ſuch as would have recommended him to our King James the Firſt. Not that we call in queſtion the perſonal merit of Iſmenias; for we ſuppoſe it to be with regard to this very merit, as well as to the reward it met with, that he is here ſet in contraſt with Anthemion.—S.

[1] A reflection this on the education of Anytus, ſlyly hinting that he was fit for nothing elſe. Plato, in this part of the dialogue, indulges a little his ſatirical genius, out of revenge for the death of Socrates, contrived and compaſſed by this Anytus.—S.

[2] It appears from this paſſage, that there were, in thoſe days, profeſſors of phyſic at Athens, ſuch as there are in modern univerſities.—S.

learn?

learn; I aſk you whether it is not from theſe conſiderations that we ſhould do well in ſending him to the phyſicians?

ANY. I anſwer, yes.

SOC. In the learning muſic too, and every other art, are not the ſame conſiderations juſt? Surely it is great want of underſtanding in us, if we are deſirous of having ſome perſon taught muſic, not to chooſe for his maſters ſuch as profeſs the teaching of the art, and the taking of money too for their teaching; but, inſtead of this, to give trouble to other people, expecting him to learn from thoſe who do not pretend to be teachers, and have not one ſcholar in that learning in which we expect our ſtudent ſhould be by them inſtructed. Think you not that ſuch an expectation would be very unreaſonable?

ANY. I do, by Jupiter; and a great ſign of ignorance too, beſides.

SOC. You ſay well. Now then you have an opportunity of conſidering together with me, and giving your advice about this gueſt of yours, Meno here. For he has often told me long ago [1], Anytus, that he wiſhed to acquire that wiſdom and virtue [2], through which men govern well both their families and the commonwealth; through which alſo they behave reſpectfully to their parents; and know how to entertain both their countrymen and foreigners, and what preſents to make them at their departure, in ſuch a manner as becomes a good man. Were we then to recommend to him any perſons [3] from whom he might learn this virtue, conſider whom we ſhould do right in recommending. Is it not clear that, agreeably to what we have juſt now ſaid in other caſes, they would be thoſe perſons who profeſs to be teachers of virtue, and publicly through all Greece offer themſelves to teach it to any one who deſires to learn; fixing the price of this their teaching, and demanding it as their juſt fee?

[1] This was probably in ſome former trip which Meno had made to Athens when a youth.—S.

[2] Here we have an account of the principal topics of praiſe and admiration in thoſe antient days.—S.

[3] In the Greek of this paſſage it is evident there is ſome word omitted. Stephens ſaw this, and in the margin of his edition conjectures the word δια to be wanting in the beginning of the ſentence. But as this conjecture is not ſatisfactory to us, we beg leave to offer to the future editors of Plato one or two of our own; viz. to read either διδαξοντας, or μαθησομενον, after αρετην, in the middle of the ſentence, or the latter of thoſe two words at the end of it.—S.

ANY. And what perſons, Socrates, do you mean?

SOC. You cannot be ignorant that I ſpeak of thoſe who are called ſophiſts[1].

ANY. O Hercules! ſpeak not ſo ſhamefully, Socrates. May none of my relations, friends, or acquaintance, fellow-citizens, or foreign gueſts, ever be ſeized with ſuch a madneſs as to go and be ſpoiled by thoſe men. For the bane and corruption thoſe men are of all who follow them.

SOC. How ſay you, Anytus? Are theſe the only men among thoſe who profeſs the knowledge of ſomething beneficial to human kind, ſo widely different from all the reſt, as not only not to improve and make better what is put into their hands as the others do, but on the contrary to corrupt and ſpoil it? and do they think fit openly to demand fees to be paid them for ſo doing? I cannot tell how I ſhould give credit to this account of yours. For I know one man in particular, Protagoras, to have acquired ſingly more riches from having this wiſdom, than Phidias has from his works ſo celebrated for their beauty, together with any ten other ſtatuaries beſides. It is a prodigy what you tell me; when the menders of old ſhoes and of old clothes could not eſcape a month from being publicly known, if they returned the clothes or ſhoes in a worſe condition than they received them; but doing ſo would be ſoon reduced to ſtarving; yet, that Protagoras ſhould corrupt and ſpoil his followers, and ſend them home worſe men than when they firſt came to him, without being diſcovered by all Greece, and this for above forty years. For I think he was near ſeventy years of age when he died, after having ſpent forty of them in the practice of his profeſſion. And during all that time he maintained a high reputation, which continues even to this day. And not only Protagoras met with this ſucceſs, but very many others: ſome of whom were prior to him in time, and ſome flouriſh at preſent. Now ſhall we ſuppoſe that they deceived and corrupted the youth, as you ſay they did, knowingly? or ſhall we ſuppoſe they did ſo unconſcious of it to themſelves? Shall we deem them to be ſo much out of their ſenſes, ſuch men, who are ſaid by ſome to be the wiſeſt of mankind?

[1] That Socrates in this ſpeaks ironically and in jeſt, the readers of Plato will of themſelves obſerve. But let them be pleaſed to obſerve further, how little Anytus could know of Socrates, of his way of thinking, or his common converſation, in taking him as he does to be here in earneſt.—S.

ANY.

ANY. They are far from being out of their ſenſes, Socrates: rather ſo are thoſe of the youth, who give them money for corrupting them; and ſtill more ſo than theſe youths are their relations in committing them to the guidance of ſuch men; but moſt of all ſo are thoſe cities which ſuffer ſuch men to come in amongſt them, and drive not away and baniſh every man, whether foreigner or citizen, who ſets up in any ſuch profeſſion.

SOC. Has any of the ſophiſts done you any injury, Anytus? or why elſe are you ſo angry with them?

ANY. I have never, by Jupiter, converſed with one of them myſelf; nor would I ſuffer ſo to do any perſon who belonged to me.

SOC. You have no experience at all then of thoſe men.

ANY. And never deſire to have any.

SOC. How then ſhould you know if there is any good or any harm in their teaching, when you have no experience of it at all?

ANY. Eaſily enough. For I know what ſort of fellows they are, whether I have had any experience or not of them and of their teaching.

SOC. You have the gift of divination perhaps, Anytus. For how otherwiſe you could know what they are, according to your own account, I ſhould much wonder. But we were not inquiring to what perſons Meno might go, and be made a bad man. As to theſe, if you will, let them be the ſophiſts. But now tell us of thoſe others: and do an act of kindneſs to this hereditary friend of yours, in directing him to what perſons in this great city he may go and be made eminent in that virtue which I gave you a deſcription of juſt now.

ANY. But why did not you direct him to ſuch perſons yourſelf?

SOC. What perſons I had imagined were the teachers of theſe duties I have told you. But I happen to have ſaid nothing to the purpoſe, as you inform me.

ANY. There is ſome truth however in that perhaps.

SOC. Now, therefore, do you in your turn tell him to whom of the Athenians he ſhould go. Name any one you chooſe.

ANY. What occaſion has he to hear any one man's name? For of the men of honour and virtue among the Athenians, there is not one, the firſt he meets with, who would not make him a better man than the ſophiſts would, if he will but hearken and be obſervant.

Soc. But did theſe men of honour and virtue become ſuch ſpontaneouſly, and without having learnt from any man to be what they are? and are they able to teach others what they were never taught themſelves?

Any. They, I preſume, learnt from thoſe who went before them, men of like honour and virtue. Or think you not that our city has produced many excellent men?

Soc. I think, Anytus, that in this city there are men excellent in political affairs, and that there have been others no leſs excellent before them. But were they good teachers of that political excellence? For it is this which happens to be the ſubject of our preſent debate: not whether men of honour and virtue are to be found at preſent in this city or not; nor whether ſuch were to be found here formerly: but whether virtue is to be taught or not. This we have been of a long time conſidering and inquiring; and in proſecuting the inquiry, we are fallen upon this queſtion, whether thoſe excellent men, either of theſe or of former days, knew how to impart, or to deliver down to others, that virtue in which they themſelves are ſo excellent; or whether it be impoſſible for man to deliver down or to impart virtue, and for men to receive it one from another. This it is which we have been long examining, I and Meno. Conſider the queſtion now in this manner, on the footing of your own argument. Would you not ſay that Themiſtocles [1] was a man of virtue?

Any. I would; and that he was ſo the moſt of all men too.

Soc. And would you not then ſay, that if ever any man could teach his own virtue to another, Themiſtocles was a good teacher?

Any. I ſuppoſe he was, had he had a mind to teach.

Soc. But do you ſuppoſe that he had no mind to have ſome others made men of honour and virtue, and eſpecially his own ſon? or do you imagine that he maliciouſly and deſignedly withheld from him that virtue in which he himſelf was excellent? Did you never hear that Themiſtocles taught [2] his

[1] For the character of this excellent general and ſtateſman ſee Plutarch, who has written his life.—S.

[2] Plutarch had in view this paſſage of Plato, where, in reckoning up the children of Themiſtocles, and coming to Cleophantus, he ſays, ου και πλατων ὁ φιλοσοφος ὡς ἱππεως αριστου, ταλλα δ' ουδενος αξιου γενομενου, μνημονευει, *that he is mentioned alſo by Plato the Philoſopher, as an excellent horſeman, but in other reſpects worthleſs.*—S.

ſon Cleophantus [1] to be an excellent horſeman? and that his ſon attained to ſuch a pitch of excellence, that he would keep himſelf for a long time ſtanding upright upon horſes in full ſpeed, and in this ſituation would throw his javelin; and performed many other ſurpriſing feats [2] of horſemanſhip, in which his father had him inſtructed; and that he made him ſkilled in all other accompliſhments, ſuch as depend on having had good maſters? Have you heard all this from elderly people who remember it?

ANY. I have.

SOC. The diſpoſition of his ſon therefore is not to be found fault with as untowardly and unteachable.

ANY. Perhaps it is not.

SOC. But what ſay you to this? That Cleophantus the ſon of Themiſtocles was a ſkilful and an excellent man in the ſame way as his father was, have you ever heard this from any man, either young or old?

ANY. No, truly.

SOC. Do we imagine then that he choſe to breed him up in ſuch ſtudies and exerciſes as he did; and yet, in that wiſdom and ſkill in which he himſelf excelled, to make him, his own ſon, not at all a better man than his neighbours, if virtue could be taught?

ANY. That indeed is, perhaps, not to be ſuppoſed.

SOC. Such a teacher of virtue now is this teacher of yours, a man whom you yourſelf acknowledge to have been one of the beſt men of the laſt age. And now let us conſider another, Ariſtides [3], the ſon of Lyſimachus. Do you not agree that he was a man of virtue?

ANY. I do entirely.

[1] In the Greek of this ſentence the word εἶναι is plainly dropped, and ought to be reſtored in all future editions of Plato. In the Dialogue περὶ ἀρετῆς, attributed by ſome to Æſchines the Socratic, but which is almoſt copied from this part of the Meno, the neceſſary word εἶναι is not omitted. It is ſtrange that neither Cornaro nor Stephens obſerved ſo groſs an omiſſion in the manuſcripts of Plato.—S.

[2] It is obſervable that Plato here uſes the plural number: from whence we may conclude that the ſame wonderful performances in horſemanſhip were then taught at Athens which have lately been exhibited in our own country, ſuch as the ſtepping or ſkipping upright from horſe to horſe in full gallop, &c.—S.

[3] How great and how good a ſtateſman Ariſtides was appears in Plutarch's Life of him.—S.

Soc. And did he not give his ſon Lyſimachus [1] the beſt education to be had at Athens, ſo far as depended on maſters and teachers? and do you think he has made him a better man than common? You have had ſome acquaintance with him, and you ſee what ſort of a man he is [2]. Let another inſtance, if you pleaſe, be Pericles [3], a man ſo magnanimouſly wiſe [4]. You know that he bred up two ſons, Paralus and Xanthippus [5].

ANY. I do.

Soc. Theſe, as you know alſo, he taught horſemanſhip ſo as to make them equal in that ſkill to any of the Athenians. In muſic too, and gymnaſtic, and all other accompliments which depend on art, he inſtructed them ſo well that none excelled them. But had he no mind to make them good men? I believe he wanted not inclination ſo to do [6]; but I ſuſpect it to be impoſſible to teach virtue. And that you may not imagine that I ſpeak only of a few, and thoſe of the meaneſt birth [7] among the Athenians, and ſuch as

[1] It was common amongſt the Athenians to give the eldeſt ſon the name of his grandfather; ſo that two names were continued alternately in the ſame family.—S.

[2] We find nothing more of this Lyſimachus, than what we read in Plutarch, that the Athenians, out of reſpect to the memory of his father, who died poor, gave him a little landed eſtate, a ſum of money in hand, and a ſmall penſion; probably finding him unfit for any office in the ſtate. He is one of the ſpeakers, however, in Plato's Dialogue called Laches: in which he complains that his father, Ariſtides, had too much indulged him in leading an idle and luxurious life, and, giving himſelf up wholly to ſtate affairs, had neglected to cultivate his ſon's mind and to form his manners.—S.

[3] Plutarch has written the life of this conſummate politician, this truly great man.—S.

[4] In the Greek ἀτω μεγαλοπρεπως σοφον. With what propriety this epithet is beſtowed on him may be ſeen in Plutarch.—S.

[5] Concerning Paralus, nothing is recorded by Plutarch to his diſadvantage. Indeed he only mentions his name, and that he, as well as his brother and ſiſters, died of the plague, that great plague deſcribed in ſo lively a manner by Thucydides the hiſtorian. But as to Xanthippus, we learn from the great biographer, how unworthy he was of ſuch a father as Pericles, and how diſreſpectful and undutiful to him was his conduct.—S.

[6] This inſtance of Pericles is produced for the ſame purpoſe as it is here, by Plato in his Protagoras.—S.

[7] It is here plainly intimated, that the three great men, whom he had juſt before celebrated, were of mean extraction. Of Themiſtocles this is expreſsly confirmed by Plutarch, who ſays that he was of an obſcure family. Of Ariſtides it is probable, from the great poverty under which he laboured all his life-time. But of Pericles, Plutarch reports, on the contrary, that his mother was of a conſiderable family, and his father a man of great perſonal merit.—S.

wanted

wanted abilities for ſuch an affair, conſider that Thucydides [1] alſo bred up two ſons, Meleſias and Stephanus [2], giving them a good education in all other reſpects, and particularly in the exerciſe of wreſtling, in which they excelled all their countrymen. For he had one of his ſons inſtructed by Xanthius, the other by Eudorus [3]; and theſe two maſters, in the art of wreſtling, were thought to be the beſt of the age. Do you not remember this?

ANY. I remember that I have heard ſo.

SOC. Is it not evident then, that he would never have taught his children thoſe things, the teaching of which muſt have put him to expenſe, and, at the ſame time, have neglected what would have coſt him nothing, the teaching them to be good men, if ſuch a thing was poſſible to be taught? But Thucydides, perhaps it may be imagined, was a mean inconſiderable perſon, who had but few friends among the Athenians or their allies. It was not ſo. For he was of a noble houſe [4], and had great power in Athens, and much weight in the other Grecian ſtates [5]. So that, if his ſons could have made good

[1] Thucydides, here mentioned by Plato, was a different perſon from the hiſtorian of the ſame name. Plutarch tells us, and it is confirmed by Marcellinus, that he was a great politician and haranguer in the forum, and was ſet up by the ariſtocratical party in the commonwealth to oppoſe Pericles, who favoured the other ſide, the democratic. It is highly probable that he was the ſame Thucydides who, as we are told by the celebrated writer of the Hiſtory of the Peloponneſian War, was one of the commanders of the Athenian fleet ſent to Samos, to ſecond that which had been ſent thither before, under the command of Pericles; for the ſon of Meleſias ſeems to have been a proper perſon to counterpoiſe the exceſſive weight of the power of Pericles, and to pleaſe and conciliate to the Athenians the ariſtocratic party among the Samians.—S.

[2] This Meleſias is introduced by Plato in his Laches, as joining Lyſimachus in lamenting his want of the better parts of education, and in complaining of his father Thucydides's too great indulgence to him.—S.

[3] In all the editions of Plato he is called Euodorus; a name, we believe, not to be met with elſewhere. We have therefore not ſcrupled to follow the tranſlation of Cornarius, who, we preſume, read in his manuſcript Eudorus, a name to be found in Homer.—S.

[4] Of the greatneſs of his family, we know not of any thing appearing on record expreſsly to confirm this paſſage. But his alliance with Cimon, the ſon of Miltiades, makes it probable: for it is not uſual for either men or women, of noble anceſtry, to intermarry with the baſe-born. Now Plutarch ſays of this Thucydides, that he was κηδεστης Κιμωνος, *a near relation of Cimon's by marriage.*—S.

[5] This is very probable, if he was, as Plutarch relates, εις των καλων καγαθων ανδρων, *one of the men of honour and virtue* in that age. Plutarch, in another place, calls him ανδρα σωφρονα, *a man of ſound underſtanding.* Steſimbrotus the Thracian, alſo wrote a treatiſe, as we are informed by

good men by teaching, he might eaſily have found out ſome perſon to make them ſo, either one of his own countrymen, or a foreigner, if he himſelf wanted leiſure, on account of his public employments and his adminiſtration of the ſtate. But I fear, friend Anytus, that virtue is a thing impoſſible to be taught [1].

ANY. You ſeem to me, Socrates, to be ready at abuſe, and to ſpeak ill of others with great facility. But I would adviſe you, if you chooſe to hearken to me, to be more cautious, and to take care of yourſelf. For that, in other cities too, it is perhaps an eaſy matter to do a man a miſchief, as well as a piece of ſervice; but here, at Athens, it is ſo more eſpecially [2]; and, if I miſtake not, you are [3] ſenſible of it yourſelf [4].

by Athenæus, p. 589, concerning Themiſtocles, Thucydides, and Pericles. From the company, therefore, in which he is placed, both by Plato and Steſimbrotus, it appears how very conſiderable a perſon he was accounted.——We have written theſe laſt notes to prevent its being thought that Socrates ſpeaks here of Thucydides ironically, and really meaning to diſparage him. But we cannot conceive what, beſide malice, could darken the underſtanding of Athenæus to ſuch a degree, as to make him imagine that Plato in this dialogue ſpeaks ill of and vilifies Pericles and Themiſtocles, thoſe greateſt of the Grecians, ſays that writer, p. 506. Anytus, however, as we ſhall preſently ſee, was ſmitten with the ſame blindneſs, and perhaps from the ſame cauſe, the malignity of his own temper.—S.

[1] Meaning that it is impoſſible for thoſe to learn it who want the *ευφυια*, a truly good natural diſpoſition; and impoſſible alſo for thoſe to teach it who cannot teach it ſcientifically, for want of the principles of wiſdom, that is, impoſſible for any but true philoſophers. For this is what Plato would inſinuate in all this latter part of the dialogue.—S.

[2] Becauſe of the power of the populace, who were eaſily led away by ſome favourite demagogue. On which account Socrates, as Ælian reports in his Various Hiſtorys, b. iii. ch. xvii. likened the Athenian democracy to a tyranny, the arbitrary government of one man; or to a monarchy (abſolute), where the legiſlative power is in the hands of one: ſo far was it from an equal republic or commonwealth, which ſecures the rights, both natural and acquired, of every citizen; and is equitable alike to all.——Within three years before the death of Socrates, an oligarchy was forced upon the Athenians by their Lacedæmonian conquerors. Then was that great Leviathan, with the demagogic head, thrown to the ground, and a monſter with thirty heads tyrannized in his room, ſlaughtered thouſands without even pretence of law, and favoured only its own abettors.——The time of this dialogue ſeems to be, either towards the end of the oligarchic tyranny, or ſoon after the reſtoration of the democracy: what Anytus here ſays is equally applicable to both.—S.

[3] Hinting at the dangers which Socrates had incurred under both governments, by a manly oppoſition to the acts of tyranny committed in each, and by a ſtrict adherence to the antient laws of his country, as interpreted and explained by the eternal laws of juſtice and equity.—S.

[4] Anytus, having finiſhed his menacing ſpeech, appears to have turned himſelf away from Socrates

Soc. Anytus ſeems to me to be angry, Meno. And I am not at all ſurpriſed at it. For, in the firſt place, he ſuppoſes that I ſpoke ill of thoſe perſons I mentioned: and then he takes himſelf[1] to be ſuch another as they were. Now if this man ſhould ever come to know what it is to ſpeak ill of others, he will ceaſe to be angry: but at preſent he is ignorant of it. Do you therefore anſwer now, and tell me; are there not amongſt us men of honour and virtue?

MENO. Certainly there are.

Soc. But are theſe men willing to offer themſelves to the youth to teach them virtue? do they profeſs the teaching of it? or do they agree that virtue is a thing which can be taught?

MENO. No, by Jupiter, Socrates, they do not. For you may hear them ſometimes maintaining that it may be taught, at other times that it cannot be taught.

Soc. Shall we ſay then that theſe men are teachers of virtue, when they have not ſettled ſo much as this point, whether virtue can be taught or not?

MENO. I think we ſhould not, Socrates.

Soc. Well; but what ſay you of thoſe ſophiſts, the only perſons who profeſs to teach virtue, think you that they are the teachers?

MENO. It is for this, O Socrates, that I eſpecially admire Gorgias; for that one ſhall never hear him making any ſuch profeſſions, or taking upon himſelf an office of that kind. On the contrary, he laughs at thoſe others whenever he hears them engaging to teach men to be virtuous; and thinks it the office of a ſophiſt only to make men great orators and powerful in ſpeaking.

Soc. You do not think then that the ſophiſts neither are the teachers of virtue?

MENO. I know not what to ſay, Socrates, to this point. They have the ſame effect on me as they have on moſt other people; ſometimes I think they are, and ſometimes that they are not.

Socrates, but not to have withdrawn from the ſcene of converſation, which is continued on between Socrates and Meno to the end of the dialogue.—S.

[1] That is, he takes himſelf to be a great man like them; μεγαλοφρονων εφ' εαυτω, *thinking highly of himſelf*, ſays Laertius, in his Life of Socrates, referring to the Meno; meaning undoubtedly this paſſage, and rightly explaining it.—S.

Soc. Do you know, that not only yourſelf and thoſe others, who are verſed in civil affairs, ſometimes think that virtue is acquired through teaching, and ſometimes that it is not; do you know that Theognis the poet is of the ſame mind, and ſpeaks exactly in the ſame manner?

MENO. In what verſes of his?

Soc. In his Elegiacs [1]; where he ſays,

> Mix evermore with men, through virtue, great;
> And near to theirs be placed thy happy ſeat:
> Still be companion of their board and bowl,
> And ſtill to what delights them bend thy ſoul.
> For good through ſweet contagion ſhall be caught,
> And virtue be by living manners taught.
> But converſe of bad men is folly's ſchool;
> Where ſenſe, taught backward, ſinks into a fool.

Do you perceive that in theſe verſes he ſpeaks of virtue as if it might be acquired through teaching?

MENO. It appears ſo to me.

Soc. And yet in other verſes [2] a little farther on he ſays,

> To fools their wiſdom could the wiſe impart;
> Could underſtanding be infus'd by art;
> Or could right thought into the mind be driv'n;
> For this how oft would great rewards be giv'n?

That is, to thoſe men who were complete maſters in this ſkill. And again he ſays,

[1] An elegiac verſe, properly ſpeaking, is a pentameter, a verſe conſiſting of four feet and two half feet, equally divided; two feet and a half conſtituting the former part of the verſe, and two feet and a half the latter. But very few poems were ever written purely in this metre. Thoſe verſes were commonly called elegiac, where hexameter and pentameter verſes were uſed alternately; ſuch as the verſes cited here by Plato. They are found in that collection of the verſes of Theognis, extant at this day, under the title of Γνωμαι ελεγιακαι, beginning at verſe 33. One would imagine, from the laſt queſtion of Meno and this anſwer of Socrates, that Theognis wrote ſome other poems in a different metre. Fabricius accordingly ſays, that Γνωμαι were written by Theognis in 2800 verſes of heroic meaſure: and cites Suidas as his authority for this. We preſume that he read thus in ſome manuſcript or old edition of Suidas: but in Kuſter's edition we read elegiac and not heroic.—S.

[2] The verſes here cited, and thoſe which follow, begin at line 434 of Theognis.—S.

Ne'er

Ne'er did bad ſon from virtuous father riſe,
If duly nurtur'd by his precepts wiſe.
But whate'er culture careful we beſtow,
Ne'er in bad ſoil can ſeed of virtue grow.

Do you obſerve, that in ſpeaking again upon the ſame ſubject, he contradicts himſelf, and ſays the very reverſe of what he had ſaid before?

MENO. So it appears.

SOC. Can you tell me now of any other thing, where they who profeſs to be teachers are held by all men to be ſo far from teaching it to others, as to be ignorant of it themſelves, and to have no merit in that very thing which they pretend to teach; and where thoſe who are by all men allowed to be excellent themſelves, ſometimes ſay it may be taught, and ſometimes that it cannot? Thoſe who are ſo unſettled and perplexed about any ſubject whatever, would you ſay that they are the proper maſters and teachers of it?

MENO. By Jupiter, not I.

SOC. If then neither the ſophiſts, nor thoſe who are themſelves excellent men, are teachers of virtue, it is plain there can be no others beſide.

MENO. I think there can be none.

SOC. And if no teachers, then no ſcholars neither.

MENO. I think what you ſay is true.

SOC. But we agreed before, that a thing in which neither teachers of it nor ſcholars are to be found, is not the ſubject of teaching, and cannot be taught.

MENO. We were agreed in this.

SOC. Of virtue now there appear no where any teachers.

MENO. Very true.

SOC. And if no teachers of it, then no ſcholars in it neither.

MENO. It appears ſo.

SOC. Virtue therefore muſt be a thing which cannot be taught.

MENO. It ſeems ſo, if we have conſidered the matter rightly. And hence, Socrates, I am led to wonder, whether any men really good are ever to be found or not; and if there are, by what means they became ſuch.

SOC. We are in danger, O Meno! of being found, you and I, both of us, very inſufficient reaſoners on the point in queſtion; and you not to have been fully inſtructed by Gorgias, nor I by Prodicus. Above all things

therefore ought we to apply our minds to ourſelves; and to ſearch out a perſon who by ſome certain means would make us better men. I ſay this with regard to the inquiry now before us; in which we have been ſo fooliſh as not to conſider, that it is not under the conduct of ſcience that the affairs of men are adminiſtered rightly and well; or, if we ſhould not chooſe to grant that, at leaſt that it is not under the conduct of ſcience only, but of ſome other thing alſo which is different from ſcience; and perhaps the knowledge of the means by which men become good hath eſcaped us.

MENO. How ſo, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you how. That thoſe men who are good and virtuous muſt alſo be advantageous to us we have agreed rightly; and that it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe. Is not this true?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. And that they are advantageous to us on this account, becauſe they conduct our affairs rightly, ſhould we not do well in admitting this?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. But we ſeem not to have done well in granting, that unleſs a man be prudent, it is not poſſible for him to conduct affairs rightly.

MENO. What mean you now by the word rightly?

SOC. I will tell you what I mean. If a man who knew the way to Lariſſa [1], or wherever elſe you pleaſe, were to walk at the head of others whom he had undertaken to conduct thither, would he not conduct them well and rightly?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. And how would it be were a man to undertake this who had only a right opinion about the way, but had never gone thither himſelf, nor had any certain knowledge of the way, would not he alſo conduct them rightly?

MENO. To be ſure.

SOC. And ſo long as he had any how a right opinion of the way, which the other man knew with certainty, he would not in the leaſt be a worſe guide, though only ſurmiſing juſtly, and not knowing clearly, than the other with all his perfect knowledge?

[1] The road to Lariſſa is made the inſtance, becauſe moſt familiar to Meno, who was of Pharſalus, a city of Theſſaly, near to Lariſſa, the chief city of all that part of the country, and with which Meno was particularly well acquainted.—S.

MENO.

MENO. Not at all worſe.

SOC. Right opinion, therefore, with regard to right action, is not at all a worſe guide than ſcience or perfect knowledge. And this it is which we omitted juſt now in conſidering the nature of virtue; when we ſaid that prudence only or knowledge led to right action; it is this, right opinion.

MENO. It ſeems ſo.

SOC. Right opinion therefore is not at all of leſs adantage to man than certain knowledge.

MENO. In this reſpect, however, Socrates, it is; in that he who has a perfect knowledge of his end, would always attain to it; but the man who had only a right opinion of it, ſometimes would attain to it, and ſometimes would not.

SOC. How ſay you? would not the man, who had a right opinion of it, always attain to it, ſo long as he entertained that right opinion?

MENO. It appears to me that he muſt. And therefore I wonder, Socrates, this being the caſe, on what account it is that ſcience is ſo much more valuable than right opinion; and indeed in what reſpect it is that they differ at all one from the other.

SOC. Do you know now why you wonder? or ſhall I tell you?

MENO. By all means tell me.

SOC. It is becauſe you never conſidered attentively thoſe images [1] made by Dædalus. But perhaps you have none of them in your country.

MENO. With what view is it now that you ſpeak of theſe images?

SOC. Becauſe theſe, if they are not faſtened, run away from us, and become fugitives: but if they are faſtened, they abide by us.

MENO. Well; and what then?

SOC. To have in one's poſſeſſion any of theſe works of his looſe and unfaſtened, is like to the being maſter of a runaway ſlave, a matter of little value, becauſe not permanent: but when faſtened and ſecured, they are things of great value; for indeed they are works of great beauty. But you aſk, with what view it is that I ſpeak of theſe images. I anſwer,—It is with a view to true opinions. For true opinions alſo, ſo long as they abide

[1] Theſe were ſmall figures of the gods, reported to have in them the power of ſelf motion.—S.

by us, are valuable goods, and procure for us all good things: but they are not diſpoſed to abide with us a long time; for they ſoon ſlip away out of our ſouls, and become fugitives. Hence are they of ſmall value to a man, until he has faſtened and bound them down, by deducing them rationally from their cauſe [1]. And this, my friend Meno, is reminiſcence, as we before agreed. But when they are thus bound and faſtened, in the firſt place they become truly known, and in conſequence of this they become ſtable and abide with us. Now it is on this very account that ſcience is a thing more valuable than right opinion; and in this reſpect it is they differ, in that the parts of ſcience only are faſtened one to another, and bound down together.

MENO. By Jupiter, Socrates, they are ſimilar to ſome ſuch things as thoſe to which you reſemble them.

SOC. Nay, for my part, I ſpeak thus not from knowledge; but only from conjecture. But that right opinion and ſcience are two different things, this, as it appears to me, I do not merely imagine or conjecture. For if I were to profeſs the knowledge of any things whatever (and there are but

[1] In the Greek, *αιτιας λογισμῳ, by a rational account of the cauſe*; or by proving, how and from what cauſe it is that they are true. The cauſe of every truth is ſome other truth, higher and more general, in which it is included. To thoſe who have conſidered the method, naturally uſed by the mind in reaſoning, commonly but improperly called the art of reaſoning, this will appear from hence;—A propoſition is an opinion of the mind expreſſed in words, which affirm or deny ſome one thing to belong to ſome other. If the propoſition, that is, if the opinion be true, it admits of a rational proof. And all rational proof conſiſts in ſhowing or exhibiting of ſome general truth, or true propoſition, in which is virtually included the popoſition to be proved. In ſyllogiſtical reaſoning (the only way of reaſoning upwards, or tracing any truths from their cauſes) that truth, or true propoſition, which is more general than the propoſition to be proved, is called the major propoſition on that very account, becauſe it is of larger extent, or more general than the propoſition to be proved, the concluſion; containing in it the truth of that concluſion, together with many other truths, collateral to one another, and all of them ſubordinate to, or leſs general than, the major propoſition itſelf. In the ſame manner, the truth of this major and more general propoſition is to be traced out and deduced from another propoſition ſtill more general; and ſo on till we arrive at ſome truth ſelf-evident, apparently the cauſe from which is deduced the truth of thoſe other propoſitions leſs general, which gradually and in order lead the mind up to it; the cauſe why they are true. If many ſubordinate truths ariſe out of one and the ſame general truth, as they all equally depend from this, ſo by means of this too they are all connected together, like the collateral chains, mentioned in the way of ſimilitude (though to another ſubject) by Plato in his Io, depending all from the iron ring at top faſtened to the magnet.—S.

a few

a few things which I could profeſs to know), this I would ſet down for one of them [1].

MENO. You are entirely right, Socrates [2].

Soc. Well; and am I not right in this alſo, that true opinion, having the conduct of any work or action whatever, executes her office full as well as ſcience?

MENO. In this too I think you are in the right.

Soc. Right opinion, therefore, is a thing not at all inferior to ſcience, nor leſs beneficial with regard to the execution of any work [3], or the performance of any action: nor is the man, who has right opinions, inferior (in this reſpect) to the man of ſcience.

MENO. Very true.

Soc. And we agreed before, that a good man was beneficial or advantageous to others.

MENO. We did.

Soc. Since, therefore, it is not through ſcience only that men have been good and beneficial to their country (if any ſuch men there may have been),

[1] This ſentence, together with that which immediately precedes it, ſeems to us the right key to open that part of the converſation of Socrates with his friends, in which he was generally ſuppoſed to diſſemble his great knowledge. We find him here diſclaiming the knowledge of thoſe things which are not the proper objects of knowledge, but of imagination and opinion only; and ſuch are almoſt all the ſubjects even of philoſophical converſation: and we find him at the ſame time openly avowing, not with irony, but with much ſerioufneſs, that he knew the different nature of thoſe two judgments of the ſoul, ſcience and opinion; one of which is from mind, the other from ſenſe. Now if all ſcience depends on knowing the principle of ſcience, if this principle is mind, and if the human ſoul partakes of mind, it follows, that the human mind knowing herſelf, knows in what ſhe differs from the lower faculties of the ſoul, and how her own judgment of things, which is ſcience, differs from theirs, which amounts to no more than mere opinion: it follows, that ſhe knows what ſcience is, and conſequently knows what falls ſhort of it: it follows alſo, that ſhe knows what the objects are of ſcience, and what thoſe of opinion; having and contemplating the former ſort in herſelf; but rejecting and diſclaiming the latter, as not belonging to her province. Accordingly we ſhall find that Socrates, who knew himſelf, his true ſelf, his mind, on the one hand never pretended, as ignorant men are apt to do, to know things which cannot be known; nor on the other hand, affected not to know the nature of the human mind, the principles of it, or any of its objects, ſo far as they are communicated to particular minds from and by mind univerſal.—S.

[2] That is, in diſtinguiſhing ſcience from right opinion.—S.

[3] This is becauſe right opinion principally verges to ſenſibles; but ſcience to intelligibles.—T.

but

but alſo by means of right opinion; and ſince neither of theſe is with men by nature, neither ſcience nor right opinion; or [1] do you think that either of them comes by nature?

MENO. Not I.

Soc. Since then, they are not by nature, by nature neither is it that men could have been good and virtuous.

MENO. Certainly not.

Soc. Seeing now, that virtue comes not by nature, we ſhould, in the next place, after this conſider if it comes through teaching.

MENO. To be ſure we ſhould.

Soc. Did it not appear to us both, that if virtue was wiſdom, then it came through teaching?

MENO. It did.

Soc. And that if virtue came through teaching, then virtue would be wiſdom?

MENO. Very true.

Soc. And that if there were any teachers of virtue, virtue would in that caſe be a thing that came through teaching; otherwiſe not?

MENO. Juſt ſo.

Soc. But we have agreed that there were no teachers of it.

[1] Juſt here, in all the editions of the Greek, are added theſe two words, *ουτ επικτητα, neither are they acquired.* Which part of the ſentence is apparently falſe: for ſcience and right opinion are both of them acquired; ſcience through teaching; and right opinion through other adventitious means: but ſuppoſing it ever ſo true with regard to right opinion; and ſuppoſing alſo, that the word *επικτητα* means in this place *acquired through teaching*; it would be impertinent to this part of the argumentation, and premature: for Socrates is here proving only this, that virtue comes not by nature: and this he proves by ſhowing that all men who act rightly and well, act thus either from ſcience or from right opinion; neither of which principles of action men have from nature. It is not till afterwards, in the next place, that he proves virtue not to be acquired through teaching. With great judgment, therefore, did Cornarius, in his tranſlation, take no notice of thoſe two words; and, in his Eclogæ, has with great probability ſuppoſed the words *αλλ' επικτητα* to have been an antient ſcholium written in the margin, and by ſubſequent tranſcribers, as happened frequently, aſſumed into the text; and afterwards the word *αλλ'* to have been changed into *ουτ* by ſome later copyiſt, not attending to the courſe of the argumentation, but to the concluſion only. The neceſſity of the omiſſion is ſo clear, that we wonder not ſo much at the accuteneſs of Cornarius in ſeeing it, as at the blindneſs of Stephens in not ſeeing but expreſsly denying it.—S.

MENO.

MENO. True.

SOC. We are agreed, therefore, that virtue comes not through teaching; and that virtue is not wiſdom.

MENO. Certainly ſo.

SOC. But we agreed beſides, that virtue was ſomething good.

MENO. True.

SOC. And that whatever conducted affairs rightly was a thing good and ſerviceable to us.

MENO. We did clearly.

SOC. And that affairs are conducted rightly by theſe two things only, true opinion and ſcience; poſſeſſed of either of which two, a man makes a good leader and guide. Whatever comes from fortune is not the effect of human conduct. But ſo far as man has to do in conducting rightly, it is only through one of theſe means, true opinion and ſcience.

MENO. I think ſo.

SOC. Now ſince virtue comes not through teaching, it is not the effect of ſcience.

MENO. It appears that it is not.

SOC. Of the two only things then, which are good and ſerviceable to man's right conduct, we have thrown one out of the queſtion; having agreed that ſcience is not the thing through which civil affairs are adminiſtered and conducted rightly.

MENO. I think it is not.

SOC. Not therefore through any wiſdom, nor as being wiſe, did ſuch men govern in the ſtate; ſuch as Themiſtocles, and the reſt, whom Anytus here juſt now recounted. And for this very reaſon they were not capable of making others to be ſuch men as themſelves; becauſe it was not ſcience that made them what they were.

MENO. The caſe, O Socrates, ſeems to be as you repreſent it.

SOC. If then it is not ſcience, it follows that it muſt be the other thing which remains of the two, namely, right opinion, through which public affairs are adminiſtered rightly by our ſtateſmen and politicians; men who, in point of wiſdom, are not at all ſuperior to the oracle ſingers and divine prophets. For theſe alſo utter many true ſayings, but have no real knowledge of any one thing they utter.

MENO. I ſuſpect this to be the caſe.

SOC. Now do not thoſe men, O Meno, deſerve the character of divine men, who either ſpeak or act aright in many things of great importance, without any intellectual knowledge of the ſubjects concerning which they ſpeak or act?

MENO. By all means do they.

SOC. Rightly then ſhould we call thoſe men divine, whom we juſt now mentioned, the oracle ſingers and the prophets, and all who are inſpired by the Muſes. Nor at all leſs divine men than theſe ſhould we ſay that the politicians are, no leſs enthuſiaſts, inſpired divinely, and poſſeſſed by the Divinity, when in their ſpeeches they direct aright many and great affairs, without any real knowledge of the ſubjects they are ſpeaking of.

MENO. Certainly we ſhould.

SOC. And accordingly the women, you know, Meno, call men of virtue by the name of divine men. And the Lacedæmonians, when they celebrate with encomiums any man of virtue, are uſed to ſay of him that he is a divine man.

MENO. And they appear, O Socrates, to ſpeak juſtly too. And yet, perhaps, Anytus here is offended at what you ſay.

SOC. I give myſelf no manner of concern about it. With him, Meno, we ſhall have ſome diſcourſe at another time. But if we, at this time, during all this converſation, have purſued our inquiries and reaſonings aright, virtue can neither come by nature, nor yet through teaching; but to thoſe with whom it is, it muſt come by a divine portion or allotment, without the intelligence or true knowledge of it; unleſs amongſt the politicians there ſhould be found ſome perſon capable of making another man a good politician. But if there ſhould, he might almoſt be ſaid to be ſuch a one amongſt the living, as Homer tells us that Tireſias is amongſt the dead; where, ſpeaking of him and of the reſt who are in Hades, he ſays [1],

> Fill'd is he only with diſcerning mind;
> The reſt flit, empty ſhadows, dark and blind.

Exactly the ſame pre-eminence hath ſuch a man; being as it were the

[1] In his Odyſſey, lib. x. ver. 495.

truth

truth and ſubſtance of things, compared with ſhadows [1], in reſpect of virtue.

MENO. What you ſay, O Socrates, ſeems to me to be in the higheſt degree juſt.

SOC. From this reaſoning then, Meno, it appears to us, that ſuch as are poſſeſſed of virtue, have it as a divine portion or allotment to them. But on this point we ſhall then arrive at certainty, when, previous to our inquiries by what means it is that virtue comes to men, we ſet about ſearching firſt, what the eſſence is of virtue.——But it is now time for me to go ſomewhere elſe. And do you, ſince you are perſuaded yourſelf of the truth of thoſe concluſions, the reſult of our inquiries, perſuade your friend Anytus to believe them alſo. For he may thus be ſoftened and become milder; and you, by thus perſuading him, may poſſibly do a piece of ſervice to your country.

[1] It is obvious to be ſeen, that this is a metaphor taken from the ſimile here uſed, of Tireſias and the reſt of the ghoſts in Hades; or an application of the ſimile to that which it is brought to illuſtrate in terms uſed properly in the ſimile, but metaphorically in the application. For the application of the ſimile is this:—As all the other ghoſts in Hades are to Tireſias, ſo are men of right opinion only, void of ſcientific principles, to men of true ſcience, men who are knowing in thoſe principles. In the ſimile, the common herd of ghoſts are unreal, unſubſtantial ſhades, or ſhadows, compared with Tireſias, who therefore, with reſpect to them, is real ſubſtance. In the ſubject, reſembled to this ſimile, men of right opinion are as ſhadows when compared with men of real ſcience.—The juſtneſs of the ſimilitude depends on theſe doctrines of Plato: that matters of opinion are objects of the imagination, and matters of ſcience are objects of the mind or intellect; that all objects of the imagination are only images of the objects of ſenſe, or things ſenſible; and that theſe objects of ſenſe, or things ſenſible, are but the ſhadows of things intelligible, the objects of intellect.—S.

THE PROTAGORAS:

OR,

THE SOPHISTS.

81446

THE PROTAGORAS[1].

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

An ASSOCIATE,	ALCIBIADES,
SOCRATES,	CALLIAS,
HIPPOCRATES,	CRITIAS,
PROTAGORAS,	PRODICUS[2],

And HIPPIAS.

ASSOCIATE.

WHENCE come you, Socrates? or is it not evident that you come from hunting about the beauty of Alcibiades? For to me, as I lately beheld him, the man appeared to be beautiful. I ſay the man: for between ourſelves, Socrates, he may be called ſo, ſince his beard begins now to make its appearance.

Soc. But what then? Do you not indeed praiſe Homer[3], who ſays, that the age of a young man when he begins to have a beard is moſt agreeable? And this is now the age of Alcibiades.

[1] As the ſame queſtion is diſcuſſed in this Dialogue, though not ſo fully as in the Meno, viz. Whether virtue can be taught, an introduction to it is unneceſſary. I ſhall therefore only obſerve, that the livelineſs and variety of the characters in it; the mirth and pleaſantry of Socrates; the ſimplicity and nobleneſs of the narratives; and the knowledge of antiquities it diſplays, are beauties no leſs obvious than inimitable. For an account of Protagoras, that prince of ſophiſts, ſee the Theætetus.

[2] This ſophiſt was of Cos, and flouriſhed about 396 years before Chriſt. Among his pupils were Euripides, Socrates, Theramenes, and Iſocrates. He made his auditors pay to hear him harangue, which has given occaſion to ſome of the antients to ſpeak of the orations of Prodicus, for 50 drachms. Among his numerous writings, he compoſed that beautiful epiſode in which virtue and pleaſure are introduced attempting to make Hercules one of their votaries.

[3] See the 10th Book of the Odyſſey, where Homer repreſents Mercury as aſſuming the ſhape of a young man that begins to have a beard.

Assoc. But do you not at preſent come from him? And how is the young man diſpoſed towards you?

Soc. He appears to be well affected towards me, and eſpecially ſo to-day; for he ſaid many things in defence of me; and I am juſt now come from him. However, I wiſh to tell you ſomething very ſtrange: though he was preſent I did not attend to him, and even forgot to look at him.

Assoc. What great affair then happened to both of you? for you could not meet with any other beautiful perſon in this city.

Soc. I did, however, and with one far more beautiful.

Assoc. What do you ſay? Was he a citizen or a ſtranger?

Soc. A ſtranger.

Assoc. Whence came he.

Soc. From Abdera.

Assoc. And did this ſtranger appear to you ſo beautiful as to ſurpaſs in beauty the ſon of Clinias?

Soc. How can it be otherwiſe, O bleſſed man, but that the wiſeſt muſt appear to be the more beautiful perſon?

Assoc. Do you come to us then, Socrates, from a certain wiſe man?

Soc. I do, and from the wiſeſt indeed of thoſe that exiſt at preſent; if Protagoras appears to you to be moſt wiſe.

Assoc. What do you ſay? Is Protagoras arrived hither?

Soc. He has been here theſe three days.

Assoc. And have you then juſt now been with him?

Soc. I have; and I have alſo both ſpoken and heard many things.

Assoc. Will you not therefore relate this converſation to us? For if nothing hinders, you may ſit here, ſince this boy will give you his place.

Soc. I will certainly relate it to you: and I ſhall alſo thank you for attending to it.

Assoc. And we ſhall thank you for the narration.

Soc. There will then be reciprocal thanks. Hear therefore:—This morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, the ſon of Apollodorus and the brother of Phaſon, knocked very hard at my gate with his ſtick, and as ſoon as it was opened he haſtily came to my bedchamber, crying with a loud voice, Socrates, are you aſleep?—And I knowing his voice ſaid, This is Hippocrates, do you bring any news?—None, he replied, but what is good.—You

ſpeak well, ſaid I, but what is it? and what brought you hither?—Protagoras, ſaid he, is come, and dwells near me.—He has been here, I replied, for ſome time; and have you only juſt heard it?—I only heard it, by the gods, ſaid he, this evening; and at the ſame time, taking a couch, he ſat down at my feet, and ſaid, I returned laſt night very late from the village of Oinoe; for my boy Satyrus had made his eſcape from me, and being deſirous to tell you that I ſhould purſue him, ſomething elſe occurring, I forgot it. But after I had returned, ſupped, and was going to bed, then my brother told me Protagoras was come. On hearing this, I immediately attempted to go to you; but afterwards it appeared to me that the night was already far advanced. Soon therefore falling aſleep from wearineſs, when I awoke, I came hither.—And I knowing the fortitude of Hippocrates, and ſeeing his aſtoniſhment, ſaid, What is this to you? Has Protagoras injured you in any reſpect?—By the gods, ſaid he laughing, he has, becauſe he alone is wiſe, and has not made me to be ſo.—But, by Jupiter, ſaid I, if you had given him money, and had perſuaded him, he would have made you alſo wiſe.—O Jupiter, and the other gods, he replied, I ſhould neither ſpare my own property, nor that of my friends, to accompliſh this, and I now come to you, that you may ſpeak to him in my behalf. For I am younger than you, and at the ſame time I never either ſaw or heard Protagoras; for I was a boy when he firſt came to this place. However, Socrates, all men praiſe him, and ſay that his diſcourſes are moſt wiſe. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within? And he reſides, as I have heard, with Callias [1] the ſon of Hipponicus. Let us then go.—To this I replied, We will not yet go thither, O good man, for it is too early; but let us go into our court, where we will walk and converſe till it is light; and afterwards we will pay a viſit to Protagoras. For, as he ſtays very much at home, we ſhall moſt probably find him within.—After this we roſe and went into the court, and I, in order to try the ſtrength of Hippocrates, looked at him attentively, and ſaid, Tell me, O Hippocrates, do you now endeavour to go to Protagoras, that by giving him money he may teach you ſomething? What kind of man do you ſuppoſe him to be? and what kind of a man would you wiſh him to make you? Juſt as if you

[1] This Callias was one of the firſt citizens of Athens, and his father Hipponicus had been general of the Athenians, together with Nicias, at the battle of Tanagre.

ſhould go to your nameſake, Hippocrates of Cos, who is a deſcendant of Eſculapius, and ſhould offer him money on your own account, if any one ſhould aſk you, O Hippocrates, to what kind of man do you give money, and on what account? what would you anſwer?—I ſhould ſay, he replied, that I give it as to a phyſician.—And with what view would you give it?—That I might become a phyſician, ſaid he.—But if you went to the Argive Polycletus, or the Athenian Phidias, and gave them a reward on your own account, ſhould any one aſk you to what kind of men, and for what purpoſe, you offered money to Polycletus and Phidias, what would you anſwer?—I ſhould anſwer, ſaid he, that I gave it as to ſtatuaries, and in order that I myſelf might become a ſtatuary.—Be it ſo, I replied. But we are now going, I and you, to Protagoras, and we are prepared to give him money on your account, if we have ſufficient for this purpoſe, and can perſuade him by this mean; but if it be not ſufficient, we muſt borrow from our friends. If therefore ſome one, on perceiving our great eagerneſs about theſe particulars, ſhould ſay, Tell me, O Socrates and Hippocrates, to what kind of man, and for what purpoſe do you intend to give money in offering it to Protagoras? what anſwer ſhould we give him? What other appellation have we heard reſpecting Protagoras, as with reſpect to Phidias we have heard him called a ſtatuary, and with reſpect to Homer, a poet? What thing of this kind have we heard concerning Protagoras?—They call this man, ſaid he, a ſophiſt, Socrates.—Shall we go therefore, and offer money as to a ſophiſt?—Certainly.—If then ſome one ſhould aſk you what do you deſign to become by going to Protagoras?—He replied, bluſhing (for there was now day-light ſufficient for me to ſee him), from what we have already admitted, it is evident that my deſign is to become a ſophiſt.—But, by the gods, ſaid I, will you not be aſhamed to proclaim yourſelf a ſophiſt among the Greeks?—I ſhall, by Jupiter, if it is requiſite to ſpeak what I think.—Your deſign then, Hippocrates, in acquiring the diſcipline of Protagoras, is not to become a ſophiſt, but you have the ſame intention as when you went to the ſchool of a grammarian, or that of a muſician, or of a maſter of gymnaſtic: for you went not to thoſe maſters to learn their art, that you might become a profeſſor yourſelf, but for the ſake of acquiring ſuch inſtruction as becomes a private and a free man.—The diſcipline which I ſhall receive from Protagoras, ſaid he, perfectly appears to me to be rather a thing of this kind.—Do you know therefore, I replied,

what you now intend to do? or is it concealed from you?—About what?—That you are about to commit your ſoul to the care of a man, who, as you ſay, is a ſophiſt; and yet I ſhould wonder if you know what a ſophiſt is. Though if you are ignorant of this, neither do you know to whom you deliver your ſoul, nor if to a good or a bad thing.—But I think, ſaid he, that I know.—Tell me then what you think a ſophiſt is?—I think, ſaid he, as the name implies, that he is one knowing in things pertaining to wiſdom.—But, I replied, the ſame thing may alſo be ſaid of painters and architects, that they alſo are knowing in things pertaining to wiſdom. And if any one ſhould aſk us in what wiſe particulars painters are knowing, we ſhould anſwer him, that their wiſdom conſiſted in the production of images; and we ſhould reply in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to the reſt. But if ſome one ſhould aſk in what particulars is a ſophiſt wiſe; what ſhould we anſwer? Of what art is he the maſter?—He is maſter, Socrates, of the art which enables men to ſpeak eloquently.—Perhaps, ſaid I, we ſpeak the truth, yet we do not ſpeak ſufficiently. For this anſwer demands from us another interrogation, viz. in what a ſophiſt renders men eloquent. For does not a harper alſo enable thoſe that are inſtructed by him, to ſpeak about that in which he is knowing, viz. the playing on the harp? Is it not ſo?—It is.—Be it ſo then. But about what does a ſophiſt render men eloquent? For it is evident, that it muſt be about things of which he has a knowledge.—It is likely.—What then is that thing about which the ſophiſt is knowing, and which he teaches to others?—By Jupiter, he replied, I can no longer tell you.—And I ſaid after this, Do you know therefore to what danger you are going to expoſe your ſoul? or if you were going to ſubject your body to the hazard of becoming in a good or a bad condition, would you not diligently conſider whether you ſhould expoſe it to this danger or not? Would you not call your friends and relations to conſult with them? And would you not take more than one day to deliberate on the affair? But though you eſteem your ſoul far more than your body, and upon it depends your happineſs or unhappineſs, according as it is well or ill diſpoſed, yet, concerning this, you neither aſk advice of your father nor brother, nor of any one of us your aſſociates, whether you ſhould commit your ſoul to this ſtranger. But having heard of his arrival yeſterday evening, you come next morning before break of day, without conſidering whether it is proper to commit yourſelf to him or not, and are

prepared to employ not only all your own riches for that purpoſe, but alſo thoſe of your friends, as if you already knew that you muſt by all means aſſociate with Protagoras, whom, as you ſay, you neither know nor have ever ſpoken to. But you call him a ſophiſt, though what a ſophiſt is, to which you are about to deliver yourſelf, you are evidently ignorant.—And he having heard me, replied, What you ſay, Socrates, appears to be the truth.—Whether or not, therefore, O Hippocrates, is a ſophiſt a certain merchant and retailer of things by which the ſoul is nouriſhed?—He appears to me, Socrates, to be a character of this kind; but with what is the ſoul nouriſhed?—By diſciplines, I replied. But we muſt take care, my friend, leſt the ſophiſt, while he praiſes what he ſells, deceive us, juſt as thoſe merchants and retailers do reſpecting the food of the body. For they are ignorant whether the articles of their traffic are ſalubrious or noxious to the body, but at the ſame time they praiſe all that they ſell. Thoſe alſo that buy theſe articles are alike ignorant in this reſpect, unleſs the purchaſer ſhould happen to be a maſter of gymnaſtic, or a phyſician. In like manner, thoſe who carry about diſciplines in cities, and who hawk and ſell them to thoſe that deſire to buy them, praiſe indeed all that they ſell, though perhaps ſome of theſe alſo, O moſt excellent youth, may be ignorant whether what they ſell is beneficial or noxious to the ſoul. And this alſo may be the caſe with thoſe that buy of them, unleſs the purchaſer ſhould happen to be a phyſician of the ſoul. If therefore you ſcientifically know what among theſe is good or bad, you may ſecurely buy diſciplines from Protagoras, or any other; but if not, ſee, O bleſſed youth, whether you will not be in extreme danger with reſpect to your deareſt concerns. For there is much greater danger in the buying of diſciplines than in that of food; ſince he who buys meats and drinks of a victualler or merchant may take them away in other veſſels, and, before he receives them into his body, may place them in his houſe, and calling in ſome perſon ſkilled in theſe things, may conſult what ſhould be eaten and drank, and what ſhould not, and how much and when it is proper to eat and drink; ſo that there is no great danger in buying proviſions. Diſciplines, however, cannot be taken away in another veſſel; but it is neceſſary that he who buys a diſcipline, receiving and learning it in his ſoul, ſhould depart either injured or benefited. Let us therefore conſider theſe things with thoſe that are older than we are: for we are too young to diſcuſs an affair of ſuch great importance. Let us

now,

now, however, go whither we intended, and hear the man; and after we have heard him, let us alſo communicate with others. For not only Protagoras is there, but Hippias the Elean, and Prodicus too, I think, and many other wiſe men.

This being agreed upon by us, we go on; but when we entered the porch, we ſtopt to diſcuſs ſomething which had occured to us in the way. That it might not therefore be unfiniſhed, but that being terminated we might thus enter the houſe, we ſtood diſcourſing in the porch, until we agreed with each other. It appears therefore to me that the porter, who was a eunuch, heard us; and that on account of the multitude of the ſophiſts he was enraged with thoſe that came to the houſe. When therefore we had knocked at the gate he opened it, and ſeeing us, Ha, ha, ſaid he, certain ſophiſts. He is not at leiſure. And at the ſame time taking the gate with both his hands, he ſhut it with all his force. We then knocked again, and he, without opening the gate, ſaid, Did not you hear me tell you that he is not at leiſure?—But, my good man, ſaid I, we are not come to Callias, nor are we ſophiſts. Take courage, therefore, for we come requeſting to ſee Protagoras. Announce this to him. Notwithſtanding this the man would ſcarcely open the gate to us. However, he opened it at length, and when we entered, we met with Protagoras walking in the veſtibule of the porch. Many followed him; on one ſide Callias the ſon of Hipponicus, and his brother by the mother; Paralus the ſon of Pericles; and Charmides the ſon of Glauco. On the other ſide of him were Xanthippus the other ſon of Pericles, and Philippides the ſon of Philomelus, and Antimocrus the Mendæan, who was the moſt illuſtrious of all the diſciples of Protagoras, and who is inſtructed in his art that he may become a ſophiſt. Of thoſe behind theſe, who followed them liſtening to what was ſaid, the greater part appeared to be ſtrangers, whom Protagoras brings with him from the ſeveral cities through which he paſſes, and whom he charms by his voice like another Orpheus: and they, allured by voice, follow him. Some of our countrymen alſo were in the choir. On ſeeing this choir I was very much delighted in obſerving how well they took care not to be an impediment to Protagoras in walking before him; but when he turned, and his company with him, theſe his auditors that followed him opened to the right and left in a becoming and orderly manner, and always beautifully ranged themſelves behind him. After Protagoras,

goras, as Homer[1] ſays, I ſaw Hippias the Elean ſeated on a throne in the oppoſite veſtibule of the porch, and round him on benches ſat Eryximachus, the ſon of Acumenus, Phædrus the Myrrhinuſian, Andron the ſon of Androtion, and ſome others, partly ſtrangers and partly his fellow citizens. They appeared, too, to be interrogating Hippias concerning the ſublime parts of nature, and certain aſtronomical particulars; but he, ſitting on a throne, conſidered and reſolved their queſtions. I likewiſe ſaw Tantalus: for Prodicus the Cean was there; but he was in a certain building which Hipponicus had before uſed for an office, but which Callias, on account of the multitude that came to his houſe, had given to the ſtrangers, after having prepared it for their reception. Prodicus therefore was ſtill in bed wrapt up in ſkins and coverings, and Pauſanias of Ceramis was ſeated by his bedſide; and with Pauſanias there was a youth, who appeared to me to be of a beautiful and excellent diſpoſition. His form indeed was perfectly beautiful; and his name, as I have heard, was Agatho. Nor did I wonder that he was beloved by Pauſanias. There were alſo the two Adimantes, the one the ſon of Cephis, and the other the ſon of Leucolophides, and many others. But as I was without, I was not able to learn what was the ſubject of their diſcourſe, though I very much deſired to hear Prodicus: for he appears to me to be a man perfectly wiſe and divine. But a certain humming ſound being produced in the chamber through the grave tone of his voice, prevented me from hearing diſtinctly what he ſaid. Juſt as we had entered, Alcibiades, the beautiful as you ſay, and as I am perſuaded he is, and Critias the ſon of Callaiſchrus, came after us.

After we had entered therefore, and had diſcuſſed certain trifling particulars, and conſidered what paſſed, we went to Protagoras; and I ſaid, O Protagoras, I and Hippocrates are come to ſee you.—Would you wiſh, ſaid he, to ſpeak with me alone, or in the preſence of others?—It makes no difference, I replied, to us; but when you hear on what account we come, you yourſelf ſhall determine this.—What is it then, ſaid he, that hath brought you?—Hippocrates here is our countryman, the ſon of Apollodorus, and is of a great

[1] See the 11th Book of the Odyſſey, where Ulyſſes is repreſented converſing with the ſhades of the dead in Hades. Plato, by alluding to this part of the Odyſſey, doubtleſs intended to inſinuate, as Dacier well obſerves, that theſe ſophiſts are not real men, but only the phantoms and ſhadows of men.

and

and happy family, and ſeems to contend with his equals in age for natural endowments. But he deſires to become illuſtrious in the city; and he thinks that he ſhall eſpecially effect this if he aſſociates with you. Conſider, therefore, whether it is proper for him to converſe alone with you about theſe particulars, or in conjunction with others.—Your forethought, ſaid he, Socrates, with reſpect to me is right. For a ſtranger who goes to great cities, and perſuades young people of the greateſt quality to leave the aſſociations both of their kindred and others, both the young and the old, and adhere to him alone, that they may become better men by his converſation, ought in doing this to be cautious. For things of this kind are attended with no ſmall envy, together with much malevolence and many ſtratagems. I ſay indeed that the ſophiſtic art is antient, but that thoſe men who firſt profeſſed it, fearing the hatred to which it would be expoſed, ſought to conceal it, ſome with the veil of poetry, as Homer, Heſiod, and Simonides, and others with that of the myſteries and prophecy, as Orpheus and Muſæus, and their followers. I perceive alſo, that ſome have called this art gymnaſtic, as Iccus of Tarentum, and as a ſophiſt at preſent does who is inferior to none, viz. Herodicus the Selymbrianian, who was originally of Megara. But your Agathocles, who was a great ſophiſt, Pythoclides of Ceos, and many others, concealed it under the veil of muſic. All theſe, as I ſaid, being afraid of envy, employed theſe arts as veils. I however, in this particular, do not accord with all theſe: for I think they did not effect any thing which they wiſhed to accompliſh; ſince theſe concealments are underſtood by men of great authority in cities. The vulgar indeed do not perceive them; but praiſe certain things which they hear from the ſophiſts. This ſubterfuge therefore, not being attended with any effect, but becoming apparent, neceſſarily ſhows the great folly of him that attempts it, and makes men much more inimical: for they think that a man of this kind is crafty in every thing. I therefore have taken an oppoſite path: for I acknowledge myſelf to be a ſophiſt, and a teacher of men: and I think that by this ingenuous confeſſion I avoid envy more ſafely than by diſſimulation. I alſo direct my attention to other things beſides this; ſo that, as I may ſay, with the aſſiſtance of Divinity, I have ſuffered nothing dire through confeſſing that I am a ſophiſt; though I have exerciſed this art many years: for my age is very great, and I am old enough to be the father of any one of you. So that it will be by far the moſt pleaſant

ſant to me, if you diſcourſe with me concerning theſe particulars in the preſence of all thoſe that are in the houſe.

I then, ſuſpecting that he wiſhed to exhibit himſelf to Prodicus and Hippias, and to boaſt that we came to him as being enamoured of his wiſdom, ſaid, Why may not Prodicus and Hippias be called, and thoſe that are with him, that they may hear us?—By all means, ſaid Protagoras, let them be called.—Callias therefore ſaid, Shall we prepare ſeats for you, that you may diſcourſe ſitting?—It was agreed to be proper ſo to do. And at the ſame time all of us being pleaſed, as thoſe that were to hear wiſe men converſe, took hold of the benches and couches, and diſpoſed them near to Hippias; for the benches had been there previouſly placed. In the interim came Callias and Alcibiades, bringing with them Prodicus, who had then riſen from his bed, and thoſe that were with him. When therefore we were all ſeated, Now, Socrates, ſaid Protagoras, you may tell me before all this company what you a little before mentioned to me about this youth. And I ſaid, My exordium, O Protagoras, is that which I employed before, viz. with what deſign we came to you. Hippocrates then, here, is deſirous of your converſe; and ſays he ſhall gladly hear what advantage he ſhall derive from aſſociating with you. This is all we have to ſay to you.—Protagoras then ſaid in reply, O young man, the advantage which you will derive from aſſociating with me is this, that on the day in which you come to me you will go home better than you was before; you will alſo be more improved on the ſecond than on the firſt day, and you will always find that you have every day advanced in improvement.—And I, hearing him, ſaid, O Protagoras, this is by no means wonderful, but it is fit that it ſhould be ſo; ſince you alſo, though ſo old and ſo wiſe, would become better, if any one ſhould teach you what you do not know. But that is not what we require. But juſt as if Hippocrates here ſhould immediately change his mind, and ſhould deſire to aſſociate with the youth lately arrived at this place, Zeuxippus the ſon of Heracletus, and coming to him in the ſame manner as he is now come to you, ſhould hear from him the ſame things as he has heard from you, that every day by aſſociating with him he would become better, and advance in improvement; if he ſhould aſk him, In what do you ſay I ſhall become better, and advance in proficiency, Zeuxippus would anſwer him, In the art of painting. And if he were to aſſociate with the Theban Orthagoras, and ſhould hear from him the ſame things

things as he has heard from you, and ſhould aſk him in what he would daily become better by aſſociating with him, he would reply, In the art of playing on the pipe. In like manner do you alſo reply to the youth, and to me aſking for him: for you ſay that Hippocrates here, by aſſociating with Protagoras, will daily become better and advance in improvement; tell us then, O Protagoras, in what he will make this proficiency?—Protagoras, on hearing me thus ſpeak, ſaid, You interrogate well, Socrates, and I rejoice to anſwer thoſe who aſk in a becoming manner. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not ſuffer that which he would ſuffer by aſſociating with any other of the ſophiſts. Other ſophiſts indeed injure youth: for they force them to apply to arts which they are unwilling to learn, by teaching them arithmetic, aſtronomy, geometry, and muſic. And at the ſame time looking at Hippias [1], he added, But he who comes to me, will not learn any thing elſe than that for the ſake of which he came. The diſcipline too which he acquires from me is the ability of conſulting well about his domeſtic affairs, ſo that he may govern his houſe in the beſt manner, and ſo that he may be capable of ſaying and doing all that is advantageous for his country.—I underſtand you, I replied: for you appear to me to ſpeak of the political art, and to profeſs to make men good citizens.—This, ſaid he, is the profeſſion which I announce.—What a beautiful artifice, ſaid I, you poſſeſs! if you do poſſeſs it. For nothing elſe is to be ſaid to you than that which I conceive. For I, O Protagoras, do not think that this can be taught, and yet I cannot diſbelieve what you ſay. It is juſt, however, that I ſhould inform you whence I think it cannot be taught, nor by men be procured for men. For I, as well as the other Greeks, ſay that the Athenians are wiſe. I ſee, therefore, when we are collected in the aſſembly, and when it is neceſſary to do ſomething reſpecting the building of houſes, that the architects being ſent for, are conſulted about the buſineſs; but that when ſomething is to be done concerning the building of ſhips, ſhipwrights are conſulted; and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other things which they think may be taught and learnt. But if any other perſon whom they do not think to be an artiſt attempts to give them advice in theſe particulars, though he may be very fine and rich and noble, they pay no more attention to him on this account, but

[1] Protagoras ſays this, becauſe Hippias profeſſed to be very ſkilful in theſe ſciences.

laugh and make a noiſe, until he either deſiſts from ſpeaking through the diſturbance, or till the archers, by order of the magiſtrates, lead or carry him out. In this manner therefore they act reſpecting things which pertain to art. But when it is requiſite to conſult about any thing which relates to the government of the city, then the builder, the brazier, the ſhoemaker, the merchant, and the ſailor, the rich and the poor, the noble and the ignoble, riſe, and ſimilarly give their advice, and no one diſturbs them, as was the caſe with the others, as perſons who, though they have never learnt nor have had a preceptor, yet attempt to give advice. For it is evident that they do not think this can be taught. Nor does this take place only in public affairs, but in private concerns alſo; the wiſeſt and beſt of the citizens are not able to impart to others the virtue which they poſſeſs. For Pericles, the father of theſe youths, has beautifully and well inſtructed them in thoſe things which are taught by maſters; but in thoſe things in which he is wiſe, he has neither himſelf inſtructed them, nor has he ſent them to another to be inſtructed; but they, feeding as it were without reſtraint, wander about, to ſee if they can caſually meet with virtue. If you will too, this very ſame man Pericles, being the tutor of Clinias the younger brother of this Alcibiades, ſeparated them, fearing the former ſhould be corrupted by the latter, and ſent Clinias to be educated by Ariphron. Before, however, ſix months had elapſed, Ariphron, not knowing what to do with him, returned him to Pericles. I could alſo mention many others to you, who being themſelves good men, never made any other man better, neither of their kindred nor ſtrangers. I therefore, O Protagoras, looking to theſe things, do not think that virtue can be taught. When, however, I hear you aſſerting theſe things, I waver, and am of opinion that you ſpeak to the purpoſe, becauſe I think that you are ſkilled in many things, and that you have learned many and diſcovered ſome things ourſelf. If, therefore, you can more clearly ſhow us, that virtue may be taught, do not be envious, but demonſtrate this to us.

Indeed, Socrates, ſaid he, I ſhall not be envious. But whether ſhall I ſhow you this by relating a fable, as an older to younger men, or ſhall I diſcuſs it by argument? Many, therefore, of thoſe that ſat with him, left it to his choice. It appears, therefore, to me, ſaid he, that it will be more agreeable to you to relate a fable.

"There was a time, then, when the gods were alone [1], but the mortal genera did not exiſt. But when the deſtined time of generation came to theſe, the gods faſhioned them within the earth, by mixing earth and fire together; and ſuch things as are mingled with theſe two elements. And when they were about to lead them into light, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus [2] to diſtribute to and adorn each with thoſe powers which were adapted to their nature. But Epimetheus requeſted Prometheus that he might diſtribute theſe powers: And, ſaid he, do you attend to my diſtribution. And having thus perſuaded him, he diſtributed. But in his diſtributing, he gave to ſome ſtrength without ſwiftneſs, and adorned with ſwiftneſs the more imbecile. Some he alſo armed; but giving to others an unarmed nature, he deviſed a certain other power for their ſecurity. For thoſe whom he had inveſted with a ſmall body, he either enabled to fly away through wings, or diſtributed them in a ſubterranean habitation; but thoſe whom he had increaſed in magnitude he preſerved by their bulk. And thus equalizing, he diſtributed other things, taking care that no genus ſhould be deprived of the means of preſervation.

"After, then, he had ſecured them from mutual deſtruction, he took care to defend them againſt the injuries of the air and ſeaſons, by clothing them with thick hairs and ſolid ſkins, ſo that they might be ſufficiently protected in the winter froſts and ſummer heats; and ſo that theſe very things might become appropriate and ſpontaneous beds to each when they went to reſt. Under their feet, likewiſe, he partly added arms, and partly hairs and ſolid and bloodleſs ſkins. He alſo imparted to different animals different nutriment; to ſome, indeed, herbs from the earth, to others the fruits of trees, and to others roots. There were ſome alſo whom he permitted to feed on the fleſh of other animals: and to ſome, indeed, he gave the power of generating but a few of their own ſpecies, but to thoſe that are devoured by theſe he imparted fecundity, thus extending ſafety to the race. However, as Epi-

[1] By this nothing more is meant than that a divine is prior to a mortal nature, according to cauſal, but not according to temporal, priority. For, whatever Divinity produces, it produces continually; and hence every effect proceeding from a divine cauſe is conſubſiſtent with that cauſe, in the ſame manner as ſhadow with its forming ſubſtance.

[2] Prometheus, as we have obſerved in the notes on the Gorgias, is the inſpective guardian of the deſcent of the rational ſoul; and Epimetheus is the guardian of the irrational ſoul.

metheus was not very wiſe, he ignorantly beſtowed all his powers on irrational animals; but the human race ſtill remained unadorned by him. Prometheus, therefore, came to him while he was doubting, and conſidered the diſtribution which he had made. And he ſaw that other animals were well provided for, but that man was naked, without ſhoes, without a bed, and unarmed. But now the fatal day was arrived, in which it was neceſſary that man ſhould emerge from the earth into light. Prometheus, therefore, being dubious what ſafety he could find for man, ſtole the artificial wiſdom of Vulcan and Minerva [1], together with fire; ſince it was impoſſible that the poſſeſſion of this wiſdom could be uſeful without fire; and thus he imparted it to man. By theſe means, therefore, man poſſeſſed the wiſdom pertaining to life. He had not, however, political wiſdom. For this was with Jupiter; and Prometheus was no longer permitted to aſcend to the citadel, the habitation of Jupiter [2]. To which we may add, that the guards of Jupiter were terrible. Prometheus, therefore, ſecretely entered into the common habitation of Minerva and Vulcan, in which the arts were exerciſed; and ſtealing the fiery art from Vulcan, and the other from Minerva, he gave them to man: and from this ariſes the fertility of human life. But Prometheus afterwards, as it is ſaid, through Epimetheus, was puniſhed for his theft. Since, however, man became a partaker of a divine allotment, in the firſt place through this alliance with divinity, he alone of the other animals believed that there were gods, and endeavoured that the altars and ſtatues of the gods ſhould be eſtabliſhed. In the next place he articulately diſtinguiſhed by art, voice and

[1] In theſe two divinities the cauſe of all arts is primarily comprehended: the former of theſe firſt imparting the fabricative power which the arts poſſeſs; and the latter illuminating them with that which is gnoſtic and intellectual.

[2] Prometheus was not permitted to aſcend to the citadel of Jupiter, with whom the political ſcience firſt ſubſiſts, becauſe the guards of Jupiter, i. e. the Curetes, who are of an unpolluted guardian characteriſtic, preſerve him exempt from all partial cauſes, among which Prometheus ranks. Through theſe guardians alſo, being firmly eſtabliſhed in himſelf, he pervades through all things without impediment, and being preſent to all his progeny, is expanded above wholes according to ſupreme tranſcendency. The citadel alſo of Jupiter (ſays Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 299), according to the rumours of theologiſts, is a ſymbol of intellectual circulation and of the higheſt ſummit of Olympus, which all the wiſe ſuſpend from Jupiter's intellectual place of ſurvey. To this place likewiſe (he adds) Jupiter extends all the mundane gods, thence imparting to them intellectual powers, divine light, and vivific illuminations.

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names, and invented houſes and garments, ſhoes and beds, and nouriſhment from the earth. But men, being thus provided for in the beginning, lived diſperſed; for cities were not: hence they were deſtroyed by wild beaſts, through being every where more imbecile than them; and the fabricating art was indeed a ſufficient aid to them for nutriment, but was inadequate to the war with wild beaſts: for they had not yet the political art, of which the military is a part. They ſought therefore to collect themſelves together, and to ſave themſelves, building for this purpoſe cities. When, however, they were thus collected in a body, they injured each other, as not poſſeſſing the political art; ſo that, again being diſperſed, they were deſtroyed by the beaſts. Jupiter, therefore, fearing for our race, leſt it ſhould entirely periſh, ſent Hermes, and ordered him to bring Shame and Juſtice to men, that theſe two might be the ornaments and the bonds of cities, and the conciliators of friendſhip. Hermes, therefore, aſked after what manner he ſhould give Shame and Juſtice to men. Whether, ſaid he, as the arts are diſtributed, ſo alſo ſhall I diſtribute theſe? for they are diſtributed as follows:—One man who poſſeſſes the medicinal art is ſufficient for many private perſons; and in a ſimilar manner other artificers. Shall I, therefore, thus inſert Shame and Juſtice in men? or ſhall I diſtribute them to all?—To all, ſaid Jupiter, and let all be partakers of them: for cities will not ſubſiſt, if a few only participate of theſe, as of the other arts. Publiſh alſo this law in my name, that he who is incapable of partaking of Shame and Juſtice ſhall be puniſhed as the peſt of the city."

Thus, Socrates, and on this account, both others and the Athenians, when they diſcourſe concerning building, or any other fabricative art, think that a few only ſhould be conſulted; and if any one unſkilled in theſe affairs offers to give advice, they do not allow him, as you ſay; and it is reaſonable, as I ſay, that they ſhould not. But when they proceed to a conſultation concerning political virtue, the whole of which conſiſts from juſtice and temperance, they very properly permit every man to ſpeak; becauſe it is fit that every one ſhould partake of this virtue, or there can be no cities. This, Socrates, is the cauſe of that which was doubted. And that you may not think I deceive you in aſſerting that all men in reality think that every man participates of juſtice, and of the reſt of politic virtue, take this as an argument: in other arts, as you ſay, if any one aſſerts that he is a good piper, or ſkilled in any

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other art of which he is ignorant, thoſe that hear him either laugh at, or are indignant with him, and his friends admoniſh him as one inſane; but in juſtice and the other political virtue, though it be known that a certain perſon is unjuſt, yet if he aſſerts the truth of himſelf before the multitude, they think that he is inſane, and that he ſhould not unfold his iniquity; and they ſay that all men ſhould acknowledge themſelves to be juſt, whether they are or not; or that he who does not pretend that he is juſt muſt be mad; as if it were neceſſary that every one ſhould, in a certain reſpect, partake of juſtice, or no longer be a man. I ſay theſe things, to ſhow that every man is very properly permitted to give his advice concerning this virtue, becauſe every one is thought to be a partaker of it. But that men do not think that it ſubſiſts from nature, nor from chance, but that it may be taught and obtained by ſtudy, this I will in the next place endeavour to ſhow you. No one is enraged with another on account of thoſe evils which he thinks ariſe either from nature or art; nor does he admoniſh, or teach, or puniſh the poſſeſſors of theſe evils in order to make them otherwiſe than they are; but, on the contrary, he pities them. Thus, for inſtance, who would be ſo mad as to reprehend the deformed, or the little, or the diſeaſed? For I think they know that theſe things, viz. ſuch as are beautiful and the contrary, happen to men from nature and fortune. On the contrary, when they think that any one poſſeſſes certain evils from ſtudy, cuſtom, and learning, then they are indignant, admoniſh, and puniſh; among the number of which evils are injuſtice and impiety, and in ſhort every thing which is contrary to political virtue. And as this ſpecies of virtue is obtained by ſtudy and diſcipline, they are on this account indignant with and admoniſh every one who neglects to acquire it. For if you are willing, O Socrates, to conſider what the puniſhment of the unjuſt is able to effect, this very thing will teach you that men think virtue is to be acquired. For no one endued with intellect puniſhes him who has acted unjuſtly, merely becauſe he has ſo acted; for he who acts in this manner puniſhes like a wild beaſt, irrationally. But he who endeavours to puniſh with reaſon, does not puniſh for the ſake of paſt guilt (for that which has been done cannot be undone), but for the ſake of future injuſtice, that neither this offender himſelf, nor any other who ſees him puniſhed, may again act unjuſtly. And he who has this conception muſt be perſuaded that virtue may be taught: for puniſhment is inflicted for the

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ſake of turning others from guilt. All, therefore, that puniſh, as well privately as publicly, have this opinion. And both other men, and eſpecially the Athenians your fellow citizens, take vengeance on and puniſh thoſe whom they think have acted unjuſtly; ſo that, according to this reaſoning, the Athenians alſo are among the number of thoſe who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Very properly, therefore, do your fellow citizens admit the brazier and ſhoemaker to give advice in political concerns; and, as it appears to me, Socrates, it has been ſufficiently demonſtrated to you that they conſider virtue as a thing which may be taught and acquired.

There ſtill, however, remains the doubt which you introduced concerning illuſtrious men, viz. on what account they teach their ſons, and make them wiſe in things which may be obtained from preceptors, but do not render them better than others in the virtue for which they themſelves are renowned. In order to remove this doubt, Socrates, I ſhall no longer employ a fable, but argument. For thus conceive: whether is there any one thing or not, of which it is neceſſary all the citizens ſhould partake, or a city cannot ſubſiſt? In this thing your doubt is ſolved, but by no means otherwiſe. For if there is this one thing, which is neither the art of the architect, nor of the brazier, nor potter, but is juſtice, and temperance, and holineſs, and in ſhort the virtue of man; if this be the thing, of which it is neceſſary all ſhould partake, and together with which every man ſhould learn and perform whatever elſe he wiſhes to learn or do, but by no means without this; or if he does not partake of it, that he ſhould be taught and puniſhed, whether boy, or man, or woman, till through puniſhment he becomes better; and he who is not obedient, when puniſhed or taught, is baniſhed from the city, or put to death as one incurable; if this then be the caſe, and thoſe illuſtrious men teach their children other things, but not this, conſider in how wonderful a manner they become excellent men: for we have ſhown that they think virtue may be taught both privately and publicly. But ſince it may be taught, do you think that fathers teach their children other things, the ignorance of which is neither attended with death nor a penalty; but that in other things in which a penalty, death, and exile are the puniſhments attendant on their children, when they are not inſtructed nor exerciſed in virtue, and beſides death, the confiſcation of their goods, and in ſhort the ruin of their families, they neither teach them theſe things,

nor

nor uſe their utmoſt endeavours that they may acquire them? It is neceſſary to think, Socrates, that fathers, beginning with their children when they are very young, will teach and admoniſh them as long as they live. For as ſoon as a boy underſtands what is ſaid to him, his nurſe, mother, pedagogue, and the father himſelf, ſtrive to the utmoſt that the boy may become a moſt excellent character; teaching and pointing out to him, in every word and deed, that this is juſt, and that unjuſt; that this is beautiful and that baſe; and that this is holy, and that unholy: likewiſe that he ſhould do theſe things, and not thoſe. And if the boy is willingly perſuaded, they think they have done well; but if not, they form him to rectitude by threats and blows, as if he were a diſtorted and bent piece of wood. In the next place they ſend him to maſters, and theſe they much more enjoin to pay attention to the morals of the boys, than to the teaching them to read and play on the harp. The preceptors likewiſe take care of the children; and when the boys have learnt their letters, and their attention is directed to the meaning of what they read, inſtead of oral precepts, the maſters give them the compoſitions of the beſt poets to read, and compel them to commit them to memory; becauſe in theſe there are many admonitions, and many tranſactions, and praiſes, and encomiums, of antient illuſtrious men, that the boy may be zealous to imitate them, and may deſire to become a ſimilar character. The maſters of the harp alſo do other things of a like kind; for they pay attention to temperance, and take care that the boys do not commit any vice. Beſides this too, when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach them the compoſitions of other good lyric poets, ſinging them to the harp; and they compel rhythms and harmonies to become familiar to the ſouls of the boys, that becoming milder, more orderly, and more harmonious, they may be more able both to ſpeak and act: for every life of man requires rhythm and harmony. Further ſtill, beſides theſe things, they ſend them to maſters of exerciſe, that their bodies being rendered better, may be uſefully ſubſervient to the rational part of the ſoul, and that they may not be compelled to cowardice, through the depravity of their bodies, in war and other actions. And theſe things are done by thoſe who are moſt able to do them: but the moſt able are the moſt wealthy; and the ſons of theſe begin their exerciſes the earlieſt, and continue them the longeſt. But when they leave their maſters, the city compels them to learn the laws, and to live according to the paradigm of theſe, that they may not

act caſually from themſelves; but in reality, juſt as writing maſters give their ſcholars, who have not yet learnt to write well, letters to be traced over by them which they have written, and thus compel them to write conformably to their copy; ſo the city preſcribing laws which were the inventions of illuſtrious and antient legiſlators, compels them to govern and to be governed according to theſe. But it puniſhes him who tranſgreſſes theſe; and the name which is given to this puniſhment, both by you, and in many other places, is ευθυναι, *corrections*, as if it were juſtice *correcting* depravity.

As ſo much attention therefore is paid, both privately and publicly, to virtue, can you ſtill wonder and doubt, O Socrates, whether virtue may be taught? It is not, however, proper to wonder that it can be taught, but it would be much more wonderful if this were not the caſe. But why then are unworthy ſons frequently the offspring of worthy fathers? Learn again the reaſon of this. For this is not wonderful, if what I have before ſaid is true, that this thing virtue ought not to be peculiar to any one perſon, in order to the exiſtence of a city. For if this be the caſe, as I ſay (and it is ſo the moſt of all things), conſider and ſelect any other ſtudy and diſcipline whatever. Thus, for inſtance, ſuppoſe that this city could not ſubſiſt unleſs we were all of us players on the pipe, ſhould we not all apply ourſelves to this inſtrument? and would not every one teach every one, both privately and publickly, to play on it? and would he not reprove him who played unſkilfully, and this without any envy? Juſt as now, no one envies or conceals things juſt and legal, as is the caſe in other arts. For mutual juſtice and virtue are, I think, advantageous to us: and on this account every one moſt willingly diſcourſes about and teaches things juſt and legal. If then in playing on the pipe we are thus diſpoſed, with all alacrity and without reſerve, to teach each other, do you think, Socrates, ſaid he, that the ſons of the moſt excellent players on the pipe would become good pipers, rather than the ſons of bad players on this inſtrument? I indeed think not; but the boy moſt happily born for that art would be found to be him who made the greateſt proficiency; and he who was not naturally adapted for it would purſue it without glory. And the ſon of an excellent piper would often be unſkilled in that art; and again, a good piper would frequently be the offspring of a bad one. However, they would be all ſufficiently excellent, if compared with the unſkilful, and with thoſe who know nothing of the piper's art. In like manner think that the man

who appears to you to be the moſt unjuſt of thoſe who are nurtured by the laws, and among men, is juſt and the artificer of this thing (juſtice), if he is compared with men; who have neither diſcipline, nor courts of juſtice, nor laws, nor any neceſſity which compels them to pay every attention to virtue, but are mere ſavages, ſuch as thoſe which Pherecrates the poet cauſed to be acted laſt year, during the feſtivals of Bacchus. And if you ſhould chance to be among ſuch men as the miſanthropes in that play, you would rejoice if you met with Eurybates and Phrynendas[1], and deploring your fortune, you would deſire the depravity of our men. But now you are delicate, Socrates, becauſe all men are teachers of virtue to the utmoſt of their abilities, though no one appears to you to be ſo. For if you ſhould ſearch for the man who taught us to ſpeak the Greek tongue, he would be no where to be found: nor, if you were to inquire who it is that can teach the ſons of manual artificers this very art which they have learnt from their father, and which both the father and the fellow artiſts his friends exerciſe, you would not, I think, O Socrates, eaſily find the preceptor of theſe; but it is every where eaſy to find teachers of the ignorant. And thus it is alſo with reſpect to virtue and every thing elſe. We ſhould likewiſe rejoice, if he who ſurpaſſes us cauſes us to advance in virtue, though but in a ſmall degree, among the number of which I think I am one, and that I know in a manner, ſuperior to other men, what will contribute to the beautiful and the good, and that I am worthy of the reward which I receive for my inſtruction, and indeed of more than I receive, as is alſo the opinion of my diſciples. Hence this is the bargain which I uſually make: when any one has learnt from me, if he is willing, he pays me the ſum of money which I require; but if not, going to a temple and ſwearing how much the diſciplines which I teach are worth, he depoſits the ſum which he is to pay me. And thus much, ſaid he, O Socrates, I, and the fable, and argument have aſſerted, to prove that virtue may be taught; and the Athenians alſo are of the ſame opinion. We have likewiſe ſhown that it is not in any reſpect wonderful that depraved ſons ſhould be the offspring of excellent fathers, ſince the ſons of Polycletus, who are of the ſame age with Paralus and Xanthippus, are nothing when compared with their father;

[1] Theſe were two notorious profligates, who had given occaſion for the proverbs, "An action of Eurybates: it is another Phrynendas."

and

and in like manner with reſpect to the ſons of other artiſts. Theſe, however, are not yet to be condemned; for they are young, and hope may be yet entertained of their making a proficiency.

Protagoras therefore, having pointed out theſe and ſimilar things, ceaſed to ſpeak; and I having been for a long time charmed, looked ſtill at him, as deſiring to hear him ſtill ſpeak. But when I perceived that he had in reality finiſhed his diſcourſe, and when I had with difficulty collected myſelf, looking to Hippocrates I ſaid, O ſon of Apollodorus, how much do I thank you for having brought me hither! For I make much of what I have heard from Protagoras; ſince before this, I thought that it was not human care by which worthy men become worthy, but now I am perſuaded that it is. There is however a ſmall impediment to my belief, which Protagoras will doubtleſs eaſily remove, ſince he has unfolded ſo much. For if ſome one ſhould diſcourſe with any one of the popular orators, perhaps he would hear arguments of this kind, ſuch as Pericles delivered, or ſome other eloquent man; but if ſome one ſhould aſk them concerning any thing, they like a book would have nothing to reply, nor any thing to ſay. And if a man ſhould aſk them any trifling particular reſpecting what was ſaid, they would reſemble braſs when ſtruck, which keeps and extends its ſound for a long time, unleſs ſome one lays hold of it. For thus rhetoricians, when aſked ſome trifling thing, reply in an extended ſpeech. But Protagoras here is ſufficient to deliver both long and beautiful diſcourſes, as he has juſt now made it appear; and he is alſo ſufficient, when interrogated, to anſwer with brevity, and interrogating, to wait for and receive an anſwer; which can be aſſerted but of a few. Now then, O Protagoras, I am in want of a certain trifling particular, and if you anſwer me this, I ſhall have all that I want. You ſay that virtue may be taught; and I, if I could be perſuaded by any man, ſhould be perſuaded by you. But I beſeech you to remove the wonder which you excited in my mind while you were ſpeaking. For you ſay that Jupiter ſent juſtice and ſhame to men; and afterwards, in many parts of your diſcourſe, you ſpeak of juſtice, temperance, and ſanctity, and of all theſe collectively, as if virtue were but one thing. Accurately explain to me, therefore, this very thing, whether virtue is one certain thing, but the parts of it are juſtice, temperance, and ſanctity; or whether all theſe which I have juſt now mentioned are names of one and the ſame thing. This it is

which I ſtill deſire to know.—But it is eaſy, ſaid he, Socrates, to anſwer this queſtion, that virtue being one thing, the particulars which you have adduced are the parts of it.—But whether, ſaid I, are they parts, in the ſame manner as the mouth, noſtrils, eyes and ears are parts of the face? or are they parts like the parts of gold, which do not differ from each other and the whole, except in magnitude and parvitude?—It appears to me, Socrates, that the parts of virtue have the ſame relation to the whole, as the parts of the face to the whole face.—Whether then, ſaid I, do different men receive a different part of virtue? or is it neceſſary that he who receives one part ſhould poſſeſs all the parts of virtue?—By no means, ſaid he; ſince many men are brave, but unjuſt; and others again are juſt, but not wiſe.—But, ſaid I, are theſe parts of virtue, viz. wiſdom and fortitude?—Certainly, the moſt of all things, he replied; and the greateſt of all the parts, is wiſdom.—But, ſaid I, of theſe parts, is this one thing, and that another?—Yes.—Has each of them alſo its proper power, in the ſame manner as each of the parts of the face? As for inſtance, the eye is not ſimilar to the ears, nor is the power of it the ſame; nor do any of the other parts reſemble each other, nor are their powers the ſame, nor are they mutually ſimilar in any other reſpect. Is it therefore thus alſo with the parts of virtue, ſo that the one does not reſemble the other, neither in itſelf, nor in its power? Or is it not evident that it is ſo, ſince it is ſimilar to the paradigm which we have introduced?—But it does thus ſubſiſt, Socrates, ſaid he.—And I replied, no other part of virtue therefore, is ſuch as ſcience, nor ſuch as juſtice, nor ſuch as fortitude, nor ſuch as temperance, nor ſuch as ſanctity.—It is not, ſaid he.

But come, ſaid I, let us conſider in common what kind of a thing each of theſe is. And, in the firſt place, is juſtice a certain thing, or is it nothing? For to me it appears to be ſomething. But what does it appear to you to be?—That it is alſo ſomething.—What then? If ſome one ſhould aſk you and me, O Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with reſpect to this very thing which you have juſt now named juſtice, whether it is juſt or unjuſt? I indeed ſhould anſwer him that it is juſt. But what would you ſay? would your anſwer be the ſame with mine or not?—The ſame, ſaid he.—I therefore ſhould ſay that juſtice is a thing ſimilar to the being juſt, in reply to the interrogator. And would not you alſo aſſert the ſame?—Yes, ſaid he.—If then, after this, he ſhould aſk us, Do you alſo ſay that ſanctity is ſomething?

ſomething? we ſhould reply, I think, that we do.—We ſhould, ſaid he.—But whether do you ſay that this very thing ſanctity is actually adapted to be unholy, or to be holy? For my part, I ſhould be indignant with this queſtion, and ſhould ſay, Predict better things, O man: for by no means will any thing elſe be holy unleſs holineſs itſelf be holy. But what do you ſay? would not you thus anſwer?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—If then, after this he ſhould ſay, aſking us, How then have ye ſpoken a little before? Or have I not rightly underſtood you? For you appear to me to aſſert that the parts of virtue ſubſiſted in ſuch a manner with reſpect to each other, that one of them does not reſemble the other; I ſhould reply, that as to other things, you have underſtood rightly, but you are miſtaken in thinking that I alſo have ſaid this: for Protagoras gave this anſwer, but I interrogated him. If then he ſhould ſay, he ſpeaks the truth, Protagoras: for you ſay that one part of virtue does not reſemble another. This is your aſſertion. What would be your anſwer to him?—It is neceſſary, ſaid he, Socrates, to acknowledge it.—What then, O Protagoras, aſſenting to theſe things, ſhall we anſwer him, if he ſhould add, holineſs therefore is not of ſuch a nature as to be a juſt thing, nor is juſtice ſuch as a holy thing, but ſuch as that which is not holy; and holineſs is ſuch as that which is not juſt. So that what is juſt is unholy. What ſhall we ſay to him in reply? For I, for my own part, ſhould ſay that juſtice is holy, and that holineſs is juſt. And for you, if you will permit me, I ſhould reply this very thing, that either juſtice is the ſame with holineſs, or that it is moſt ſimilar to it; and that the moſt of all things, juſtice is ſuch as holineſs, and holineſs ſuch as juſtice. But ſee whether you hinder me from giving this anſwer; or does this alſo appear to you to be the caſe?—It does not entirely, ſaid he, Socrates, appear to me to be ſimply thus, ſo as to grant that juſtice is holy, and holineſs juſt; but there appears to me to be a certain difference between them. However, of what conſequence is this? For, if you will, let juſtice be holy, and let holineſs be juſt.—I have nothing to do, ſaid I, with *I will*; and if it is agreeable to you, let it be reprobated. And let us alſo be perſuaded that the ſubject of our converſation will be diſcuſſed in the beſt manner, when the particle *if* is removed from it.—But indeed, he replied, juſtice has ſomething ſimilar to holineſs. For one thing always reſembles another in a certain reſpect, contraries alone excepted: for white has no ſimilitude to black, nor hard to ſoft; and ſo with reſpect

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to other things which appear to be moſt contrary to each other, and which, as we before obſerved, poſſeſs another power, and of which one does not reſemble the other. But there are other things, ſuch as the parts of the face, in which the one is ſimilar to the other. So that although you ſhould confute theſe things after this manner, if you are of opinion that all things are ſimilar to each other, yet it is not juſt to call thoſe things ſimilar which poſſeſs a certain ſimilitude to each other; as neither is it juſt to call thoſe things which poſſeſs a certain diſſimilitude, diſſimilars, though they have but very little of the ſimilar.—And I wondering, ſaid to him, do the juſt and the holy appear to you to be ſo mutually related, as to poſſeſs but a ſmall degree of ſimilitude to each other?—Not entirely ſo, ſaid he; nor yet again, do I conſider them in the ſame way as you appear to me to conſider them.—But I replied, Since theſe things do not ſeem to be agreeable to you, we will diſmiſs them, and conſider this other thing which you ſay. What do you call folly? Do you not ſay that wiſdom is perfectly contrary to it?—To me it appears to be ſo, ſaid he.—But when men act rightly and profitably, do they then appear to you to act temperately; or when they act in a contrary manner?—They appear to me, ſaid he, to act temperately, when they act rightly and profitably.—And do they not act temperately by temperance?—It is neceſſary.—Do not therefore thoſe that act wrongly, act fooliſhly, and thus acting, not act by temperance?—I agree with you, ſaid he, that they do.—The acting fooliſhly, therefore, is the contrary to acting temperately.—He ſaid it was.—Are not, therefore, things which are done fooliſhly, ſo done by folly, but by temperance things which are done temperately?—He granted it.—If then any thing is done by ſtrength, is it not done ſtrongly, and if by weakneſs, weakly.—So it appears.—And if any thing is done with ſwiftneſs, is it not done ſwiftly, and if with ſlowneſs, ſlowly?—He ſaid it was.—And if any thing is done after the ſame manner, is it not done by the ſame, and if in a contrary manner by the contrary?—He granted it.—Come then, I replied, is there ſomething beautiful?—He admitted there was.—And is any thing contrary to this except the baſe?—There is not.—But what? Is there ſomething good? And is any thing contrary to this except evil?—There is not.—Is there alſo ſomething acute in voice?—He ſaid there is.—And is any thing contrary to this except the grave?—There is not, ſaid he.—To every one of contraries therefore, I replied, there is only one contrary, and not

many.—He granted it.—Let us then, ſaid I, repeat the particulars to which we have aſſented. We have acknowledged that there is only one contrary to one thing, but not more than one.—We have.—But that which is done contrarily is done by things contrary.—He admitted it.—We alſo granted that what is done fooliſhly is done in a manner contrary to that which is done temperately.—He ſaid we did.—But that which is done temperately is done by temperance, and that which is done fooliſhly, by folly.—He granted it.—But if a thing is done contrarily, is it not done by a contrary?—Yes.—And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly.—Yes.—And are they not done contrarily?—Entirely ſo.—Are they not therefore done by contraries?—Yes.—Folly therefore is contrary to temperance.—So it appears.—Do you remember, then, that it was before acknowledged by us, that folly is contrary to wiſdom?—He agreed that it was.—And did we not alſo ſay, that there is only one contrary to one thing.—We did.—Which therefore of theſe poſitions, O Protagoras, ſhall we reject? That which ſays there is only one contrary to one thing, or that in which it is aſſerted, that wiſdom is different from temperance? but that each is a part of virtue? And that beſides being different, both they and their powers are diſſimilar, in the ſame manner as the parts of the face? Which therefore of theſe ſhall we reject? for both of them are not very muſically aſſerted; ſince they do not accord, nor coharmonize with each other. For how can they accord, if it be neceſſary that there ſhould only be one contrary to one thing, but not to more than one? But to folly, which is one thing, wiſdom and temperance have appeared to be contrary. Is it ſo, ſaid I, O Protagoras, or not?—He acknowledged that it was ſo, but very unwillingly.—Will not, therefore, temperance and wiſdom be one thing? And again, prior to this, it appeared to us that juſtice and ſanctity were nearly the ſame thing. But come, ſaid I, Protarogas, let us not be weary, but conſider what remains. Does it then appear to you that a man who acts unjuſtly is wiſe, becauſe he acts unjuſtly?—I, ſaid he, Socrates, ſhould be aſhamed to aeknowledge this, though it is aſſerted by many men.—Whether then ſhall we addreſs ourſelves to them, or to you?—If you are willing, ſaid he, ſpeak firſt to this aſſertion of the many.—But it makes no difference to me, if you only anſwer, whether theſe things appear to you or not; for I eſpecially direct my attention to the aſſertion. It may, however, perhaps happen, that I ſhall both explore myſelf interrogating, and him who anſwers.

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At firſt, therefore, Protagoras began to aſſume ſome conſequence (for he was averſe to diſcuſs this affair, and ſaid it was difficult); but afterwards he ſubmitted to anſwer.—Come then, ſaid I, anſwer me from the beginning: Do certain perſons who act unjuſtly, appear to you to be wiſe?—Let them be ſo, ſaid he.—And does not the being wiſe conſiſt in conſulting well, even when they act unjuſtly?—Be it ſo, ſaid he.—But whether, I replied, does this take place if they do well, acting unjuſtly, or if they do ill?—If they do well.—Do you then ſay that certain things are good?—I do.—Whether, therefore, ſaid I, are thoſe things good which are advantageous to men?—By Jupiter, ſaid he, they are; and I alſo call ſome things good, though they are not advantageous to men. And Protagoras, when he ſaid this, appeared to me to be ruffled, afraid, and averſe to anſwer. Seeing him, therefore, in this condition, I cautiouſly and gradually interrogated him; and I ſaid, Whether, O Protagoras, do you ſpeak of things which are advantageous to no *man*, or of thoſe which are in *no reſpect* advantageous? And do you call ſuch things as theſe good?—By no means, ſaid he; but I know many things which are uſeleſs to men, meats and drinks, and medical potions, and ten thouſand other things; and I alſo know ſome things which are advantageous to them. There are likewiſe ſome things which are by no means profitable to men, but are beneficial to horſes; ſome which are advantageous to oxen only; and others to dogs: others again which are beneficial to no one of theſe, but to trees; and others which are good to the roots of trees, but pernicious to their bloſſoms. Thus, for inſtance, dung is beneficial to the roots of all trees when thrown upon them; but if you were to throw it on their branches and ſhoots, you would deſtroy them all. Thus too, oil is a very excellent thing for all plants: but is moſt hoſtile to the hairs of all animals except man. For it is beneficial to the hairs of man, and to the reſt of his body. And ſo diverſified and all-various a thing is good, that this very thing, oil, is good to the external parts of the body of man, but is moſt pernicious to his inward parts. And on this account all phyſicians forbid the diſeaſed the uſe of oil; or at leaſt only permit them to uſe it in a very ſmall degree, and juſt ſufficient to correct the bad ſmell of the food which they take.

Protagoras having thus ſpoken, thoſe that were preſent loudly applauded him as one that had made a good ſpeech. And I ſaid, O Protagoras, I am a man naturally forgetful, and if any one makes a long diſcourſe to me, I forget

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what was the ſubject of his diſcourſe. As, therefore, if I were deaf, and you intended to diſcourſe with me, it would be neceſſary for you to ſpeak a little louder to me than to others; ſo now, ſince you happen to have met with a forgetful man, cut your anſwers for me, and make them ſhorter, if you wiſh that I ſhould follow you.—How would you have me ſhorten my anſwers? Muſt I anſwer you, ſaid he, ſhorter than is neceſſary?—By no means, I replied.—But as much as is proper, ſaid he?—Yes, ſaid I.—Whether, therefore, muſt my reply be ſuch as appears to me to be neceſſary, or ſuch as appears to be ſo to you?—I have heard, I replied, that you can both ſpeak with prolixity yourſelf about the ſame things, and teach another to do the ſame, ſo as never to be in want of words; and again, that you can ſpeak with brevity, ſo that no one can deliver himſelf in fewer words than you. If, therefore, you intend to diſcourſe with me, uſe the other method, that of ſpeaking with brevity.—O Socrates, ſaid he, I have had verbal conteſts with many men, and if I had done this which you urge me to do, viz. if I had ſpoken as my antagoniſt ordered me to ſpeak, I ſhould not have appeared to excel any one, nor would the name of Protagoras have been celebrated in Greece.—And I (for I knew that the former anſwers did not pleaſe him, and that he would not be willing to anſwer my interrogations) thought that I had no longer any buſineſs in the conference. I therefore ſaid, O Protagoras, I do not deſire you to diſcourſe with me contrary to your will; but if you are diſpoſed to converſe ſo that I can follow you, then I will diſcourſe with you. For you, according to report, and as you yourſelf ſay, are able to ſpeak both with prolixity and brevity: for you are wiſe. But I am unable to make theſe long ſpeeches; though I wiſh that I had the ability. It is fit, however, that you, who are capable of doing both, ſhould yield to my inability, in order that converſation may take place. But now, as you are not willing to do this, and a certain buſineſs prevents me from ſtaying to hear your long ſpeeches, I muſt depart whither it is requiſite I ſhould go; though perhaps it would not be unpleaſant to me to hear theſe things from you.—And at the ſame time having thus ſpoken, I roſe in order to go. But as I was riſing, Callias taking hold of me with his right hand, and of my cloak with his left, ſaid, We ſhall not diſmiſs you, Socrates: for if you depart, our converſation will be at an end. I beſeech you, therefore, ſtay with us: for there is not any one thing which I would more willingly hear than you and Protagoras diſcourſing

together. Gratify all of us therefore.—And I ſaid (for I was now ſtanding as being ready to go), O ſon of Hipponicus, I have always admired your philoſophy; but I now both praiſe and love it; ſo that I ſhould wiſh to gratify you, if you requeſt of me poſſibilities. But at preſent, it is juſt as if you ſhould deſire me to run a race with Criſo the Himeræan, who is now in the vigour of youth, or with one of thoſe who run and accompliſh the longeſt courſe, or with ſome diurnal courier; I ſhould ſay to you, that I wiſh much more than you do that I could keep pace with theſe runners, but that I cannot. If, therefore, you would ſee me and Criſo running a race together, you muſt requeſt him to keep pace with me: for I am not able to run ſwiftly, but he is able to run ſlowly. In like manner, if you deſire to hear me and Protagoras, you muſt requeſt him, that as he at firſt anſwered me with brevity the queſtions that were aſked, he will now alſo anſwer me in the ſame manner: for if he does not, what will be the mode of our diſcourſe? I indeed thought that it is one thing to converſe together, and another to harangue.—But you ſee Socrates, ſaid Callias, that Protagoras appears to ſpeak juſtly, when he ſays that he ought to be permitted to ſpeak as he pleaſes, and you as you pleaſe. Alcibiades, therefore, taking up the diſcourſe, ſaid, You do not ſpeak well Callias: for Socrates here acknowledges that he cannot make a long ſpeech, and in this yields to Protagoras. But in the ability of diſcourſing, and knowing how to queſtion and anſwer, I ſhould wonder if he yielded to any man. If, therefore, Protagoras confeſſes that he is inferior to Socrates in diſputation, it is ſufficient for Socrates; but if he denies it, let him diſpute, both by queſtioning and anſwering, without making a long ſpeech to every interrogation, and without deviating from the ſubject ſo as to prevent another from ſpeaking, and lengthening his diſcourſe till the greater part of the auditors forget what was the ſubject of inveſtigation. For as for Socrates, I will be ſecurity for him that he will not forget any thing: ſince he only jeſts when he ſays he is forgetful. To me, therefore, Socrates appears to be more reaſonable in what he demands: for it is fit that every one ſhould declare his own opinion. But after Alcibiades, it was Critias, I think, who ſaid, O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias indeed appears to me to be very much for Protagoras; but Alcibiades is always fond of contention in every thing to which he applies himſelf. We, however, ought not to contend with each other, either for Socrates or Protagoras, but we ſhould requeſt both of them

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in common not to diſſolve the conference in the middle. But he having thus ſpoken, Prodicus ſaid, You appear to me, Critias, to ſpeak well: for it is requiſite that thoſe who are preſent at theſe conferences ſhould be the common, but by no means equal auditors of both ſpeakers. For theſe two are not the ſame: for it is requiſite to hear both in common, but not to diſtribute equally to either; but to the wiſer more, and to the more unlearned leſs. I indeed, O Protagoras and Socrates, think that you ought to concede ſomething to each other, and to contend together, but not to quarrel: for friends contend with friends through benevolence; but adverſaries and enemies quarrel with each other. And thus this conference will be conducted in the moſt beautiful manner. For you, the ſpeakers, will be eſpecially approved, I do not ſay praiſed, by us the hearers: for auditors approve from their ſoul without deception; but praiſe is frequently beſtowed in words, falſely, contrary to the real opinion. And thus again, we, the hearers, ſhall be eſpecially delighted, but not pleaſurably affected: for he is delighted who learns any thing and participates of wiſdom in his dianoëtic part; but he is pleaſurably affected who eats ſomething, or is paſſive to ſome other pleaſant ſenſation in his body.

Prodicus having thus ſpoken, many of thoſe that were preſent approved what he ſaid. But after Prodicus, Hippias the wiſe thus addreſſed them:—I conſider all ye that are preſent as kinſmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by nature, and not by law: for the ſimilar is naturally allied to the ſimilar. But law being the tyrant of men, compels many things to be done contrary to nature. It would be diſgraceful, therefore, if we who know the nature of things, who are the wiſeſt of the Greeks, and who are now come for the purpoſe of diſplaying our knowledge into the very prytaneum itſelf of wiſdom, and into this houſe, which is the greateſt and moſt fortunate in the city, ſhould exhibit nothing worthy of this dignity, but diſagree with each other like the vileſt of men. I therefore both requeſt and adviſe you, O Protagoras and Socrates, to ſubmit yourſelves to us, as if we were arbitrators aſſembled for the purpoſe of bringing you to an agreement. Nor do you, Socrates, purſue this accurate form of dialogue, which is ſo very conciſe, unleſs it is agreeable to Protagoras; but give up the reins to diſcourſe, that it may appear to us to be more magnificent and elegant. Nor do you, Protagoras, extending all your ropes, fly with ſwelling ſails into the wide ſea of

diſcourſe, and loſe ſight of ſhore: but let both endeavour to preſerve a middle courſe. Be perſuaded alſo by me, and let ſome moderator and preſident be choſen, who ſhall oblige each of you to keep within bounds.—This expedient pleaſed thoſe that were preſent, and all of them praiſed it. And Callias ſaid, that he would not ſuffer me to go, and required me to chooſe a moderator. I therefore ſaid, that it would be diſgraceful to ſelect a judge of our diſcourſes: for if he be our inferior, it will not be right that the ſubordinate ſhould preſide over the more excellent; and if he be our equal, neither thus will it be right. For he who is juſt ſuch a one as we are, will act ſimilarly to us; ſo that the choice will be vain. But to chooſe one better than we are, is, I think, in reality impoſſible: ſince one wiſer than Protagoras here cannot be choſen. And if you ſhould chooſe a man in no reſpect more able, but whom you aſſert however to be ſo, this alſo will be diſgraceful to Protagoras, by ſubjecting him to a preſident, as if he were ſome contemptible perſon: for it makes no difference as to myſelf. I am willing, therefore, to act as follows, that converſation and dialogue may take place between us, which are the objects of your deſire: If Protagoras is not willing to anſwer, let him interrogate, and I will anſwer; and at the ſame time I will endeavour to ſhow him in what manner I ſay he who is interrogated ought to anſwer. But when I reply to that which he may be willing to aſk, he again in a ſimilar manner ſhall reply to me. If, therefore, he ſhall appear not to be cheerfully diſpoſed to anſwer the interrogation, both you and I in common muſt demand of him, that which you now demand of me, not to diſſolve the converſation. Nor for the ſake of this is there any occaſion to appoint a preſident: for all of you will be preſidents in common.—It appeared to all that this was what ought to be done. And Protagoras, indeed, was not very willing to comply; but at the ſame time he was compelled to conſent to interrogate; and that when he had ſufficiently interrogated, he would in his turn anſwer with brevity. He began therefore as follows:

I think, ſaid he, O Socrates, that the greateſt part of a man's erudition conſiſts in being ſkilled in poetical compoſitions. But this is the ability of knowing what is well or ill ſaid by the poets, ſo as to be capable of aſſigning a reaſon when interrogated concerning their poems. And now indeed let the queſtion be reſpecting virtue, the ſubject of our preſent diſcourſe; differing only in this, that the diſquiſition is transferred to poetry. Simonides then

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ſays to Scopas, the ſon of Creon the Theſſalonian, "That it is difficult to become a truly good man, ſo as in hands, feet, and intellect, to be faſhioned a blameleſs ſquare." Do you know the verſe, or ſhall I repeat the whole paſſage to you?—And I ſaid, there is no neceſſity for this; for I know, and have paid great attention to the verſe.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he. Whether, therefore, does Simonides appear to you to have done well and rightly, or not?—Very well, ſaid I, and rightly.—But does the poet appear to you to have done well if he contradicts himſelf?—By no means, I replied.—Conſider more attentively, ſaid he.—But, my good man, I have ſufficiently conſidered it.—You know therefore, ſaid he, that in the courſe of the poem he ſays, "The aſſertion of Pittacus does not pleaſe me, though it was delivered by a wiſe man, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man." Do you underſtand that the ſame perſon made this and the former aſſertion?—I do, I replied.—Does it therefore, ſaid he, appear to you that theſe things accord with thoſe?—To me they do appear to accord. And at the ſame time fearing leſt he ſhould ſay any thing in addition, I ſaid, But do they not appear to do ſo to you?—How, he replied; can he who made both theſe aſſertions accord with himſelf, when he firſt ſays, that it is difficult to become a truly good man, and a little after, forgetting what he had aſſerted, he blames Pittacus for ſaying the ſame thing that he had ſaid, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man, though it is evident that in blaming him who ſaid this, he alſo blames himſelf? So that either the former or the latter aſſertion is not right.—Protagoras having thus ſpoken, many of the auditors made a noiſe, and applauded him. And I indeed at firſt, as if I had been ſtruck by a ſkilful pugiliſt, was incapable of ſeeing, and became giddy, on his ſaying theſe things, and the reſt making a tumult; but afterwards (to tell you the truth), that I might have time to conſider what the poet ſaid, I turned myſelf to Prodicus, and calling him, I ſaid, Simonides, O Prodicus, was your fellow-citizen, and it is juſt that you ſhould aſſiſt the man. I appear therefore to myſelf to call upon you, in the ſame manner as Homer[1] ſays Scamander called upon Simois when beſieged by Achilles, "Dear brother, let us both join to repel the proweſs of this man." For I ſay the ſame to you, let us take care that Simonides be not ſubdued by Protagoras. For in order to aſſiſt Simonides, that elegant device of yours is requiſite, by which you diſtinguiſh between *to will*

[1] Iliad xxi. v. 308.

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and *to deſire*, as not being the ſame, and by which you have juſt now ſaid many and beautiful things. And now conſider whether the ſame thing appears to you as to me: for I do not think that Simonides contradicts himſelf. But do you, Prodicus, firſt declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that *to become* is the ſame as *to be*, or that it is ſomething different?—Something different, by Jupiter, ſaid Prodicus.—Does not Simonides then, ſaid I, in the firſt aſſertion, declare his own opinion, that it is difficult to *become* a truly good man?—You ſpeak the truth, ſaid Prodicus.—But he blames Pittacus, I replied, not as Protagoras thinks, for ſaying the ſame thing that he had ſaid, but for aſſerting ſomething different from it. For Pittacus does not ſay this, that it is difficult to *become* a good man, as Simonides does, but that it is difficult to *continue* to *be* ſo. But as Prodicus ſays, *to be* is not the ſame as to *become*. And if this be the caſe, Simonides does not contradict himſelf. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may ſay with Heſiod[1], "It is difficult to become good: for the gods have placed ſweat before virtue. But he who has arrived at the ſummit will find that to be eaſy, which it was difficult to acquire." Prodicus therefore having heard theſe things, praiſed me; but Protagoras ſaid, your emendation, Socrates, is more erroneous than that which you correct.—And I ſaid, Then I have done ill, as it ſeems, O Protagoras, and I am a ridiculous phyſician; ſince by attempting to cure, I increaſe the diſeaſe.—Thus however it is, ſaid he.—But how? I replied.—The poet, ſaid he, would have been very ignorant, if he had aſſerted that virtue is ſo vile a thing that it may be eaſily acquired, though, as it appears to all men, its poſſeſſion is the moſt difficult of all things.—And I ſaid, by Jupiter, Prodicus, here, is opportunely preſent at our conference. For the wiſdom of Prodicus appears, O Protagoras, to be of great antiquity, whether it originated from Simonides, or from a ſource ſtill more antient. But you, who are ſkilled in many other things, appear to be unſkilled in this, and not ſkilled in it as I am, in conſequence of being the diſciple of this Prodicus. And now you appear to me not to underſtand that this thing which is ſaid to be difficult, was not perhaps ſo apprehended by Simonides, as you apprehend it; but it is with that as with the word δεινος, *deinos*, concerning which Prodicus continually admoniſhes me, when in praiſing you, or any other, I ſay, that

[1] Op. et Dier.

Protagoras is a wiſe and *ſkilful* (δεινὸς) man, by aſking me if I am not aſhamed to call things excellent *dreadful* (δεινος). For το δεινον, ſays he, ſignifies ſomething bad. Hence no one ſays *dreadful* riches, nor *dreadful* peace, nor *dreadful* health; but every one ſays *dreadful* diſeaſe, and *dreadful* war, and *dreadful* poverty, as if thatwhich is (δεινον) *deinon*, is *bad*. Perhaps, therefore, the inhabitants of Ceos and Simonides apprehended by the word *difficult* (χαλεπον) either that which is bad, or ſomething different from what you conceive it to mean. Let us therefore inquire of Prodicus (for it is juſt to aſk him the ſignification of words employed by Simonides); What, O Prodicus, does Simonides mean by the word *difficult*?—He meant, ſaid he, *bad*. On this account, therefore, I replied, he blames Pittacus for ſaying that it is *difficult* to continue to be good, juſt as if he had heard him ſaying, that it is *bad* to continue to be good.—But what elſe, Socrates, ſaid he, do you think Simonides intended, than to blame Pittacus becauſe he did not know how to diſtinguiſh terms rightly, as being a Leſbian, and educated in a barbarous language?—Do you hear Prodicus, ſaid I, O Protagoras? And have you any thing to ſay to theſe things?—This is very far, O Prodicus, ſaid Protagoras, from being the caſe; for I well know that Simonides meant by the word *difficult*, not that which is *bad*, but that which we and others mean by it, viz. a thing which is not eaſy, but is accompliſhed through many labours.—But I alſo think, I replied, that Simonides meant this, and that Prodicus knows that he did; but he jeſts, and is willing to try whether you can defend your aſſertion. For that Simonides did not by the word *difficult* mean any thing *bad*, is very much confirmed by what he adds immediately after: for he ſays, that Divinity alone poſſeſſes this honourable gift. He does not indeed ſay, that it is bad to continue to be good, and afterwards add that Divinity alone poſſeſſes this, and attribute this honour to Divinity alone: for if this were the caſe, Prodicus ſhould have called Simonides a *profligate*, and not a divine man [1]. But I wiſh to tell you what Simonides appears to me to have underſtood in this verſe, if you think proper to make trial of my poetical ſkill. Or, if it is agreeable to you, I will hear you.—Protagoras, therefore, hearing me thus ſpeak, ſaid, Do ſo, if you pleaſe, Socrates: but Prodicus, Hippias, and the reſt, very much urged

[1] Inſtead of ουδαμως κακον, as in the printed text, it is neceſſary to read, as in our verſion, ουδαμως θειον; as Dacier alſo well obſerves.

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me to do it.—I will endeavour then, ſaid I, to explain to you my conceptions reſpecting this verſe.

Philoſophy is very antient among the Greeks, and particularly in Crete and Lacedæmon; and there are more ſophiſts there than in any other country. They diſſemble, however, and pretend that they are unlearned, in order that it may not be manifeſt that they ſurpaſs the reſt of the Greeks in wiſdom (juſt as Protagoras has ſaid reſpecting the ſophiſts); but that they may appear to excel in military ſkill and fortitude; thinking if their real character were known, that all men would engage in the ſame purſuit. But now, concealing this, they deceive thoſe who laconize in other cities. For there are ſome that in imitation of them cut their ears, have a cord for their girdle, are lovers of ſevere exerciſe, and uſe ſhort garments, as if the Lacedæmonians ſurpaſſed in theſe things the other Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, when they wiſh to ſpeak freely with their own ſophiſts, and are weary of converſing with them privately, expel theſe laconic imitators, and then diſcourſe with their ſophiſts, without admitting any ſtrangers to be preſent at their converſations. Neither do they ſuffer any of their young men to travel into other cities, as neither do the Cretans, leſt they ſhould unlearn what they have learnt. But in theſe cities, there are not only men of profound erudition, but women alſo. And that I aſſert theſe things with truth, and that the Lacedæmonians are diſciplined in the beſt manner in philoſophy and diſcourſe, you may know from the following circumſtance: For if any one wiſhes to converſe with the meaneſt of the Lacedæmonians, he will at firſt find him, for the moſt part apparently deſpicable in converſation, but afterwards, when a proper opportunity preſents itſelf, this ſame mean perſon, like a ſkilful jaculator, will hurl a ſentence worthy of attention, ſhort, and contorted; ſo that he who converſes with him will appear to be in no reſpect ſuperior to a boy. That to laconize, therefore, conſiſts much more in philoſophiſing, than in the love of exerciſe, is underſtood by ſome of the preſent age, and was known to the antients; they being perſuaded that the ability of uttering ſuch ſentences as theſe is the province of a man perfectly learned. Among the number of thoſe who were thus perſuaded, were Thales the Mileſian, Pittacus the Mitylenæan, Bias the Prienean, our Solon, Cleobulus the Lindian, Miſo the Chenean, and the ſeventh of theſe is ſaid to be the Lacedæmonian Chilo. All theſe were emulators,

lators, lovers, and diſciples of the Lacedæmonian erudition. And any one may learn that their wiſdom was a thing of this kind, viz. ſhort ſentences uttered by each and worthy to be remembered. Theſe men alſo aſſembling together, conſecrated to Apollo the firſt fruits of their wiſdom, writing in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi thoſe ſentences which are celebrated by all men, viz. "Know thyſelf," and "Nothing too much." But on what account do I mention theſe things? To ſhow that the mode of philoſophy among the antients was a certain laconic brevity of diction. But the ſentence which is aſcribed to Pittacus in particular, and which is celebrated by the wiſe, is this: "It is difficult to continue to be good." Simonides, therefore, as being ambitious of wiſdom, knew that if he could overthrow this ſentence, and triumph over it like a renowned athletic, he himſelf would be celebrated by the men of his own time. In oppoſition to this ſentence, therefore, and with a view to renown, he compoſed the whole of this poem, as it appears to me. Let all of us, however, in common, conſider whether what I aſſert is true.

In the firſt place, then, the very beginning of the poem would indicate that its author was inſane, if he, wiſhing to ſay that it is difficult to become a good man, had afterwards inſerted the particle (μεν) *indeed*. For this would appear to have been inſerted for no purpoſe. Unleſs it ſhould be ſaid, that Simonides in what he ſays contends as it were againſt the ſentence of Pittacus: and that Pittacus, having aſſerted that it is difficult to continue to be good, Simonides diſputing this, ſays it is not difficult; but it is difficult *indeed*, O Pittacus, to become a good man, and to be *truly* good. For he does not uſe the word *truly*, as if there were ſome men that are *truly* good, and others that are good indeed, but not truly ſo (for this would have been ſtupid and unworthy of Simonides); but it is neceſſary to conſider the word *truly* as an hyperbaton[1] in the verſe; and we muſt ſuppoſe Pittacus ſpeaking, as if there was a dialogue between him and Simonides, and ſaying, O men, it is difficult to continue to be good; but Simonides anſwering, O Pittacus, your aſſertion is not true: for it is not difficult to *be* truly good, but to *become* ſo, in hands and feet, and intellect, being faſhioned a blameleſs ſquare:

[1] An hyberbaton is a rhetorical figure, and ſignifies the tranſpoſition of words from their plain grammatical order.

And thus it appears that the particle *indeed* is introduced with reaſon, and that the word *truly* is rightly added in the laſt place. All that follows likewiſe teſtifies that this is the meaning of the paſſage. There are alſo many ſentences in this poem, each of which might be proved to be well written; for it is very elegantly and accurately compoſed. To evince this, however, would take up too much time; but let us ſummarily conſider the whole form and intention of the poem, that we may ſhow that the deſign of it throughout is more than any thing to confute that ſentence of Pittacus. For a little after he ſays, as follows: "It is indeed truly difficult to *become* a good man; yet for a certain time it is poſſible to *be* ſo. But *having become* a good man, to continue in this habit, and to *be* a good man, (as you ſay[1], O Pittacus,) is impoſſible. For this is not human, but Divinity alone poſſeſſes this honourable gift. For man, who may be overwhelmed by unexpected calamity, cannot continue free from vice.

Whom, then, does an unexpected calamity overwhelm in the government of a ſhip? Evidently not an idiot; for the idiot is always overwhelmed. As therefore no one throws to the ground him who is lying on it, but ſometimes he who ſtands upright is thrown down, ſo as to be proſtrate; but this is never the caſe with him who is already proſtrate; ſo an unexpected calamity may ſometimes overwhelm a ſkilful man, but never him who is always unſkilful. And a mighty ſtorm burſting on the head of the pilot may render him unſkilful; bad ſeaſons may confound the huſbandman; and things ſimilar to theſe may be applied to the phyſician: for a good may indeed become a bad man. And this is alſo teſtified by another poet, who ſays, "A good man is ſometimes bad, and ſometimes worthy." But it is not poſſible for a bad man to become bad, but it is always neceſſary that he ſhould be ſo. So that when an unexpected calamity overwhelms a ſkilful, wiſe, and good man, it is not poſſible for him not to be wicked. But you, O Pittacus, ſay, that it is difficult to continue to be good. The truth however is this, that it is difficult indeed, but poſſible, to *become* good; but impoſſible to *continue* to be good. For every man who acts well is good; but bad if he acts ill. What then is a good action with reſpect to literature? and what makes a man excellent in literature? Evidently the being diſciplined in it. What

[1] Meaning that it is impoſſible for man in the preſent life to continue invariably good.

good

good action likewiſe makes a good phyſician? Evidently the learning the art of curing the ſick. For a good phyſician cures properly[1], but a bad one improperly. Who is it then that becomes a bad phyſician? Evidently the man to whom it belongs in the firſt place to be a phyſician, and in the next place to be a good phyſician; for he may become a bad phyſician. But we who are ignorant of the medicinal art, can never by acting ill become bad phyſicians; nor being ignorant of architecture can we become bad architects, or any thing elſe of this kind. But whoever does not become a phyſician by acting ill, it is evident that neither is he a bad phyſician. Thus alſo a good man may ſometimes become a bad man, either from time, or labour, or diſeaſe, or from ſome other circumſtance (for this alone is a bad action to be deprived of ſcience); but a bad man can never become bad (for he is always ſo); but if he is to become bad, it is neceſſary that prior to this he ſhould have been good. So that to this alſo the verſes of Simonides tend, that it is not poſſible to be a good man, ſo as to be perſeveringly good; but that it is poſſible to become a good man, and for this ſame good to become a bad man. And alſo that for the moſt part, thoſe are the beſt men whom the gods love. All theſe things therefore are ſaid againſt Pittacus, which the verſes following theſe ſtill more clearly evince. For he ſays, "Wherefore I ſhall not explore in vain and hope for that which cannot be found, viz. a man nouriſhed by the fruits of the earth, who lives a blameleſs life and is perpetually good." Afterwards he adds, "I will tell you when I have found him." So vehemently, and through the whole of the poem, does he attack the ſaying of Pittacus. He alſo adds, "I willingly praiſe and love the man, who does nothing baſe; and the gods themſelves are not able to contend with neceſſity." And this likewiſe is ſaid in oppoſition to Pittacus. For Simonides was not ſo unlearned as to ſay that he praiſed him who willingly did nothing bad, as if there were ſome who committed baſe actions willingly. For I nearly think this, that no wiſe man conſiders any man as erring voluntarily, and as acting baſely and wickedly with the concurrence of his will; but he well knows that all thoſe who act baſely and wickedly, do ſo involuntarily. But

[1] In the original here there is nothing more than κακος δε κακως; but from the verſion of Ficinus, it appears that the words αγαθος γαρ ιατρος θεραπευει καλως muſt be ſupplied as in our tranſlation. The ſenſe indeed evidently requires this addition.

Simonides does not ſpeak as if he ſaid, that he praiſes the man who does not willingly do wrong, but he ſays this word *willingly* of himſelf. For he thought that a worthy and good man is frequently compelled to love and praiſe a certain perſon. Thus, for inſtance, it often happens that a man has a monſtrous father, or mother, or country, or ſomething elſe of this kind. Depraved characters, therefore, when any thing of this nature happens to them, are in the firſt place glad to ſee it, and in the next place blame and every where divulge the depravity of their parents or country, that they may not be accuſed of having neglected theſe, nor fall into diſgrace for their neglect. Hence they blame their parents or country in a ſtill greater degree, and add voluntary to neceſſary enmity. But the worthy man conceals the faults of his parents or country, and if any unjuſt conduct has led him to be enraged with them, he is their mediator to himſelf, and compels them to love and praiſe their own offspring. I alſo think that Simonides himſelf frequently praiſed and was the encomiaſt of a tyrant, or ſome other character of this kind; and this not willingly, but by compulſion. This, then, is what he ſays to Pittacus; "I, O Pittacus, do not blame you, from being myſelf one who loves to blame: for I am ſatisfied if a man is not wicked, nor very indolent, as knowing that a ſane man benefits his country. Nor will I find fault; ſince I am not a lover of detraction. For the race of fools is infinite; ſo that he who delights in blaming will be ſatiated with it. All things, indeed, are beautiful with which ſuch as are baſe are not mingled." His meaning however in this, is not as if he had ſaid, all things are white with which black is not mingled (for this would be very ridiculous), but he intends to ſignify that he admits mediocrity, ſo as not to blame it. "And I do not ſeek," ſays he, "a man perfectly blameleſs, or expect to find him among ſuch as gather the fruits of the wide-boſomed earth: for I will tell you when I find ſuch a one. So that on this account I ſhall praiſe no one as perfect. But I am ſatisfied with a man of moderate excellence, and who does no ill: and all ſuch as theſe I both love and praiſe." Here too he uſes the language of the Mitylenæans as ſpeaking to Pittacus, and ſaying, "I willingly praiſe and love all theſe." But here it is neceſſary to conſider the word *willingly* as connected with the words "Who does nothing baſe," and to ſeparate it from the verſe in which he ſays, "There are alſo thoſe whom I unwillingly praiſe and love. You therefore, O Pittacus, I ſhould never have blamed,

blamed, if you had ſpoken of that equitable and true mediocrity; but now, though you are very much miſtaken about things of the greateſt moment, yet you *appear* to ſpeak the truth, and on this account I blame you."—It appears to me, ſaid I, O Prodicus and Protagoras, that Simonides compoſed this poem in conſequence of theſe conceptions.

Then Hippias anſwering ſaid, You ſeem to me, Socrates, to have well explained theſe verſes: and I alſo have ſomething pertinent to ſay concerning them, which, if you pleaſe, I will point out to you.—Do ſo, O Hippias, ſaid Alcibiades, but let it be at another time; for now it is juſt to attend to the coincidence in opinion of Protagoras and Socrates with each other. And indeed, if Protagoras wiſhes ſtill to interrogate, Socrates ſhould anſwer; but if he wiſhes to reply to Socrates, then Socrates ſhould interrogate.—And I ſaid, I leave it to Protagoras, to do whichever of the two is more agreeable to him: but if he is willing, let us diſmiſs any further conſideration about the verſes. And I would gladly, O Protagoras, complete with you the diſcuſſion of thoſe things, concerning which I at firſt interrogated you. For it appears to me, that a diſcourſe about poetry is moſt ſimilar to the banquets of vile and ruſtic men; ſince theſe, not being able, through the want of education, to converſe with each other while they are drinking, in their own language, and with their own words, introduce the players on the flute as honourable perſons, hire at a great expenſe a foreign voice, viz. that of flutes, and through the ſound of theſe aſſociate with each other. But when worthy, good, and well-educated men feaſt together, you will ſee neither pipers, nor dancers, nor ſingers, but they being ſufficient to converſe with themſelves, without theſe trifles and ſportive amuſements, ſpeak in their own language, and in a becoming manner reciprocally hear each other, even though they have drank a conſiderable quantity of wine. In like manner, ſuch converſations as the preſent, when they are between men ſuch as moſt of us aſſert ourſelves to be, require no foreign voice, nor poets, of whom it is impoſſible to aſk the meaning of what they ſay, and to whom moſt of thoſe by whom they are cited attribute different conceptions, without being able to explain their real meaning. Wiſe men, therefore, bid farewell to ſuch conferences as theſe, but converſe with each other through themſelves, and in their diſcourſes make trial of each other's ſkill. It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate

conferences

conferences of this kind, laying aſide the poets, and diſcourſing with each other through ourſelves, make trial of the truth of ourſelves. And if you wiſh ſtill to interrogate, I am prepared to anſwer you; but if you do not wiſh it, impart yourſelf to me, and aſſiſt me in giving completion to thoſe things, the diſcuſſion of which we left unfiniſhed.—When I had ſaid theſe and other ſuch like things, Protagoras did not clearly ſignify what part he would take. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, ſaid, Does Protagoras, O Callias, appear to you to do well, in not now being willing to ſay clearly, whether he will anſwer or not? For to me he does not; but let him ſay, whether he is willing or not willing to converſe, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converſe with ſome other perſon, or that ſome one of the company who is ſo diſpoſed may diſcourſe with ſome other.—And Protagoras, as it ſeemed to me, being aſhamed in conſequence of Alcibiades thus ſpeaking, and Callias, and nearly all thoſe that were preſent, ſoliciting him, ſcarcely at length agreed to diſpute, and deſired me to interrogate him that he might anſwer.

I then ſaid to him, O Protagoras, do not think that I ſhall converſe with you with any other deſign, than that thoſe things may be diſcuſſed of which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer ſpeaks very much to the purpoſe, when he ſays, "When two come together, the one apprehends prior to the other." For with reſpect to us men, we are all of us more prompt in every deed, and word, and conception, when collected together. But he who thinks of any thing by himſelf alone, immediately ſearches for ſome one to whom he may communicate it, and from whom he may derive ſtability till he meets with the object of his ſearch. Juſt as I, alſo, for the ſake of this, more willingly converſe with you than with any other, thinking that you diſcriminate the beſt of all men, both about other things which it is likely a worthy man would make the object of his conſideration, and alſo concerning virtue. For what other perſon can do this beſides you? Since you not only think yourſelf to be a worthy and good man, as ſome others alſo are indeed themſelves worthy, but are not able to make others ſo; but you are both worthy yourſelf, and are able to make others good. And you have ſuch confidence in yourſelf, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourſelf to all the Greeks to be a ſophiſt, declare that you are a maſter of erudition and virtue, and you are the firſt that has thought

fit to ſet a price on his inſtructions. Is it not proper, therefore, to call upon you to the conſideration of theſe things, and to interrogate and communicate with you concerning them?—There is no reaſon why this ſhould not be done.—And now, with reſpect to thoſe things which were the ſubject of my former interrogations, I again deſire from the beginning, partly to be reminded of them by you, and partly to conſider them in conjunction with you. But the queſtion, I think, was this, whether wiſdom, temperance, fortitude, juſtice, and ſanctity, which are five names, belong to one thing, or whether a certain proper eſſence pertains to each of theſe names, ſo that each is a thing having a power of its own, and no one of them poſſeſſes a quality ſimilar to the other. You ſaid, therefore, that theſe were not names belonging to one thing, but that each of theſe names pertained to a proper thing. You likewiſe obſerved, that all theſe are parts of virtue, not in the ſame manner as the parts of gold are ſimilar to each other, and to the whole of which they are parts, but juſt as the parts of the face are diſſimilar to the whole of which they are parts, and to each other, and each poſſeſſes a proper power of its own. Inform me if theſe things ſtill appear to you as they did then; or if you think otherwiſe concerning them. For I ſhall not accuſe you, if you now ſpeak differently; ſince I ſhould not wonder if you ſaid theſe things for the purpoſe of trying me.—But, Socrates, he replied, I ſay that all theſe are parts of virtue; and that four of them may juſtly be conſidered as ſimilar to each other, but that fortitude very much differs from all theſe. By the following circumſtance you may know that I ſpeak the truth. You will find men who are moſt unjuſt, moſt unholy, moſt intemperate, and moſt unlearned, who are notwithſtanding remarkably brave.—Stop, ſaid I; for what you ſay deſerves to be conſidered. Whether do you call brave men, daring men, or any thing elſe?—I do, he replied, and I likewiſe ſay that they ruſh headlong on things, which the multitude are afraid to approach.—Come then; Do you ſay, that virtue is ſomething beautiful; and that you are a teacher of it, as of a thing beautiful?—Yes, ſaid he, and a thing moſt beautiful, unleſs I am inſane.—Whether then, ſaid I, is one thing belonging to it baſe, and another beautiful? Or, is the whole beautiful?—The whole is as much as poſſible beautiful.—Do you not know, then, that there are ſome who boldly merge themſelves in wells?—I know that divers do.—Whether do they do this in conſequence of poſſeſſing knowledge, or on account of ſomething

thing elſe?—In conſequence of poſſeſſing knowledge.—But who are they that fight boldly on horſeback? Are they horſemen, or thoſe that are unſkilled in horſemanſhip?—They are horſemen.—And who are they that fight boldly with ſhort ſhields? Are they thoſe that are ſkilled in the uſe of ſuch ſhields, or thoſe that are not ſkilled?—Thoſe that are ſkilled. And in every thing elſe, ſaid he, you will find that thoſe who poſſeſs knowledge, are bolder than the ignorant; and the ſame men after they have been diſciplined are bolder than they were before.—But did you ever ſee any, I ſaid, who being ignorant of all theſe things, were yet daring with reſpect to each of theſe?—I have, he replied, and ſuch as were very daring.—Are, therefore, thoſe daring perſons brave alſo?—If they were, ſaid he, fortitude would be a baſe thing, ſince theſe men are inſane.—What then, ſaid I, have you aſſerted of the brave? Is it not that they are bold?—I have, ſaid he, and now alſo I aſſert the ſame.—But, I replied, do not thoſe who are thus bold appear, not to be brave, but inſane? And again, did not the moſt wiſe appear to us to be alſo the moſt daring? And being moſt daring, were they not alſo moſt brave? And according to this reaſoning, will not wiſdom be fortitude?—You do not well remember, Socrates, ſaid he, what I ſaid, and what was my anſwer to you? For being aſked by you if the brave were bold, I acknowledged that they were; but you did not alſo aſk me if the bold were brave. For if you had aſked me this, I ſhould have ſaid that all the bold were not brave. But you have by no means ſhown that I was not right in granting that the brave are bold. In the next place, you ſhow that men, when they poſſeſs knowledge, are bolder than when they were ignorant, and than others who are ignorant; and in conſequence of this, you think that fortitude and wiſdom are the ſame. But from this mode of reaſoning, you may alſo think that ſtrength is wiſdom. For in the firſt place, if you ſhould in like manner inquire of me, if the ſtrong are powerful, I ſhould ſay that they are; and in the next place, if you ſhould aſk me, if thoſe who know how to wreſtle are more powerful than thoſe who do not poſſeſs this knowledge, and if they are more powerful after they have learnt than before, I ſhould ſay that they are. But from my acknowledging theſe things, it will be poſſible for you, by uſing the ſame arguments, to ſay that, by my own confeſſion, wiſdom is ſtrength. I, however, ſhall by no means here acknowledge that the powerful are ſtrong; but I ſhall admit,

indeed,

indeed, that the ſtrong are powerful; ſince power and ſtrength are not the ſame. For, indeed, power may be produced from inſanity, and from anger; but ſtrength derives its ſubſiſtence from nature, and the proper nutrition of bodies. In like manner, boldneſs and fortitude are not the ſame; ſo that it will happen, that the brave are bold, but not that all the bold are brave. For boldneſs is produced in men from anger, and from inſanity, in the ſame manner as we obſerved of power; but fortitude ariſes from nature, and the proper nutrition of ſouls.—But do you ſay, O Protagoras, that ſome men live well, and others ill?—I do, ſaid he.—Does, therefore, a man appear to you to live well, if he lives in moleſtation and ſorrow?—He does not, ſaid he.—But what, if he has lived pleaſantly to the end of life, will he not thus appear to you to have lived well?—To me he will, ſaid he.—To live pleaſantly, therefore, is a good, but unpleaſantly a bad thing.—If, ſaid he, he has lived delighted with worthy things.—But what, O Protagoras, Do you, like the multitude, call certain things that are pleaſant bad, and ſome things that are diſagreeable good?—I do.—How do you ſay?—So far as they are agreeable, are theſe things according to this not good, unleſs ſomething elſe happens from them?—And again, is this alſo the caſe with things diſagreeable?—It is.—Are they not then bad ſo far as they are diſagreeable?—I do not know, Socrates, ſaid he, whether I ſhould ſimply anſwer as you aſk me, that all pleaſant things are good, and all diſagreeable things evil; but it appears to me to be more ſafe to anſwer, not only to the preſent queſtion, but alſo to every other during the reſt of my life, that there are ſome pleaſant things which are not good, and again, that there are ſome diſagreeable things which are not evil; and that there are alſo a third ſort, which are neither good nor evil.—But do you not call, I ſaid, thoſe things pleaſant, which either participate of pleaſure, or produce pleaſure?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—I aſk, therefore, whether they are not good, ſo far as they are pleaſant; aſking with reſpect to pleaſure itſelf, if it is not good?—Juſt as you continually ſay, Socrates, he replied, we muſt examine it, and if it ſhall ſeem to be conformable to reaſon, and the ſame thing ſhall appear to be pleaſant and good, we muſt acquieſce in it; but if not, we muſt controvert it.—Whether, therefore, ſaid I, are you willing to be the leader of the inquiry? or ſhall I lead?—It is juſt, ſaid he, that you ſhould lead: for you began the conference.—Perhaps then, ſaid I, that which we inveſtigate will become

manifeſt after the following manner: for juſt as if any one, directing his attention to the form or health of a man, or any other of the works of his body, on beholding his countenance and his hands, ſhould ſay, Come, ſtrip yourſelf, and ſhow me your breaſt and back, that I may ſee more clearly; I alſo deſire ſomething of this kind in the preſent inquiry, perceiving that you being ſo affected as you ſay you are, with reſpect to the good and the pleaſant, it is requiſite I ſhould ſay to you ſome ſuch thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me, and inform me what are your conceptions with reſpect to ſcience. Does the ſame thing appear to you concerning it as to other men, or not? But a thing of this kind appears to the many concerning ſcience; that it is not ſtrong, and that it neither poſſeſſes a leading nor a governing power; nor is it conceived to be a thing of this kind: but ſcience being frequently inherent in man, they are of opinion, that it is not ſcience that governs him, but ſomething elſe; at one time anger, at another pleaſure, and at another pain: and that he is ſometimes governed by love, and frequently by fear. And, in ſhort, their conceptions of ſcience are, as if it were a ſlave dragged about by every thing elſe. Does, therefore, a thing of this kind appear to you alſo reſpecting it? Or, do you think that ſcience is ſomething beautiful, and as it were the governor of man? And, that he who knows good and evil, will never be ſubdued by any thing, ſo as to act contrary to the mandates of ſcience, but that intellectual prudence will be a ſufficient aid to ſuch a man?—It appears to me alſo, he replied, Socrates, as you ſay: and it would be baſe in me, if it ever were ſo in any man, not to aſſert that wiſdom and ſcience are the moſt powerful of all human affairs.—You ſpeak well, and with truth, I ſaid.—You know, therefore, that the multitude of men are not perſuaded by you and me, but ſay that many who know what is beſt, are unwilling to do it, when they have the power of acting in the beſt manner, but do other things. And ſuch as I have aſked what is the cauſe of this, have replied, that being vanquiſhed by pleaſure or pain, or ſome one of the things which I have juſt now mentioned, they have acted in this manner. For I think, ſaid he, Socrates, that men aſſert many other things erroneouſly.

Come then, ſaid I, endeavour with me to perſuade and teach men what this paſſion is, which they call the being vanquiſhed by pleaſures, and through which they do not perform the moſt excellent things, though they have a knowledge

knowledge of them. For, perhaps, if we ſhould ſay, you ſpeak erroneouſly, O men, and are deceived, they would aſk us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this paſſion is not the being vanquiſhed by pleaſure, but ſomething elſe, tell us what you ſay it is?—But, why is it neceſſary, Socrates, that we ſhould conſider the opinion of the multitude, who ſpeak that which caſually preſents itſelf?—But I think, I replied, that this will contribute to our diſcovering how fortitude is related to the other parts of virtue. If, therefore, you are willing to abide by that which was juſt now agreed upon by us, that I ſhould be the leader, follow me in that in which I think this thing will become moſt beautifully apparent; but if you are not willing, diſmiſs it, if you think fit.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he; but proceed as you begun.—Again, therefore, ſaid I, if the multitude ſhould aſk us, What then do you aſſert this thing to be, which we call the being vanquiſhed by pleaſures? I ſhould anſwer them as follows: Hear then, for I and Protagoras ſhall endeavour to tell you, Do you, O men, ſay that any thing elſe happens to you in this caſe, than that which often happens to thoſe who are ſubdued by meats and drinks, and venereal pleaſures; who, though they know that theſe things are baneful, yet at the ſame time they do them becauſe they are pleaſant? They will ſay, that nothing elſe happens. You and I, therefore, will again aſk them, Do you ſay that theſe things are baneful? Whether, therefore, is it becauſe they immediately impart pleaſure, and each of them is pleaſant? Or is it becauſe that in ſome future time they produce diſeaſes and poverty, and procure many other things of this kind? Or, though they ſhould be followed by nothing of this kind, are they bad in conſequence of cauſing men to rejoice? Shall we think, O Protagoras, that they will anſwer any thing elſe than that they are not evil from the immediate pleaſure which they produce, but from the diſeaſes and other things with which they are followed?—I indeed think, ſaid Protagoras, that the multitude would thus anſwer. If they cauſe diſeaſes, therefore, and poverty, do they not alſo cauſe ſorrow?—I think they would acknowledge that they did.—Protagoras aſſented.—It appears, therefore, O men, as I and Protagoras ſay, that theſe things are bad, for no other reaſon than becauſe they end in ſorrow, and deprive their votaries of other pleaſures.—It appeared to both of us, that they would acknowledge this to be the caſe.—Again, therefore, if, taking the contrary ſide, we ſhould aſk them, O men! ye who ſay that diſagreeable things are good, do you not ſpeak of ſuch

things as gymnaſtic exerciſes, military labours, and things which are effected through burnings, and inciſions, and medicines, and faſting? And do you not ſay, that theſe things are indeed good, but diſagreeable? They would ſay ſo.—It alſo appeared to Protagoras, that they would.—Whether, therefore, do you call theſe things good, becauſe they immediately impart extreme pain and torment; or becauſe they are followed by health, and a good habit of body, together with the ſafety of cities, dominion and wealth? They would ſay, becauſe of the latter conſequence.—And to this alſo Protagoras aſſented.—But are theſe things good through any thing elſe, than becauſe they end in pleaſures, and liberations from pain? Or can you mention any other end than pleaſures and pains to which looking they call theſe things good? They will ſay, I think, that they cannot.—So, likewiſe, it appears to me, ſaid Protagoras.—Do you, therefore, purſue pleaſure as being good, and avoid pain as an evil? They will ſay, that they do.—And to this alſo Protagoras aſſented.—You, therefore, are of opinion, that this thing is evil, viz. pain, and that pleaſure is good; ſince delight alſo is then ſaid to be evil, when it deprives us of greater pleaſures than it poſſeſſes, or when it procures pains greater than the pleaſures which it contains. For if you call delight an evil on any other account, and look to any other end, you would alſo be able to inform us; but you cannot.—Nor do they appear to me, ſaid Protagoras, to regard any other end.—Again, therefore, after the ſame manner with reſpect to pain, do you not then call the being in pain a good, when it liberates from pains greater than thoſe which it contains, or when it procures pleaſures greater than the pains? For if you looked to any other end, when you call the being in pain a good, than that which I have mentioned, you would be able to inform us; but you cannot.—You ſpeak the truth, ſaid Protagoras.—Again, therefore, ſaid I, if you ſhould aſk me, O men, on what account I ſpeak ſo much and ſo frequently about this, I ſhould ſay, Pardon me. For, in the firſt place, it is not eaſy to ſhow what this thing is which you call the being ſubdued by pleaſures; and, in the next place, all demonſtrations are contained in this. But now, alſo, you are at liberty to inform me, if you have any thing elſe which you aſſert to be good beſides pleaſure, or any thing elſe beſides pain, which you call evil. Or are you ſatisfied with paſſing your life pleaſantly without pain? For if you are ſatisfied with this, and if you cannot mention any good or evil which

does

does not end in theſe things, hear what follows: I ſay, then, that, if this be the caſe, the aſſertion is ridiculous when you ſay that frequently, though a man knows that evil things are evil, he at the ſame time does them (though he has the power of not doing them), in conſequence of being led and aſtoniſhed by pleaſure: and again, when you ſay that a man, knowing what is good, is not willing to do it, in conſequence of being vanquiſhed by immediate pleaſure. For it will be manifeſt that theſe things are ridiculous, unleſs we employ a multitude of names; ſuch as *pleaſant* and *diſagreeable*, *good* and *evil*. But ſince it appears that there are theſe two things, we muſt alſo call them by two names; in the firſt place by *good* and *evil*, and in the next place by *pleaſant* and *diſagreeable*. Theſe things, therefore, being admitted, we will ſay that a man, knowing things evil to be evil, at the ſame time does them. If, then, ſome one ſhould aſk us why he does them, we muſt ſay, becauſe he is vanquiſhed. By what? he will ſay to us. But we are no longer permitted to ſay, by pleaſure; for it aſſumes another name in the place of pleaſure, viz. good. We muſt, however, anſwer him, and ſay that he does it becauſe he is vanquiſhed. By what? he will ſay. By good, we muſt ſay, by Jupiter. If it ſhould happen, therefore, that he who interrogates us is an inſolent man, he will laugh and ſay, You ſpeak of a ridiculous thing when you aſſert that any one does evil, knowing that it is evil (and it is not proper to do it), in conſequence of being vanquiſhed by good. For he will ſay, Is ſuch a one vanquiſhed becauſe the good in him is not worthy to vanquiſh the evil? Or is it becauſe it is worthy? We ſhall evidently ſay in reply, that it is becauſe it is not worthy. For otherwiſe he would not err whom we ſay is ſubdued by pleaſure. But perhaps he will ſay, Why is the good in ſuch a one unworthy to vanquiſh the evil? Or the evil to vanquiſh the good? Is it for any other reaſon than becauſe the one is greater, and the other leſſer? or becauſe the one is more, and the other fewer in number? Have we any other cauſe to aſſign than this? It is evident, therefore, he will ſay, that this thing which is called the being vanquiſhed, is to receive greater evils inſtead of leſſer goods. And thus much for theſe particulars.

Let us then again change the names, and introduce in theſe very ſame things the pleaſant and diſagreeable, as follows: We formerly ſaid that a man does evil; let us now ſay that he does things diſagreeable, knowing that they

they are diſagreeable, in conſequence of being vanquiſhed by pleaſures, viz. by ſuch as are unworthy to conquer. And what other unworthineſs is there in pleaſure with reſpect to pain, than the exceſs and defect of each other; that is, when they become greater and leſſer, more or leſs numerous? For if any one ſhould ſay, Immediate pleaſure, O Socrates, very much differs from future pleaſure and pain, I indeed ſhould reply by aſking, Whether it differs in any thing elſe than in pleaſure and pain? For it cannot differ in any thing elſe. But it is juſt as if a man who is ſkilful in weighing, having collected together things pleaſant and painful, and placed thoſe which are near, and thoſe which are remote, in the balance, ſhould ſay which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleaſures with pleaſures, the greater and more numerous muſt always be choſen; but, if you weigh pains with pains, the fewer and the ſmaller muſt be ſelected. If likewiſe you weigh pleaſures with pains, if the diſagreeables are ſurpaſſed by the pleaſures, thoſe that are near by thoſe that are remote, or thoſe that are remote by thoſe that are near, we muſt yield to the more weighty; but if the pleaſures are ſurpaſſed by the diſagreeables, this conduct muſt not be adopted. Is it not ſo, O men, with reſpect to theſe things? I know that they will not be able to ſay otherwiſe. It alſo appeared to Protagoras that they would not. Since, therefore, this is the caſe, I will thus interrogate them, Do the ſame magnitudes appear to your ſight greater when near, but leſſer when at a diſtance? They will ſay, that they do. And is not this the caſe alſo with things bulky, and with things numerous? And are not equal voices greater when near, but leſſer when at a diſtance? They will ſay that they are. If therefore our acting well conſiſted in this, viz. in making and receiving great maſſes, but rejecting and not making ſuch as are ſmall, what would appear to be the ſafety of our life? Would it be the art of meaſuring, or the power of ſight which judges of that which is apparent? Or rather would not the latter deceive us, and involving us in error, often compel us to judge differently at different times of the ſame thing, and change our opinion in the actions and elections of things great and ſmall? But the art of meaſuring would make this phantaſm void, and manifeſting the truth, would cauſe the ſoul, by abiding in reality, to be at reſt, and would preſerve our life. Would the men aſſent to theſe things, and acknowledge that the art of meaſuring preſerves us, or that this is effected by any other art? They would acknowledge that we ſhould be preſerved

ſerved by the meaſuring art. But what, if the ſafety of our life conſiſted in chooſing the even and the odd, ſo as to know when more ought to be rightly choſen, and when leſs, either one of theſe with reſpect to itſelf, or one with reſpect to the other, whether they be near or at a diſtance, what is it that in this caſe would preſerve our life? Is it not ſcience? For it would no longer be the art of meaſuring, ſince this is the art of exceſs and defect. But ſince that of which we are ſpeaking is the art of the even and the odd, is it any thing elſe than arithmetic? The men would acknowledge that it is nothing elſe: or would they not? It appeared alſo to Protagoras that they would. Be it ſo, O men; but ſince the ſafety of our life has appeared to conſiſt in the right choice of pleaſure and pain, and in the choice of the more and the leſs, of the greater and the ſmaller, of the more diſtant and the nearer; of theſe, in the firſt place, does not the art of meaſuring appear to be the conſideration of the exceſs and defect, and alſo of the equality of theſe to each other? Neceſſarily ſo. But ſince it is converſant with meaſuring, it is neceſſary that it ſhould be both an art and a ſcience. They will agree to this. What then this art and ſcience may be, we will conſider hereafter; but that it is a ſcience is ſufficient to the demonſtration which it is neceſſary that Protagoras and I ſhould give to your queſtion. And, if you remember, when we mutually agreed that nothing is ſuperior to ſcience, but that this always governs, wherever it may be, both pleaſure and every thing elſe, then you ſaid that pleaſure frequently ſubdues a man, even though he poſſeſſes ſcience. But as we did not agree with you, after this you aſked us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this paſſion is not to be vanquiſhed by pleaſure, tell us what it is, and what you aſſert it to be? If, therefore, we then had immediately ſaid to you that it is ignorance, you would have derided us. For ye have acknowledged that thoſe that err in the choice of pleaſures and pains (and theſe are things good and evil) err through the want of ſcience; and not only through the want of ſcience, but, ye have alſo added, of the ſcience of meaſuring. But an erroneous action without ſcience, is, as ye alſo know, performed through ignorance. So that to be vanquiſhed by pleaſure is the greateſt ignorance; of which Protagoras here, Prodicus and Hippias, ſay they are the phyſician. But ye, becauſe ye think this is ſomething elſe than ignorance, neither go yourſelves, nor ſend your children to the ſophiſts, the teachers of theſe things, as if this ſcience of meaſuring could

not

not be taught: and by ſaving your money, and not giving it to theſe men, ye act badly both in private and public. And in this manner we ſhould anſwer the multitude.

Together with Protagoras, however, I aſk you, O Hippias, and you, O Prodicus (for let my diſcourſe be in common to you), whether I appear to ſpeak the truth, or that which is falſe?—It appeared to all that what had been ſaid was tranſcendently true.—You confeſs, therefore, I ſaid, that the pleaſant is good, but the diſagreeable evil. But I requeſt Prodicus to excuſe my adopting his diviſion of names. For whether you call it pleaſant, or delightful, or joyful, or in whatever way you may think fit to denominate things of this kind, O moſt excellent Prodicus, only anſwer what I wiſh to aſk you.—Prodicus therefore laughing aſſented, and ſo likewiſe did the reſt.—I then ſaid, But what, my friends, as to this particular, are not all actions which contribute to the living well and pleaſantly, beautiful and profitable? And is not a beautiful deed good and profitable?—They granted this.—If, therefore, I ſaid, the pleaſant is good, no one either knowing or thinking that other things are better than thoſe which he does, and is able to do, will afterwards do theſe things, when he has the power of doing thoſe that are better. Nor when a man is inferior to himſelf, is it any thing elſe than ignorance; nor, when he is ſuperior to himſelf, is it any thing elſe than wiſdom.—To this all of them aſſented.—But what? Do you ſay that ignorance is a thing of this kind, viz. to have a falſe opinion, and to be deceived about things of great importance?—And to this, likewiſe, all of them aſſented.—Does it not then follow, ſaid I, that no one willingly betakes himſelf to things evil, or to thoſe things which he thinks are evil? For, as it appears, it is not in the nature of man to betake himſelf to things which he conſiders as evil, inſtead of applying himſelf to ſuch as are good. And when it is neceſſary to chooſe one of two evils, no one will chooſe the greater if he has it in his power to chooſe the leſſer.—All theſe things were aſſented to by all of us.—What then, ſaid I, do you call dread and fear? Is it that which I ſay it is to you, O Prodicus, viz. a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread?—It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear were this; but to Prodicus it appeared that dread was this, but not fear.—It is, however, ſaid I, O Prodicus, of no conſequence; but this is of importance, whether what has been formerly aſſerted is true. Is, therefore, any man

willing to betake himſelf to thoſe things which he dreads, when he has the power of betaking himſelf to things which he does not dread? Or is not this impoſſible from what we have granted? For we have granted that he thinks thoſe things to be evil which he dreads; and that no one betakes himſelf to, or willingly receives things which he conſiders as evil.—Theſe things, likewiſe, were aſſented to by all of them.—This, then, being admitted, ſaid I, O Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras, here, defend to us the rectitude of his firſt anſwer. For then, there being five parts of virtue, he ſaid that no one of them reſembled the other, but that each had a peculiar power of its own. I do not, however, urge this at preſent, but I ſpeak of that which he afterwards ſaid, viz. that four of the parts might juſtly be conſidered as ſimilar to each other, but that one of them, fortitude, very much differed from the reſt. He alſo ſaid that this might be known from the following circumſtance. You will find, ſaid he, Socrates, men that are moſt unholy, moſt unjuſt, moſt intemperate, and moſt undiſciplined, but who are, at the ſame time, moſt brave; by which you may know that fortitude very much differs from the other parts of virtue. And I indeed, at that time, immediately very much wondered at the anſwer, and my ſurpriſe has been greatly increaſed ſince I have diſcuſſed theſe things with you. I therefore aſked him this, If he called brave men bold men? He ſaid he did, and likewiſe impetuous. Do you remember, Protagoras, that this was your anſwer?—I do, ſaid he.—Tell us, then, ſaid I, in what, according to you, the brave are impetuous? Is it in things which the timid attempt?—It is not, ſaid he.—In other things, therefore.—Yes.—But whether do the timid engage in bold attempts, but the brave in ſuch as are dreadful?—It is ſo ſaid, Socrates, by the multitude.—You ſpeak the truth, I replied. I do not, however, aſk this: but in what do you ſay the brave are impetuous? Is it in dreadful things, thinking that they are dreadful, or in things that are not dreadful?—But, ſaid he, this, in what you juſt now ſaid, has been ſhown to be impoſſible.—And in this, alſo, I replied, you ſpeak the truth. So that if this is rightly demonſtrated, no one betakes himſelf to things which he thinks are dreadful, ſince it has been found that it is ignorance for a man to be inferior to himſelf.—He acknowledged it.—All men, however, both the timid and the brave, engage in things in which they boldly confide; and, in conſequence of this, both the timid and the brave engage in the ſame things.—But indeed, Socrates, ſaid

he, the things in which the timid and the brave engage are perfectly contrary to each other; for the latter wiſh, but the former are unwilling to engage in war.—But whether, ſaid I, is it a beautiful, or a baſe thing to engage in war?—A beautiful thing, ſaid he.—If, therefore, it is a beautiful thing, we have above agreed that it is a good thing. For we have acknowledged that all beautiful are good actions.—You ſpeak the truth, and to me this has always appeared to be the caſe.—Right, ſaid I. But which of the two do you ſay is unwilling to engage in war, though it is a beautiful and good thing.—The timid, he replied.—If, therefore, ſaid I, it be beautiful and good, is it not alſo pleaſant?—It is granted, ſaid he.—Are the timid, therefore, unwilling to proceed to that which is beautiful, better, and more pleaſant, knowing it to be ſuch?—But, ſaid he, if we aſſented to this, we ſhould deſtroy what we have before acknowledged.—But what with reſpect to the brave man? Does he not engage in that which is more beautiful, more excellent, and more pleaſant?—It is neceſſary, ſaid he, to acknowledge that he does.—Hence, in ſhort, the brave have not any baſe fears when they are afraid; nor when they are bold, are they baſely daring.—True, ſaid he.—But if they are not baſely, does it not follow that they are beautifully daring?—He aſſented.—And if their boldneſs is beautiful, is it not alſo good?—Yes.—Are not, therefore, the timid, and the raſh, and the inſane, on the contrary, baſely afraid, and baſely bold?—He agreed they were.—But are they baſely and wickedly bold, through any thing elſe than ignorance and the want of diſcipline?—It is ſo, ſaid he.—What then? Do you then call this thing, through which the timid are timid, timidity or fortitude?—Timidity, ſaid he.—But have not the timid appeared to be what they are, through the ignorance of things dreadful?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—They are timid, therefore, through this ignorance.—He acknowledged it.—But that through which they are timid, you have granted to be timidity.—He ſaid, he had.—Will not, therefore, the ignorance of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be timidity?—He aſſented.—But, ſaid I, fortitude is contrary to timidity.—It is.—Will not then the wiſdom of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be contrary to the ignorance of theſe things?—To this alſo he aſſented.—But is not the ignorance of theſe things timidity?—He, with great difficulty, aſſented to this.—The wiſdom, therefore, of things dreadful, and not dreadful, is fortitude, being contrary to the ignorance of theſe.—Here, however, he was no

longer willing to aſſent, but was ſilent.—And I ſaid, Why, O Protagoras, do you neither aſſent to, nor deny what I ſay?—Come to a concluſion, ſaid he.—Immediately, ſaid I; let me only firſt aſk you, if it ſtill appears to you as it did before, that there are certain men who are moſt ignorant, and yet moſt brave?—You ſtill, Socrates, ſeem to be very anxious that I ſhould anſwer you. I will therefore gratify you; and I ſay, that from what has been granted, it appears to me impoſſible that this ſhould be the caſe.—But, ſaid I, I do not aſk you all theſe particulars on any other account, than becauſe I wiſh to conſider how the things pertaining to virtue ſubſiſt, and what virtue itſelf is. For I know that this becoming apparent, that which has been the ſubject of a long diſcuſſion to you and me will be made manifeſt; I indeed, aſſerting, that virtue cannot be taught, but you that it can. And it ſeems to me, that the concluſion of our arguments, as if it were a man, reviles and derides us; and that if it had a voice, it would thus addreſs us:—You are abſurd, O Socrates, and Protagoras; you indeed, in aſſerting in the former part of your diſcourſe, that virtue cannot be taught, and now, being anxious to contradict yourſelf, by endeavouring to ſhow that all theſe things, viz. juſtice, temperance, and fortitude, are ſcience; by which mode of proceeding virtue will eſpecially appear to be a thing which may be taught. For if virtue were any thing elſe than ſcience [1], as Protagoras endeavours to evince it is, it clearly could not be taught; but now, if it ſhould appear that it is ſcience, as you, Socrates, are anxious to infer, it will be wonderful if it cannot be taught. Again, Protagoras at firſt admitted that it could be taught, but now, on the contrary, he ſeems earneſtly to endeavour that virtue may appear to be any thing elſe rather than ſcience; and thus it will be a thing in the ſmalleſt degree capable of being taught. I therefore, O Protagoras, ſeeing all theſe things agitated upwards and downwards with ſuch dire confuſion, am in the higheſt degree anxious that they may become apparent. And I could wiſh that we, in conſequence of diſcuſſing theſe things, might diſcover what virtue is: and again, that we might ſpeculate concerning it, whether it can be taught, or whether it can-

[1] Inſtead of *ει γαρ αλλο τι ην η επιστημη η αρετη*, as in the printed text, the ſenſe requires we ſhould read *ει γαρ αλλο τι ην η επιστημη η αρετη*. Ficinus in his verſion has adopted the error of the original; for he renders this paſſage, "Si enim aliud quiddam eſſet ſcientia quam virtus."

not. For I fear that your Epimetheus has frequently deceived us in our inquiry, juſt as you ſay he neglected us in the diſtribution which he made. I am more pleaſed, therefore, with Prometheus in the fable, than with Epimetheus. Hence, following his example, and paying a *providential attention* to the whole of my life, I diligently conſider all theſe things. And if you are willing, as I ſaid at the beginning, I would moſt gladly examine theſe particulars with you.—To this Protagoras ſaid—I, O Socrates, praiſe your alacrity, and the evolution of your diſcourſe. For I am not, in other reſpects, I think, a bad man, and I am envious the leaſt of all men: indeed I have often ſaid reſpecting you to many, that I admire you by far the moſt of thoſe with whom I aſſociate, and conſider you as greatly ſurpaſſing your equals in age. And I ſay, that I ſhall not wonder if you rank among the men renowned for wiſdom. And, with reſpect to theſe things, we will again diſcuſs them when you pleaſe; but it is now time for me to betake myſelf to ſomething elſe.—But, I replied, it is requiſite ſo to do, if it ſeems fit to you. For I ought to have gone elſewhere ſome time ago; but I ſtaid in order to gratify the beautiful Callias.—Having ſpoken and heard theſe things, we departed.

THE END OF THE PROTAGORAS.

THE THEAGES

A DIALOGUE

ON

POLITICAL WISDOM.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE THEAGES.

IN order to underſtand the deſign of this Dialogue, it is neceſſary to obſerve that wiſdom is two-fold, the one abſolute, the other conditional. The abſolute is that which is denominated wiſdom ſimply, and without any addition; but the conditional is that which is not ſimply called wiſdom, but a certain wiſdom. The former of theſe is defined to be the knowledge of thoſe things which are the objects of ſcience, and the objects of ſcience are things which poſſeſs a neceſſary eternal and invariable ſubſiſtence, ſuch as are thoſe luminous cauſes and principles of things reſident in a divine intellect, which Plato denominates ideas, and Ariſtotle [1] things moſt honourable by nature. But conditional wiſdom is common to all arts: for the ſummit or perfection of every art is called a certain wiſdom. Of all thoſe arts however, which poſſeſs conditional wiſdom, the principal is political wiſdom, to which the reſt are miniſtrant. This is called as well the political as the royal diſcipline; of which the ſubject is a city, the end the common good, and its ſervants all the arts.

As this political wiſdom, the ſubject of this Dialogue, forms an important part of virtue conſidered as a whole, Socrates, conformably to what he had delivered in the Meno, indicates that it can only be obtained by a *divine deſtiny*

[1] Ariſtotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, defines wiſdom abſolutely conſidered to be "Science, and the intellect of things moſt honourable by nature, and the intellect of principles." Η σοφια εστιν η επιστημη, και νους των τιμιωτατων τη φυσει, και νους των αρχων.

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(θεια μοιρα), without which all the endeavours of the moſt conſummate maſters are uſeleſs; and this he confirms by various examples.

This converſation, according to Dacier, paſſed that year in which the Athenians were vanquiſhed at Epheſus by Tiſaphernus; which was the 4th year of the 92d Olympiad, and 470 years before the birth of Chriſt. Plato being twenty years of age, was then the diſciple of Socrates.

THE THEAGES.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

DEMODOCUS, SOCRATES, THEAGES.

DEMODOCUS.

I WANT, Socrates, to ſpeak with you in private about certain things, if you are at leiſure; and if you are not, unleſs your buſineſs is of great importance, make leiſure for my ſake.

Soc. But I am indeed at leiſure, and very much at your ſervice. You have my permiſſion therefore to ſpeak, if you wiſh to ſay any thing.

Dem. Are you willing therefore that we ſhould retire from this place into the porch of Jupiter Eleutherius, which is very near?

Soc. If you pleaſe.

Dem. Let us go then, Socrates. All plants, whatever is produced from the earth, other animals, and man, appear to ſubſiſt after the ſame manner. For in plants this thing is eaſy to ſuch of us as cultivate the earth, viz. to prepare every thing prior to planting, and the planting itſelf; but when that which is planted lives, then the attention which the plant requires is great and very difficult. The ſame thing alſo appears to take place reſpecting men. For I form a conjecture of other things from my own affairs. For of this my ſon, the planting, or the procreating, or whatever elſe it may be requiſite to call it, is the eaſieſt of all things; but his education is difficult, and occaſions one to be in continual fear about him. With reſpect to other things, therefore, much might be ſaid; but the deſire which he now poſſeſſes very much terrifies me. It is not indeed ignoble, but it is dangerous. For he deſires, Socrates, as he ſays, to become a wiſe man. And as it appears to me, certain plebeians of the ſame age with him, coming to this city, and re-

peating certain diſcourſes which they have heard, have very much diſturbed him. Of theſe he is emulous, and ſome time ago was troubleſome to me, thinking it fit that I ſhould pay attention to him, and give a ſum of money to ſome one of the ſophiſts, who might make him a wiſe man. I am not indeed much concerned about the expenſe; but I think that the object of his purſuit will lead him into no ſmall danger. Hitherto, therefore, I have reſtrained by ſoothing him; but as I am no longer able to effect this, I have thought it beſt to comply with his wiſhes, leſt by frequently aſſociating with others without me he ſhould be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpoſe, that I may place him with ſome one of thoſe who appear to be ſophiſts. Our meeting with you, therefore, is a fortunate circumſtance: for as I am going to engage in affairs of this kind, I wiſh very much to conſult you about them. If then you have any advice to give reſpecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and proper for you to give it.

Soc. Counſel, however, O Demodocus, is ſaid to be a ſacred thing. If therefore any other thing whatever is ſacred, this will be ſo which is now the object of your conſultation: for it is not poſſible for man to conſult about any thing more divine than about the erudition of himſelf and of thoſe that belong to him. In the firſt place, therefore, you and I ſhould mutually agree, what we think this thing to be about which we conſult; leſt I ſhould frequently apprehend it to be one thing, and you another, and afterwards very much diſſenting from each other in our conference, we ſhould perceive ourſelves to be ridiculous: I who give, and you who requeſt, advice not agreeing in any one thing.

Dem. You appear to me, Socrates, to ſpeak rightly, and it is proper ſo to do.

Soc. I do ſay right, and yet not entirely, ſince I make an alteration in a certain trifling particular: for I am thinking that perhaps this youth may not deſire that which we think he deſires, but ſomething elſe. And if ſomething elſe is the object of his wiſhes, we ſhall act abſurdly in conſulting about that which is different from them. It appears therefore to me to be moſt right to begin by inquiring of him what it is which he deſires.

Dem. It appears indeed, as you ſay, to be beſt to do ſo.

Soc. But tell me what the name is of this fine youth: what muſt we call him?

Dem.

DEM. His name, Socrates, is Theages.

Soc. You have given to your ſon, O Demodocus, a beautiful and ſacred name. But tell us, O Theages, do you ſay that you deſire to become a wiſe man, and do you think it is fit that this your father ſhould find out a man, who by aſſociating with you may make you wiſe.

THEA. I do.

Soc. But whether do you call thoſe men wiſe, who are ſcientifically knowing, whatever that may be about which they poſſeſs this knowledge; or do you call thoſe wiſe who do not poſſeſs ſcientific knowledge?

THEA. I call the ſcientific wiſe.

Soc. What then? Has not your father taught and inſtructed you in thoſe things, in which others here are inſtructed who are the ſons of reſpectable fathers; viz. letters, to play on the harp, to wreſtle, and other exerciſes?

THEA. He has.

Soc. Do you think, then, that there is ſtill a certain ſcience wanting, which it is proper your father ſhould pay attention to for your ſake?

THEA. I do.

Soc. What is it? Tell us alſo, that we may gratify you.

THEA. My father alſo knows what it is, Socrates: for I have often mentioned it to him. But he deſignedly ſays theſe things to you, as if he did not know what I deſire: for in other things alſo he ſimilarly oppoſes me, and is not willing to place me with any one.

Soc. But all that you have hitherto ſaid to him has been ſaid without witneſſes: now therefore make me a witneſs, and before me ſay what the wiſdom is which you deſire: for come now, if you ſhould deſire that wiſdom by which men ſteer ſhips, and I ſhould aſk you, O Theages, what is the wiſdom, of which being in want, you blame your father as unwilling to place you with a man through whom you might become wiſe? what anſwer would you give me? What would you ſay this wiſdom is? Is it not that of piloting?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But if you deſired to be wiſe according to that wiſdom by which they drive chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my aſking you what this wiſdom is, what anſwer would you give me? Would you not ſay it is the charioteering art?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But with reſpect to the wiſdom which you now deſire, whether is it without a name, or has it a name?

THEA. I think it has a name.

Soc. Whether therefore do you know the thing itſelf, but not its name? Or do you alſo know its name?

THEA. I alſo know its name.

Soc. Say, therefore, what it is.

THEA. What other name, Socrates, can any one ſay it has than that of wiſdom?

Soc. Is not then the charioteering art alſo wiſdom? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

THEA. It does not.

Soc. But wiſdom?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. What is the uſe of it? Is it not that we may know how to manage horſes when yoked to a chariot?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Is not therefore the piloting art alſo wiſdom?

THEA. To me it appears to be ſo.

Soc. Is it not that by which we know how to manage ſhips?

THEA. It is.

Soc. But what is the wiſdom of which you are deſirous? Or, what is that which, when we obtain it, we ſhall know how to govern?

THEA. To me it appears to be that by which we know how to govern men.

Soc. What, ſick men?

THEA. No.

Soc. For that wiſdom is the medicinal art. Is it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Is it that, then, by which we know how to regulate ſingers in choirs?

THEA. It is not.

Soc. For this is muſic.

THEA. Certainly.

Soc.

Soc. But is it that by which we know how to govern thoſe that engage in gymnaſtic exerciſes?

THEA. It is not.

Soc. For this is gymnaſtic.

THEA. It is.

Soc. Is it the wiſdom by which thoſe who do ſomething effect their purpoſe? Endeavour to tell me, in the ſame manner as I have told you above.

THEA. It appears to me to be that wiſdom by which we know how to govern thoſe in a city.

Soc. Are there not, therefore, in a city alſo thoſe that are ſick?

THEA. Yes: but I do not ſpeak of theſe only, but alſo of others in the city.

Soc. I underſtand then the art of which you ſpeak. For you appear to me not to ſay, that it is that art by which we know how to govern mowers, vine-dreſſers, ploughmen, ſowers, and threſhers: for that by which we know how to govern theſe is agriculture. Is it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Nor is it that by which we know how to govern thoſe that handle the ſaw, the plane, and the lathe; for this belongs to the carpenter's art. Does it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But perhaps you ſpeak of that wiſdom by which we govern all theſe, viz. huſbandmen, carpenters, all artificers, and private perſons, both men and women.

THEA. It is this wiſdom, Socrates, of which I wiſhed to ſpeak ſome time ago.

Soc. Are you, therefore, diſpoſed to ſay that Ægiſthus, who ſlew Agamemnon in Argos, had dominion over theſe things of which you ſpeak, viz. all artificers and private perſons, both men and women, or over certain other things?

THEA. He only had dominion over ſuch as theſe.

Soc. But what? Did not Peleus, the ſon of Aeacus, have dominion over theſe very things in Phthia?

THEA. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. And have you not heard that Periander, the ſon of Cypſelus, governed Corinth.

THEA. I have.

Soc. And did he not rule over theſe very ſame things in his city?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But what? Do you not think that Archelaus, the ſon of Perdiccas, who lately governed [1] in Macedonia, had dominion over theſe very things?

THEA. I do.

Soc. But over what things do you think Hippias [2], the ſon of Piſiſtratus, who rules in this city, has dominion? Is it not over theſe things?

THEA. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Can you tell me, then, what Bacis [3] and the Sibyl, and our Amphilytus, are called?

THEA. What elſe, Socrates, than diviners?

Soc. You ſpeak rightly. Endeavour, therefore, alſo to tell me what name you give to Hippias and Periander through the ſame dominion?

THEA. I think they are tyrants: for what elſe can they be called?

Soc. Whoever, therefore, deſires to have dominion over all the men in the city, deſires this very ſame dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

THEA. So it appears.

Soc. Do you therefore ſay that you deſire this dominion?

THEA. It ſeems ſo from what I have ſaid.

Soc. O you wicked one! Do you deſire to tyranniſe over us? And did you ſome time ago blame your father becauſe he did not ſend you to ſome tyrannic preceptor? And are not you, O Demodocus, aſhamed; who, having for ſome time known what your ſon deſires, and having likewiſe the

[1] It was five or ſix years before. He was killed at the end of this very year.—Dacier.

[2] Hippias, the ſon of Piſiſtratus, was tyrant of Athens four years. According to Thucydides he ſucceeded his father, and not Hipparchus. After he had reigned four years he was baniſhed; and twenty years after his exile was ſlain at the battle of Marathon, where he bore arms for the Perſians.—Dacier.

[3] Bacis was a prophet, who, long before Xerxes made a deſcent into Greece, predicted to the people all that would befall them. Herodotus relates ſome of his prophecies in his 8th book, and conſiders them to be ſo formal and plain, ſince their accompliſhment, that he ſays he neither dares accuſe thoſe oracles of falſehood himſelf, nor ſuffer others to do ſo, or to refuſe to give credit to them. Ariſtophanes ſpeaks of this prophet in his comedy of Peace.—Dacier.

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ability of ſending him to be made that artiſt in wiſdom which he aſpires to be, have, notwithſtanding, envied him this object of his wiſhes, and have not been willing to ſend him to obtain it? Now, however, ſince he accuſes you before me, let us conſult in common, you and I, whither we ſhould ſend him; and through aſſociating with whom he may become a wiſe tyrant.

Dem. Let us indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates, conſult: for it appears to me that no deſpicable counſel is requiſite about this affair.

Soc. Permit us firſt, O good man, to make inquiry of him ſufficiently.

Dem. Interrogate him.

Soc. What then, O Theages, if we ſhould make uſe of Euripides? For he ſomewhere ſays,

Tyrants are wiſe that with the wiſe converſe.

If, therefore, ſome one ſhould aſk Euripides, In what, O Euripides, do you ſay tyrants become wiſe by the converſation of the wiſe? juſt as if he had ſaid,

Farmers are wiſe that with the wiſe converſe:

and we ſhould aſk him, In what are they rendered wiſe? What anſwer would he give us? Would he reply that they are rendered wiſe in any thing elſe than in things pertaining to agriculture?

Thea. He would not.

Soc. But what? If he had ſaid,

Wiſe are the cooks that with the wiſe converſe:

and we ſhould aſk him, In what they become wiſe? What do you think he would anſwer? Would it not be, that they become wiſe in things pertaining to cooking?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Again, if he had ſaid,

Wreſtlers are wiſe that with the wiſe converſe:

and we ſhould aſk him, In what they are rendered wiſe? Would he not ſay in things pertaining to wreſtling?

THEA. Yes.

SOC. But ſince he ſays,

Tyrants are wiſe that with the wiſe converſe:

if we ſhould aſk him, In what do you ſay they become wiſe, O Euripides? What would be his anſwer?

THEA. By Jupiter, I do not know.

SOC. Are you willing, then, I ſhould tell you?

THEA. If you pleaſe.

SOC. Theſe are the things which Anacreon, ſays Callicrete [1], knew. Or are you not acquainted with the verſe?

THEA. I am.

SOC. What then? Do you alſo deſire to aſſociate with a man of this kind, who poſſeſſes the ſame art with Callicrete the daughter of Cyane, and who knows tyrannic concerns, in the ſame manner as the poet ſays ſhe did; and this, that you may become a tyrant to us and the city?

THEA. You have for ſome time, Socrates, derided and jeſted with me.

SOC. But what? Do you not ſay that you deſire this wiſdom, by which you may have dominion over all the citizens? And doing this, will you be any thing elſe than a tyrant?

THEA. I think, indeed, that I ſhould pray to become the tyrant of all men, or, if not of all, of the greater part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the ſame. Or, perhaps, *you* would rather pray that you might become a god [2]. But I did not ſay that *I* deſired this.

SOC. But what then, after all, is this which you deſire? Do you not ſay that you deſire to govern the citizens?

THEA. Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I deſire to govern the willing, in the ſame manner as other excellent men in the city.

SOC. Do you ſpeak of ſuch men as Themiſtocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and ſuch as were ſkilful in political affairs?

[1] This was a virgin who employed herſelf in teaching politics, as Aſpaſia, Diotima, and ſome others, did after her. The verſes which Anacreon made on her are loſt.—Dacier.

[2] Theages here alludes to what Socrates was wont to ſay, that men ſhould endeavour to become ſimilar to divinity.

THEA.

THEA. By Jupiter, I ſpeak of theſe.

SOC. What then, if you deſired to become wiſe in equeſtrian affairs, would you obtain the object of your wiſh, by going to any other than thoſe who are ſkilled in the management of horſes?

THEA. By Jupiter, not I.

SOC. But you would go to theſe very men who are ſkilled in theſe things, who poſſeſs horſes, and who continually uſe both their own and many that are the property of others.

THEA. Certainly.

SOC. But what! If you deſired to become wiſe in things pertaining to the throwing of darts, would you not go to thoſe who are ſkilled in theſe affairs, and who continually uſe many darts, both thoſe belonging to others and their own?

THEA. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. Tell me then, ſince you wiſh to become wiſe in political affairs, do you think you will become wiſe by going to any others than theſe politicians, who are ſkilful in political affairs, who continually uſe their own city, and many others, and who are converſant both with Grecian and Barbarian cities? Or do you think, that by aſſociating with certain other perſons you will become wiſe in thoſe things in which they are wiſe, but not in theſe very things?

THEA. I have heard aſſertions, which they ſay are yours; that the ſons of theſe political men are in no reſpect better than the ſons of ſhoe-makers: and you appear to me to have ſpoken moſt truly, from what I am able to perceive. I ſhould be ſtupid, therefore, if I ſhould think that any one of theſe could impart to me his wiſdom, when he cannot in any reſpect benefit his own ſon; or if I ſhould ſuppoſe that he could in theſe things benefit any other man.

SOC. What then would you do, O beſt of men, if you had a ſon who cauſed you moleſtation of this kind; and who ſhould ſay that he deſired to become a good painter; and ſhould blame you, his father, becauſe you are not willing to be at any expenſe for the ſake of theſe things; while he, on the other hand, deſpiſed thoſe artiſts, the painters, and was unwilling to learn from them; or, if he acted in this manner towards pipers or harpers, being at the ſame time deſirous to become a piper or harper? What would

you do with him, and where would you ſend him, being thus unwilling to learn from theſe perſons?

THEA. By Jupiter, I do not know.

SOC. Now, therefore, doing theſe very things to your father, can you wonder at and blame him, if he is dubious what he ſhould do with you, and where he ſhould ſend you? For, if you are willing, he will immediately place you with thoſe Athenians that are moſt ſkilled in political affairs: and with theſe you will not be at any expenſe, and at the ſame time will be much more generally renowned than by aſſociating with any others.

THEA. What then, Socrates; are not you among the number of excellent and worthy men? For if you are willing to aſſociate with me, it is ſufficient, and I ſhall ſeek for no other.

SOC. Why do you ſay this, Theages?

DEM. O Socrates, he does not ſpeak badly; and at the ſame time by doing this you will gratify me. For there is not any thing which I ſhould conſider to be a greater gain, than for my ſon to be pleaſed with your converſation; and for you to be willing to aſſociate with him. And indeed I am aſhamed to ſay how very much I wiſh this to take place. I therefore entreat both of you; you, Socrates, that you will be willing to aſſociate with him; and you, my ſon, that you do not ſeek to aſſociate with any other than Socrates; and you will thus liberate me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear leſt my ſon ſhould meet with ſome other perſon who may corrupt him.

THEA. You need not fear any longer, O father, for me, if you can but perſuade Socrates to permit me to aſſociate with him.

DEM. You ſpeak very well. And after this, all the converſation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, in ſhort, to give up myſelf to you, and whatever is moſt dear to me that you may require, if you will love this my Theages, and benefit him to the utmoſt of your ability.

SOC. O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are ſo importunate, if you think that your ſon can be eſpecially benefited by me. For I do not know any thing about which he who is endued with intellect ought to be more anxious, than how his ſon may become the beſt of men. But whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to aſſiſt your ſon in becoming a good

good citizen, than you yourſelf, and whence you have thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For you, in the firſt place, are older than I am; and in the next place, you have exerciſed the principal offices among the Athenians; nor is any one more honoured than you by the Anagyruſian populace and the reſt of the city. But neither of you ſees any one of theſe things in me. If therefore Theages, here, deſpiſes the aſſociating with political men, and ſeeks after certain others who profeſs to give inſtruction, there and here, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias the Leontine, Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are ſo wiſe, that going into cities they perſuade the nobleſt and moſt wealthy of the youth, who are permitted to aſſociate gratis with any one of the citizens they pleaſe,—they perſuade theſe, I ſay, to renounce thoſe of their own city, and adhere to them, though the youth give them a conſiderable ſum of money, and thanks beſides, for their inſtruction. It is fit, therefore, that you and your ſon ſhould chooſe ſome one of theſe; but it is not fit that you ſhould chooſe me: for I know none of theſe bleſſed and beautiful diſciplines; though I wiſh I did; but I always profeſs to know nothing, as I may ſay, except a certain ſmall diſcipline of amatory affairs. In this diſcipline, I acknowledge myſelf to be more ſkilful than any one of the paſt or preſent age.

Thea. Do you not ſee, O father, that Socrates does not appear to be very willing to aſſociate with me. For, as to myſelf, I am ready, if he is willing; but he ſays theſe things in jeſt to us. For I know ſome of the ſame age with myſelf, and others who are a little older, who before they were familiar with him were of no worth, but when they aſſociated with him, in a very little time appeared to be the beſt of all men, and ſurpaſſed thoſe to whom they were before inferior.

Soc. Do you know, therefore, O ſon of Demodocus, how this comes to paſs?

Thea. Yes, by Jupiter, I do; and if you were willing, I alſo ſhould become ſuch as they were.

Soc. Not ſo, O excellent youth; but you are ignorant in what manner this takes place. However, I will tell you how it happens:—There is a certain dæmoniacal power[1] which has followed me by a divine allotment from childhood.

[1] This paſſage inconteſtably proves that the dæmon of Socrates was not the intellect of that philoſopher,

childhood. This is a voice, which when it takes place always ſignifies to me that I ſhould abandon what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and I hear the voice, it diſſuades me from this thing, and does not ſuffer me to do it. Of theſe things I will adduce to you witneſſes: You know the beautiful Charmides, the ſon of Glauco; he once came to me, in order to communicate to me his intention of contending in the Nemean games[1]; and immediately, on his beginning to tell me that he meant to contend, I heard the voice. And I forbade him, and ſaid, While you was ſpeaking to me, I heard the voice of the dæmoniacal power; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, ſaid he, the voice ſignified to you that I ſhould not conquer; but, though I ſhould not be victorious, yet by exerciſing myſelf at this time I ſhall be benefited. Having thus ſpoken, he engaged in the conteſt. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him what happened to him from contending in theſe games. If you are willing alſo, aſk Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus[2], what Timarchus ſaid to him when he was about to die, for having deſpiſed the admonition of the dæmonical power. For he and Euathlus, who was famous for running races, and who received Timarchus when he fled, will tell you what he then ſaid.

THEA. What did he ſay?

SOC. O Clitomachus, ſaid he, I indeed am now going to die, becauſe I was unwilling to be perſuaded by Socrates. But why Timarchus ſaid this I will tell you. When Timarchus roſe from the banquet, together with Philemon the ſon of Philemonides, in order to kill Nicias the ſon of Heroſcomander, for none but they two were in the conſpiracy,—Timarchus, as he roſe, ſaid to me, What do you ſay, Socrates? Do you indeed continue drinking; but it is neceſſary that I ſhould depart. I will, however, return ſhortly, if I can. I then heard the voice, and I ſaid to him, By no means ſhould

philoſopher, nor any part of his ſoul, as has been raſhly aſſerted by ſome moderns unſkilled in the writings and philoſophy of Plato. For a full account of this dæmon ſee the note at the beginning of the firſt Alcibiades.

[1] One of the four famous games of Greece, which were celebrated once in three years.

[2] I ſuppoſe this is Timarchus of Cheronea, who deſired to be interred near one of the ſons of Socrates, who died a little before. I could never find any footſtep of this hiſtory elſewhere.—Dacier.

you

you leave us; for I have heard the accuſtomed dæmoniacal ſignal. Upon this he ſtayed; and having remained with us for a time, he again roſe up to depart, and ſaid, Socrates, I am going: and again I heard the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to ſtay. The third time wiſhing to eſcape me unnoticed, he roſe without ſaying any thing to me, when my attention was otherwiſe engaged, and thus departing he did that which was the cauſe of his death. Whence he ſaid this to his brother, which I have now told you, viz. that he was going to die, becauſe he would not believe me. Further ſtill, you may alſo learn from many in Sicily, what I ſaid concerning the deſtruction of the army. And with reſpect to things that are paſt, you may hear them from thoſe that know them; but you may now make trial of the dæmoniacal ſignal, if it ſays any thing to the purpoſe. For Sannion, the ſon of Calus, is gone to the army; and on his going, I heard the dæmonical ſignal. But he is now gone with Thraſyllus [1], in order to wage war immediately with Epheſus and Ionia; and I think that he will either die, or that ſome misfortune will befall him. And I very much fear [2] for the reſt of the enterpriſe. I have ſaid all theſe things to you, becauſe this power of the dæmon is able to effect every thing with reſpect to the converſations of thoſe that aſſociate with me. For it is adverſe to many, nor can thoſe be benefited by aſſociating with me whom the dæmon oppoſes: ſo that it is not poſſible for me to live with theſe. With many, however, he does not prevent me from converſing; and yet they are not all benefited by aſſociating with me. But thoſe whoſe converſation with me is favoured by the power of the dæmon, theſe are they whom you have noticed: for in a ſhort time they make a proficiency. And of theſe, ſome poſſeſs this advantage with firmneſs and ſtability; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner, but when they leave me, they again differ in no reſpect from other men. This Ariſtides, the ſon of Lyſimachus and grandſon of Ariſtides, once experienced: for, aſſociating with me, he made a very great proficiency in a ſhort

[1] Thraſyllus was choſen general with Thraſybulus, the fourth year of the ninety-ſecond Olympiad.—Dacier.

[2] Indeed the Athenians were vanquiſhed at Epheſus. Xenoph. lib. i. Hence Plutarch ſays, in the life of Alcibiades, that the army of Thraſyllus was terribly galled under the walls of Epheſus; and that in memory of this defeat the Epheſians erected a trophy of braſs, to the ſhame of the Athenians.—Dacier.

time; but afterwards he ſailed from hence, in order to engage in ſome military expedition. When he returned, he found Thucydides, the ſon of Meleſias and grandſon of Thucydides[1], aſſociating with me. But this Thucydides, the day before, had quarrelled with me in a certain conference. Ariſtides, therefore, ſeeing me, after he had ſaluted me, and ſome converſation had paſſed between us, ſaid,—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himſelf, with reſpect to ſome things, and is angry with you, as if he were an extraordinary perſon. It is ſo, ſaid I. But what? ſaid he, does he not know what a ſlave he was before he aſſociated with you? It does not ſeem that he does, ſaid I, by the gods. But a ridiculous circumſtance, ſaid he, has happened to me, Socrates. What is it, ſaid I. It is this, ſaid he, that before I went to the army, I was able to converſe with any man whoever he might be, nor did I appear to be inferior to any one in argument, ſo that I ſought after the company of the moſt elegant men; but now, on the contrary, I ſhun any one whom I perceive to be learned, ſo aſhamed am I of my own vileneſs. But, ſaid I, whether did this power leave you ſuddenly, or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it preſent with you, ſaid I? Was it preſent while you was learning ſomething from me, or was it in ſome other way? I will tell you, ſaid he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true: for I never, at any time, learnt any thing from you, as you know, but I made a proficiency when I aſſociated with you, even if I was only in the ſame houſe that you were, though not in the ſame room; but my proficiency was greater when I was in the ſame room with you. I alſo appeared to myſelf to improve much more when, being in the ſame room with you, I looked at you when you ſpoke, than when I looked another way. But I made by far the greateſt proficiency when I ſat near you and touched you. Now, however, ſaid he, all that habit has entirely fled. Such, therefore, O Theages, is the aſſociation with me: for if it pleaſes divinity, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but you will not, if he does not pleaſe. See then, whether it is not ſafer for you to be inſtructed by ſome one of thoſe who have power over the benefit which they impart to men, than by me who benefit, or not, juſt as it may happen.

[1] This grandſon of Thucydides rivalled Pericles in the government.

THEA. It appears to me, therefore, Socrates, that we ſhould act in this manner, viz. that we ſhould make trial of this dæmoniacal power by aſſociating together. And, if he is favourable to us, the beſt conſequences will enſue; but if he is not, then let us immediately conſult what is to be done, whether we ſhould aſſociate with ſome other, or endeavour to appeaſe the divine power, that is preſent with you, by prayers and ſacrifices, or any other means which our diviners teach.

DEM. Do not oppoſe the lad any longer, Socrates, in theſe things: for Theages ſpeaks well.

SOC. If it appears proper thus to act, let us do ſo.

THE END OF THE THEAGES.

THE LACHES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

FORTITUDE.

THE LACHES[1].

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS[2], MELESIAS, ‖ NICIAS[3], LACHES[4],

The Sons of LYSIMACHUS and MELESIAS, and SOCRATES.

[1] We have already obſerved, in the introduction to the Parmenides, that the dialectic energy is triple; either ſubſiſting through oppoſite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falſehood. As the deſign of the preſent dialogue, therefore, is to confute the falſe opinions of Laches and Nicias concerning fortitude, and thus to liberate them from two-fold ignorance, the reader muſt not expect to find in it an accurate definition of fortitude. As, however, he will doubtleſs be anxious to obtain this definition, I ſhall preſent him with the luminous conceptions of the divine Jamblichus on this ſubject.

Fortitude, conſidered according to its moſt principal ſubſiſtence, is an immutable intellectual power, and a moſt vigorous intellectual energy; or, in other words, it is a fameneſs and ſtable habit of intellect in itſelf. And of this kind will the ſpecies of fortitude be, which are beheld about life, whether they are conſidered as ſubſiſting by themſelves, or as imparting their ſtrength to the firm ſtability of reaſoning. But from theſe, thoſe ſpecies of fortitude proceed, which are ſeen in the paſſions, about things dreadful and the contrary, and in fear and boldneſs; which generouſly reſiſt pleaſure and pain, and always preſerve the ſame right opinions, and commenſurate and moderate manners. In common with theſe, manifold ſpecies of fortitude ariſe from paſſion, reaſon, and free deliberation, through which human life derives a ſtrenuouſneſs of action, incapable of being ſubdued. This ſtrenuous energy likewiſe voluntarily performs whatever is beautiful, and to be choſen for its own ſake; and for the ſake of good, endures all labours and dangers. It alſo cheerfully and readily gives itſelf to things which appear to be difficult; boldly encounters and meditates on death; and eaſily bears pain and calamity of every kind.

This Dialogue is ſuppoſed to have been written ſoon after the defeat of the Athenians at Delium, which happened in the firſt year of the 89th Olympiad.

[2] The ſon of Ariſtides the Juſt.

[3] The general of the Athenians.

[4] Another Athenian general.

LYSIMACHUS.

YOU have ſeen, O Nicias and Laches, this man fighting in armour[1]: and indeed we did not then tell you on what account I and Meleſias here called you to ſee him; but now we will tell you; for we think it is proper to ſpeak freely to you. There are, indeed, ſome who laugh at things of this kind; and if any one conſults them, they will not tell you what they think; but conjecturing the thing about which their advice is aſked, they ſpeak contrary to their own opinion. Thinking, however, that you are ſufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you will in ſhort ſay what you think, we have made you our aſſociates in the ſubject of our deliberation. The thing, therefore, about which I have for a long time prefaced ſo much is this:—Theſe are our ſons. That youth, the ſon of Meleſias, is called Thucydides, by his grandfather's name; and this which is mine, is called Ariſtides, after my father. It has appeared therefore to us, that we ſhould pay all the attention to them in our power, and that we ſhould not act in the ſame manner as many do, who, when their children become lads[2], ſuffer them to do as they pleaſe, but we now begin to take all the care of them we are able. Seeing, therefore, that you alſo have children, we thought that you eſpecially muſt have conſidered how they may be educated ſo as to become the beſt of men. If, however, you have not frequently paid much attention to this thing, we now remind you that it is not proper to be negligent of it, and we call upon you to deliberate, in common with us, concerning the education of children. But whence we have been led to think in this manner, O Nicias and Laches, it is proper you ſhould hear, though the narration may be ſomewhat prolix.

I and Meleſias, here, have but one table, and theſe lads eat with us. As I told you therefore at firſt, we ſhall ſpeak freely to you. For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful deeds of our fathers, both in war and peace, during the time that they managed the affairs of their allies

[1] It is well obſerved by Dacier, that this fighting in armour appears to have been ſimilar to the exerciſe which is at preſent taught in fencing ſchools.

[2] In the original μειρακια, which ſeems to correſpond to our Engliſh word *lads*. For according to the anonymous Greek interpreter of Ptolemy's books De Judiciis, p. 166, the ſeven ages of man are βρεφος, παις, μειρακιον, νεος, ανηρ, πρεσβυτης, γερων. i. e. an infant, a boy, a lad, a youth, a man, an elderly man, an old man.

and

and of the city; but we cannot relate to them any deeds of our own. This covers us with ſhame, and we accuſe our fathers for ſuffering us to live delicately when we became lads, while they in the mean time were buſily employed about the affairs of others. Theſe very things we point out to theſe youths, telling them that if they neglect themſelves, and are not perſuaded by us, they will become ignoble; but that, if they pay attention to themſelves, they may quickly become worthy of the name which they bear. They therefore ſay that they will obey us; but we conſider what that is through which they by learning or ſtudying may become the beſt of men. Hence, a certain perſon recommended to us, that the young men ſhould learn to fight in armour, and ſaid that this was a beautiful diſcipline. He alſo praiſed him, whom you have juſt now beheld exhibiting, and adviſed us likewiſe to ſee him. It appeared to us, therefore, proper to come and take you along with us, that you might not only be ſpectators together with us, but might alſo aſſiſt us with your advice, if you were willing, concerning the attention which ſhould be paid to children. Theſe are the things which we wiſh to conſider in common with you. It is now, therefore, your part to conſult about this diſcipline, whether it appears proper to learn it or not; and with reſpect to other things, whether you have any diſcipline or ſtudy for the youths worthy of praiſe; and in ſhort to tell us, what mode of conduct you intend to adopt for your own children.

Nic. I indeed, O Lyſimachus and Meleſias, praiſe your conception, and am prepared to join with you in this deliberation, and I think that Laches here is prepared for the ſame purpoſe alſo.

Lac. You think with truth, O Nicias. And what Lyſimachus juſt now ſaid about his father, and the father of Meleſias, appears to me to have been very well ſaid, both againſt them and us, and all ſuch as engage in political affairs: for thoſe things nearly happen to them which he ſaid, both with reſpect to children and other domeſtic concerns, viz. that they are neglected and deſpiſed by them. Theſe things, therefore, O Lyſimachus, you have well ſaid. But I am ſurpriſed that you ſhould call us to join with you in conſulting about the education of youth, and ſhould not call Socrates here: for, in the firſt place, he is our fellow-citizen; and in the next place, he is always buſily employed in conſidering that which is the object of your inveſtigation, viz. what diſcipline or purſuit is proper for youth.

Lys. How do you ſay, O Laches? Does Socrates here pay attention to any thing of this kind?

Lac Entirely ſo, Lyſimachus.

Nic. I alſo can aſſert this with no leſs confidence than Laches. For he lately introduced as a ſtranger to me, for the ſake of inſtructing my ſon in muſic, Damon the diſciple of Agathocles, a man moſt acceptable, not only for his ſkill in muſic, but alſo for other things which qualify a man to aſſociate with ſuch youths as theſe.

Lys. Indeed, O Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, I, and ſuch as are my equals in age, have no longer any acquaintance with younger perſons, becauſe we for the moſt part keep within doors on account of our age. But, O ſon of Sophroniſcus, if you have any thing to adviſe for the good of this your fellow-citizen, it is proper that you ſhould communicate it: for it is juſt that you ſhould; ſince you are a paternal friend to us; for I and your father were always aſſociates and friends; and our friendſhip laſted till his death without interruption. At preſent I have ſome recollection of the name of Socrates: for theſe lads, when diſcourſing with each other at home, frequently make mention of Socrates, and very much praiſe him; but I never have yet aſked them whether they ſpoke of Socrates the ſon of Sophroniſcus. Tell me, however, O boys, whether this is that Socrates of whom you ſo often make mention?

Sons of Mel. *and* Lys. Yes, O Father, it is the ſame.

Lys. It is well, by Juno, Socrates, that you do credit to your father, who was the beſt of men; and henceforward your intereſts ſhall be mine, and mine yours.

Lac. And, indeed, O Lyſimachus, you muſt not let this man go: for I have elſewhere ſeen him, not only doing credit to his father, but alſo to his country. For, at the defeat at Delium[1], he retired along with me; and I can aſſure you, that if the reſt had conducted themſelves as he did, our city would have ſtood firm, and would not then have ſuffered ſuch a ruin.

Lys. O Socrates, this indeed is a beautiful praiſe, which is now given

[1] In this battle Socrates ſaved the life ſo Xenophon, who fell in conſequence of his horſe being killed under him; and Socrates being on foot, took him on his back, and carried him ſeveral miles.

to you by men who are worthy to be believed, and who deſerve to be celebrated for the ſame things for which they praiſe you. Be well aſſured, therefore, that I, hearing theſe things, rejoice that you are renowned; and think that I am among the number of thoſe who are moſt benevolently diſpoſed towards you. Hence it is requiſite that you ſhould firſt come to us, and believe that we are your familiars, as it is juſt you ſhould. Now, therefore, from this very day, ſince we have recognized each other, you ſhould not do otherwiſe; but be familiar with us and theſe youths, that mutual friendſhip may be preſerved between us. Do you therefore do theſe things, and we will again recall them to your memory. But with reſpect to the things which we began to inquire into, what do you ſay? Does it appear to you that this diſcipline is adapted to lads, or not; I mean the learning to fight in amour?

Soc. Concerning theſe things, O Lyſimachus, I will endeavour to give you what advice I am able; and again, to do all that you requeſt. It appears indeed to me to be moſt juſt, that I being the younger, and leſs experienced in theſe things, ſhould firſt hear what theſe perſons ſay, and learn from them. And if I ſhould have any thing to ſay different from their opinion, then I will declare my ſentiments, and endeavour to perſuade you and them of their truth. But, O Nicias, why do not you ſpeak the firſt?

Nic. Nothing hinders, Socrates; for it appears to me that the knowledge of this diſcipline is very generally uſeful to youth. For it is well not to be buſily employed about thoſe things with which young men love to be converſant when they are at leiſure, but to engage in this whence the body neceſſarily acquires a better condition. For it is not inferior to any of the exerciſes, nor has it leſs labour; and at the ſame time this exerciſe and equeſtrian ſkill are eſpecially proper for a liberal man. Indeed, in the conteſt in which we are athletæ, and in thoſe exerciſes in which a conteſt is propoſed to us, thoſe alone contend who are exerciſed in theſe warlike inſtruments. In the next place, this diſcipline is of advantage in battle itſelf, when it is neceſſary to fight in rank with many others. But it is moſt beneficial when the ranks are broken, and when it is neceſſary, in ſingle combat, either to purſue one reſiſting, or in flight to repel one attacking. For he who is ſkilled in this art, will not be vanquiſhed by one, nor perhaps by many

many enemies, but will every where through this be ſuperior to his opponent. Further ſtill, a thing of this kind incites a deſire of another beautiful diſcipline. For every one who has learnt to fight in armour, will alſo deſire the diſcipline conſequent to this, viz. that concerning the ranks of an army; and having received theſe diſciplines, and being ambitious of excelling in them, he will be impelled to every thing which concerns the command of an army. And this being the caſe, it is evident that he will apply himſelf to thoſe beautiful diſciplines and ſtudies conſequent to theſe, which it is well worth while for a man to learn and ſtudy, and of which this diſcipline is the leader. We may alſo add to it this, which is no trifling addition, that this ſcience will make every man in no ſmall degree more daring and brave in battle than he was before. Nor is this alſo to be paſſed over in ſilence (though it may appear to be very trifling), that it gives a man a graceful carriage, in thoſe places where it is proper he ſhould appear to poſſeſs it; and where alſo through this gracefulneſs of carriage he will at the ſame time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me therefore, O Lyſimachus, as I have ſaid, it appears to be neceſſary to teach young men theſe things, and for the reaſons which I have aſſigned. But I ſhall be glad to hear if Laches has any thing to ſay in oppoſition to what I have advanced.

Lac. But it is difficult, O Nicias, to ſay with reſpect to any diſcipline, that it is not proper to learn it: for it appears to be good to know all things. And indeed, as to this art reſpecting arms, if it is a diſcipline, (as thoſe ſay it is who teach it, and if it is ſuch as Nicias aſſerts it to be,) it is neceſſary to learn it; but if it is not a diſcipline, and thoſe deceive us who promiſe to teach it us as ſuch, or if being a diſcipline, it is not of much worth, why is it neceſſary to learn it? But I ſay theſe things concerning it, looking to this circumſtance, viz. that if it were of any value, I think it would not have been concealed from the Lacedæmonians, who are concerned for nothing elſe in life than to ſeek and ſtudy that by which they may ſurpaſs others in war. And if this art were concealed from them, yet it could not be concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæmonians, the moſt of all the Greeks, pay attention to things of this kind, and that he who is renowned for theſe things, will accumulate much wealth both from them and from others, juſt as a tragic poet when he is renowned among us. For indeed, he who thinks that he can compoſe excellent tragedies, does not, wandering out of Attica,

make

make the circuit of other cities, in order to attract notice, but immediately comes hither, and very properly exhibits himſelf to our citizens. But I ſee that thoſe who fight in armour conſider Lacedæmon as an inacceſſible temple, and do not enter into it even on tip-toe, but they wander round it, and rather exhibit themſelves to others, and eſpecially to thoſe who acknowledge themſelves to be inferior to many others in warlike concerns. In the next place, O Lyſimachus, I have been preſent with not a few of theſe men in the work itſelf, and I have ſeen what kind of men they are. But we may form a judgment of them from this circumſtance, that no man who has applied himſelf to armorial concerns has ever become illuſtrious in war; though in all other things men have been celebrated for their ſkill in their reſpective profeſſions. But theſe men, as it ſeems, are particularly unfortunate in this reſpect beyond others. For this very ſame Steſileus, whom you beheld together with me exhibiting himſelf in ſo great a crowd, I have ſeen truly diſplaying himſelf elſewhere, in a far better manner, though unwillingly. For when the ſhip he was in attacked a merchantman, he fought with a ſpear headed with a ſcythe that his arms might be as different as himſelf was from the reſt of the combatants. Other particulars therefore reſpecting the man do not deſerve to be related; but the ſucceſs of this ſtratagem of heading a ſpear with a ſcythe muſt not be paſſed over in ſilence: for while he was fighting, his ſcythe became entangled in the tackling of the enemy's ſhip; Steſileus therefore pulled in order to diſengage it, but was not able to effect his purpoſe; and the one ſhip paſſed by the other. In the mean time he followed the courſe of the ſhip holding his ſpear. But when the enemy's ſhip ſteered off, and was drawing him in, as he was ſtill holding his ſpear, he ſuffered it to ſlip through his hands, till he had only hold of it by the ſmall end. The crew of the merchantman laughed and ſhouted at this circumſtance of his being drawn by his ſpear, and at the figure which he made. At length ſome one having thrown a ſtone that fell juſt at his feet, on one of the rowers' ſeats, he quitted his ſpear. Then, indeed, thoſe that were in the three-banked galley were no longer able to reſtrain their laughter on ſeeing that ſpear headed with a ſcythe hanging from the ſhip. Perhaps therefore, this art may be of ſome uſe, as Nicias ſays; ſuch however are the particulars of which I was a ſpectator. Hence, as I ſaid at firſt, if it be a diſcipline, it poſſeſſes but little utility; and if it be not, but they diſſemble who ſay it is, it is not worth while

to endeavour to learn it. For it appears to me, that if any coward ſhould think he ought to learn this art, acquiring confidence through it, his cowardice would become more apparent; but that if a brave man ſhould learn it, in conſequence of being obſerved by every one, if he erred but in a ſmall degree he muſt endure great calumnies. For the profeſſion of this ſcience is attended with envy; ſo that unleſs he ſurpaſſes others in virtue in a wonderful degree, he who acknowledges that he poſſeſſes this ſcience cannot avoid becoming ridiculous. Such, O Lyſimachus, does the purſuit of this diſcipline appear to me. But it is requiſite, as I ſaid at firſt, not to diſmiſs this Socrates, but to requeſt him to give his opinion on this ſubject.

Lys. But I indeed requeſt, O Socrates, that you will do ſo: for it appears to me that we want an umpire to decide the difference. Had theſe indeed agreed in opinion, a thing of this kind would have been leſs neceſſary. But now (for you ſee that Laches diſſents from Nicias) it will be well to hear from you to which of the men you give your ſuffrage.

Soc. But what, O Lyſimachus? If many praiſe us, will you make uſe of them?

Lys. What elſe can any one do, O Socrates?

Soc. And will you alſo, O Meleſias, act in this manner? And if it were neceſſary for you to conſult about exerciſe for your ſon, would you rather be perſuaded by the many, than by one who had learned under a ſkilful maſter, and who had exerciſed himſelf?

Mel. It is fit, Socrates, I ſhould be perſuaded by the latter.

Soc. You would rather, therefore, be perſuaded by him than by us four?

Mel. Perhaps ſo.

Soc. For it is neceſſary, I think, to judge by ſcience, and not by multitude, if a man intends to judge well.

Mel. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Now, therefore, it is neceſſary to conſider this very thing in the firſt place, viz. whether any one of us is an artiſt, in the thing about which we conſult, or not. And if any of us is, we ſhould be perſuaded by him being one, diſmiſſing the reſt. But if no one of us is an artiſt in this particular, we muſt ſeek after ſome other perſon. Or, do you and Lyſimachus think that this is an affair of ſmall conſequence, and that it is not concerning

cerning that which is the greateſt of all your poſſeſſions? For the government of the whole paternal houſe will be according as the children are worthy, or the contrary.

MEL. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. It is neceſſary, therefore, to pay much attention to this ſubject.

MEL. Certainly.

SOC. How then ſhould we conſider that which I juſt now mentioned, if we wiſhed to find which of us is moſt expert in conteſt? Should we not conſult him who had learned and ſtudied this art of contending, and who had been inſtructed in it by good maſters?

MEL. To me it appears that we ſhould.

SOC. Should we not, therefore, prior to this, conſider what this thing is in which we ſeek for maſters?

MEL. How do you ſay?

SOC. Thus, perhaps, what I ſay will be more manifeſt. It does not appear to me, to have been acknowledged by us at firſt what that is about which we conſult and ſpeculate, in order to know which of us is moſt ſkilled in it, and has had maſters for the ſake of this, and which of us is not.

NIC. Did we not, O Socrates, conſider about fighting in armour, whether it was proper lads ſhould learn it or not?

SOC. Entirely ſo, O Nicias: but when any one conſiders about a remedy for the eyes, whether it is proper to apply it or not, whether do you think the conſultation ſhould then be about the remedy, or about the eyes?

NIC. About the eyes.

SOC. Hence alſo, when any one conſiders about a bridle for a horſe, whether it ſhould be uſed or not, and when it ſhould be uſed, he will then conſult about the horſe, and not about the bridle.

NIC. True.

SOC. In one word, therefore, when any one conſiders a certain thing for the ſake of ſomething, his conſultation will be about that thing for the ſake of which he ſpeculates, and not about that which he ſeeks for the ſake of ſomething elſe [1].

[1] Thus, in the above inſtance of the bridle and the horſe, the horſe is that for the ſake of which a man conſiders about a bridle; but the bridle is that which is ſought for the ſake of the horſe.

Nic. Neceſſarily ſo.

Soc. It is neceſſary, therefore, to conſider whether the perſon whoſe advice we aſk is ſkilled in that thing for the ſake of which we engage in the preſent inquiry.

Mel. Certainly.

Soc. Do we not therefore ſay, that we now inquire concerning diſcipline for the ſake of the ſoul of youth?

Nic. Yes.

Soc. Whether, therefore, any one of us is ſkilled in the art of taking care of the ſoul, and is able to accompliſh this employment well, and has had good maſters in this art himſelf, muſt be conſidered.

Lac. But what, O Socrates, have you never yet ſeen ſome perſons become more ſkilful in a certain thing without than with maſters?

Soc. I have, O Laches; whom, however, you would not be willing to believe, if they ſaid that they were good artiſts, unleſs they could ſhow you ſome excellent production of their art, and not only one but many.

Nic. What you ſay is true.

Soc. It is neceſſary, therefore, O Laches and Nicias, ſince Lyſimachus and Meleſias have called upon us to conſult with them concerning their ſons, in conſequence of being anxious that their ſouls may become moſt excellent,—I ſay, it is neceſſary that we, if we acknowledge that we have had maſters, ſhould ſhow who they were, they in the firſt place being good maſters, and having cultivated the ſouls of many youths; and in the next place, who ſhall appear to have alſo inſtructed us. Or, if any one of us ſhall ſay that he has had no maſter, he ought to be able to ſpeak of the works which he has performed, and to ſhow what Athenians or foreigners, what ſlaves or freemen, have acknowledged themſelves to have been benefited by him. But if we can do neither of theſe, we muſt order them to ſeek for advice from others, and not ſubject ourſelves to the danger of corrupting the ſons of other men, and thus be expoſed to the greateſt reproach from thoſe with whom we are moſt familiar. I therefore, O Lyſimachus and Meleſias, in the firſt place, ſay concerning myſelf, that I have had no preceptor of this thing, though my deſire has always tended to it from my youth. But I am not able to give a reward to the ſophiſts, who alone profeſs themſelves to be capable of making me a worthy man; and even now I am unable to diſcover this

this art myſelf. If, however, Nicias or Laches ſhall have either diſcovered or learned it, I ſhall not wonder: for they are richer than I am, ſo that they might learn it from others; and they are at the ſame time older, ſo that they may now have diſcovered it. But they appear to me to be able to inſtruct a man: for they never would ſo intrepidly have decided concerning worthy and baſe purſuits, unleſs they had believed that they had a ſufficient knowledge of them. I believe them, therefore, as to other things; but I wonder that they differ from each other. Hence, as Laches juſt now ordered that you ſhould not diſmiſs but interrogate me; in like manner I now call upon you not to diſmiſs Laches and Nicias, but to interrogate them; at the ſame time telling them, that Socrates ſays he has no knowledge of the thing, and is not qualified to judge which of you ſpeaks the truth; for he is neither the inventor nor the diſciple of any one about things of this kind. But do you, O Laches and Nicias, tell us what man you have met with moſt ſkilled in the education of youth; and whether you know theſe things in conſequence of having learnt them from ſome one, or from having diſcovered them yourſelves. And, if you have learnt them, tell us who was your maſter, and who thoſe are that are ſimilar artiſts; that if the affairs of the city ſhould not afford you leiſure ſufficient to attend to us, we may go to thoſe maſters, and may perſuade them, either by gifts or careſſes, or both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may not, through becoming depraved characters, be a diſgrace to their anceſtors. But if you yourſelves diſcovered this art, give us inſtances of thoſe who by your care have, from being depraved, become worthy characters. For if you now begin to give inſtruction for the firſt time, it is requiſite to conſider that you will be expoſed to the danger, not of making trial in Car[1], but upon your ſons, and the ſons of your friends, and, in ſhort, according to the proverb, that you will teach a potter[2] in a tub. Tell us, then, what you can do, and what not. Inquire theſe things of them, O Lyſimachus, and do not diſmiſs the men till they have anſwered.

Lys. Socrates, my friends, appears to me to ſpeak well; wherefore, O Nicias and Laches, conſider whether it will be agreeable to you to be interro-

[1] This is ſaid of thoſe that engage in perilous concerns, and in the affairs of others, when they are attended with danger.

[2] See this explained in a note on the Gorgias.

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gated about, and reply to ſuch like particulars. For to me and Meleſias here, it will certainly be very agreeable, if you are willing to diſcuſs all that Socrates may aſk. For I ſaid from the firſt, that we called upon you for advice, becauſe we thought that you would pay attention to theſe things in a becoming manner, and becauſe your ſons, as well as ours, are now nearly arrived at that age in which they ought to be inſtructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, ſpeak, and conſider the affair in common with Socrates, giving and receiving arguments from each other: for this was well ſaid by him, that we are now conſulting about the moſt important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it appears to you that this ought to be done.

Nic. O Lyſimachus, you ſeem to me to know Socrates only from his father, and not to have aſſociated with him; unleſs, perhaps, when he was a boy, you may have met with him in public aſſemblies following his father, or in a temple, or ſome other convention of the people; but it is evident that you never had any correſpondence with him ſince he came to be a man.

Lys. Why do you ſay this, O Nicias?

Nic. You ſeem to me not to know that whoever draws near to Socrates by diſcourſe, as if by family alliance, and converſes with him, although he may begin to diſcourſe about ſomething elſe, will not ceaſe to be led about by his arguments, till he falls on the neceſſity of giving an account of his preſent mode of life, and the manner in which his paſt life has been ſpent. And when he has fallen on this neceſſity, Socrates will not diſmiſs him till he has well and properly examined all theſe particulars. But I am accuſtomed to his manner, and I know that it is neceſſary to ſuffer theſe things from him; and I alſo well know that I muſt ſuffer them now: for I rejoice, O Lyſimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no bad thing to be reminded that we have acted or ſhall act in an improper manner. But, indeed, he who is not averſe to this muſt neceſſarily be more cautious in future, being willing and thinking it worth while, according to the ſaying of Solon, to learn as long as he lives, and not expecting that age, when it comes, will bring intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is neither unuſual nor unpleaſant to be examined by Socrates; but, indeed, I have nearly for ſome time perceived that our diſcourſe, as Socrates is preſent, would not be about the lads, but about ourſelves. As I ſaid, therefore, as to myſelf nothing hinders

ders me from diſcourſing with Socrates in whatever manner he pleaſes. But ſee how Laches here is diſpoſed about a thing of this kind.

LAC. The manner in which I am affected, O Nicias, with reſpect to diſcourſe, is ſimple, or, if you will, is not ſimple, but double: for to ſome one I may appear to be a philologiſt, and not a miſologiſt. For when I hear a man diſcourſing concerning virtue, or concerning a certain wiſdom, he being one who is truly a man, and worthy the arguments which he uſes, I rejoice tranſcendently, contemplating at the ſame time him who ſpeaks and what is ſaid, how they fit and harmonize with each other. And, indeed, ſuch a man appears to me to be a muſician, and one who produces the moſt beautiful harmony; not that he is harmonized according to the melody of the lyre, or inſtruments of ſport; but in reality he attunes his life. Such a one too lives in concord with himſelf both in words and deeds, not indeed according to the Ionic[1], or Phrygian, or Lydian harmony, but according to the Dorian, which is alone the Grecian harmony. Such a man, therefore, when he ſpeaks, cauſes me to rejoice, and to ſeem to be a lover of words, with ſuch avidity do I receive what he ſays. But he who acts in a manner contrary to this man pains me, and by how much the better he appears to ſpeak, by ſo much the more does he make me ſeem to be a hater of words. I have not yet, indeed, had any experience of the words of Socrates; but of his works, as it ſeems, I formerly have; and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful aſſertions and of all liberty of ſpeech. If, therefore, he is ſuch a man, I will conſult him, and moſt willingly ſhall I be interrogated by, and not be averſe to learn from him. I alſo aſſent to the ſaying of Solon, with the addition only of one thing: for I wiſh to learn as I grow old, but from the worthy alone. Let this then be granted to me that he is a worthy preceptor, leſt while I learn unpleaſantly, I ſhould appear to be indocile. For it is with me a thing of no conſequence, if he who teaches me ſhould be younger than I am, or ſhould not yet be renowned, and the like. I announce to you, therefore, O Socrates, that you may confute and teach me whatever you pleaſe: for I am favourably diſpoſed towards you from that day,

[1] The Ionic harmony was effeminate and ſoft; the Lydian was doleful and adapted to lamentation; the Phrygian vehement, and capable of producing ecſtaſy, and on this account Proclus informs us that it was uſed in the myſteries; and the Dorian was grave and maſculine, and on this account was preferred by Plato to all the reſt. See the third book of the Republic.

in which you was my companion in danger, and in which you gave ſuch a ſpecimen of your virtue, as it became a juſt man to give. Say therefore whatever you pleaſe, and pay no attention to our age.

Soc. We cannot then accuſe you, as it ſeems, that you are not ready jointly to conſult and inveſtigate with us.

Lys. This is our buſineſs, Socrates; for I regard you as one of us. Conſider, therefore, inſtead of me, for the ſake of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them, and conſult by converſing with them. For I have forgotten many things, through my age, which I had intended to aſk them; and again, I do not very well remember what I hear, if any other converſation intervenes. Do you therefore ſpeak about, and diſcuſs among yourſelves, the things which we have propoſed to be inveſtigated; and when I have heard what you have to ſay, I will do, together with Meleſias here, whatever ſhall appear to you proper to be done.

Soc. O Nicias and Laches, we muſt obey Lyſimachus and Meleſias. The things then which we juſt now endeavoured to conſider, viz. who were our maſters in a diſcipline of this kind, or what other perſons we had made better, it will not perhaps be improper to inveſtigate among ourſelves. But I think that ſuch a conſideration as this tends to the ſame thing; or nearly it will be ſomething which rather flows as from a principle. For if we have a ſcientific knowledge of any thing, which when communicated to another renders him better, and if we are alſo able to communicate it to another, it is evident that we know the thing itſelf, and alſo how it may be acquired in the eaſieſt and beſt manner. Perhaps you do not underſtand what I ſay, but thus you will eaſily comprehend my meaning. If we know that ſight, when preſent to the eyes, makes thoſe eyes to which it is preſent better, and if beſides this we have the power of making it preſent to the eyes, it is evident that we know what the ſight is, and can inform him who conſults us for this purpoſe how it may be acquired in the eaſieſt and beſt manner. For if we have no knowledge of this very thing, what the ſight is, or what the hearing is, we cannot be counſellors or phyſicians worthy of any regard, either about the eyes or the ears, with reſpect to the manner in which either the hearing or the ſight may be moſt beautifully obtained.

Lys. You ſpeak the truth, O Socrates.

Soc. Do not therefore theſe perſons, O Laches, now call upon us to conſult

with them after what manner virtue, being preſent to the ſouls of their ſons, may render them better?

Lac. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, eſſentially neceſſary to know this, what virtue is? For if we are entirely ignorant what virtue is, how can we become adviſers to any one, ſo as that he may be able to acquire it in the moſt beautiful manner?

Lac. By no means can we, as it appears to me, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we ſay then, O Laches, that we know what virtue is?

Lac. We ſhall certainly ſay ſo.

Soc. If, therefore, we know, cannot we alſo tell what it is?

Lac. Undoubtedly.

Soc. We will not, therefore, O beſt of men, immediately ſpeculate concerning the whole of virtue (for that perhaps would be a very laborious work); but let us firſt ſee with reſpect to a certain part of it, if we are ſufficiently able to know it, and thus, as it is probable, the ſpeculation will be eaſy to us.

Lac. Let us do ſo, Socrates, ſince it is agreeable to you.

Soc. Which of the parts of virtue then ſhall we ſelect? Is it not evident that it muſt be this, to which the diſcipline of arms appears to tend? But it appears to the many to tend to fortitude. Or does it not?

Lac. And very much does it appear ſo.

Soc. In the firſt place, therefore, O Laches, let us endeavour to ſay what fortitude is; and in the next place let us after this conſider how it may be acquired by youth, ſo far as it is poſſible for it to be acquired by ſtudies and diſciplines. But endeavour to ſay what fortitude is.

Lac. By Jupiter, Socrates, it is not difficult to ſay what it is. For if any one is willing, keeping in his rank, to oppoſe the enemy, and does not fly, I well know that he will be a brave man.

Soc. You ſpeak well, O Laches; but perhaps I, from not ſpeaking clearly, am the cauſe of my perceiving that you do not anſwer that which I aſked, but ſomething elſe.

Lac. Why do you ſay this, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as you ſay, is one who, keeping in his rank, fights the enemy.

Lac. So I ſay.

Soc. And I alſo. But is not he likewiſe a brave man, who flying and not keeping in his rank fights the enemy?

Lac. How flying?

Soc. Juſt as the Scythians are ſaid to fight no leſs flying than purſuing. And Homer, praiſing the horſes of Æneas, ſays,

Swiftly they every where purſue and fly.

And for this very thing he praiſes Æneas himſelf, viz. for his being ſkilled in flying, and ſays, that he was expert in retreating.

Lac. And very properly, Socrates: for he there ſpeaks concerning chariots; but you ſpeak concerning the horſe of the Scythians. For their cavalry fight in this manner; but the infantry of Greece fight as I ſaid.

Soc. Except perhaps the Lacedæmonians, O Laches. For they ſay that the Lacedæmonians, in the battle of Platæa, when they were engaged with the *Gerrophori*[1], were not willing to fight ſtanding their ground againſt them, but fled; but that after the ranks of the Perſians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and thus became conquerors in that battle.

Lac. You ſpeak the truth.

Soc. On this account, therefore, I ſaid that I was the cauſe that you did not anſwer well, becauſe I did not interrogate you well. For I wiſhed to aſk you not only concerning thoſe who are brave in the infantry, but alſo concerning thoſe who are brave in the cavalry, and in all the forms of war; and not only concerning thoſe that are brave in battle, but alſo concerning thoſe that are brave in dangers on the ſea,—in diſeaſes,—in poverty,—and in political affairs: and again, not only concerning thoſe who are brave in pains or fears, but alſo concerning thoſe who are powerful in contending againſt deſires or pleaſures, both by ſtanding their attacks, or retreating from them: for ſome men, O Laches, are alſo brave in things of this kind.

Lac. And very much ſo, O Socrates.

Soc. All theſe, therefore, are brave; but ſome of them poſſeſs fortitude in pleaſures, others in pains, others in deſires, and others in fears; and others, I think, poſſeſs timidity in theſe very ſame things.

[1] Theſe were Perſian troops armed with bucklers of willows.

Lac.

LAC. Entirely ſo.

SOC. What then each of theſe is, this is the thing which I aſk. Again, therefore, endeavour to tell me, in the firſt place, what fortitude is which is the ſame in all theſe. Or do you not yet underſtand what I ſay?

LAC. Not very much.

SOC. But I ſay, juſt as if I ſhould aſk what ſwiftneſs is, which is preſent with us in running, in playing on the harp, in ſpeaking, in learning, and in many other things. For we nearly poſſeſs it in ſuch things as the following, which it is worth while to mention, viz. either in the actions of the hands or feet, or mouth and voice, or in thoſe of the dianoëtic part. Or do not you alſo ſay ſo?

LAC. Entirely ſo.

SOC. If, therefore, any one ſhould aſk me, O Socrates, What do you call this thing which you denominate ſwiftneſs in all things? I ſhould ſay to him, that I call that power ſwiftneſs which accompliſhes many things in a ſhort time, about the voice, and about the courſe, and about all other things.

LAC. And you would ſay rightly.

SOC. Do you alſo endeavour, O Laches, thus to define fortitude, and tell us what that power is which is the ſame in pleaſure and in pain, and in all the above-mentioned caſes, and which in all theſe is called fortitude.

LAC. It appears, therefore, to me to be a certain endurance of the ſoul, if it is neceſſary to ſpeak of that which accords with fortitude in all things.

SOC. But this indeed is neceſſary, if we are to reply to the queſtion that was aſked us. This therefore appears to me, that you do not conſider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. But I infer this from hence: for I nearly know, O Laches, that you think fortitude to be among the number of things which are very beautiful.

LAC. I do indeed, and I alſo think that it ranks among things the moſt beautiful.

SOC. Is not, therefore, that endurance which ſubſiſts in conjunction with prudence beautiful and good?

LAC. Entirely ſo. But what of that endurance which ſubſiſts with folly? Is it not on the contrary bad and pernicious?

LAC. Yes.

Soc. Do you then ſay that a thing of this kind is beautiful, though it is bad and pernicious?

Lac. This would not be juſt, O Socrates.

Soc. You do not, therefore, acknowledge ſuch an endurance as this to be fortitude, ſince it is not beautiful; but fortitude is beautiful.

Lac. That is true.

Soc. Prudent endurance, therefore, according to your aſſertion, will be fortitude.

Lac. So it ſeems.

Soc. Let us ſee then in what this endurance is prudent; or whether it is prudent in all things both great and ſmall. Thus, for inſtance, if ſome one endures to ſpend his money prudently, knowing that he ſhall be enriched by thus ſpending it, would you call him a brave man?

Lac. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. And if ſome one, being a phyſician, had a ſon or ſome other patient ill with an inflammation in his breaſt, and this patient ſhould requeſt him to give him ſomething to eat or drink, but the phyſician ſhould inflexibly perſiſt in denying his requeſt, would you call this endurance fortitude?

Lac. I ſhould not.

Soc. But in war; here is a man of endurance who is willing to fight; and he prudently reaſons with himſelf, that others will give him aſſiſtance, and that he fights againſt thoſe who are fewer and more deſpicable than thoſe of his own party, and ſtill further that he has the advantage of the ground: will you ſay that this man, enduring with ſuch like prudence and advantage, is braver than him in the contrary army who is willing to ſtand his ground and endure?

Lac. The man in the contrary army, O Socrates, appears to me to be the braver.

Soc. And yet the endurance of the one is more imprudent than that of the other.

Lac. That is true.

Soc. Will you, therefore, ſay that a man who endures in an equeſtrian conteſt with equeſtrian ſcience, is leſs brave than him who endures without ſcience?

Lac. To me it appears that he is.

Soc. And will you alſo ſay the ſame of a ſlinger, or an archer, or of any other who endures in any other art?

Lac. Entirely ſo.

Soc. And with reſpect to ſuch as are willing to deſcend into a well, and there to endure ſwimming in it, though they are not ſkilled in this employment, or in any thing elſe of this kind,—will you ſay that ſuch men are braver than thoſe that are ſkilled in theſe things?

Lac. What elſe can one ſay, O Socrates?

Soc. Nothing, if he thinks ſo.

Lac. But I, indeed, do think ſo.

Soc. And yet, O Laches, ſuch men encounter danger, and endure more imprudently than thoſe who do this in conjunction with art.

Lac. So it appears.

Soc. Did not, therefore, baſe and imprudent boldneſs and endurance appear to us to be noxious in our former concluſions?

Lac. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But fortitude was acknowledged by us to be ſomething beautiful.

Lac. It was acknowledged.

Soc. But now again we ſay that that baſe and imprudent endurance is fortitude.

Lac. So it appears.

Soc. Do we therefore appear to you to ſpeak well?

Lac. By Jupiter, Socrates, to me we do not.

Soc. In your own language, therefore, O Laches, you and I are not Dorically harmonized: for our works do not accord with our words. For ſome one, as it ſeems, may ſay that we participate of fortitude in our deeds; but not, as I think, in our words, if he ſhould hear us now diſcourſing.

Lac. You ſpeak moſt truly.

Soc. What then? Does it appear to you to be beautiful that we ſhould be in this condition?

Lac. By no means.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we ſhould yield our aſſent to what we ſaid?

Lac. To what aſſertion of ours do you allude?

Soc.

Soc. To that which ordered us to endure. If you are willing, therefore, let us perſevere in our inquiry, and endure, leſt fortitude itſelf ſhould deride us for not bravely inveſtigating what it is; if, indeed, endurance itſelf is often fortitude.

Lac. I, indeed, O Socrates, am ready to ſtand my ground, though I am unaccuſtomed to ſuch like conferences. But a certain pertinacity inſtigates me againſt what has been ſaid, and I am in reality indignant that I am ſo incapable of telling my conceptions. For I ſeem to myſelf to know what fortitude is; but I know not how it juſt now fled from me, ſo that I cannot comprehend in words and ſay what it is.

Soc. But a good huntſman, my friend, ought to run after the beaſt he hunts, and not remit his purſuit.

Lac. By all means he ought.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we call Nicias alſo to this hunting, that we may try if he is in any reſpect more ſagacious than us?

Lac. I am willing: for why ſhould I not?

Soc. Come then, O Nicias, gratify your friends, and aſſiſt them in their doubts in this conference, if you poſſeſs any power; for you ſee how we are embarraſſed. Do you, therefore, tell us what you think fortitude is, free us from this doubt, and confirm by argument what you conceive it to be.

Nic. You have appeared to me, for ſome time paſt, Socrates, not to have well defined fortitude; for you make no uſe of that which I have heard you ſo well aſſert.

Soc. What is that, O Nicias?

Nic. I have often heard you aſſert that every one of us is good with reſpect to thoſe things in which he is wiſe, but bad with reſpect to thoſe of which he is ignorant.

Soc. By Jupiter, what you ſay is true, O Nicias.

Nic. If, therefore, a brave is a good man, he is clearly a wiſe man.

Soc. Do you hear, O Laches?

Lac. I do, but I do not very much underſtand what he ſays.

Soc. But I ſeem to underſtand him, and he appears to me to call fortitude a certain wiſdom.

Lac. What kind of wiſdom, O Socrates?

Soc. Will you not therefore inquire this of him?

Lac.

LAC. I will.

SOC. Come then, O Nicias, tell him what kind of wiſdom fortitude will be according to you: for it is not that which belongs to the pipe.

NIC. By no means.

SOC. Nor yet that which belongs to the harp.

NIC. It is not.

SOC. But what is it then, or of what is it the ſcience?

LAC. You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates; and let him tell us what wiſdom it is.

NIC. I ſay then, O Laches, that it is the ſcience of things dreadful and daring, both in war and in all other things.

LAC. How abſurdly he ſpeaks, Socrates!

SOC. Looking to what do you ſay this, O Laches?

LAC. To what? Why wiſdom is ſeparate from fortitude.

SOC. Nicias does not ſay ſo.

LAC. He does not, by Jupiter; and therefore he raves.

SOC. Let us therefore teach and not revile him.

NIC. He does not revile me; but it ſeems to me, O Socrates, that Laches is deſirous that I alſo may appear to ſay nothing, becauſe this was juſt now the caſe with him.

LAC. Entirely ſo, O Nicias; and I will endeavour to evince this: for you ſay nothing. Without going any further, in diſeaſes do not phyſicians know things that are dreadful? Or do brave men appear to you to know this? Or do you call phyſicians brave men?

NIC. By no means.

LAC. Neither do you give that name, I think, to huſbandmen, though they know things that are dreadful in agriculture; and all other artificers know things that are dreadful and daring in their own arts, and yet they are not in any reſpect the more brave for this.

SOC. What does Laches, O Nicias, appear to you to ſay? for he certainly appears to ſay ſomething.

NIC. He does indeed ſay ſomething, and yet not what is true.

SOC. How ſo?

NIC. Becauſe he thinks that phyſicians know ſomething more about the ſick than the being able to ſay that a thing is healthful or unhealthful; but

they

they alone know this. But whether to be well is a thing dreadful to any one rather than to be ill; do you think, O Laches, that phyſicians have any knowledge of this? Or do you not think that it is better to many for them not to recover from diſeaſe than to recover? For tell me this: Do you ſay that it is better to all men to live, and that it is not more advantageous to many to die?

LAC. I do ſay this.

NIC. To thoſe, therefore, to whom it is advantageous to die, do you think the ſame things are dreadful, as to thoſe to whom it is better to live?

LAC. Not I.

NIC. But do you allow that phyſicians know this, or that it is known by any other artificer than the man who is ſkilled in things dreadful, and whom I call a brave man?

SOC. Do you underſtand, O Laches, what he ſays?

LAC. I do; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave men: for who elſe knows to whom it is better to live than to die? And I aſk you, O Nicias, whether you acknowledge yourſelf to be a prophet, or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?

NIC. But what? Do you think it belongs to a prophet to know things dreadful and daring?

LAC. I do; for to whom elſe does it belong?

NIC. Much more, O beſt of men, to him of whom I ſpeak; ſince it is neceſſary that a prophet ſhould only know the ſigns of future events, whether they portend death to any one, or diſeaſe, or the loſs of riches, or victory, or the being vanquiſhed in battle or in any other conteſt. But, why does it rather belong to a prophet, than any other, to judge for whom it is better to ſuffer or not ſuffer any one of theſe things?

LAC. I do not underſtand, Socrates, what he means to ſay: for he does not render it manifeſt that it is either a prophet, or a phyſician, or any other perſon, whom he calls brave, unleſs he ſays that this brave perſon is a certain god. Nicias, therefore, appears to me to be unwilling ingenuouſly to confeſs that he ſays nothing, but he is rolled upwards and downwards, concealing his perplexity; though you and I might have been ſimilarly rolled, if we had wiſhed not to appear to contradict ourſelves. If, indeed, we were

pleading

pleading in a court of juſtice, it might be reaſonable to act in this manner; but now, in ſuch a conference as this, why ſhould any one vainly adorn himſelf with empty words?

Soc. For no reaſon, as it appears to me, O Laches. But let us ſee; perhaps Nicias thinks that he ſays ſomething to the purpoſe, and does not aſſert theſe things merely for the ſake of ſpeaking. Let us, therefore, inquire of him more clearly what he means; and if it ſhall appear that he ſays any thing pertinent, let us aſſent to him; if not, we will teach him better.

Lac. Do you, therefore, O Socrates, if you will, aſk him; for I have interrogated him ſufficiently.

Soc. Nothing will hinder me: for the interrogation will be in common to me and you.

Lac. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Tell me then, O Nicias, (for I and Laches unite in this queſtion,) Do you ſay that fortitude is rather the ſcience of things dreadful and daring, than of any thing elſe?

Nic. I do.

Soc. But it is not the province of every man to know this, ſince neither a phyſician nor a prophet poſſeſſes this knowledge; nor will a man be brave, unleſs he acquires this ſcience. Do you not ſay ſo?

Nic. I do.

Soc. According to the proverb, therefore, in reality, every hog does not know this, nor will every hog be valiant.

Nic. It does not appear to me that it will.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, O Nicias, that neither do you believe that the Crommyonian ſow was brave. But I do not ſay this in jeſt: for I think it is neceſſary that he who aſſerts theſe things ſhould admit that no brute is brave; nor ought he to grant that any wild beaſt is ſo wiſe, that what few men know through the difficulty of acquiring knowledge, *that* a lion, or a leopard, or a certain boar knows. But he who defines fortitude, as you have done, muſt neceſſarily ſay that a lion and a ſtag, a bull and an ape, are ſimilarly formed by nature with reſpect to fortitude.

Lac. By the gods, Socrates, you ſpeak well: and in reality inform us, O Nicias, whether you ſay that theſe wild beaſts, which we all of us acknow-

ledge to be brave, are wiſer than we are, or, contrary to the opinion of all men, will you dare to deny that they are brave?

Nic. Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beaſt, or any thing elſe brave, which through ignorance is not terrified at things dreadful, but is fearleſs and ſtupid. Or, do you think, that I call all boys brave, who through ignorance fear nothing? But I am of opinion, that *the fearleſs* is not the ſame with *the brave*. For, I think, that fortitude and forethought are to be found in very few; but that confidence and boldneſs, and a privation of fear, together with the want of forethought, may be ſeen in very many men and women, boys and wild beaſts. That, therefore, which you and the many call fortitude, I call raſhneſs; but I call the brave, the prudent and the wiſe, about whom I now ſpeak.

Lac. You ſee, Socrates, how well this man decorates himſelf, as he thinks, with words; but thoſe whom all men acknowledge to be brave he endeavours to deprive of this honour.

Nic. Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I ſay that you and Lammachus[1] are wiſe, if you are brave; and that this is alſo true of many others of the Athenians.

Lac. I ſay nothing againſt theſe things, though I could reply to them, leſt you ſhould ſay that I am in reality a ſlanderer.

Soc. Nor ſhould you ſpeak againſt them, O Laches; for you appear to me not to have perceived that Nicias here received this wiſdom from our aſſociate Damon; and Damon is very intimate with Prodicus, who appears to diſtinguiſh appellations of this kind in a manner ſuperior to the other ſophiſts.

Lac. For it rather becomes a ſophiſt, O Socrates, to think highly of himſelf on account of things of this kind, than a man whom the city thinks worthy to be its governor.

Soc. It becomes indeed him, O bleſſed man, who preſides over things of the greateſt conſequence, to participate of the greateſt wiſdom. But it appears to me to be worth while to conſider with a view to what Nicias thus defines fortitude.

[1] This Lammachus was general of the Athenians, with Nicias and Alcibiades, in the expedition of Sicily, where he was killed.

Lac.

LAC. Conſider this then, Socrates, yourſelf.

SOC. I ſhall do this, O beſt of men. Do not, however, think that you are to be excluded from this conference, but attend and conſider what is ſaid.

LAC. Let theſe things be ſo if it appears to be proper.

SOC. But it does appear to be ſo. And do you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning; for you know that at the beginning of our conference we conſidered fortitude as a part of virtue.

NIC. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Did not you, therefore, alſo anſwer, that it was a part of virtue, there being likewiſe other parts, all which are called virtue?

NIC. For how is it poſſible I ſhould not?

SOC. Do you, therefore, call the ſame things the parts of virtue as I do? For I, beſides fortitude, call temperance and juſtice, and certain other ſuch like things, parts of virtue. And do not you alſo?

NIC. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Attend then: for theſe things are granted by us. But let us conſider concerning things terrible and daring, leſt you ſhould form one opinion of them, and we another. For we will tell you what we think concerning them; and do you, if you do not accord with us, teach us better. We then think thoſe things to be dreadful which occaſion fear, and that thoſe things are daring, or may be dared, which do not occaſion fear. Neither, however, paſt nor preſent evils occaſion fear, but thoſe which are expected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does it not likewiſe appear ſo to you, O Laches?

LAC. Very much ſo, Socrates.

SOC. Do you, therefore, O Nicias, hear our aſſertions, that things dreadful are future evils; but that things which may be dared are future goods, or at leaſt are not evils. Do you ſay this, or ſomething elſe about theſe things?

NIC. I ſay this.

SOC. But do you call the ſcience of theſe things fortitude?

NIC. I do.

SOC. Let us then ſtill further conſider whether a third thing appears the ſame to you as to us.

NIC. What is that?

Soc. I will tell you. For it appears to me and Laches, that of whatever things there is ſcience, there is not one ſcience of a thing which is paſt, by which we know that it was made, another concerning things preſent, by which we know that they are made, and another concerning that which is not yet made, by which we know that it may and will be made in the moſt beautiful manner; but to know all theſe is the province of the ſame ſcience. Thus, for inſtance, with reſpect to that which is ſalubrious at all times, there is no other ſcience than medicine, which being one and the ſame, ſees what has been, what is, and what will be ſalubrious. And agriculture ſubſiſts in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to things which grow out of the earth. Thus too, in warlike concerns, you yourſelves can teſtify that the ſcience of commanding an army, provides in the moſt beautiful manner for other things and for what will happen in future. For this art does not think it fit that it ſhould be ſubſervent to divination, but preſide over it, as better knowing things which do and will take place about wars. And the law alſo orders this, not that the diviner ſhall command the general, but that the general ſhall command the diviner. Shall we aſſert theſe things, O Laches?

Lac. We muſt aſſert them.

Soc. But what? Do you agree with us, O Nicias, that it is the province of the ſame ſcience to poſſeſs a knowledge of the ſame things, whether they be conſidered as paſt, or as preſent, or as future?

Nic. I do: for thus it appears to me, O Socrates.

Soc. Is not, therefore, O beſt of men, fortitude, as you ſay, the ſcience of things dreadful and daring?

Nic. It is.

Soc. But it has been acknowledged that things dreadful are future evils, and things daring future goods.

Nic. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But the ſame ſcience has a knowledge of things paſt, preſent, and future.

Nic. It has.

Soc. Fortitude, therefore, is not only the ſcience of things dreadful and daring: for it not only has a knowledge of future goods and evils, but alſo of ſuch as are paſt and preſent and in ſhort it ſurveys all things like the other ſciences.

Nic.

Nic. So it ſeems.

Soc. You have, therefore, O Nicias, only defined to us in your anſwer the third part of fortitude, though we aſked you what the whole of fortitude is. And now, as it ſeems, according to your aſſertion, fortitude is not only the ſcience of things dreadful and daring, but nearly of all good and evil, and in ſhort of all things, from your argument, in whatever manner they may ſubſiſt. Do you thus determine, or how do you ſay, O Nicias?

Nic. To me it appears to be ſo, O Socrates.

Soc. Does then ſuch a virtue as this appear to you, O bleſſed man, to be deficient in any reſpect, if it knows all goods, and in what manner they have been, are, and will be produced, and in the ſame manner as to evils? And do you think that he is indigent of temperance, or juſtice, or piety, to whom alone it belongs to be cautious with reſpect to ſuch things as are dreadful and ſuch as are not, both concerning gods and men; who alſo knows how to obtain what is good, and to aſſociate in a proper manner with others?

Nic. You appear to me, O Socrates, to ſay ſomething.

Soc. That therefore, O Nicias, which is now adduced by you, will not be a part of virtue, but all virtue.

Nic. So it ſeems.

Soc. Nevertheleſs we ſaid that fortitude is one of the parts of virtue.

Nic. We did ſay ſo.

Soc. But that which is now ſaid does not appear to be a part of virtue.

Nic. It does not.

Soc. We have not, therefore, O Nicias, diſcovered what fortitude is.

Nic. It does not appear that we have.

Lac. And yet I ſhould have thought, my dear Nicias, that you would have diſcovered it, by your contempt of me when I anſwered Socrates. And therefore I had very great hope that you would have diſcovered it from the wiſdom of Damon.

Nic. Excellent indeed, O Laches, that you ſhould think it a thing of no conſequence, that you juſt now appeared to know nothing about fortitude; but ſhould be alone concerned that I alſo may appear to be as ignorant as yourſelf: and as it ſeems you are ſatisfied, if I as well as you am ignorant of things, of which it becomes him to have a knowledge who wiſhes to be a man of any conſequence. You therefore appear to me to act in reality

after

after the manner of men, becauſe you do not at all look to yourſelf but to others. I think, however, that I have ſpoken tolerably well on this ſubject; and if any thing that I have aſſerted is defective, I ſhall afterwards correct it, and this with the aſſiſtance of Damon, whom you think proper to deride, though you have never ſeen him. I ſhall alſo do this by calling in the aid of others: and when I have obtained a firm conviction of theſe things, I will likewiſe inſtruct you without envy; for you appear to me to be in very great want of inſtruction.

Lac. You are indeed wiſe, O Nicias: but, at the ſame time, I adviſe Lyſimachus here and Meleſias to bid farewell to you and me concerning the education of youth; but not to diſmiſs this Socrates, as I ſaid from the firſt: for I would thus act, if my children were of a proper age.

Nic. I alſo grant you, that if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care, no other perſon ſhould be ſought after. Indeed, I ſhould moſt gladly ſend Niceratus to him, if he were willing; but when I ſay any thing to him on this ſubject, he recommends others to me, and is unwilling to undertake this office himſelf. But ſee, O Lyſimachus, whether Socrates will more willingly comply with your requeſt.

Lys. It is juſt, O Nicias, ſince I alſo am willing to do many things for him, which I ſhould not be very willing to do for many others. What then do you ſay, O Socrates? Will you comply with our requeſt, and will you take charge of theſe lads, ſo that they may become moſt excellent characters?

Soc. It would certainly be a dreadful thing, O Lyſimachus, not to be willing to endeavour that they may become moſt worthy. If, therefore, in the preceding conference, I have appeared to be ſkilful, but the other perſons of the dialogue not, it will be juſt to call me eſpecially to this employment; but now, ſince we are all ſimilarly involved in doubt, which of us ought to be preferred? To me indeed it ſeems that no one of us ſhould have the preference. And ſince this is the caſe, conſider whether I appear to adviſe you rightly: for I ſay it is requiſite, O men, (ſince our conference is only among ourſelves,) that we ſhould all of us in common inquire, in the firſt place, after the beſt maſter for ourſelves, for we ſtand in need of one; and in the next place for theſe lads, ſparing neither money nor any thing elſe; but I ſhall not adviſe our continuing in the condition in which we now are. And

if

if any one ſhould deride us for applying to teachers at theſe years, it appears to me that it will be proper to adduce Homer[1], who ſays,

"Shame ill-accompanies a man in need."

We therefore, bidding farewell to reproach, will pay attention in common to ourſelves and the lads.

Lys. What you ſay, Socrates, pleaſes me; and by how much the older I am, by ſo much the more readily ſhall I deſire to learn together with the youths. Do then as you have ſaid: come to-morrow morning early to my houſe without fail, that we may conſult about theſe very things: for it is now time that we ſhould diſſolve this conference.

Soc. I will do theſe things, O Lyſimachus; and, if it pleaſe God, I will be with you to-morrow morning.

[1] In the 17th book of the Odyſſey.

THE END OF THE LACHES.

THE LYSIS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

FRIENDSHIP.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE LYSIS.

WHEN Socrates, ſays Ficinus, diſputes with the ſophiſts and their followers, he confutes falſe opinions, and ſignifies, rather than teaches, ſuch as are true. This is evident from the Euthydemus, Protagoras, Meno, Hippias, Euthyphro, and Lyſis. But where he diſcourſes with his diſciples, and thoſe who were anxious to be inſtructed, he unfolds and teaches, as is evident from many of the preceding dialogues. In this Dialogue, therefore, in which he diſputes concerning friendſhip among the diſciples of the ſophiſts, he is rather ſtudious of confuting falſe opinions than of demonſtrating ſuch as are true.

But, that we may take a curſory view of the contents of the Lyſis, in the firſt place, Socrates reproves thoſe who pervert the power of love, and, under the pretext of friendſhip, are ſubſervient to baſe luſt. In the ſecond place, he admoniſhes thoſe who, looking no higher than corporeal beauty, think themſelves worthy to be beloved for this alone. And, in the laſt place, he indicates to the ſagacious a certain path by which friendſhip may be inveſtigated and diſcovered. Again, while Socrates ironically derides Hippothales and Cteſippus, he ſignifies that they were captivated by baſe love. And, while in their preſence he prepares youth for moral diſcipline, he admoniſhes lovers how they ſhould live together, and what kind of attachment they ſhould entertain for each other. Having inſtructed lovers in the ſecond part of the Dialogue, he inſtructs thoſe that are the objects of love;

and, by a long ſeries of induction, teaches that wiſdom and prudence ought to be explored by friends, which compoſe the true beauty of the ſoul, and not the ſhadowy form of this fleeting body. In the third place, he confutes, and firſt the opinion of Solon, who ſaid that thoſe who are beloved are friends; for theſe often hate their lovers. He adds, that neither are lovers only friends, becauſe theſe are frequently the objects of hatred. And here he concludes that reciprocal benevolence ſhould be called friendſhip. In the next place, he reproves Empedocles, who was of opinion that any kind of ſimilitude is ſufficient to produce friendſhip. This, however, the ſimilitude of many arts ſhows to be falſe, which more frequently generates envy and hatred than friendſhip. In the laſt place, the aſſertion of Heſiod and Heraclitus is adduced, that diſſimilars are friendly to each other.—That they are not, however, appears from this, that hatred and love, ſince they are diſſimilars, will not be friendly, nor will a juſt and an unjuſt man; and of others in a ſimilar manner. And, if it ſhould be ſaid that ſometimes a thing deſires that which is diſſimilar to itſelf, as that which is dry, moiſture, or that which is hot, the cold, the anſwer is, that it does not in this caſe love its contrary, but ſeeks after a reſtitution of itſelf from a contrary. For that which is preternaturally hot is reduced through cold to its proper temperament; ſo that it does not love cold, but through it deſires a temperament accommodated to its nature.

Having confuted theſe aſſertions, Socrates, as if propheſying, introduces a certain opinion as his own, and ſays that there appear to him to be three genera of things, the good, the evil, and that which is neither good nor evil. But the evil, on account of diverſity, cannot be a friend to the good, and the evil, through injuſtice, are injured by the evil. Theſe, therefore, cannot be mutually friends. It is likewiſe impoſſible for him who is neither good nor evil to love the evil; for evil, ſince it is noxious, is always attended with hatred. It remains, therefore, that friendſhip muſt ſubſiſt between the good and the good, and between that which is neither, and the good. But here certain objections ariſe which Socrates openly introduces, but the ſolutions of which he occultly indicates. In the firſt place, the good is ſimilar to the good; but it was ſaid, in oppoſition to the opinion of Empedocles, that ſimilars are not friendly to each other. It muſt, however, be obſerved, that it was not aſſerted that ſimilars are by no means friendly; but it was denied that every

kind

kind of ſimilitude is ſufficient to the production of friendſhip. Again, when, in the ſecond place, it is objected that the good man is ſufficient to himſelf, that on this account he does not deſire another, is without love, and therefore is not the friend of the good;—it muſt be obſerved that this abſurdity does not follow from the doctrine of Plato, but from the aſſertions of Empedocles and Heraclitus ſuperficially conſidered, in which the deſire of love is not apparently diſtinguiſhed from friendſhip. And as deſire is a want, for it always tends to ſomething unpoſſeſſed, it follows, from this doctrine, that friendſhip is always attended with deſire. To admit this, however, would be to confound friendſhip with love. But, according to Plato, they are different, becauſe they are directed to different ends: for friendſhip tends to the good, and love to the beautiful.

In ſhort, friendſhip, conſidered with relation to man, is a union among worthy characters, ariſing from a ſimilitude of diſpoſition and purſuits. Love alſo is a union between the lover and the beloved; but it differs from the union of friendſhip in this, that the former is inſeparable from indigence, from which likewiſe it originates; while, on the other hand, the latter ariſes from plenitude, with which it is conſtantly attended in proportion to the perfection which it poſſeſſes. In the friendſhips, indeed, of the moſt worthy men, this union is not without deſire, and is conſequently accompanied with want; but this is becauſe the object of friendſhip is not in this caſe the higheſt good. Hence friendſhip with divinity is the only union in which a perfect plenitude is produced, deſire dies, and indigence is unknown.

The character of this Dialogue, like that of the Theætetus, is *maieutic*, and the conceptions here, of which Socrates is the midwife, as well as there, are abortive.

THE

THE LYSIS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, HIPPOTHALES, CTESIPPUS[1], MENEXENUS,

And LYSIS.

ON going from the Academy, in a ſtraight line to the Lyceum, which is indeed out of the walls, but cloſe to them, when I arrived at the gate, where there is the fountain Panopis, I met with Hippothales the ſon of Hieronymus, and Cteſippus Pæanæus, and other young men who were aſſembled together with theſe. And Hippothales, on ſeeing me approaching, O Socrates, ſays he, whither are you going, and whence do you come?—I replied, I came from the Academy, and am going in a direct road to the Lyceum.—But will you not come to us, ſays he? For it is worth while.—I replied, Whither do you wiſh me to go, and to whom among you?—Hither, ſays he, ſhowing me a certain encloſure, and an open gate, oppoſite to the wall. Here we, and many other very worthy perſons, paſs away our time.—I then aſked him, What is this place, and what do you employ yourſelves about?—It is a Palæſtra, ſays he, newly built: but we ſpend our time for the moſt part in diſcourſe, which we ſhall gladly communicate to you.—You do well, ſaid I. But who is the preceptor in that place?—Your aſſociate and encomiaſt, ſays he, Miccus.—By Jupiter, ſaid I, he is not a vulgar man, but a ſufficiently great ſophiſt.—Are you willing therefore, ſays he, to follow me, that you may ſee thoſe that are aſſembled in that place?—But I ſhould firſt of all gladly hear

[1] Cteſippus was a ſon of Chabrias the Athenian general. After his father's death he was received into the houſe of Phocion, the friend of Chabrias. Phocion in vain attempted to correct his natural foibles and extravagancies.—Plut. in Phoc.

for

for what purpoſe I am to enter, and who that beautiful perſon is.—To ſome of us, ſays he, Socrates, he does not appear to be beautiful.—But what does he appear to you to be, O Hippothales? Tell me this.—But he being thus interrogated, bluſhed.—And I ſaid, O Hippothales, ſon of Hieronymus, you need no longer inform me whether you love or not: for I know that you not only love, but that you are far advanced in love. For, with reſpect to other things, I am vile and uſeleſs, but divinity has given me the ability of very rapidly knowing a lover, and the perſon beloved.—And on hearing this, he bluſhed in a ſtill greater degree than before. Cteſippus therefore ſaid, You are polite, Hippothales, becauſe you bluſh, and refuſe to tell Socrates the name of your beloved. But you will do nothing but commend him, if Socrates ſtays only a ſhort time with you. As to our ears, Socrates, they are perfectly filled and rendered deaf with the name of Lyſis: and when Hippothales has drunk largely, it is eaſy for us to think, when we are rouſed from ſleep, that we hear the name of Lyſis. And the things which he relates concerning him in proſe, though dire, are not altogether ſo, except when he robs us of our poems, and other writings; and what is ſtill more dire, when he ſings his loves with a wonderful voice, which we are under the neceſſity of enduring to hear. But now being aſked by you, he bluſhes.—This youth then, it ſeems, I ſaid, is Lyſis. But I conjecture this; for I do not know it, from having heard his name.—They very ſeldom, ſays he, call him by his own name, but he is yet called by the name of his father, becauſe he is a man very much known. *But I* well know, that you are far from being unacquainted with the form of the youth: for he may be ſufficiently known from this alone.—I then ſaid, Tell me whoſe ſon he is?—He is the ſon of Democrates, ſays he, who is the eldeſt ſon of Æxoneus.—Be it ſo then, ſaid I, O Hippothales, that you have found this generous and juvenile love. But come, evince to me the things which you have ſhown to theſe perſons, that I may ſee whether you know what a lover ought to ſay reſpecting the objects of his love, either to himſelf or to others.—Do you examine, ſays he, Socrates, any thing that he aſſerts? But do you deny that you love him, as he ſays?—I do not, ſaid he. But I affirm that I do not compoſe any thing, either in proſe or verſe, with a view to my amours.—He is not well, ſays Cteſippus, but is delirious and inſane.—Upon this, I ſaid, O Hippothales, I neither requeſt to hear any verſes, nor any ſong, which you may have

have compoſed on the young man, but I deſire to become acquainted with your thoughts, that I may know in what manner you conduct yourſelf in your amours.—Cteſippus here, ſays he, will tell you: for he accurately knows and remembers; ſince, as he ſays, he has heard me continually talking about him.—Entirely ſo, by the gods, ſays Cteſippus. Though indeed it is very ridiculous that he being a lover, and paying far more attention to the youth than others, ſhould have nothing of his own to ſay. Would not even a boy ſay that this is ridiculous? For what the whole city proclaims about Democrates, and Lyſis the grandfather of the youth, and about all his anceſtors, his wealth, his ſtore of horſes, his victories in the Pythian, Iſthmian, and Nemean games, and his conteſts with four horſes, and with one horſe, theſe are the very things which he celebrates. And beſides theſe, he ſpeaks of things ſtill more common: for he lately related to us, in a certain poem, the reception of Hercules as a gueſt, viz, how an anceſtor of Democrates and Lyſis entertained Hercules on account of his alliance to him, through being alſo the offspring of Jupiter and the daughter of the prince of the people;—a circumſtance, indeed, which even old women ſing. He likewiſe celebrates, Socrates, many other ſuch like particulars. And theſe are the things which he compels us to hear him relating and ſinging.—Upon hearing this, I ſaid, O ridiculous Hippothales, before you have vanquiſhed you make and ſing an encomium on yourſelf.—But I neither make nor ſing theſe things for myſelf, Socrates, ſays he.—I replied, You do not think that you do.—How do you mean?—Theſe odes, I ſaid, tend to you the moſt of all things. For if you ſhould find a beloved perſon of this kind, your aſſertions and ſongs will be an ornament to you, and an encomium on yourſelf as a conqueror, for having made ſuch an acquiſition. But if you are deceived in this reſpect, by how much greater the encomiums are which you make on your beloved, by ſo much the more you will appear to be deprived of things beautiful and good, and become ridiculous. Whoever therefore, my friend, is wiſe in amatory affairs, will not praiſe his beloved till he is well acquainted with him, in conſequence of being fearful of the event. For at the ſame time it muſt be obſerved, that ſuch as are beautiful are filled with pride and oſtentation when any one praiſes and extols them. Or do you not think this is the caſe?—He replied, I do.—Does it not therefore follow, that by how much the more

inſolent

inſolent they are, by ſo much the more difficult it is to catch them?—It is likely.—What kind of a hunter, therefore, would he appear to you to be, who ſhould drive wild beaſts out of their lurking places, and increaſe the difficulty of taking them?—Doubtleſs, a vile one.—And is it not a mark of great unſkilfulneſs, to exaſperate men, inſtead of alluring them by diſcourſe and ſongs?—To me it appears to be ſo.—But conſider, O Hippothales, whether you do not render yourſelf obnoxious to all theſe things through your poeſy. Indeed, I think you are not willing to acknowledge that a man who injures himſelf in his poems can be a good poet.—I am not, by Jupiter, ſays he: for this would be very abſurd. But on account of theſe things, Socrates, I communicate my thoughts to you. And conſult with yourſelf, whether you have any thing elſe to offer, by which it may appear how a man by ſpeaking and acting may become acceptable to the objects of his love.—This, I replied, is not eaſy to relate: but if you are willing to make Lyſis join us in diſcourſe, perhaps I may be able to ſhow you what ought to be ſaid to him, inſtead of thoſe things which they ſay you have aſſerted and ſung.—He replied, there is nothing difficult in this. For if you enter this place together with Cteſippus, and ſitting down diſcourſe, I think that he will join us: for he is remarkably fond, Socrates, of hearing others converſe. Obſerve too, that both young men and boys are mingled together in this place, as being engaged in Mercurial conteſts. He will therefore come to you: and if he does not, ſince he is familiar with Cteſippus, through Menexenus the conſin of Cteſippus, (for he is in the higheſt degree of intimacy with Menexenus,) let him call him, if he does not join us of his own accord.—I replied, it is proper to act in this manner: and at the ſame time, laying hold of Cteſippus, I entered the Palæſtra, and the others came after us. But on entering, we found that the boys were ſacrificing, and that the particulars pertaining to the victims were nearly finiſhed: but all of them were playing at dice, and properly dreſſed. Many of them, therefore, were playing out of the Palæſtra in the porch; but ſome of them in a corner of the place, where they put off their clothes, were playing with a great multitude of dice, and ſelecting them from certain little baſkets. But others ſtood round theſe, beholding them; among whom was Lyſis, who was ſtanding crowned, among the boys and young men, and tranſcending all of them in the beauty of his perſon. Nor did he alone deſerve to be heard for his beauty, but becauſe he was worthy

and good. But we, withdrawing from the crowd, ſeated ourſelves oppoſite to him: for the place where we ſat was quiet; and we there entered into converſation with each other. Lyſis, therefore, turning round, often looked at us; and it was evident that he deſired to join us; but, in the mean time, he heſitated, and was averſe to come to us alone. Afterwards Menexenus came from the porch, in the midſt of the games, and as ſoon as he ſaw me and Cteſippus, came and ſeated himſelf by us. Lyſis, therefore, ſeeing him, followed, and ſat down with Menexenus. Others likewiſe came; but Hippothales, after he ſaw that many were aſſembled in this place, deſiring to be concealed, betook himſelf to a part where he thought he ſhould not be ſeen by Lyſis, fearing leſt he ſhould be offended with him; and, ſtanding in this manner, he heard the diſcourſe. And I, beholding Menexenus, ſaid, O ſon of Demophon, which of you is the elder?—He replied, weare not certain.—I then ſaid, Do you therefore contend which of you is the more generous?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—And in a ſimilar manner, likewiſe, which of you is the more beautiful?—At this queſtion both of them laughed.—But I ſaid, I do not alſo aſk you which of you is the more rich, for you are friends: are you not? They replied, entirely ſo.—The poſſeſſions of friends, therefore, are ſaid to be common; ſo that about this you will not, in any reſpect, diſagree, if this aſſertion about friendſhip is true.—To this they aſſented.—But after this, as I was endeavouring to aſk, which of them was the more juſt and wiſe, a certain perſon interrupted us, by telling Menexenus that he was called by the maſter of the Gymnaſium. But it appeared to me that he was called by the ſacrificer. Menexenus therefore left us; and I thus interrogated Lyſis:

Inform me, O Lyſis, if your father and your mother very much love you?—He replied, entirely ſo.—Do they not, therefore, wiſh you to be moſt happy?—Undoubtedly they do.—Does that man appear to you to be happy who is in a ſtate of ſubjection, and who is not permitted to do any thing which he deſires to do?—By Jupiter, ſays he, to me he does not.—If, therefore, your father and your mother love you, and wiſh that you may be happy, they will certainly, by every poſſible means, endeavour that you may become ſo.—How is it poſſible they ſhould not, ſaid he.—Do they, therefore, permit you to do what you pleaſe, and in no reſpect oppoſe your deſires?—By Jupiter, ſays he, Socrates, they oppoſe me in very many things.—How do you ſay? I replied.

plied.—At the ſame time that they wiſh you to be bleſſed, do they prevent you from acting as you pleaſe? But anſwer me this queſtion; If you ſhould deſire to ride in ſome one of your father's chariots, and for this purpoſe ſhould take the reins, when he is going to contend in the games, would he not ſuffer you? or would he prevent you?—By Jupiter, ſays he, he would not ſuffer me.—But would he not permit ſome one to do this?—There is a certain charioteer who is hired for this purpoſe by my father.—How do you ſay? Would your father rather ſuffer a mercenary to do what he pleaſes to the horſes than you, and, beſides this, pay him for ſo doing?—But what then? ſays he.—But I think he would permit you to drive the yoked mules, and, if you were willing, to take the whip and ſtrike them.—Why ſhould he permit me to do this? ſays he.—Why not? ſaid I. Is no one permitted to ſtrike them?—Yes, ſaid he, the muleteer, very much ſo.—Is he a ſlave, or free-born?—A ſlave.—It ſeems, therefore, that your parents think more highly of a ſlave than of you who are their ſon, and commit their affairs to him rather than to you, and that they permit him to do what he pleaſes, but do not give this liberty to you. And farther ſtill, anſwer me this queſtion, Do they ſuffer you to govern yourſelf? or neither do they permit you to do this?—For how, ſays he, ſhould they permit me? Who then governs you?—The pædagogue, ſays he.—Does he do this, being a ſlave?—But what then? he is our ſlave, ſays he.—But I replied, Is it not a dire thing for one who is free-born to be governed by a ſlave? And what does this pædagogue when he governs you do?—He leads me, ſays he, to my maſter.—And do not theſe maſters alſo govern you?—Certainly, entirely ſo.—Your father, therefore, voluntarily places over you many deſpots and governors. But when you return home to your mother, does ſhe ſuffer you to do what you pleaſe, that you may be bleſſed, either about the wool or the web, when ſhe weaves? For ſhe doubtleſs does not prevent you from touching the two-handed ſword, or the ſhuttle, or any other inſtrument ſubſervient to the working of wool.—But he laughing replied, By Jupiter, Socrates, ſhe not only prevents me, but beats me if I touch them.—By Hercules, ſaid I, have you in any reſpect injured your father or your mother?—Not I, by Jupiter, ſaid he.—On what account then do they in ſo dire a manner prevent you from being happy, and from doing what you pleaſe? And why every day do they educate you ſo as to be in ſubjection to ſome one, and, in one word, do not in the leaſt ſuffer you to

gratify your deſires? So that, as it ſeems, neither are ſuch great riches of any advantage to you (ſince every one has dominion over them rather than you), nor even your body, though it is ſo noble, but this alſo is fed and taken care of by another. But you, O Lyſis, have no authority over any one, nor do you do any thing that you deſire to do.—For I am not yet old enough, Socrates, ſays he.—But ſee whether it is not this which prevents you, O ſon of Democrates. For thus much I think both your father and mother will concede to you, and will not wait till you are more advanced in years. I mean, when they wiſh any thing to be read to or written for them, they will, I think, order you to do this the firſt in the houſe, or will they not?—Entirely ſo, ſays he.—Are you therefore allowed, in this caſe, to write which of the letters you pleaſe firſt, and which ſecond? And are you allowed to read in the ſame manner? And again, when you take up a lyre, does neither your father nor your mother prevent you from ſtretching and relaxing the chords as much as you pleaſe, and from gently touching and ſtriking them with the plectrum? or do they prevent you?—They certainly do not.—What then is the cauſe, Lyſis, that they do not prevent you in theſe things, but prevent you in thoſe which we juſt now mentioned?—Becauſe, I think, ſays he, I know the one, but am ignorant of the other.—Be it ſo, I replied, O moſt excellent youth. Your father, therefore, does not wait for age, to give you permiſſion to do as you pleaſe in all things; but on whatever day it ſhall appear to him that you are become more prudent, on this day he will permit you to govern yourſelf, and your own affairs.—I think he will, ſaid he.—Be it ſo, I replied.—But what? Will not a neighbour conduct himſelf towards you in the ſame manner as your father? Whether do you think he will commit to you the government of his family, when he is of opinion that you are more ſkilled in œconomics than himſelf, or in this caſe govern it himſelf?—I think he will commit the government of it to me.—But what with reſpect to the Athenians? Do you not think that they will commit to you the management of their affairs, when they perceive that you are ſufficiently wiſe?—I do.—But what with reſpect to the great king? Would he ſuffer his eldeſt ſon, who will ſucceed to the government of all Aſia, to throw into broth whatever he pleaſes, rather than us, if going to him we ſhould convince him that we were more ſkilled in the preparation of a banquet than his ſon?—He replied, It is evident he would rather ſuffer us.—Is it not alſo clear that he would not

permit

permit his ſon to throw any thing, however trifling, into the broth, but that he would permit us, if we wiſhed to throw in a quantity of ſalt, to do ſo?—Undoubtedly.—But what if his ſon ſhould be diſeaſed in his eyes? Would he therefore ſuffer him to meddle with his own eyes, at the ſame time that he thinks he is not a phyſician, or would he prohibit him?—He would prohibit him.—But if he conſidered us as good phyſicians, I think he would not prevent us, even though we ſhould wiſh to open his eye-lids and ſcatter aſhes on his eyes.—True.—Would he not, therefore, rather commit to us than to himſelf or his ſon every thing elſe in which we appeared to be more wiſe than either of them?—He replied, it is neceſſary, Socrates.—This then, I ſaid, is the caſe, friend Lyſis, that all perſons, both Greeks and Barbarians, men and women, will permit us to act as we pleaſe with reſpect to things in which we are ſkilled, nor will any one voluntarily hinder us from ſo acting; but in theſe particulars we ſhall be free, and the governors of others. And theſe things will be ours, for we ſhall be benefited by them. But no one will permit us to act as we pleaſe reſpecting things of which we are ignorant; but all men will hinder us as much as they are able, not only ſtrangers, but our parents, and whatever elſe may be more allied to us than theſe. And in theſe we ſhall become the ſervants of others, and they will be things foreign to us, for we ſhall derive no benefit from them. Do you agree that this will be the caſe?—I do.—Shall we, therefore, be friends to any one, and will any one love us in thoſe things in which we are uſeleſs?—By no means, ſaid he.—Now, therefore, neither your father nor any other perſon will ever love you, ſo far as you are uſeleſs.—It does not appear he will, ſaid he.—If then you become wiſe, O boy, all men will be your friends, and will be familiar with you; for in this caſe you will be uſeful and good. But if you do not, neither will any other perſon, nor your father nor mother, nor any of your kindred, be your friend, or be familiar with you. Is it poſſible, therefore, that any one can think highly of himſelf with reſpect to things in which he has not yet acquired any ſkill?—How can he? ſaid he.—If, therefore, you require a maſter, you are not yet wiſe.—True.—And hence you are not magnanimous, if you are yet unwiſe.—By Jupiter, ſays he, Socrates, I do not appear to myſelf to be ſo.

Upon hearing him ſay this, I looked at Hippothales, and was very near committing an error; for it occurred to me to ſay, after this manner, O Hippothales,

pothales, it is requiſite to diſcourſe with thoſe of a puerile age, viz. humbling and repreſſing them, and not, as you do, flattering and rendering them effeminate. But perceiving him anxious and diſturbed, on account of what had been ſaid, I recollected that, a little while ſince, he wiſhed to conceal himſelf from Lyſis; I therefore recovered myſelf, and was ſilent. In the mean time Menexenus came again, and ſeated himſelf near Lyſis, in the place whence he roſe before. Lyſis, therefore, in a very playful and friendly manner, but without Menexenus obſerving him, ſaid to me, O Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have told me.—And I replied, You ſhould relate theſe things yourſelf to Menexenus, for you have heard me with very great attention.—Entirely ſo, ſays he.—Endeavour, therefore, I replied, to recollect theſe particulars as much as poſſible, that you may clearly tell him the whole. But if you ſhould happen to forget any one of them, you may again inquire of me the firſt time that you meet with me.—I will by all means do ſo, ſaid he, Socrates; of this you may be well aſſured. But you ſhould ſay ſomething elſe to him, that I alſo may hear, till it is time to return home.—I replied, this muſt be done, ſince you command: but ſee how you will be able to defend me, if Menexenus ſhould endeavour to confute me. Or do you not know that he is contentious?—Very much ſo, ſays he, by Jupiter; and on this account I wiſh to hear you diſcourſe with him.—I replied, Do you deſire this, in order that I may become ridiculous?—By Jupiter I do not, ſaid he, but in order that you may puniſh him.—I replied, This is a thing not eaſy to accompliſh: for he is a ſkilful man, and the diſciple of Cteſippus. And beſides, do not you ſee Cteſippus himſelf is preſent?—Be not at all concerned at this, Socrates, ſaid he; but come, diſcourſe with him.—I replied, We will diſcourſe.—As, therefore, we were thus ſpeaking to each other, Cteſippus ſaid, Why are you thus feaſting alone, and do not impart your diſcourſe to us?—But indeed, I replied, we ſhall impart it; for Lyſis here does not underſtand ſomething which I have ſaid, but thinks that Menexenus will underſtand it, and therefore orders me to interrogate him.—Why then, ſaid he, do you not interrogate him?—I replied, But I will.—Give me an anſwer, then, Menexenus, to that which I ſhall aſk you; for from my childhood I have had a deſire of a certain poſſeſſion, juſt as another perſon may have had of a different thing; for one man deſires to poſſeſs horſes, another dogs, another gold, and another honours; but I was indifferent with reſpect to theſe things,

but

but was affected in a very amatory manner with reſpect to the poſſeſſion of friends. Hence I was more deſirous of finding a good friend than the moſt excellent quail or cock; and, by Jupiter, I preferred this to the beſt horſe or dog. I likewiſe think, by the dog, that I ſhould prefer the poſſeſſion of an aſſociate far beyond the wealth of Darius, or even Darius himſelf: ſuch a lover of an aſſociate am I. Perceiving, therefore, you and Lyſis, I was immediately ſtruck, and proclaimed you happy, becauſe, young as you are, you have ſo rapidly and eaſily acquired this poſſeſſion; you with ſuch celerity having made him ſo much your friend, and he you. But I am ſo far from this poſſeſſion, that I do not even know after what manner one man becomes the friend of another. But in this I wiſh to be informed by you, who are a ſkilful perſon: Tell me, therefore, when any one loves another, which of the two becomes the friend of the other? Whether the lover becomes the friend of the beloved, or the beloved of the lover? Or is there in this caſe no difference?—It does not appear to me, ſaid he, that there is any difference.—To this I replied, How do you ſay? Do both therefore become friends of each other, if one alone loves the other?—It appears ſo to me, ſaid he.—But what? May there not be a lover who is not in his turn beloved by the object of his love?—There may.—Is it not poſſible, therefore, that a lover may be hated? which lovers ſometimes appear to ſuffer from the objects of their love: for though they moſt ardently love, they are not beloved in return, but, on the contrary, are ſometimes hated. Or does not this appear to you to be true?—Very much ſo, ſaid he.—In a caſe of this kind, therefore, I replied, does not the one love, and is not the other beloved?—Yes.—Which then of theſe is the friend of the other? Is the lover the friend of the beloved, whether he is loved in return, or hated, or the beloved of the lover? Or in this caſe, is neither the friend of neither, ſince a mutual love does not ſubſiſt between them?—It appears ſo.—Now, therefore, the caſe appears to us to be otherwiſe than what it appeared to us before. For then it ſeemed, that if one alone loved, both were friends; but now, that neither is a friend, unleſs both mutually love.—This appears to be the caſe.—No one, therefore, is a friend to the object of his love, unleſs he is beloved in return.—It does not appear that any one is.—Neither, therefore, are thoſe the friends of horſes, whom horſes do not love in return; nor are thoſe the friends of quails and dogs, of wine and gymnaſtic, who are not mutually beloved by theſe; nor are thoſe friends of wiſdom, whom wiſdom does not love in return;

return: for each of theſe is a lover without being a friend. The poet therefore ſpeaks falſely who ſays, "Happy the man that poſſeſſes beautiful boys, horſes with ſolid hoofs, hunting dogs, and a foreign gueſt." Does he appear to you to ſpeak the truth?—Yes.—The beloved, therefore, is the friend of the lover, as it ſeems, O Menexenus, whether he loves or whether he hates; juſt as children recently born, partly do not yet love, and partly hate when they are chaſtized by their mother or father; and at the very time in which they hate, they are in the higheſt degree beloved by their parents.—It appears to me, ſaid he, that this is the caſe.—The lover, therefore, from this reaſoning, will not be the friend, but the beloved.—It appears ſo.—Hence too, he who is hated is an enemy, but not he who hates.—So it appears.—Many, therefore, are beloved by their enemies and hated by their friends; and are friends to their enemies, but enemies to their friends; if the beloved is a friend, and not the lover. Though it is very abſurd, my friend, or rather, I think, impoſſible, to be an enemy to a friend, and a friend to an enemy.—You ſeem, ſaid he, to ſpeak the truth, Socrates.—If, therefore, this is impoſſible, the lover will be the friend of the beloved.—So it appears.—Again, therefore, he who hates will be the enemy of him who is hated.—It is neceſſary.—It happens, therefore, that it is neceſſary for us to acknowledge the ſame things as we aſſented to before, that a man is often the friend of one who is not his friend, and that he is often the friend of his enemy, when either he loves and is not beloved, or loves one by whom he is hated. It likewiſe often happens that a man is an enemy to one who is not his enemy, or even to one who is his friend; when any one loves him by whom he is hated, or hates him by whom he is loved.—So it appears, ſaid he.—I replied, What then ſhall we ſay, if neither lovers, nor thoſe that are beloved, are friends, nor yet lovers and the beloved? Shall we ſay that certain others beſides theſe become friends to each other?—By Jupiter, ſaid he, Socrates, I do not well know what to reply.—Conſider, therefore, Menexenus, whether our inveſtigation has been perfectly right.—Lyſis replied, To me it appears ſo, Socrates; and at the ſame time that he ſaid this he bluſhed: for he appeared to me unwilling to avoid what was ſaid, through the very great attention which he paid to the diſcourſe. I, therefore, being willing that Menexenus ſhould ceaſe from ſpeaking, and being delighted with his philoſophy, thus transferred my diſcourſe to

Lyſis,

Lyſis, and ſaid, O Lyſis, what you have aſſerted appears to me to be true; I mean that if we have rightly conſidered, we ſhall not in any reſpect have wandered from the truth. But we will proceed no further in this way: for that conſideration appears to me to be difficult like a rough road. But it ſeems to me requiſite to proceed in the path in which we have now entered, ſpeculating the aſſertions of the poets: for theſe are, with reſpect to us, as the fathers and leaders of wiſdom. They ſay, therefore, not badly, with reference to ſuch as are friends, that divinity makes them to be friends, by conducting them to each other. But I think they thus ſpeak:

> Likeneſs to likeneſs, God for ever leads,
> And makes it known.

Or have you not met with theſe verſes?—I have, ſaid he.—Have you, therefore, likewiſe met with the writings of the wiſeſt of men, in which it is ſaid, that the ſimilar is always neceſſarily a friend to the ſimilar? But theſe men are thoſe that diſcourſe and write about nature and the univerſe.—He replied, What you ſay is true.—Whether or no, therefore, do they ſpeak well?—Perhaps ſo, ſaid he.—I replied, Perhaps the half of this is true, and perhaps alſo the whole. But we do not underſtand them: for it ſeems to us, that by how much nearer a depraved man approaches to one depraved, and by how much the more frequently he converſes with him, by ſo much the more inimical will he become: for he will act unjuſtly. But it is impoſſible that thoſe can be friends who injure, and are injured. Is it not ſo?—He replied, It is.—On this account, the half of this ſaying will not be true, ſince the depraved are ſimilar to each other.—True.—But they appear to me to ſay, that the good are ſimilar and friends to each other; but that the wicked, (as it is ſaid concerning them,) are never ſimilar, not even to themſelves, but are ſtupid and unſtable. But he who is diſſimilar to, and diſſents from himſelf, can never be ſimilar to, or become the friend of another. Or does it not appear ſo to you?—To me it does, he ſaid.—It ſeems to me, therefore, my friend, that thoſe who ſay the ſimilar is a friend to the ſimilar, obſcurely ſignify this, that he alone who is good, is a friend to the good, but that he who is wicked can never arrive at true friendſhip, either with the good or

the wicked. Does this alſo appear to you to be the caſe?—It does.—We now, therefore, have thoſe that are friends: for our diſcourſe now ſignifies to us, that thoſe are friends that are worthy.—It appears entirely ſo to me, ſaid he.—And to me alſo, I replied. But, notwithſtanding this, there is ſomething difficult in the affair. Come then, by Jupiter, and ſee what I ſuſpect to be the caſe. He who is ſimilar, ſo far as he is ſimilar, is a friend to the ſimilar, and ſuch a one is uſeful to ſuch a one. Or rather thus: Is any kind of the ſimilar, of any advantage to any kind of the ſimilar? Or is it able to do any injury to the ſimilar, which it does not do to itſelf? Or to ſuffer any thing which it does not alſo ſuffer from itſelf? But how can ſuch things as theſe, which are not able to afford any aſſiſtance to each other, be loved by each other?—They cannot.—But how can he who does not love be a friend?—By no means.—But perhaps the ſimilar is not a friend to the ſimilar; but the good is a friend to the good, ſo far as he is good, and not ſo far as he is ſimilar.—Perhaps ſo.—But what? Is not he who is good, ſo far as he is good, ſufficient to himſelf?—Yes.—But he who is ſufficient to himſelf, is not indigent of any thing, ſo far as he poſſeſſes ſufficiency.—Undoubtedly.—And he who is not indigent of any thing, will not love any thing.—He will not.—But he who does not love, will not be a friend.—Certainly not.—How then will the good be friends to the good, who neither when abſent deſire each other (for they are ſufficient to themſelves when apart), nor when preſent are indigent of each other? By what artifice can theſe poſſeſs a great eſteem for each other?—By none, ſaid he.—But thoſe will not be friends who do not very much eſteem each other.—True.—Conſider then, O Lyſis, in what reſpect we are deceived. Are we therefore deceived in a certain whole?—But how? ſaid he.—I once heard a perſon aſſert, and I now very well remember it, that the ſimilar was hoſtile to the ſimilar, and the good to the good. And he who aſſerted this, produced Heſiod [1] as a witneſs, who ſays, "The potter is hoſtile to the potter, the ſinger to the ſinger, and the mendicant to the mendicant." And it appeared to him that all other things neceſſarily ſubſiſt in this manner; and that things moſt ſimilar to each other, were in the higheſt degree filled with envy, emulation, and hatred; but ſuch as are moſt diſſimilar with friendſhip. For he

[1] Op. et Di. v. 25.

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was of opinion that the poor man was neceſſarily a friend to the rich, and the weak to the ſtrong, for the ſake of help: that in like manner the ſick man was a friend to the phyſician; and that every one who was ignorant, loved and was a friend to the man endued with knowledge. He likewiſe added ſomething ſtill more magnificent, that the ſimilar is ſo far from being a friend to the ſimilar, that the very contrary to this takes place. For that which is moſt contrary, is eſpecially a friend to that which is moſt contrary. For every thing deſires a nature of this kind, but not that which is ſimilar. Thus the dry deſires the moiſt; the cold, the hot; the bitter, the ſweet; the acute, the obtuſe; the void, the full; and the full, the void; and the like takes place in other things. For the contrary is aliment to the contrary, but the ſimilar does not in any reſpect enjoy the ſimilar. And indeed, my friend, he who aſſerted theſe things appeared to be an elegant man: for he ſpoke well. But how does he appear to us to have ſpoken?—Well, Menexenus replied, as it ſeems on the firſt view.—Shall we ſay, therefore, that the contrary is eſpecially a friend to the contrary?—Entirely ſo.—Be it ſo, I replied, O Menexenus: but is not this prodigious? And will not thoſe all-wiſe men, who are ſkilled in contradicting, gladly riſe up againſt us immediately, and aſk, if friendſhip is not moſt contrary to hatred? What ſhall we ſay, in anſwer to them? Is it not neceſſary to acknowledge that their aſſertion is true?—It is neceſſary.—Will they therefore ſay, that an enemy is a friend to a friend, or that a friend is a friend to an enemy?—He replied, they will ſay neither of theſe things.—But is the juſt a friend to the unjuſt, or the temperate to the intemperate, or the good to the bad?—It does not appear to me that this is the caſe.—But, I replied, if any one is a friend to any one, according to contrariety, it is neceſſary that theſe alſo ſhould be friends.—It is neceſſary.—Neither, therefore, is the ſimilar a friend to the ſimilar, nor that which is contrary to that which is contrary.—It does not appear that it is.—Further ſtill, let us alſo conſider this, leſt we ſhould be ſtill more deceived; I mean that a friend in reality is none of theſe, but that what is neither good nor evil may ſometimes become the friend of the good.—How do you ſay? he replied.—By Jupiter, ſaid I, I do not know; for I am in reality ſtaggered by the ambiguity of the diſcourſe. And it appears, according to the antient proverb, that a friend is a beautiful thing. It

reſemble, however, ſomething ſoft, ſmooth, and fat; on which account perhaps it eaſily eludes us, and glides away, as being a thing of this kind. For I ſay that the good is beautiful. Do you not think ſo?—I do.—I ſay therefore, propheſying, that that which is neither good nor evil, is the friend of the beautiful and the good. But hear what it is that induces me thus to propheſy. There appear to me to be three certain genera of things, the good, the evil, and that which is neither good nor evil. But how does it appear to you?—The ſame, ſaid he; and that neither the good is a friend to the good, nor the evil to the evil, nor the good to the evil; as neither did our former diſcourſe ſuffer us to ſay.—It remains, therefore, if any thing is a friend to another, that that which is neither good nor evil, muſt be a friend either to the good, or to ſomething which reſembles itſelf. For nothing can become a friend to the evil.—True.—And we juſt now ſaid, that neither is the ſimilar a friend to the ſimilar. Did we not?—Yes.—Hence to that which is neither good nor evil, that will not be a friend, which is itſelf neither good nor evil.—It does not appear that it will.—That which is neither good nor evil, therefore, alone happens to become a friend to the good alone.—It is neceſſary, as it ſeems.—Is therefore that which we have now ſaid, I replied, O boys, well explained? If then we wiſh to underſtand, a healthy body has not any occaſion for the medicinal art, nor does it require any aſſiſtance: for it poſſeſſes ſufficiency. So that no healthy perſon is a friend to the phyſician through health. Or is he?—No one.—But the diſeaſed, I think, is a friend to the phyſician through diſeaſe.—Undoubtedly.—But diſeaſe is an evil; and the medicinal art is uſeful and good.—It is.—But the body, ſo far as body, is neither good nor bad.—True.—But through diſeaſe, the body is compelled to embrace and love the medicinal art.—It appears ſo to me.—That, therefore, which is neither evil nor good, becomes a friend to the good, through the preſence of evil.—So it ſeems.—But it is evident that it becomes a friend to the good, prior to its becoming evil through the evil which it poſſeſſes. For it does not become evil, inſtead of the good which it deſires, and of which it is the friend. For we have ſaid it is impoſſible, that the evil can be a friend to the good.—It is impoſſible.—But conſider what I ſay. For I ſay that ſome things are ſuch as that which is preſent to them; but that this is not the caſe with other things. Thus, if any one wiſhes to

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be anointed with a certain colour, the inunction is after a manner preſent to him who is anointed.—Entirely ſo.—Whether therefore, after being anointed with the colour, does he remain the ſame as he was before?—He replied, I do not underſtand you.—Conſider thus, then I ſaid. If any one ſhould beſmear your hairs which are yellow with white lead, would they then be white, or only appear to be ſo?—He replied, They would only appear to be ſo.—But whiteneſs would be preſent with them.—It would.—And yet at the ſame time your hairs would not be in any reſpect more white than they were before; but though whiteneſs is preſent, they will neither be white nor black.—True.—But when, my friend, old age cauſes them to be of this colour, then they will become ſuch as the colour which is preſent to them, viz. white through the preſence of whiteneſs.—Undoubtedly.—This then is what I now aſk, Whether that to which any thing is preſent, is, by poſſeſſion, ſuch as the thing which is preſent? Or whether this is the caſe, if the thing is preſent after a certain manner, but otherwiſe not?—Thus, rather, he replied.—In like manner, that which is neither evil nor good, ſometimes when evil is preſent, is not yet evil; but there is a time when it becomes ſo.—Entirely ſo.—When, therefore, it is not yet evil, though evil is preſent, this very preſence of evil cauſes it to deſire good; but this preſence which cauſes it to be evil, deprives it of the deſire, and at the ſame time friendſhip of good. For it is now no longer neither evil nor good, but is evil. But it was ſhown that the good is not a friend to the evil.—It is not.—Hence we muſt ſay, that thoſe who are wiſe muſt no longer philoſophize[1], whether they are gods or men; nor again, thoſe who are ſo ignorant, that they are vicious. For no one who is vicious and void of diſcipline can philoſophize. Thoſe therefore remain, who poſſeſs indeed this evil, ignorance, but are not yet ſtupid and void of all diſcipline, but who yet think they do not know thoſe things of which they are ignorant. On which account, in a certain reſpect, thoſe that are neither good, nor bad, philoſophize: for ſuch as are bad do not philoſophize, nor ſuch as are good. For it has appeared to us, that neither is the contrary a friend to the contrary, nor the ſimilar to the ſimilar. Or do you not remember that this

[1] For philoſophy, as is ſhown in the ſpeech of Diotima in the Banquet, is a medium between wiſdom and ignorance.

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was aſſerted by us above?—He replied, I perfectly remember.—Have we not therefore, O Lyſis and Menexenus, more than any thing diſcovered what is a friend, and what is not? For we have ſaid, that both according to the ſoul, and according to the body, and every where, that which is neither evil nor good, is a friend to the good through the preſence of evil.—They in every reſpect admitted that theſe things were ſo. And I indeed was very glad, like a hunter having gladly obtained that of which I was in ſearch. But afterwards, I know not how, a moſt abſurd ſuſpicion came into my mind, that the things which we had aſſented to were not true. And being immediately uneaſy on this account, I ſaid, It is ſtrange, Lyſis and Menexenus, but we ſeem to be enriched with a dream.—Why ſo? ſaid Menexenus.—I am afraid, I replied, leſt we have met with falſe aſſertions, as with arrogant men, in our inquiry about friendſhip.—How? he replied.—To which I anſwered, let us conſider thus. Is he who is a friend, a friend to any one or not?—Neceſſarily ſo, ſaid he.—Whether, therefore, is he a friend for the ſake of nothing, and through nothing, or for the ſake of ſomething, and through ſomething?—The latter.—Is that thing then a friend, for the ſake of which a friend is a friend to a friend, or is it neither a friend nor an enemy?—He replied, I do not perfectly apprehend you.—It is likely, I ſaid. But thus perhaps you will follow me; and I think that I alſo ſhall better underſtand what I ſay. We have juſt now ſaid that the ſick is a friend to the phyſician. Did we not?—Yes.—Is he not therefore through diſeaſe, and for the ſake of health, a friend to the phyſician?—Yes.—And is not diſeaſe an evil?—Undoubtedly.—But what of health? I replied. Is it good or evil, or neither?—It is good, ſaid he.—We have therefore ſaid, as it ſeems, that the body is neither good, nor bad, through diſeaſe; but that through diſeaſe it is a friend to the medicinal art. We have likewiſe aſſerted that the medicinal art is good; but that it obtains friendſhip for the ſake of health: and that health is good. Is it not?—Yes.—But is health a friend, or not a friend?—A friend.—And is not diſeaſe an enemy?—Entirely ſo.—Hence that which is neither evil nor good, through evil and an enemy, is the friend of good, for the ſake of good and a friend.—It appears ſo.—A friend therefore is a friend for the ſake of a friend, through an enemy.—So it ſeems.—Be it ſo, I replied. But ſince, O boys, we have arrived thus far, let us diligently

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attend leſt we ſhould be deceived. For we ſhall bid farewell to the aſſertion, that a friend becomes the friend of a friend, and that the ſimilar is a friend to the ſimilar; for this we have ſaid is impoſſible. But at the ſame time, let us conſider as follows, leſt what is now aſſerted ſhould deceive us. Do we not ſay, that the medicinal art is a friend for the ſake of health?—Yes.—And therefore that health is a friend?—Entirely ſo.—If then it is a friend, it is for the ſake of ſomething.—It is.—But it is the friend of ſomething, from what we have aſſented to before.—Entirely ſo.—Will not therefore that again be a friend, for the ſake of a friend?—Yes.—Is it not therefore neceſſary that thus proceeding, we ſhould reject what we have ſaid, and arrive at a certain principle, which is not referred to another friend, but brings us to that which is the firſt friend, and for the ſake of which we ſay all other things are friends?—It is neceſſary.—This then is what I ſay, that we ſhould be cautious leſt we are deceived by all thoſe other particulars which we aſſert to be friends for the ſake of the firſt friend, and which are as it were certain images of it; while, in the mean time, this firſt friend is truly a friend. For we ſhould thus conſider: That which any one very much eſteems, (as, for inſtance, a father ſometimes his ſon,) he honours before all other things. But a man of this kind, on account of thus highly eſteeming his ſon, will alſo, on his account, highly eſteem ſomething elſe. Thus, for inſtance, if he perceives that he drinks hemlock, he will very much eſteem wine, becauſe he thinks that this will ſave his ſon. Or will he not?—Undoubtedly, he replied.—Will he not therefore alſo highly value the veſſel which contains the wine?—Entirely ſo.—But will he then no leſs eſteem the earthern cup, or three cups of wine, than his ſon? Or is the caſe thus? The whole of the endeavour, in an affair of this kind, does not regard thoſe things which are procured for the ſake of ſomething elſe, but that for the ſake of which all ſuch things are procured. Nor is the aſſertion which we frequently make true, that we very much eſteem gold and ſilver; but in this caſe, that which we highly eſteem, is that for the ſake of which gold, and all other preparatives, are procured. Shall we not ſay ſo?—By all means.—The ſame thing therefore may be ſaid reſpecting a friend: for ſuch things as we ſay are friends to us, when they ſubſiſt for the ſake of a friend, we improperly denominate. But that appears to be a friend in

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reality, in which all thoſe that are called friendſhips end.—This, ſaid he, ſeems to be the caſe.—Hence that which is in reality a friend, is not a friend, for the ſake of a certain friend.—True.—The aſſertion therefore is to be rejected, that a friend is a friend, for the ſake of a certain friend. But is a friend, therefore, a good thing?—It appears ſo to me.—Is the good then beloved though evil? And is the caſe thus? Since the things of which we now ſpeak are three, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, if two of theſe are received, but evil entirely departs, and has not any connection either with body, or ſoul, or any thing elſe, which we ſay is in itſelf neither good nor evil, in this caſe will good be perfectly uſeleſs to us? For if nothing any longer injures us, we ſhall not be indigent of any aſſiſtance whatever. And thus it will then become manifeſt that we have ſought after, and loved good on account of evil; good being the medicine of evil; but evil being a diſeaſe. But when there is no diſeaſe, there will be no occaſion for medicine. Does good thus naturally ſubſiſt, and is it thus beloved, on account of evil, by us who are ſituated between evil and good? And is it of no uſe itſelf, for its own ſake?—He replied, It ſeems to ſubſiſt in this manner.—That friend, therefore, in which all other things end, which we ſay are friends for the ſake of another friend, is not in any reſpect ſimilar to theſe. For theſe are called friends for the ſake of a friend; but that which is in reality a friend, appears to be naturally in every reſpect contrary to this: for we have ſeen that this is a friend for the ſake of an enemy. But if an enemy ſhould be preſent, it would no longer as it ſeems be a friend to us.—He replied, It does not appear to me that it would, as it is now ſaid.—But, by Jupiter, ſaid I, if evil ſhould be extirpated, would there no longer be any hunger or thirſt, or any thing elſe of the like kind? Or would there be hunger, but yet not noxious, ſince there would be men and other animals? and thirſt, and other appetites, but without being evil, in conſequence of evil being aboliſhed? Or ſhall we ſay that the inquiry is ridiculous, what would then be, or would not be? For who knows? This however we know, that at preſent it is poſſible to be injured by being hungry, and it is alſo poſſible to be benefited. Or is it not?—Entirely ſo.—Does it not therefore follow, that when we are hungry, or deſire the gratification of any other appetite, our deſire may be ſometimes beneficial, and ſometimes noxious, and ſometimes

times neither?—Very much ſo.—If, therefore, evils were deſtroyed, what would be the advantage, if things which are not evil, were deſtroyed together with ſuch as are evil?—There would be none.—There would be appetites, therefore, which are neither good nor evil, even if evils were deſtroyed.—It appears ſo.—Is it therefore poſſible, that he who deſires and loves any thing, ſhould not be the friend of that which he deſires and loves?—It does not appear to me that it is.—When evils therefore are deſtroyed, certain friendly perſons, as it ſeems, will ſtill remain.—They will.—But if evil were the cauſe of friendſhip, no one would be a friend to another, when evil is deſtroyed. For the cauſe being taken away, that of which it was the cauſe can no longer have an exiſtence.—Right.—Was it not therefore acknowledged by us, that a friend loved ſomething, and on account of ſomething? And did we not then think, that through evil, that which is neither good nor evil loves good?—True.—But now, as it ſeems, ſomething elſe appears to be the cauſe of loving and being beloved.—So it ſeems.—Is then, in reality, deſire, as we ſaid, the cauſe of friendſhip? And is that which deſires, the friend of that which it deſires, and then, when it deſires? And is he whom we before aſſerted to be a friend, a mere trifle, like a very prolix poem?—It appears ſo, ſaid he.—But, I replied, he who deſires, deſires that of which he is indigent. Or does he not?—Yes.—Is not then that which is indigent, the friend of that of which it is indigent?—It appears ſo to me.—But every one becomes indigent of that of which he is deprived.—Undoubtedly.—Hence, as it ſeems, love, friendſhip, and deſire, reſpect that which is domeſtic and allied to them. This appears to be the caſe, O Menexenus and Lyſis.—They admitted it was ſo.—You, therefore, if you were friends to each other, would be naturally mutually allied. They replied, And very much ſo.—And hence, I ſaid, if any one perſon deſires or loves another, O boys, he can never either deſire, or love, or be a friend, unleſs he is allied to the object of his love, either according to his ſoul, or a certain cuſtom of his ſoul, or according to manners, or according to ſpecies.—Menexenus ſaid, Entirely ſo; but Lyſis was ſilent.—But I replied, It appears to be neceſſary for us, to love that which is naturally allied to us.—It ſeems ſo, he ſaid.—It is neceſſary therefore, that he who is a genuine, and not a

pretended lover, ſhould be beloved by the objects of his love.—To this Lyſis and Menexenus ſcarcely aſſented: but Hippothales, through the pleaſure which he experienced, exhibited all various colours. And I being willing to conſider the aſſertion, ſaid, If that which is domeſtic and allied differs from that which is ſimilar, we have declared, as it appears to me, O Lyſis and Menexenus, what a friend is: but if the ſimilar and the allied are the ſame, it is not eaſy to reject the former aſſertion, that the ſimilar is not uſeleſs to the ſimilar, according to ſimilitude; but to acknowledge that a friend is uſeleſs, is inelegant. Are you willing therefore, I added, ſince we are as it were intoxicated by diſcourſe, that we ſhould grant and ſay that the allied is ſomething different from the ſimilar?—Entirely ſo.—Whether, therefore, ſhall we admit that good is allied, but evil foreign to every one? Or ſhall we ſay that evil is allied to evil, but good to good? and that a thing which is neither good nor evil, is allied to that which is neither good nor evil?—Each of theſe appeared to us to be allied to each.—Again therefore I ſaid, O boys, we have fallen upon thoſe aſſertions which we firſt made reſpecting friendſhip. For an unjuſt man will be no leſs a friend to the unjuſt, and the vicious to the vicious, than the good to the good.—So it ſeems, he ſaid.—But what? if we ſhould ſay the good and the allied are the ſame, will any thing elſe follow, than that the good alone is a friend to the good?—Nothing elſe.—But this aſſertion alſo we thought was confuted by us. Or do you not remember?—We do remember.—What further then can we employ in our diſcourſe?—It is evident nothing further.—Like wiſe men, therefore, in courts of juſtice, we ought to repeat all that has been ſaid: for if neither thoſe that are beloved, nor lovers, nor the ſimilar, nor the diſſimilar, nor the good, nor the allied, nor any other ſuch particulars as we have diſcuſſed, (for I do not remember any further, on account of their multitude),—if then no one of theſe is a friend, I have not any thing more to ſay. When I had thus ſaid, intending afterwards to excite ſome one who was more advanced in years, the pædagogues of Lyſis and Menexenus approaching like certain dæmons, together with the brothers of theſe two, called to them, and ordered them to return home: for it was then late. At firſt, therefore, both we, and thoſe that ſurrounded us, drove them away: but they paid no attention to us,

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but ſpeaking in a barbaric manner were indignant and continued no leſs calling to the boys. Being vanquiſhed therefore by their importunity, and it appearing to us, that as they had been ſubdued in the Mercurial feaſt, they would not have any thing elſe to offer, we diſſolved the conference. At the ſame time, after they had departed, I ſaid to Lyſis and Menexenus, We are become ridiculous, I who am an old man, and you who are boys. For they, now they have left us, will ſay, that we think ourſelves to be friends to each other (for I rank myſelf among you), though at the ſame time we have not yet been able to find what a friend is.

THE END OF THE LYSIS.

THE CHARMIDES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

TEMPERANCE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CHARMIDES.

TWO things are to be noted in the exordium of this Dialogue, which transfer love from corporeal to incorporeal form. First, the aſſertion of Socrates, that nearly all young men appear to him to be beautiful; which is as if he had ſaid that he did not ſtop at the form of one body, but aſcended to the common beauty of the whole ſpecies. As therefore we aſcend from the beauty of an individual, to that which is common to the ſpecies, and from this to that beauty which is uncoordinated with the many, and is an incorporeal form ſubſiſting by itſelf; ſo by what is here ſaid we are admoniſhed to paſs from the love of an individual form, to the love of that which is common, and from this to the love of ideal form, ſubſiſting in intellect as its native ſeat. The ſecond thing which deſerves to be noted is, that Socrates orders the ſoul of Charmides to be expoſed naked to the view, and that neglecting the form of the body we ſhould behold the natural beauty of the ſoul, and diligently endeavour to obtain it when it is found to be wanting. Nor is it without reaſon that the exhortation to temperance begins from the beauty of body: for this is nothing more than a ſymphony and conſent of the organical parts, which correſponds to temperance in the ſoul.

Plato in the Cratylus explains the name of temperance, as ſignifying a certain ſafety and preſervation of prudence. For he conſidered all truth as naturally inherent in the ſoul; and that, in conſequence of this, the ſoul by profoundly looking into herſelf will diſcover every truth. She is however impeded from this converſion to herſelf, by an immoderate love of body and corporeal natures. Hence temperance is in the firſt place neceſſary, by which the darkneſs of perturbations being expelled, the intellect becomes more ſerene, and is abundantly irradiated with the ſplendors of divinity.

But

But as Socrates intends to diſcourſe about temperance, he admoniſhes Charmides to look into himſelf. For a converſion of the ſoul into herſelf is the buſineſs of this virtue. And it is ſaid in the Timæus that all our affairs become proſperous, from the ſoul being in harmony with herſelf, and in concord with reſpect to the body. The Pythagoreans alſo aſſert, that if the ſoul prudently governs not only her own motions, but thoſe of the body, length of life will be the portion of the latter, and perpetual health of both. To this Socrates adds, as ſtill more wonderful, that the Magi promiſe by their verſes immortality to bodies: and we learn from Plato, in the firſt Alcibiades, that the magic of Zoroaſter was nothing elſe than the worſhip of divinity. Socrates however obſerves, that the ſoul and body are not only preſerved from death by magical verſes, but likewiſe by philoſophic reaſonings and temperance. Again, as that diſcourſe, which is calculated to perſuade its auditors to temperance, requires power imparted by divinity, and reaſonings produced by philoſophy, Plato calls ſuch a diſcourſe a magical incantation.

In the next place, Socrates often inquires what temperance is, which, neither Charmides nor Critias accurately defines. For the one adduces, that which is not properly temperance, but its attendant, and the other, that which rather belongs to prudence. Hence the latter defines temperance to be a certain ſcience, which both knows itſelf and all other ſciences, but is ignorant of the things themſelves which are the objects of ſcience. This however is falſe, becauſe the truth of ſcience conſiſts in a certain congruity and contact of that, which knows with that which is known. Beſides, ſcience cannot be perfectly known, unleſs it is perceived what ſcience is, and this cannot be obtained without a knowledge of its object. But as Critias brings the diſcourſe on temperance to prudence, Socrates aſſerts that prudence, or the ſcience of good and evil, obtains the higheſt authority with reſpect to beatitude, as well becauſe it demonſtrates the moſt excellent end, and the media which lead to it, as becauſe all arts and purſuits, ſo far as they are governed by it, contribute to our advantage, but end in our detriment when it is neglected. In the laſt place, Socrates teaches us that nothing can with more difficulty be defined, or procured, than temperance. It is moſt difficult to define, becauſe it is ſo intimately combined with the other virtues, of which it is a certain conſonance; and it cannot be obtained without

without great difficulty, becauſe from our union with body we are prone to intemperance, and from our infancy drink deep of the envenomed cup of pleaſure.

For the benefit of the Platonic reader, as this Dialogue is piraſtic, I ſhall conclude this Introduction with the following admirable obſervations from Jamblichus[1], in which the nature of temperance is beautifully unfolded. "Every virtue deſpiſes that which is mortal, and embraces that which is immortal; but this in a very remarkable degree is the endeavour of temperance, as deſpiſing thoſe pleaſures which faſten the ſoul to the body as by a nail, and eſtabliſhing itſelf, as Plato ſays, on holy foundations. For how is it poſſible that temperance ſhould not make us perfect, ſince it exterminates from us the imperfect and the paſſive? But you may know that this is the caſe by attending to the fable of Bellerophon, who, contending in conjunction with *moderation*, deſtroyed Chimæra, and every beaſtly, wild, and ſavage tribe. For, in ſhort, the immoderate dominion of the paſſions does not ſuffer men to be men, but draws them down to that which is irrational, beaſtly, and diſordered. But that excellent order, which confines the pleaſures within definite meaſures, preſerves families, and preſerves cities according to the aſſertion of Crates: and further ſtill, it alſo in a certain reſpect approximates to the form of the gods. Perſeus therefore, riding to the higheſt good of temperance, with Minerva for his leader, cut off the head of Gorgon, which appears to me to be deſire drawing men down to matter, and turning them into ſtone, through a repletion of ſtupid paſſions. Continence of pleaſure therefore, as Socrates ſays, is the foundation of virtue; and temperance appears to be the ornament of all the virtues, as Plato alſo aſſerts. And, as I ſay, this virtue is the fortification of the moſt beautiful habits. Hence, I ſhall with confidence ſtrenuouſly aſſert, as a thing truly acknowledged, that the beauty of temperance extends through all the virtues, that it coharmonizes them according to one harmony, and that it inſerts in them ſymmetry and mixture with each other. Such then being the nature of temperance, it affords an opportunity to the implanting of the other virtues, and when they are implanted, imparts to them ſtable ſecurity."

[1] Stobæi Eclog. p. 68.

THE CHARMIDES.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, CHÆREPHO, ‖ CRITIAS, and CHARMIDES,

YESTERDAY, when I came in the evening from the army, I gladly returned to my accuſtomed exerciſe, in conſequence of having been for ſome time abſent from it; and entered into the Palæſtra of Taurean Neptune, which is oppoſite to the royal temple. Here I met with very many perſons, ſome of whom were unknown to me, but the greater part of them I knew. And as ſoon as I was ſeen entering thus unexpectedly, ſome from all quarters immediately congratulated me at a diſtance. But Chærepho, as if he had been inſane, leaping from the midſt of them, ran towards me, and taking me by the hand, O Socrates, ſays he, how were you ſaved in the engagement? For a ſhort time before we came away there was a battle at Potidæa, of which thoſe that are here juſt now heard.—And I anſwering them, ſaid, It is as you ſee.—Indeed, ſaid he, a report was ſpread here, that a very ſharp engagement had taken place, and that many of thoſe that we know had periſhed in it.—I replied, You were told the truth.—But, ſaid he, was you in the engagement?—I was.—Sit down here, ſaid he, and relate the affair to us; for we have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the ſame time leading me along, he ſeated me near Critias the ſon of Callæſchrus. Being therefore ſeated, I ſaluted Critias, and the reſt, and according as any one aſked me, related the affairs of the army. But ſome aſked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of things of this kind, I again aſked them reſpecting philoſophy, how it was circumſtanced

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at preſent; and whether there were any young men who were remarkable for wiſdom, or beauty, or both. Critias then, looking towards the gate, and perceiving certain young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, ſaid, It appears to me, Socrates, that you will immediately have an anſwer to your queſtion reſpecting beautiful youths. For thoſe that are now entering, are forerunners and lovers of one who ſeems to be the moſt beautiful of all of the preſent time. And it appears to me that he is now nearly entering.—But who is he? I replied; and of whom is he the ſon?—Perhaps you know, ſaid he, (but he was very young when you left this place;) I ſay, perhaps you know Charmides, the ſon of our uncle Glauco, but my couſin.—I know him indeed, by Jupiter, I replied, for he was not then to be deſpiſed, though he was but a boy, but now I think he muſt be almoſt a young man.—You will immediately know, ſaid he, both his age, and the qualities which he has acquired. And at the ſame time that he was thus ſpeaking, Charmides entered.—No conſideration therefore, my friend, is to be paid to me. For I am indeed a white rule [1] with reſpect to thoſe that are beautiful; ſince nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. But he then appeared to me to be wonderful, both on account of the magnitude and the beauty of his body: and all the reſt ſeemed to me to be in love with him; ſo aſtoniſhed and ſo diſturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers alſo followed among thoſe that were behind him. And as to the men indeed, this was leſs wonderful: but I alſo paid attention to the boys, and ſaw that none of theſe beheld any one elſe than him, not even the ſmalleſt among them, but the eyes of all were fixed on him, as on a ſtatue. And Chærepho calling me, ſaid, What do you think of the youth, Socrates? Is he not a beautiful perſon?—I replied, tranſcendently ſo.—But, ſaid he, if he were willing to ſhow himſelf naked, he would appear to you to have a deformed face, his form is ſo very beautiful. And this aſſertion of Chærepho was confirmed by all the reſt.—I then ſaid, By Hercules, you ſpeak of an unconquerable man, if only one ſmall thing further belongs to

[1] The expreſſion *a white rule*, ſays the Greek Scholiaſt on Plato, is applied to thoſe who ſignify things immaniſeſt, by ſuch as are immaniſeſt, and in ſo doing indicate nothing. For a white rule can indicate nothing in white ſtones *(with reſpect to whiteneſs)*, as a rule can which is of a red colour.

him.—What is that? ſaid Critias.—I replied, If his ſoul is naturally in a good condition. It is however proper, Critias, that it ſhould be ſo, as being one of your family.—But, he replied, he is alſo very beautiful and good in this reſpect.—Why then, I ſaid, do we not expoſe *this* naked to the view, and contemplate it prior to his form? For ſince he is thus inwardly beautiful, he will in every reſpect be willing to diſcourſe.—Very much ſo, ſaid Critias; ſince he is a philoſopher, and (as it appears both to others and himſelf) very poetic.—I replied, This beauty, friend Critias, deſcends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon. But why do you not call the youth hither, and preſent him to me? For it would not diſgrace us to diſcourſe with him, even if he were younger than he is, while you are preſent, who are his couſin and tutor.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he; and we will call him. And at the ſame time turning to the perſon that followed him; Call, ſays he, Charmides, and tell him that I wiſh to commit him to the care of a phyſician, on account of the infirmity of which he has lately complained.—Critias therefore ſaid to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heavineſs in his head when he roſe in the morning. What then ſhould hinder you from pretending to him, that you know a remedy for this diſorder of the head?—Nothing, I replied; let him only come.—But he does come, ſaid he. Which was indeed the caſe: for he came, and cauſed much laughter. For each of us that were ſeated together, through eagerneſs to ſit near Charmides, puſhed his neighbour; till of thoſe that were ſeated laſt of all, ſome we forced to riſe up, and others to fall on the ground. But he came and ſat between me and Critias. And I then ſaid, My friend, I am now perplexed, and the confidence which I before had, that I ſhould eaſily diſcourſe with Charmides, fails me. But when Critias had told him, that I was the perſon who knew a remedy for his diſeaſe, he fixed his eyes upon me as ſomething prodigious, and drew near as if he meant to aſk me a queſtion. Then all that were in the Palæſtra immediately gathered round us; and when, O generous man, I ſaw the beauty of his form within his garments, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myſelf. I likewiſe thought that Critias was moſt wiſe in amatory affairs, who ſaid, when ſpeaking of a beautiful boy, but employing the ſimilitude of ſomething elſe, that I ſhould be cautious leſt a fawn coming oppoſite to the lion, a portion of the fleſh ſhould be

taken

taken away: for he appeared to me to have been captured by an animal of this kind. But at the ſame time, when Charmides aſked me, if I knew a remedy for the head, I ſcarcely knew what to anſwer. What is it? ſaid he.—I replied that it was a certain leaf, but that a certain incantation muſt be added to the medicine, which if any one employed together with the leaf, the medicine could perfectly reſtore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no uſe without the incantation.—He then ſaid, I will write down this incantation from you.—I replied, Will you do this, whether you are perſuaded by me or not?—Upon this, he ſaid laughing, I will, if I am perſuaded by you, Socrates.—Be it ſo, I replied. And do you alſo accurately know my name?—I do, unleſs I am unjuſt, ſaid he. For there is no ſmall talk about you, among thoſe of my age: and I can remember that you aſſociated with Critias when I was a boy.—You ſay well, I replied. For I ſhall now tell you, with greater freedom of ſpeech, what the incantation is. But, juſt now, I was doubtful, after what manner I ſhould ſhow you its power. For this incantation is ſuch, O Charmides, that it is not able to make the head alone well; juſt perhaps as you have often heard good phyſicians aſſert, when any one comes to them with diſeaſed eyes: for then they ſay, that they muſt not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is neceſſary for them at the ſame time to cure the head [1], if they deſign to render the eyes in a good condition. And again, that it would be very ſtupid to think to cure the head itſelf without the whole body. In conſequence of this reaſoning, they turn their attention to the regimen of the whole body, and endeavour to cure the part in conjunction with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus ſpeak, and that this is the caſe?—Entirely ſo, he replied.—Does it therefore appear to you that they ſpeak well; and do you admit this doctrine?—The moſt of all things, ſaid he.—And I, on hearing him praiſe this method of cure, took courage, and my confidence again was a little excited and revived: and I ſaid, Such, therefore, O Charmides, is the power of this incantation. But I learnt it there, in the army, from one of the Thracian phyſicians of Zamolxis [2], who are ſaid to render men immortal. This Thracian

[1] Viz. Not only the head, but the whole body muſt be cured, when the eyes are diſeaſed from an *internal* cauſe.

[2] A ſlave and diſciple of Pythagoras.

too

too ſaid, "The Grecian phyſicians beautifully aſſert the ſame things as I now aſſert. But Zamolxis, ſaid he, our king, being a god, ſays, that as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, ſo neither is it proper to cure the body without the ſoul: and that the reaſon why many diſeaſes are unknown to the Grecian phyſicians is, becauſe they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid. For when this is not well diſpoſed, it is impoſſible that a part ſhould be well affected. For all things, ſaid he, originate from the ſoul, both ſuch as are good and ſuch as are evil, and emanate from thence into the body, and the whole man, juſt as things flow from the head to the eyes. It is requiſite therefore that the maladies of this ſhould in the firſt place and eſpecially be healed, in order that the head and the whole body my be well affected." But he ſaid, O bleſſed youth, "that the ſoul was cured of its maladies by certain incantations; and that theſe incantations were beautiful reaſons, from which temperance was generated in ſouls." He further added, "that when this was inſerted and preſent, it was eaſy to impart health, both to the head and the reſt of the body." Having therefore taught me the medicine, and the incantations, "Let none, ſaid he, perſuade you to cure the head of any one with this medicine, who has not firſt preſented his ſoul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, ſaid he, of the preſent time, reſpecting men, is this, that certain perſons endeavour to become phyſicians without a knowledge of temperance and health." And he very earneſtly ordered me to take care, that neither any rich, or noble, or beautiful perſon, ever perſuaded me to do otherwiſe. I therefore declared to him, with an oath, that I would not; and hence it is neceſſary I ſhould obey him, which I am determined to do. And indeed, if you are willing, according to the mandate of the ſtranger, to preſent your ſoul firſt of all to be enchanted by the incantations of the Thracian, I will adminiſter the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot in any reſpect benefit you, O friend Charmides.—Critias therefore hearing me thus ſpeak, ſaid, This heavineſs of the head, O Socrates, will be gain to the youth, if he ſhould be compelled to become better in his dianoëtic part through his head. I can indeed aſſure you, that Charmides not only ſurpaſſes all his equals in the form of his

body

body, but in this very thing for which you ſay you have an incantation. But you ſay this is temperance. Or do you not?—Entirely ſo, I replied.—Know then, ſaid he, that Charmides appears to be by far the moſt temperate of thoſe that exiſt at preſent; and that, as far as his age permits, he is not inferior to any one in every thing elſe.—And I replied, It is but juſt, O Charmides, that you ſhould excel all others in all ſuch things as theſe. For I do not think that any one now preſent can eaſily ſhow two families among the Athenians, from a conjunction between which by marriage, a beautiful and excellent offspring is ſo likely to be produced, as from thoſe that were your progenitors. For the paternal family of Critias, here, the ſon of Diopis, is celebrated by Anacreon, and Solon, and many other poets, as excelling in beauty, virtue, and the reſt of what is called felicity. And again, there is the ſame renown on his mother's ſide: for no one of thoſe that dwell on the continent is ſaid to ſurpaſs in beauty and grandeur your uncle Pyrilampes, as often as he goes in the character of ambaſſador to the great king, or to ſome other inhabitant of the continent. But the whole of his family is in nothing inferior to any other. It is likely, therefore, that, being the offspring of ſuch characters, you ſhould be the firſt in all things. Hence, O beloved ſon of Glauco, with reſpect to your viſible form, you appear to me to diſgrace no one of your progenitors: and, if you are naturally endued with all that is ſufficient to the poſſeſſion of temperance, and the other virtues, according to the aſſertion of Critias here, your mother, O dear Charmides, brought you forth bleſſed. The caſe, then, is this: If temperance is preſent with you, as Critias ſays it is, and if you are ſufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris[1], but the medicine for the head ſhould be immediately adminiſtered you. But if you are in any reſpect indigent of this, the incantation muſt precede the medicine. Inform me therefore, whether you aſſent to Critias, and affirm that you ſufficiently participate of temperance, or whether you are deficient in this reſpect.—Charmides therefore bluſhing, in the firſt place appeared to be ſtill more beautiful (for baſhfulneſs becomes his age); and in the next place he

[1] A Scythian in the time of the Trojan war, who is fabled to have received a flying arrow from Apollo, with which he gave oracles, and tranſported himſelf wherever he pleaſed.

anſwered:

anſwered me not ignobly. For he ſaid, It is not eaſy either to admit or reject the ſubjects of the preſent inveſtigation: for, ſaid he, if I ſhould affirm that I am not temperate, it would be abſurd that I ſhould aſſert ſuch a thing of myſelf, and at the ſame time I ſhould evince that Critias has ſpoken falſely, and many others to whom I appear to be temperate. But again, if I ſhould affirm that I am temperate, by thus praiſing myſelf, I ſhall perhaps give offence: ſo that I do not know how to anſwer you.—To this I replied, You appear to me, O Charmides, to ſpeak well: and I think we ſhould conſider in common whether you poſſeſs that which I inquire after, or not; that you may neither be compelled to ſpeak contrary to your will, nor I may again inconſiderately turn myſelf to the medicinal art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I wiſh to conſider this affair together with you; but if it is not, to diſmiſs it.—But it is, ſaid he, the moſt agreeable to me of all things. Purſue therefore the inquiry, in whatever manner appears to you to be beſt.—This, I replied, ſeems to me to be the beſt mode of conſidering the ſubject; for it is evident, if temperance is preſent with you, that you have ſome opinion about it; for it is neceſſary, if it is really inherent in you, that it muſt produce ſome ſenſation of itſelf, from which you will poſſeſs an opinion reſpecting it, what it is, and what are the qualities with which it is endued. Or do you not think ſo?—He replied, I do think ſo.—And do you not alſo, I ſaid, think this, ſince you know how to ſpeak the Greek tongue, that you can likewiſe inform me what temperance appears to you to be?—Perhaps ſo, ſaid he.—That we may therefore conjecture whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, I ſaid, what temperance is, according to your opinion? And at firſt, indeed, he was tardy, and was not altogether willing to anſwer; but afterwards he ſaid, that temperance appeared to conſiſt in doing all things in an orderly manner, in walking and diſcourſing quietly in the public ways, and acting ſimilarly in every thing elſe. And, in ſhort, ſaid he, that which is the object of your inquiry appears to me to be a certain quietneſs[1].—I replied, You ſpeak well; for they ſay, O Charmides, that quiet are temperate perſons. But let us ſee if they ſay any thing to the purpoſe: for, tell me, is not temperance ſomething beautiful?—He replied, Entirely ſo.—Whether, therefore, in

[1] Ἡσυχία, *quietneſs*, ſignifies, in this place, a leiſurely mode of acting in every thing.

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the grammatic art, is it moſt beautiful to write ſimilar letters ſwiftly or ſlowly?—Swiftly.—But what with reſpect to reading? Is it moſt beautiful to read ſwiftly or ſlowly?—Swiftly.—And is it alſo by far more beautiful to play on the harp rapidly, and to wreſtle with celerity, than quietly and ſlowly? —Yes.—And does not the like take place in pugiliſtic and pancratiatic conteſts? —Entirely ſo.—And with reſpect to running and leaping, and all other works of the body, are they not beautiful when performed with vigour and rapidity; but when performed ſlowly, with difficulty, and quietly, are they not baſe?—It appears ſo.—It appears to us, therefore, I replied, that with reſpect to the body, not the quiet, but the moſt rapid, and the moſt vigorous, are the moſt beautiful. Is it not ſo?—Entirely ſo.—But did we not ſay that temperance is ſomething beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietneſs, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with reſpect to the body; ſince temperance is beautiful.—It ſeems ſo, ſaid he.—What then, I replied, is docility more beautiful than dulneſs?—It is.—But docility, I ſaid, is to learn ſwiftly; and dulneſs to learn quietly and ſlowly.—It is.—And is it not more beautiful to teach another ſwiftly and vehemently, than quietly and ſlowly. —Yes.—And which is the more beautiful to recollect and commit things to memory quietly and ſlowly, or vehemently and rapidly?—He replied, Vehemently and rapidly.—And with reſpect to ſagacity, is it not a certain acute energy, and not a quietneſs of the ſoul?—True.—Does it not therefore follow, that it is moſt beautiful in the grammatic art, in the art of playing on the harp, and in every thing elſe, to underſtand what is ſaid, in the moſt rapid, and not in the moſt quiet manner?—Yes.—And again, in the inveſtigations and conſultations of the ſoul, it does not appear to me that he who conſults and diſcovers in the moſt quiet manner, and with difficulty, is worthy of praiſe, but he who does this eaſily and rapidly.—To this alſo he aſſented.—Hence, I replied, in all things, both pertaining to the ſoul and the body, ſuch as are performed with celerity and vigour appear to be more beautiful than ſuch as are performed ſlowly and quietly.—It appears ſo, ſaid he.—Temperance, therefore, will not be quietneſs, nor will a temperate be a quiet life, from this reaſoning: ſince that which is temperate ought to be beautiful: for one of two things muſt take place, viz. quiet actions in life muſt either never, or very rarely, appear to be more beautiful than ſuch as are ſwift and ſtrenuous. If then, my friend, it were even found that not fewer quiet actions are beautiful than ſuch as are vehement and rapid,

neither would it follow from hence that temperance conſiſted rather in acting quietly, than in vehement and rapid energy, either in walking or in reading, or any thing elſe; nor would a quiet and orderly life be more temperate than one which is not orderly, ſince it has been admitted in our diſcourſe, that temperance is ſomething beautiful. But things ſwift have appeared to be no leſs beautiful than ſuch as are quiet.—What you have ſaid, Socrates, he replied, appears to me to be right.—Again, therefore, ſaid I, O Charmides, be ſtill more attentive, and looking to yourſelf, conſider what kind of a perſon temperance, when preſent, cauſes you to be, and what ſort of a thing it is itſelf while it accompliſhes this: reaſoning, therefore, on all theſe particulars, inform me well, and in a virile manner, what appears to you to be the truth.—But then Charmides, collecting and looking into himſelf, in a very manly manner ſaid, Temperance ſeems to me to make a man bluſh and be aſhamed; and I, therefore, conclude that temperance is ſhame.—Be it ſo, I replied: but did we not juſt now acknowledge that temperance is ſomething beautiful?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men?—Yes.—Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?—It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful but good.—It appears ſo to me.—What then, I replied, will you not believe that Homer [1] ſpeaks well, when he ſays,

"Shame ill accompanies a man in need?"

I do, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it ſeems, is both not good, and good.—It appears ſo.—But temperance is good; ſince it makes thoſe good, to whom it is preſent, but by no means evil.—The caſe appears to me to be as you ſay.—Temperance, therefore, will not be ſhame; ſince temperance is good, but ſhame is not in any reſpect more good than evil.—It appears to me, Socrates, ſaid he, that this is rightly aſſerted. But attend to what I ſhall adduce reſpecting temperance. For juſt now I recollected what I had heard a certain perſon aſſert, viz. that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Conſider, therefore, whether what I ſay appears to you to be well ſaid.—I replied, O vile youth! you have heard this from Critias, or from ſome other of the wiſe.—It ſeems, ſaid Critias, he muſt have heard it from ſome other perſon, for he did not hear it from me.—But of what

[1] Odyſſ. lib. 17.

conſequence

conſequence is it, Socrates, Charmides replied, from whom I heard it?—None at all, ſaid I. For we are not to conſider who ſaid it, but whether he has ſpoken the truth or not.—Now you ſpeak as you ought, he replied.—By Jupiter, I do, ſaid I. But if we diſcover how this thing ſubſiſts, I ſhall wonder: for it is ſimilar to a certain enigma.—On what account, ſaid he.—Becauſe, I replied, his meaning is not ſuch as the words ſeem to imply, when he ſays that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Or do you think that a grammarian does nothing when he writes or reads?—I think he does ſomething, ſaid he.—Does a grammarian, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to inſtruct you boys? And do you in conſequence of his inſtructions no leſs write the names of your enemies than the names of your friends?—No leſs, ſaid he.—When, therefore, you do this, are you too buſily employed, and intemperate?—By no means.—And beſides this, you do not perform things pertaining to yourſelf, if to write, and alſo to read, is to do ſomething. But it certainly is. And beſides, my friend, to be healed, to build, to weave, and to accompliſh the work of any art, is certainly to do ſomething. Is it not?—Entirely ſo.—What then, I replied, does that city appear to you to be well inſtituted in which there is a law commanding every one to weave and waſh his own garment, to make his own ſhoes, oil-cruiſe, curry-comb, and every other neceſſary article, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to attend to his own affairs?—He replied, It does not appear to me that ſuch a city is well inſtituted.—But, ſaid I, if a city is temperately, it is well inſtituted.—Undoubtedly, he replied.—For a man, therefore, to do ſuch things as theſe, and to manage his own affairs, will not be temperance.—It does not appear that it will.—He, therefore, who ſaid, that for a man to do things pertaining to himſelf is temperance, ſpoke, as I juſt now obſerved, obſcurely: for he was not ſo ſtupid, as to mean that his words ſhould be taken in the literal ſenſe. Or did you hear ſome ſtupid perſon aſſert this, O Charmides?—By no means, ſaid he; ſince to me he appeared to be very wiſe.—More than any thing, therefore, as it ſeems to me, he propoſed this enigma, becauſe it is difficult to know what it is for a man to tranſact his own affairs.—Perhaps ſo, ſaid he.—Can you therefore tell me what it is to tranſact one's own affairs?—He replied, by Jupiter, I do not know. But perhaps nothing hinders, but that he who ſaid this did not know the meaning

of the aſſertion. And at the ſame time that he thus ſpoke, he laughed, and looked at Critias. But it was evident that Critias, who had formerly contended with, and was ſtimulated by ambition againſt Charmides, and thoſe that were preſent, and who could then ſcarcely contain himſelf, was now no longer able to do ſo. And it appeared to me that my former ſuſpicion was more than any thing true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance from Critias. Charmides, therefore, not being willing to ſupport the definition himſelf, but being deſirous that this province ſhould fall to the lot of Critias, ſhewed as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure, but appeared to me to be as much enraged with Charmides, as a poet with a player who acts his poems badly. So that, looking at him, he ſaid, Do you therefore think, O Charmides, that if you do not underſtand his meaning who ſaid, that temperance is for a man to tranſact his own affairs, neither does he know what he aſſerted?—But, I replied, O Critias, beſt of men, it is nothing wonderful that Charmides, who is but a youth, ſhould not underſtand this aſſertion; but it is fit that you ſhould underſtand it, both on account of your age and employment. If therefore you affirm that this is a true definition of temperance, I ſhall very gladly conſider with you, whether it is ſo or not.—But I entirely aſſent to it, ſaid he.—You do well then, I replied. But inform me whether you admit what I juſt now aſked: I mean, if all artiſts do ſomething?—I do.—Do they therefore appear to you to do things belonging to themſelves only, or things alſo belonging to others?—Things alſo belonging to others.—Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do things belonging to themſelves?—What ſhould hinder? ſaid he.—Nothing, ſo far as reſpects myſelf, I replied; but ſee whether there may not be a hindrance with reſpect to him who, defining temperance to be the tranſacting one's own affairs, afterwards ſays that nothing hinders but that thoſe who tranſact the affairs of others may alſo be temperate.—I indeed, he replied, have confeſſed that thoſe that *tranſact* the affairs of others may be temperate. But have I alſo acknowledged that this is the caſe with reſpect to thoſe that *make* things pertaining to others?—But inform me, ſaid I, do you not affirm that to *make* a thing is the ſame as to do it?—I do not indeed, ſaid he. Nor do I ſay that to *operate* is the ſame as to *make*. For I have learned to make this diſtinction from Heſiod [1],

[1] In his Works and Days.

who

who ſays, "No *work* is a diſgrace." Do you therefore think that if he had called by the names of *to operate* and *to do*, ſuch works as you now ſpeak of, he would have ſaid that no work is a diſgrace, whether it is that of the ſhoemaker, or of a ſalter of fiſh, or of one who ſits in a ſhop?—It is not proper to think he would, Socrates: but I think that he conſidered making as ſomething different from action and operation; and that a thing made ſometimes becomes a diſgrace, when it is not produced in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no work is ever a diſgrace. For things which are made beautifully and with utility he calls works, and denominates operations and actions certain makings of this kind. It is likewiſe proper to aſſert that he conſidered ſuch things as theſe, as alone domeſtic and allied, but every thing noxious as foreign. Hence, it is requiſite to think that Heſiod, and every other prudent perſon, calls him who tranſacts his own affairs temperate.—O Critias, I replied, as ſoon as you began to ſpeak, I almoſt immediately perceived, that you called things allied to a man, and which are his own good, and that you denominated the making of things good, actions. For I have ten thouſand times heard Prodicus dividing names: and I will allow you to uſe every name as you pleaſe, if you only evince what you mean to ſignify by any particular name. Now therefore again, from the beginning, define more clearly, whether you ſay that temperance is the doing, or the making, (or in whatever manner you may wiſh to denominate it,) of good things.—I do, ſaid he.—He therefore is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.—He replied, Does it not, O beſt of men, appear ſo to you?—Diſmiſs this queſtion, I ſaid: for we do not conſider what appears to me to be the caſe, but what you now ſay.—But indeed, ſaid he, I do not aſſert that he is temperate, who does not do good but evil. For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the practice of things good. And perhaps nothing hinders but that you ſpeak the truth. But nevertheleſs I ſhould wonder if you thought that men who conduct themſelves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.—But I do not think ſo, ſaid he.—To this I replied, Did you not ſay a little before, that nothing hindered but that artiſts who made things pertaining to others might be temperate?—It was aſſerted by me, ſaid he. But what then?—Nothing. But inform me whether he appears to you to be a phyſician, who, in making any one well, does that which is advantageous both to himſelf, and to him whom he cures?—To me he does.—Does not he, therefore, who acts in this manner,

manner, act well?—Yes.—And is not he temperate who acts well?—He is temperate.—Is it not therefore neceſſary that a phyſician ſhould know when he cures with advantage, and when not? And likewiſe that every artiſt ſhould know when he will be benefited by the work which he does, and when not?—Perhaps not, ſaid he.—Sometimes, therefore, I replied, when a phyſician acts profitably, or noxiouſly, he will not know that he acts in this manner; though, according to your doctrine, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately. Or do you not ſay ſo?—I do.—Does it not therefore ſeem, I replied, that ſometimes, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is himſelf ignorant that he is temperate? But this, ſaid he, Socrates, can never take place. If you think that this neceſſarily follows from what I have admitted above, I will readily grant it you. For I ſhall not be aſhamed to confeſs, that ſomething has been improperly aſſerted, rather than admit that the man who is ignorant of himſelf is temperate. For I nearly ſay, that to know ourſelves, is temperance; and I agree with him who inſcribed this precept in the temple of Apollo at Delphi. For this precept appears to me to have been inſcribed as a ſalutation of Divinity, to be uſed by thoſe that enter the temple, inſtead of *hail!* So that this inſcription does not directly ſignify joy, or imply that we ſhould exhort each other to rejoice, but rather, to be temperate. For thus the God ſpeaks to thoſe that enter the temple; and addreſſes us otherwiſe than men are wont to do, as he alſo conceived, in my opinion, who placed this inſcription. It likewiſe ſays nothing elſe to thoſe that enter, than that they ſhould live temperately. But as ſpeaking prophetically, it ſays this in a more enigmatic manner. For "Know thyſelf," is the ſame as "Be temperate," as both the writings and I aſſert. But perhaps ſome one may think it has a different meaning, which appears to me to have been the caſe with thoſe who placed thoſe poſterior inſcriptions, "Nothing too much[1]", and "A ſurety is near to ſorrow[2]." For they thought that "Know thyſelf," was advice, and not an addreſs of the Divinity to thoſe that enter the temple. Afterwards, that they might ſuſpend advice in no reſpect inferior to this, they placed theſe inſcriptions. Hence, Socrates, that for the ſake of which I aſſert all theſe things is this, that I may grant you all that has been ſaid above. For perhaps you may have ſaid ſomething more right reſpecting them, and perhaps this may be the

[1] The ſaying of Solon. [2] The ſaying of Pittacus.

caſe

caſe with myſelf; but we have not advanced any thing clear. However, I now wiſh to give you the reaſon of this, if you do not grant that temperance is to know one's ſelf. But, I replied, O Critias, you act by me as if I acknowledged that I knew that which is the ſubject of your inquiry. But this is not the caſe. For I always inquire in conjunction with you, reſpecting that which is propoſed to be conſidered, in conſequence of being myſelf ignorant. I am conſidering, therefore, whether I ſhall aſſent or not. But ſtop till I have conſidered.—Conſider then, he replied.—I anſwered, I do. For if to know a certain thing is temperance, it is evident that temperance will be a certain ſcience, and a ſcience of ſomething. Or will it not?—It is, he replied, and of itſelf.—Is not therefore, I ſaid, medicine the ſcience of that which is healthy?—Entirely ſo.—If then, I ſaid, you ſhould aſk, ſince medicine is the ſcience of that which is healthy, of what advantage it is to us, and what it accompliſhes, I ſhould reply that it is of no ſmall advantage, becauſe it procures us health, the effecting of which is beautiful, if you admit this.—I do admit it.—If therefore you ſhould again aſk me, what architecture effects, which is the ſcience of building, I ſhould ſay, houſes; and I ſhould reply in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other arts: it is requiſite therefore, Critias, ſince you ſay that temperance is the ſcience of itſelf, that you ſhould be able to anſwer him who aſks you, what beautiful work temperance effects, and which deſerves to be named. Tell me therefore what it is?—But Socrates, ſaid he, you do not interrogate rightly. For temperance is not naturally ſimilar to other ſciences, nor are other ſciences ſimilar to other. But you make your inquiry as if they were ſimilar. For tell me, ſaid he, what work is there in the logiſtic [1], or geometric art, which is of the like nature with a houſe, the work of the architectural art, or with that of a garment, which is the work of the weaving art; and ſo in many other ſuch particulars belonging to the ſeveral arts. Can you in theſe exhibit to me any ſuch work? But you cannot.—I replied, You ſpeak the truth. But this I can ſhow you, of what each of theſe ſciences is the ſcience, and which is ſomething different from that ſcience. Thus, for in-

[1] Logiſtic is the contemplation of things numbered, but is not converſant with pure numbers. Hence it conſiders any one ſenſible *particular* as the monad, and that which is *numbered* as *number*; as for inſtance three things as the triad, and ten things as the decad. It is nothing elſe than vulgar practical arithmetic.

ſtance,

ſtance, the logiſtic ſcience is the ſcience of even and odd multitude, how they ſubſiſt with reſpect to themſelves and to each other. Is it not?—Entirely ſo, he replied.—Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from the logiſtic ſcience?—Undoubtedly.—Staticks alſo is the ſcience of the weight of a heavier and lighter body. And the heavy and the light are different from ſtaticks itſelf. Do you admit this?—I do.—Tell me then, what that is of which temperance is the ſcience, and which is different from temperance itſelf?—This very thing, Socrates, ſaid he, which you are now ſeeking, is that by which temperance differs from all other ſciences: but you inquire after a certain ſimilitude of it to other ſciences. This however is not the caſe: for all other ſciences are ſciences of ſomething different from themſelves; but this alone is both the ſcience of other ſciences and of itſelf. And of theſe things you ought by no means to be ignorant. But I think that you do the very thing which you juſt now denied that you did: for you attempt to confute me, and diſmiſs that which is the ſubject of our diſcourſe.—What are you doing, I replied? Do you think that if I ſhould endeavour to confute you, I ſhould do it on any other account, than that I might diſcover the meaning of what I aſſert, as I am fearful, leſt whilſt I think myſelf knowing, when at the ſame time I am not, I ſhould be unconſcious of my ignorance? And now I ſay that I do this, viz. conſider the diſcourſe, principally indeed for my own ſake, but, perhaps alſo for the ſake of my other friends. Or do you not think it is a common good, for the condition of every thing to become apparent nearly to all men?—Very much ſo, he replied, Socrates.—Boldly therefore, ſaid I, O bleſſed man, give your opinion in anſwer to the queſtion, diſmiſſing the conſideration whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted; but attend to the diſcourſe itſelf, conſidering what will be the conſequence when either of us is confuted.—I ſhall do ſo, he replied: for you appear to me to ſpeak well.—Inform me therefore, ſaid I, what you ſay reſpecting temperance.—I ſay then, he replied, that this alone, of all other ſciences, is both the ſcience of itſelf and of other ſciences. Will it therefore, ſaid I, be the ſcience of ignorance[1], ſince it is of ſcience?—Entirely ſo.—The temperate man therefore alone

[1] Socrates aſks this, becauſe there is one and the ſame ſcience of contraries. Thus the medicinal ſcience, which knows health, knows alſo diſeaſe.

will

will know himſelf, and will be able to explore what it is he knows, and what it is he does not know. In a ſimilar manner likewiſe he will be able to conſider reſpecting others, what it is which any one knows, and thinks he knows; and what it is which he himſelf thinks he knows, but does not know. But no other perſon will be able to accompliſh this. Likewiſe this is to be temperate, and is temperance, and the knowledge of ourſelves, to know what we know, and what we do not know. Are theſe the things which you aſſert?—They are, he replied.—Again therefore, ſaid I, the third[1] to the Saviour, let us conſider as it were from the beginning. In the firſt place, whether this is poſſible or not, that with reſpect to what a man knows, and does not know, he may know that he knows and does not know. And, in the next place, if this is poſſible, what will be the utility of it to us who know it.—It is requiſite, ſaid he, to conſider this.—Come then, ſaid I, Critias, conſider whether you have any clear conceptions reſpecting theſe things. For I am dubious, and I will tell you in what.—By all means, ſaid he.—The following conſequence then, I replied, will enſue (if that is true which you juſt now aſſerted), that there is one ſcience which is not the ſcience of any thing elſe than of itſelf and other ſciences, and of ignorance. Will not this be the caſe?—Entirely ſo.—See then, my friend, how abſurdly we have endeavoured to ſpeak. For if you conſider this ſame thing in other things, it will, I think, appear to you to be impoſſible.—How and where?—In the following particulars. For conſider, whether it appears to you that there is a certain ſight, which is not the viſion of thoſe things which are the objects of other viſions, but is the viſion of itſelf and other viſions, and is likewiſe the viſion of that which is not viſion: and again, in a ſimilar manner, which does not ſee any colour, though it is ſight, but ſees itſelf and other viſions. Does it appear to you that there is ſuch a ſight as this?—By Jupiter, it does not.—What then? Can there be an auditory ſenſe, which does not hear any ſound, but hears itſelf, and other hearings, together with a privation of hearing?—Nor yet this.—In ſhort, therefore, conſider with reſpect to all the ſenſes, whether it appears to you that there is any ſenſe, which perceives other ſenſes and itſelf, but perceives none of thoſe things which are the objects of the other ſenſes.—This does not appear to me to

[1] See this explained in the Notes on the Philebus.

be the caſe.—But does it appear to you that there is any deſire, which is the deſire of no pleaſure, but is the deſire of itſelf and of other deſires?—It does not.—Nor, as I think, is there any will which wills no good, but alone wills itſelf and other wills.—There is not.—But will you ſay that there is a love of ſuch a kind, as to be the love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itſelf and other loves?—Not I, ſaid he.—Do you conceive then, that there is any fear which fears itſelf and other fears, but fears nothing dreadful?—I do not, ſaid he.—But is there any opinion which opines opinions and itſelf, but which forms no opinion reſpecting thoſe things which are the ſubjects of other opinions?—By no means.—But we ſay, as it ſeems, that there is a ſcience of ſuch a kind, as to be the ſcience of no diſcipline, but which is the ſcience of itſelf and of other ſciences.—We do ſay ſo.—Muſt it not therefore be wonderful if there is ſuch a ſcience? For we do not as yet ſtrenuouſly contend that there is not, but conſider if there is.—Right.—Come then, is this ſcience the ſcience of ſomething? And does it poſſeſs a certain power, by which it is enabled to be the ſcience of ſomething?—Entirely ſo.—And muſt we not alſo ſay that the greater poſſeſſes a certain power, by which it is greater than ſomething?—We muſt.—Muſt it not therefore be greater than ſomething leſſer, if it is greater?—It is neceſſary.—If therefore we ſhould find ſomething greater, which is greater than things greater, and than itſelf, but which is not greater than any of thoſe things than which other things are greater, would it not follow that a thing of this kind, ſince it is greater than itſelf, is alſo leſs than itſelf?—This is perfectly neceſſary, Socrates, ſaid he.—If therefore there is any thing which is double of other doubles, and of itſelf, it will be double of other doubles, and of itſelf, in conſequence of being half. For nothing can be double of any thing elſe than of half.—True.—But being more than itſelf, will it not alſo be leſs than itſelf? And will not a thing which is heavier than, be alſo lighter than, itſelf? And that which is older than, be alſo younger than, itſelf? And in every thing elſe, in a ſimiliar manner, will it not follow, that whatever has a power of its own with reſpect to itſelf, will alſo poſſeſs that eſſence to which this power is related? But my meaning is this: Do we not ſay, that hearing is nothing elſe than a hearing of ſound?—We do?—If therefore it could hear itſelf,

itſelf, would it not hear in conſequence of itſelf poſſeſſing a voice? For otherwiſe it would not hear.—It is perfectly neceſſary this ſhould be the caſe.—Sight likewiſe, O beſt of men, if it could itſelf ſee itſelf, muſt neceſſarily poſſeſs a certain colour. For without colour, ſight would never be able to perceive any thing.—It would not.—You ſee therefore, O Critias, that the particulars which we have diſcuſſed, appear to us to be partly altogether impoſſible, and partly dubious in the extreme, whether they poſſeſs a power of their own with reſpect to themſelves. For it is perfectly impoſſible that this can be the caſe with magnitude, multitude, and other things of this kind. Or is it not?—Entirely ſo.—Again, that hearing hears itſelf, and ſight ſees itſelf, and that motion moves itſelf, and heat burns itſelf, and all other ſuch like aſſertions, may be not credited by ſome, but may perhaps be believed by others. But there is occaſion, my friend, for ſome great man, who may be able to ſhow ſufficiently, by a diviſion through all things, whether nothing except ſcience naturally poſſeſſes a power of its own with reſpect to itſelf, and not a power only over ſomething elſe; or whether this is the caſe with ſome things, and not with others: and again, if there are certain things which poſſeſs a power with reſpect to themſelves, whether the ſcience which we ſay is temperance, ranks in the number of theſe. For I do not believe myſelf ſufficient for the diſcuſſion of theſe particulars: on which account I am not able ſtrenuouſly to affirm, whether it is poſſible there can be a ſcience of ſcience. Nor if there is, could I admit that temperance is this ſcience, till I had conſidered whether, being ſuch, it would be of any advantage to us, or not. For I propheſy that temperance is ſomething advantageous and good. Do you therefore, O ſon of Callæſchrus, (ſince you aſſert that temperance is this ſcience of ſcience, and likewiſe of ignorance,) in the firſt place evince this, that it is poſſible for you to prove that which I have juſt now mentioned; and in the next place, in addition to its being poſſible, ſhow that it is profitable: and thus perhaps you will ſatisfy me that what you have ſaid reſpecting temperance is right.—But, Critias, when he had heard theſe things, and ſaw that I was dubious, in the ſame manner as thoſe that look directly at others who are gaping, gape themſelves, ſo he appeared to me to be involved in doubt, in conſequence of my doubting. However, being very much

celebrated, he was aſhamed of thoſe that were preſent; and was neither willing to grant me that he was incapable of deciding the queſtion which I propoſed to him, nor yet did he aſſert any thing perſpicuous, but concealed his perplexity. But I, that the diſcourſe might proceed, ſaid, If it is agreeable to you, Critias, we will now grant this, that it is poſſible there may be a ſcience of ſcience. But again, let us conſider whether it is ſo or not. If therefore this is in the higheſt degree poſſible, why is it more poſſible to know what any one knows, and what he does not know? For we ſay that this is for a man to know himſelf, and to be temperate. Or do we not?—Entirely ſo, he replied, and this happens in a certain reſpect to be the caſe, Socrates. For if any one poſſeſſes that ſcience which knows itſelf, he will be ſuch as that is which he poſſeſſes. Juſt as when any one poſſeſſes ſwiftneſs, he is ſwift; when he poſſeſſes beauty, is beautiful; and when knowledge, is knowing. But when any one poſſeſſes a knowledge of himſelf, he will then become himſelf knowing himſelf.—To this I replied, I was not dubious, that when any one poſſeſſes the knowledge of himſelf, he then knows himſelf; but I was doubtful, what neceſſity compels the man who poſſeſſes this knowledge to know what he knows, and what he does not know.—Becauſe, Socrates, this is the ſame with that.—Perhaps ſo, I replied; but I ſeem to be always ſimilarly affected. For again, I do not underſtand how it is the ſame thing for a man to know what he knows, and to know what he does not know.—How do you mean? ſaid he.—Thus, I replied. Since there is a ſcience of ſcience, will this ſcience be able to divide any further than this, that of theſe things this is ſcience, and that is ignorance?—It will not; but thus far alone.—Is the ſcience therefore, and ignorance of that which is healthful, the ſame with the ſcience and ignorance of the juſt?—By no means.—But I think that the one is a medicinal, and the other a political ſcience; and that the ſcience of ſcience is nothing elſe than ſcience.—Undoubtedly.—He therefore who has not a ſcientific knowledge of the healthy and the juſt, but alone knows ſcience, as alone poſſeſſing ſcience of this, ſuch a one will know that he knows, and that he poſſeſſes a certain ſcience, both with reſpect to himſelf and other things. Or will he not?—Yes.—But how will he know that he knows through this ſcience? For he knows the healthful through the medicinal ſcience, and not through temperance; the harmonic

harmonic through the muſical ſcience, and not through temperance; and that which pertains to building through the architectural ſcience, and not through temperance; and ſo in every thing elſe. Is it not ſo?—So it appears.—But how can temperance, if it is the ſcience of ſciences, know that it knows the ſalubrious, or that which pertains to building?—It cannot by any means.—Being therefore ignorant of this, it will not know that which it knows, but will alone know that it knows.—So it ſeems.—To know therefore that which we know, and that of which we are ignorant, will not be to be temperate, nor yet will be temperance, but as it ſeems this will conſiſt alone in knowing that we know, and that we do not know.—It appears ſo.—Hence, he who poſſeſſes this ſcience of ſciences, will not be able to examine another, who profeſſes to have a ſcientific knowledge, whether he knows ſcientifically or not that which he ſays he knows; but as it ſeems he will alone know this, that he poſſeſſes a certain ſcience, but temperance will not enable him to know the object of this ſcience.—It does not appear that it will.—Neither therefore will he be able to diſtinguiſh one who pretends to be a phyſician, but is not, from one who is a true phyſician, nor any other who is from one who is not endued with ſcientific knowledge. But let us thus conſider; if a temperate man, or any other perſon, intends to diſcover a true and a falſe phyſician, will he not act as follows? He will not diſcourſe with him reſpecting the medicinal ſcience: for, as we have ſaid, a phyſician attends to nothing elſe than the healthy and the diſeaſed, the ſalubrious and the noxious. Is it not ſo?—It is.—But he knows nothing reſpecting ſcience; for this we have attributed to temperance alone.—We have.—The phyſician therefore will not know any thing about medicine, ſince medicine is a ſcience.—True.—And the temperate man will know that he poſſeſſes a certain ſcience; but it is neceſſary that of this ſcience the phyſician ſhould make trial; and to know what this ſcience is muſt be the province of ſome other perſon. Or is not every ſcience defined by this, not only that it is a ſcience, but by aſcertaining what ſcience it is, and what are its objects?—Yes.—The medicinal ſcience, therefore, is defined to be different from other ſciences in this, that it is the ſcience of the ſalubrious and the noxious.—It is.—Is it not therefore neceſſary, that he who wiſhes to conſider the medicinal ſcience, ſhould conſider the ſubjects with which it is converſant?

verſant? For it is not proper to contemplate it in things external, with which it is not converſant.—Certainly not.—He therefore who contemplates rightly, will contemplate a phyſician, ſo far as he is a phyſician, in things ſalubrious and noxious.—So it ſeems.—In words and actions therefore, will not ſuch a one conſider whether what is aſſerted is true, and whether what is done is done rightly?—It is neceſſary.—But can any one accompliſh this without the medicinal ſcience?—Certainly not.—Nor yet can any other, as it ſeems, except the phyſician; nor can this be accompliſhed by the temperate man. For, beſides being temperate, he would be a phyſician.—True.—More than any thing therefore will it follow, if temperance is alone the ſcience of ſcience, and the ſcience of ignorance, that neither can he who knows the medical art, nor he who does not, be able to diſtinguiſh the real or pretended phyſician, or one who thinks he is a phyſician, nor can any other perſon who is knowing in any thing whatever, be able to accompliſh this, except him who profeſſes the ſame art, as is the caſe with other artiſts.—It appears ſo, ſaid he.—What further utility then, Critias, ſhall we derive from temperance, if it is ſuch as we have aſſerted it to be? For if, as we ſuppoſed in the beginning, the temperate man knows that which he knows, and that of which he is ignorant, knowing with reſpect to the former *that* he knows, and with reſpect to the latter that he does not know, and is able to contemplate another perſon who is affected in the very ſame manner,—if this be the caſe, we muſt ſay that we derive a great advantage from being temperate. For both we who poſſeſs temperance, and all ſuch as are governed by us, ſhall paſs through life without guilt; ſince we ſhall neither ourſelves endeavour to do any thing which we do not know, but finding out ſkilful perſons, commit it to their care, nor ſhall we allow thoſe that are in ſubjection to us to do any thing elſe than what they will do well, but this will be that of which they poſſeſs a ſcientific knowledge. And thus through temperance we ſhall govern our families in a proper manner, well adminiſter the affairs of cities, and every thing elſe which is under the dominion of temperance. For erroneous conduct being taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it is neceſſary that men with theſe qualifications ſhould act beautifully and well; and that thoſe that act well ſhould be happy. Should we not, O Critias, ſpeak in this manner reſpecting temperance;

temperance; aſſerting, how great a good it is to know what any one knows, and what he does not know?—Entirely ſo, he replied.—But now, ſaid I, you ſee that no ſuch ſcience has appeared to us any where.—I do ſee it, he replied.—Has not therefore, ſaid I, temperance, which we have now found to be that which knows both ſcience and the privation of ſcience, this good, that he who poſſeſſes it will eaſily learn whatever elſe he may attempt to learn, and all things will appear to him in a clearer point of view? Will not this likewiſe follow from his looking to ſcience in whatever he learns? And will he not examine others better, reſpecting things which he has learned? And muſt not thoſe who examine others without this, do it in a more imbecile and unbecoming manner? Are theſe the privileges, my friend, which we enjoy through the poſſeſſion of temperance? But at the ſame time, do we look to ſomething greater, and require temperance to be greater than it really is?—Perhaps, ſaid he, this is the caſe.—Perhaps ſo, I replied. And perhaps too we have inveſtigated nothing profitable. But I conjecture this from hence, that certain abſurd conſequences appear to me to enſue reſpecting temperance, if it is ſuch as we have defined it to be. For let us ſee, if you pleaſe admitting that it is poſſible to have a ſcientific knowledge of ſcience; and let us not deprive temperance of the power of knowing what it knows, and what it does not know, which we aſcribed to it at firſt, but let us confer upon it this power. And, admitting all theſe particulars, let us ſtill more diligently conſider, if being ſuch it will benefit us at preſent. For what we juſt now ſaid, I mean that temperance would be a great good, if it were of ſuch a nature as to govern families and cities, does not appear to me, O Critias, to have been properly granted.—How ſo, he replied.—Becauſe, ſaid I, we eaſily admitted, that it would be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed thoſe things which we knew, and committed to others endued with knowledge the management of things of which we are ignorant.—Did we not then, ſaid he, do right in aſſenting to theſe things?—It appears to me, I replied, that we did not.—You really ſpeak abſurdly, ſaid he, Socrates.—By the dog, ſaid I, thus it appears to me. And juſt now looking at theſe things, I ſaid, that they ſeemed to me to be abſurd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly conſidered them. For in reality, if temperance is ſuch as we have deſcribed it, it does not appear evident to

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me; what good it will produce for us.—Inform me, ſaid he, how this is, that we alſo may know what you ſay.—I think, I replied, that I am trifling; but at the ſame time, it is neceſſary to conſider that which preſents itſelf to our view, and not raſhly omit it, if any one pays to it the ſmalleſt degree of attention.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he.—Hear then, I replied, my dream, whether it has paſſed through the gate of horn [1], or through that of ivory. For if temperance ſhould govern us, being ſuch as we have now defined it to be, it would indeed act ſcientifically; nor would he who aſſerts himſelf to be a pilot, when he is not, deceive us; nor would a phyſician, nor a general of an army, nor any other who pretends to know that which he does not know, elude our penetration. But from theſe things thus ſubſiſting, ſomething elſe would happen to us; for our bodies would be more healthful than they are at preſent, and we ſhould be preſerved in the perils of the ſea and war. We ſhould likewiſe poſſeſs all our veſſels and inſtruments, together with our garments, ſhoes, and all the conveniences and neceſſaries of life, more artificially conſtructed than at preſent, becauſe we ſhould employ true artiſts. If alſo you are willing we ſhould grant that prophecy is the ſcience of that which is future, and that temperance preſiding over it, avoids arrogant diviners, but chooſes true prophets for the prediction of future events, I ſhould affirm that the human race, furniſhed with this, would act and live ſcientifically. For temperance being our guard, it will not ſuffer ignorance interfering to cooperate with us. But that we ſhall act well and be happy, in conſequence of acting ſcientifically, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to underſtand.—But indeed, he replied, you will not eaſily find any other end of acting well, if you deſpiſe acting ſcientifically.—In-

[1] Socrates here alludes to Homer's well-known deſcription of the two gates of dreams, of which the following explanation is given by Porphyry, as preſerved by Macrobius in Somn. Scip. cap. 3. "All truth, ſays he, is latent; but this the ſoul ſometimes beholds, when ſhe is a little liberated by ſleep from the employments of the body. And ſometimes ſhe extends her ſight, but never perfectly reaches the object of her viſion. Hence when ſhe beholds, ſhe does not ſee it with a free and direct light, but through an intervening veil, which the folds of darkening nature draw over her eye. This veil, when in ſleep it admits the ſight to extend as far as to truth, is ſaid to be of horn, whoſe nature is ſuch, from its tenuity, that it is pervious to the ſight. But when it dulls the ſight and repels it from the viſion of truth, it is ſaid to be of ivory, which is a body ſo naturally denſe, that, however thin it may be ſcraped, it cannot be penetrated by the viſual rays."

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ſtruct me therefore more particularly, I ſaid, what kind of ſcientific action you mean. Is it that of cutting leather?—It is not, by Jupiter.—Is it that of a brazier?—By no means.—Is it that of a wool-worker, or a turner, or any ſuch like artiſts?—It is not.—We muſt therefore, I replied, no longer perſiſt in the aſſertion, that he is happy who lives ſcientifically. For theſe artiſts, though they live ſcientifically, are not acknowledged by you to be happy; but it appears to me that the happy man ſhould be ranked among *certain* perſons that live ſcientifically. And perhaps you will aſſert the happy man to be him whom I juſt now mentioned, I mean the diviner, who knows all future events. Do you ſpeak of this, or of any other character?—Of this, ſaid he, and another.—What other? I replied. Do you ſpeak of the man who, beſides knowing future events, knows every thing paſt and preſent, and is not ignorant of any thing? For let us admit that there is ſuch a man: for I think you will not ſay that any one lives more ſcientifically than this man.—Certainly not.—But this alſo ſhould be added, Which of the ſciences makes him happy? Or do all the ſciences ſimilarly produce this effect?—By no means, ſaid he.—But which moſt eminently accompliſhes this? Is it that by which a man knows things paſt, preſent, and to come? And will it therefore be the ſcience of cheſs?—But why of cheſs? he replied.—Will it then be the logiſtic ſcience?—By no means.—Shall we ſay it is the ſcience by which health is procured.—Rather ſo, ſaid he.—But is it, I replied, eſpecially that ſcience by which we know ſome particular thing?—It is that, ſaid he, by which we know good and evil.—O vile man, I replied, ſome time ſince you drew me round in a circle, concealing from me that to act well, and be happy, did not conſiſt in living ſcientifically, and were not produced by the poſſeſſion of all the other ſciences, but are effected by one ſcience alone, which enables us to know good and evil. And if, O Critias, you were willing to take away this ſcience from the other ſciences, would the medicinal ſcience no leſs produce health, that of the leather-worker ſhoes, that of the weaver garments? And would the pilot's art no leſs prevent us from periſhing in the ſea, and the military ſcience from being killed in battle?—No leſs, ſaid he.—But, friend Critias, this ſcience, by which we know good and evil, being taken away, each of theſe other ſciences will no longer operate beneficially.—True.—But this ſcience, as it ſeems, is not temperance, but that, the employment of which is to benefit us: for it is not

the ſcience of ſciences, and their privations, but it is the ſcience of good and evil. So that if temperance is beneficial, it will be uſeful to us in ſome other reſpect.—But, he replied, is not temperance then beneficial? For if temperance is the ſcience of ſciences, and preſides over other ſciences, it will alſo benefit us by ruling over this ſcience which is converſant with the good.—But will temperance, I replied, give us health, and not the medicinal ſcience? And will this effect all that the other arts effect, ſo that each of theſe will no longer accompliſh its proper work? Or did we not ſome time ſince teſtify that temperance is the ſcience of ſcience, and ignorance alone, but of nothing elſe? Is it not ſo?—So it appears.—It is not therefore the artificer of health.—Clearly not.—For health is the production of another art. Is it not?—It is.—Hence, my friend, temperance is not the artificer of utility: for we attributed this effect to another art. Did we not?—Entirely ſo.—How therefore will temperance be beneficial, ſince it is the artificer of no utility.—By no means, Socrates, as it ſeems.—Do you not ſee, therefore, Critias, that I was very properly afraid ſome time ſince, and that I juſtly accuſed myſelf, becauſe I beheld nothing uſeful reſpecting temperance? For that which is acknowledged to be the moſt beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be uſeleſs, if I were myſelf in any reſpect uſeful for the purpoſe of proper inveſtigation. But now we are every way vanquiſhed, and by no means able to diſcover with what deſign the legiſlator inſtituted this name temperance; although we have granted many things which by no means followed from our diſcourſe. For we admitted, that there is a ſcience of ſcience, though our diſcourſe neither ſuffers nor affirms this. We likewiſe granted that the works of other ſciences were known by this ſcience, though neither did our diſcourſe ſuffer this, in order that we might define a temperate man to be one who knows that he knows the things which he knows, and who likewiſe knows that he does not know the things of which he is ignorant. This indeed we granted in a manner perfectly magnificent, not conſidering that it is impoſſible, after a manner, for a man to know that which he in no reſpect knows. For we agreed that he who is ignorant of any thing may know [1] that he is ignorant of that thing,

[1] He who is paſſing from twofold ignorance, or the being ignorant that he is ignorant, to knowledge, ſubſiſts in a middle condition between ignorance and knowledge. Accurately ſpeaking,

thing, though in my opinion there is nothing which appears more irrational than this aſſertion. But at the ſame time, ſo ſilly were we, though not obſtinate in the purſuit of this inquiry, that we were not rendered in any reſpect more able to diſcover the truth. Indeed, ſo ridiculous was our inveſtigation, that what we had formerly acknowledged, and mutually deviſed to be temperance, this in a very inſolent manner has appeared to us to be uſeleſs. On my own account, therefore, I am leſs indignant; but for your ſake I replied, O Charmides, I am very indignant, if you who are ſo beautiful in your body, and moſt temperate with reſpect to your ſoul, derive no advantage from this temperance, and are not in any reſpect benefited in life by its preſence. But I am ſtill more indignant for the ſake of the incantation, which I learned from a Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have beſtowed ſo much labour in learning it to no purpoſe. I do not, therefore, by any means think that this is the caſe, but I am of opinion that I am a bad inveſtigator. For I conſider temperance as a certain mighty good; and I am perſuaded, that if you poſſeſs it, you are *bleſſed*. But ſee if you do poſſeſs it, and do not in any reſpect require the incantation. For if you poſſeſs it, I ſhall rather adviſe you to conſider me as a trifler, and one who is incapable of inveſtigating by diſcourſe; but I ſhall adviſe you to conſider yourſelf happy in proportion to the degree of temperance which you poſſeſs. And, O Charmides—— But, by Jupiter, Socrates, ſaid he, I do not know whether I poſſeſs it, or not. For how can I know that, the nature of which you, as you ſay, are unable to diſcover? I, indeed, am not very much perſuaded by you, and I conſider myſelf, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation. I likewiſe am of opinion, ſo far as pertains to myſelf, that nothing hinders me from being daily enchanted by you, as long as you ſhall think it neceſſary.—Be it ſo, ſaid Critias: but, O Charmides, if you act in this manner, it will be to me as an argument that you are temperate, becauſe you will preſent yourſelf to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not deſert him for any occaſion, whether great or ſmall.—I ſhall follow, ſaid he, and not deſert him. For I ſhould act in a dire manner, if I were not perſuaded by you who are my tutor,

ing, therefore, he does not *know* that he is ignorant, but may be ſaid to have a confuſed conſciouſneſs, or a dreaming perception, that he is ſo. This is the key to the profound meaning of Socrates when he ſaid that he *knew* that he knew nothing, which I have explained in a note on the Apology, and elſewhere.

and did not do what you order.—But, ſaid Critias, I do order you.—I ſhall, therefore, act in this manner, Charmides replied, beginning from this very day.—But what are theſe, I replied, deliberating about?—Nothing, ſaid Charmides: but we have determined to act in this manner.—You have employed violence, therefore, ſaid I, and do not permit me to interrogate.—Conſider me as having uſed force, ſaid he, ſince Critias commands me to adopt this mode of conduct. Beſides this, do you alſo conſult what you are to do.—But, I replied, there is no place left for conſultation: for no man is able to oppoſe you, when you are endeavouring and compelling to do any thing.— Do not you, therefore, reſiſt, ſaid he.—I ſhall not indeed, ſaid I, oppoſe you.

THE END OF THE CHARMIDES.

THE

LESSER HIPPIAS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ERROR.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

IN this Dialogue Hippias the ſophiſt bears the higheſt of the two ſubordinate parts or characters: from him therefore it derives its name [1]; and the brevity of it, in compariſon with the other between Socrates and the ſame ſophiſt, has occaſioned it to be called The Leſſer Hippias.—The title prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato, which is this, περι ψευδους, Concerning Lying, or untruth, is apparently defective; becauſe it expreſſes only part of the ſubject: unleſs the word lying be there taken in the ſenſe put upon it by a late writer [2], ſo as to relate to every part of human conduct. But this being not the proper ſenſe of the word, we have ventured to change the title; and to aſſign ſuch a one as, we think, comprehends the whole of the ſubject; and, in as few words as are requiſite to ſome degree of clearneſs, ſhows the nature of it. For in this Dialogue is argued a point which has been long

[1] See the latter part of the Prologue.—S.

[2] Mr. Wollaſton in his Religion of Nature delineated: where that very ingenious and learned man makes error, or deviation from rectitude in moral actions, to conſiſt in acting a lie; that is, in acting as if the nature of that perſon or thing, whom or which our action concerns, were different from what it is: which in plain Engliſh, and agreeably to the language of the Platoniſts, is the ſame thing as acting with incongruity and impropriety; or, as the Stoics love to expreſs themſelves, acting contrary to nature, our own, and that of other things.—S.

the

the ſubject of much controverſy, "whether error in the will depends on error in judgment." Socrates takes the affirmative ſide of the queſtion: and his end in ſo doing is to prove the neceſſity of informing the underſtanding in moral truths, that is, of acquiring moral ſcience; together with the neceſſity of maintaining the governing part within us in full power over that which is inferior, that is, of acquiring habits of virtue: through want of which ſcience, and of which power or virtue, the philoſopher inſinuates, that man is either led blindly or impelled inevitably into evil. This deſign is executed in three parts. The firſt is concerning words: in which it appears, from inductional reaſoning, that all untruth is owing either to ſome ignorance in the mind, that is, want of knowledge in thoſe things which are the ſubjects of our affirmation or negation, or to ſome paſſion of the ſoul, deſire of glory, for inſtance, prompting us to ſpeak either deliberately and with deſign, like Hippias, or inadvertently and raſhly, like Achilles, untruths or lies. The ſecond part is concerning actions; and proceeds in the ſame way of reaſoning by induction, to prove that all error in acting ariſes either from ignorance or weakneſs: ſeeing that in every action, merely corporeal, and alſo in the energies or works of every art, when faults are committed, ſuch as are blamable, the cauſe of this is either defect of ſkill to deſign well, or defect of ability to execute. In the laſt part, by much the ſhorteſt, but for which the other two are intended by Plato, according to his uſual manner, merely to prepare us, the reaſoning is analytical; and proves, that in diſhoneſt or bad men the underſtanding is either unenlightened by ſcience, or overpowered and blinded by paſſion, or elſe ſuffers in both ways; and therefore that, with the ignorance or impotence of mind under which they labour, they labour at the ſame time under a neceſſity of doing ill: from which neceſſity they can be freed only by inward light and ſtrength, that is, by ſcience and virtue. Here we find the Sapiens ſibique Imperioſus of Horace, in a beautiful paſſage of his ſeventh Satire, the ſecond book: ſo much of which as relates immediately to our purpoſe we have thus paraphraſed;

Thy maſter does, himſelf, ſome maſter ſerve;
Some impulſe ſets in action every nerve.
Think not the puppet in his own command;
His ſtrings are guided by another's hand.

Who then is free?—who not by paſſion fool'd,
In every motion is by reaſon rul'd.
To all but reaſon he, ſuperior, ſtill
Moves but as bids him his own better will.

Agreeably to this is that doctrine of the Stoics, derived immediately, it ſhould ſeem, from this dialogue of Plato, "that only the wiſe man is free[1]:" upon which maxim the fifth Satire of Perſius is a lively comment. But this being a philoſophical paradox, Plato employs great addreſs, in the inſinuating into the mind a truth which our own conſciouſneſs ſeems to contradict: for who is there, not under outward reſtraint, and only influenced by inward motives, who does not think himſelf free? Our ſubtle philoſopher therefore argues upon the ſuppoſition of the freedom of will in bad men; and by thus arguing, proves an abſurdity, "that ſuch as do evil wilfully are better men than thoſe who do evil without intending it." The conſequence of which is this, that the argument proceeded upon a falſe ſuppoſition; for that none do evil with a clear-ſighted and diſtinct view, and that in bad men the will is not free. Thus much only ſeems neceſſary for opening the concealed manner, deſign, and method of this dialogue. A more explicit and

[1] Plotinus alſo, the moſt antient Platoniſt of any whoſe writings are now remaining, proves that only mind or intellect is truly free; and that, therefore, liberty of will in man, or his having his actions in his own power, το αυτεξουσιον, reſides only in a ſoul whoſe inward operations follow the leading of intellect or mind, εν ψυχη κατα νουν ενεργουσῃ. And at the end of his argument he thus concludes, The ſoul, therefore, becomes free through the government of the mind; purſuing thus, without impediment or hindrance, her way to good: Γινεται ουν ψυχη ελευθερα δια νου, προς το αγαθον σπευδουσα ανεμποδιστως. Plotin. Enn. vi. l. viii. c. 5, 6, and 7. Alexander Aphrodiſ. alſo, the oldeſt interpreter of Ariſtole extant, makes the eſſence of man's freedom to conſiſt in his being governed κατα λογον τε και κρισιν, by the judgment of his own reaſon; and in acting κατα λογικην ὁρμην, from rational motives, or as he is prompted and excited by reaſon. See his treatiſe Περι ειμαρμενης, §. 14, and 23. ed. Lond. and Ariſtotle himſelf, Metaphyſic. l. ix. c. 5. Epicurus ſeems to have been the firſt who imagined human liberty to conſiſt in acting without any motives at all, or at leaſt independently of any. To account for which wild way of acting, he ſuppoſes that uncertain and unaccountable declination of atoms, or their deviation from the ordinary courſe of nature, for which he is juſtly reprehended by Cicero in many parts of his philoſophical works. Yet this notion, or fancy, of Epicurus, concerning the liberty of the will, abſurd as it is, hath been eſpouſed by ſome modern writers of great name; though without his, or indeed any other ingenious contrivance to obviate the abſurdity.—S.

particular account of them will appear in the proceſs of our notes. The Introduction is too natural and eaſy to want any explication. The outward form of the Dialogue is ſimply dramatic: and as to its genius, it may perhaps not improperly be ſaid to be of the confuting kind; for we would not, unleſs obliged by the neceſſity of reaſon, chooſe to differ from other writers, or depart from antient authority, by which it is pronounced anatreptic. What ground there is, however, for referring it to ſome other kind, will eaſily appear to the readers of our ſynopſis.—S.

THE

THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

[1] *SCENE.—The SCHOOL of PHIDOSTRATUS.*

EUDICUS.

WHENCE comes it, Socrates, that you are ſo ſilent; when Hippias here has been exhibiting ſo finely and ſo copiouſly? Why do you not join the reſt of the audience in praiſing his diſſertation; or, at leaſt, make ſome objections to it, if there was any thing in it which you diſapproved?—All the company too are now departed, and we left by ourſelves; we, who would claim an eſpecial right to ſhare in all philoſophic exerciſes.

Soc. It would give me pleaſure, Eudicus, I aſſure you, to aſk Hippias a queſtion

[1] The converſation, here related, was held preſently after Hippias had finiſhed the exhibiting or public reading of that diſſertation of his, ſo highly celebrated by himſelf in the larger Dialogue of his name, and upon the ſame ſpot of ground, which had been the ſcene of his lecture. This is evident from many circumſtances. In the firſt place, Eudicus, who is there mentioned as the patron of Hippias, and promoter of that exhibition in particular, ſuſtains the ſame character in this Dialogue. He opens it with an air of triumph upon the ſucceſs of Hippias, which appeared in the applauſe paid him by his audience: and whenever he ſpeaks afterwards, he takes the air and ſtyle of a patron, one of that kind who are humble and ignorant admirers.—It is probable that he ſtayed behind, one of the laſt of the aſſembly, on purpoſe to have an opportunity of inviting and leading the orator to his houſe; to feaſt there together, upon his coming off ſo triumphantly; as the cuſtom is in modern times upon ſimilar occaſions.—Further, it appears from that paſſage of the Greater Hippias before cited, that Socrates, with ſuch of his philoſophic friends as himſelf ſhould chooſe, was, at the particular requeſt of Hippias, to make part of the audience at his intended exhibition. It is reaſonable therefore to ſuppoſe them to be admitted without paying their quota of the contribution money. Now this circumſtance exactly tallies with what we

queſtion or two, relating to a ſubject, which he has juſt now been treating of, taken out of Homer. For I have heard your father Apemantes ſay, that the Iliad of Homer was a finer poem than his Odyſſey; and as far ſurpaſſed it in excellence, as the virtue of Achilles ſurpaſſed the virtue of Ulyſſes. For thoſe two poems, he ſaid, were purpoſely compoſed in honour of thoſe two heroes: the Odyſſey, to ſhew the virtues of Ulyſſes; the Iliad, thoſe of Achilles. Concerning this very point then, I ſhould be glad, if it pleaſes Hippias, to aſk his opinion; what he thinks of thoſe two perſons, and whether of them in his judgment was the better man. For his exhibition, beſides containing a great variety of other matters, diſplayed much learning in the poets, and particularly in Homer.

Eud. There is no doubt but Hippias, if you propoſe a queſtion to him, will condeſcend to give an anſwer.—Will you not, Hippias, anſwer to any queſtion which Socrates ſhall propoſe to you? or what other courſe will you take in the affair?

Hip. [1] I ſhould take a ſhameful courſe indeed, Eudicus, ſhould I decline

find in this Dialogue. For, not to inſiſt on the improbability that Socrates ſhould have been preſent without ſuch ſpecial invitation; it accounts for the tarrying behind of Socrates and his friends, out of civility to Hippias, who probably had conducted and introduced them to the place appointed for the exhibition.—That Socrates was at this time accompanied by ſome of his followers in philoſophy, is plain from the firſt ſpeech of Eudicus; at the concluſion of which he addreſſes Socrates in the plural number, meaning him and his friends.—One argument more, to prove that the exhibition of Hippias, which gave occaſion to this Dialogue, was the ſame with that promiſed in the Greater Hippias, ariſes from the nature of the diſſertation itſelf. For the characters of the heroes in Homer's Iliad were drawn in this which he had been exhibiting, as we learn from the following Dialogue; and it appears from the ſubject, the title, and introduction of the diſſertation promiſed, that a deſcription of thoſe very characters made a conſiderable part of it.—Remarkable inſtances, all theſe, of Plato's exact fidelity in the dramatic circumſtances of his Dialogues, if true; or of his accuracy and exquiſite judgment in adapting them one to another and to probability, if they are feigned.—S.

[1] The uſual manner of Plato, in his Dialogues, is to open the character of each perſon, in the beginning or firſt ſpeeches of his part; a manner worthy the imitation of all dramatic poets. The moſt ſtriking feature in the character of Hippias is vanity, or the deſire of falſe and vain applauſe: accordingly, it is here, in the very outſet of the Dialogue, ſhown in a ſtrong light. But there is, beſides, a peculiar reaſon for diſplaying it in the beginning of this particular Dialogue, becauſe the diſplay of Hippias's vanity, and of the influence that vanity had upon his conduct, makes a material part of the ſubject and deſign.—S.

anſwering

anſwering to any queſtion put by Socrates; I, who never fail my attendance at the Olympic games; and, quitting the privacy of home, conſtantly preſent myſelf in the temple there, to diſſert, before the general aſſembly of the Grecians, upon any of the ſubjects which I have then ready for exhibition, ſuch as ſhall be choſen by the audience; and to anſwer to any queſtion which any man ſhall think fit to aſk.

Soc. Happy is the ſituation of your mind, Hippias, that, as often as the Olympic feſtival returns, you can [1] proceed to the temple with a ſoul ſo full of alacrity and hope, through conſciouſneſs of wiſdom. I ſhould much wonder, if any one of the athletic combatants, on that occaſion, marched to the engagement with half that ſecurity and confidence in the powers of his body, which you, according to your own account, have in the abilities of your mind.

Hip. I have reaſon, Socrates, to entertain ſuch confidence. For, ſince the time when I firſt contended for a prize in the trials of ſkill at the Olympics, I have never met with a man my ſuperior in any which I engaged in.

Soc. The reputation of your wiſdom, Hippias, will be a fair monument of glory to your family and country.—But what ſay you to our queſtion concerning Achilles and Ulyſſes? Whether of the two, think you, was the better man; and in what reſpects? For, amidſt the multitude of people, who were within, thronging about you at your exhibition, I miſſed hearing ſome part of what you ſaid; and, though deſirous of aſking you to repeat it over again, I ſuppreſſed that deſire, on account of the greatneſs of the crowd, and becauſe I would not interrupt your diſſertation. But ſince we are reduced

[1] That is, when he was going to engage in thoſe voluntary combats or contentions between the ſophiſts, to prove which of them could make the fineſt exhibition. The deciſion of theſe ſeems to have been left to that judicious audience of theirs, the multitude; who promulgated their ſentence, we preſume, in their uſual way, by beſtowing a more or leſs loud roar of applauſe, in proportion as they were more or leſs pleaſed with each of the combatants in theſe bye-battles. For, as it is certain that theſe made no part of thoſe ſolemn combats or competitions at the Olympic feſtival, according to its original inſtitution; ſo neither do we ſuppoſe them in the number of thoſe added afterwards, thoſe in the liberal arts and ſciences. It is more probable that the ſophiſts, with a view of ſpreading their fame wider, exhibited on theſe occaſions, gratis, to the public, the moſt approved of their diſſertations made for private exhibition.—S.

to

to ſo ſmall a number, and ſince Eudicus here encourages me to aſk you, give me a preciſe and clear account of what you then ſaid of thoſe two heroes, and what diſtinction you made between their characters.

Hip. Well, Socrates; I am willing to inform you, more preciſely and diſtinctly than I did in my exhibition, what my ſentiments are concerning thoſe heroes, and others beſide.—I ſay then, that Homer has made Achilles ſuperior in virtue to all the Grecians who were at the ſiege of Troy, Neſtor ſuperior in wiſdom, and Ulyſſes in cunning.

Soc. Ah, Hippias! Will you grant me one favour more? and that is, not to laugh at me, if I am ſlow in apprehending what you ſay, and importune you with frequent and repeated queſtions. Will you endeavour, on the contrary, to give me mild and gentle anſwers?

Hip. Since I profeſs the inſtructing others in the knowledge of thoſe very things which are the ſubjects of your inquiry, and think that knowledge ſo rare, as to deſerve the being well paid for, it would be unfair and diſhonourable in me, Socrates, not to pardon your ignorance, and give a mild anſwer to your queſtions.

Soc. Very fairly and honourably ſpoken.—You muſt know then, that when you ſaid Achilles was made by Homer ſuperior in virtue, I ſeemed to apprehend your meaning: as I alſo did, when you told me that his Neſtor was made ſuperior in wiſdom. But when you further ſaid, that the poet had made Ulyſſes ſuperior in cunning, what you mean by this, to confeſs to you the truth, I am entirely ignorant of.—Poſſibly I may apprehend your meaning better by your anſwer to this queſtion: Is not cunning part of the character of Achilles, as drawn by Homer?

Hip. Nothing like it; but the height of ſimplicity. For in the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles and Ulyſſes are introduced in converſation together, Achilles, addreſſing himſelf to Ulyſſes, ſpeaks thus:

> [1] Son of Laertes, progeny of Jove!
> Subtle thy wit, Ulyſſes, and thy brain

[1] It muſt be remembered, that we have profeſſed to tranſlate the paſſages, taken out of Homer, not immediately from the poet, but from Plato. Now in theſe verſes, as here cited, beſides other various readings, there is one whole line omitted; which, though of importance in the poem, is inſignificant to the deſign of Hippias in citing the paſſage.—S.

Full

Full of devices various: but to me
Plain ſpeech belongs; and bluntly to declare
My mind, my meaning, and my fix'd reſolve.
Not the black gates of hades are to me
More hoſtile or more hateful, than the man
Whoſe tongue holds no communion with his heart.
Thus then the ſecret purpoſe of my ſoul
I tell thee—in no fruitleſs words; the deed
Shall follow.——

In theſe verſes we ſee the character of each of thoſe heroes: we ſee Achilles ſincere and ſimple, Ulyſſes falſe and cunning. For Achilles is made the ſpeaker of theſe verſes, and to Ulyſſes are they ſpoken.

Soc. Now, Hippias, I am in ſome hopes of underſtanding what you mean. Falſe you call cunning, it ſeems; and a cunning man, with you, I find, is a man of falſehood.

Hip. Exactly ſo, Socrates. And Homer accordingly has made Ulyſſes a man of that very character, in many places both of the Iliad and of the Odyſſey.

Soc. Homer then, it ſeems, was of opinion, that the man of truth was a man of different character from the man of falſehood.

Hip. Certainly, Socrates. How ſhould it be otherwiſe?

Soc. And are you of the ſame opinion then yourſelf, Hippias?

Hip. Moſt certainly. For it would be of ſad conſequence to have thoſe two oppoſite characters confounded.

Soc. Homer then let us leave out of the queſtion: it being impoſſible for us to aſk him, what he had in his mind when he wrote thoſe verſes. But, ſince you appear to ſecond and ſupport his cauſe, and to entertain the ſame ſentiments with thoſe which you attribute to him, do you anſwer at the ſame time for both, for the poet and yourſelf.

Hip. So it ſhall be. Aſk any queſtion then, whatever you think fit;—only let it be brief.

Soc. [1] By men of falſehood, do you mean men who are under ſome ſuch kind

[1] Plato, in this and the queſtions which follow, informs us what are the ſources of vice and moral

kind of inability to certain actions, as men who are ſick labour under? or do you mean men of abilities and powers for ſome or other performance?

HIP. I mean men, who have powers, and thoſe very ſtrong ones too, for many purpoſes, but particularly to deceive others.

SOC. The cunning then, it ſeems, according to your account, are men of ſtrong powers and abilities. Are they not?

HIP. They are.

SOC. Is it through folly, and want of underſtanding, that they are cunning and deceitful? or is it through artfulneſs and underſtanding—of a certain kind?

HIP. Through artfulneſs in the higheſt degree, and depth of underſtanding.

SOC. They are men of good underſtanding then, it ſeems.

HIP. They are in no want of underſtanding, by Jupiter.

SOC. Since they have underſtanding then, are they ignorant of what they are about? or do they know it?

HIP. They know well enough what they do. And through this very knowledge it is that they are ſo wicked.

SOC. With this knowledge then, which they are maſters of, can they want diſcipline or ſkill? or do they abound in it?

HIP. They have diſcipline and ſkill very ſufficient for their purpoſe, that is, to deceive.

SOC. Hold now: let me recollect all that you have ſaid. You aſſert, that men of falſehood aremen of abilities, underſtanding, knowledge, and ſkill;—that is, in thoſe ſubjects, in which they deceive.

HIP. I do.

SOC. And that men of ſincerity and men of falſchood are different kinds of men, and of quite oppoſite characters one to the other.

HIP. I own this aſſertion alſo.

moral evil. The firſt is ſome diſorder in the body, obſcuring the light of the mind, or obſtructing the operation of its faculties. Another is ſome defect in the natural powers of the underſtanding. A third is want of ſcience: and the fourth, want of virtuous habit and practice.—S.

SOC.

Soc. Well then; amongſt the men of abilities and ſkill, ſome, it ſeems, are men of falſehood, according to your account.

Hip. Moſt true.

Soc. When you ſay now, that men of falſehood are men of abilities and ſkill in certain reſpects, do you mean that they are able to deceive, if they are willing ſo to do? or think you that they want abilities for the purpoſe of deceiving?

Hip. I think they have abilities for that purpoſe.

Soc. To ſum up the whole then; men of falſehood are men who have ſkill and ability to deceive.

Hip. Right.

Soc. The man therefore, who has no ability or ſkill to deceive, cannot be a man of falſehood, or a deceiver.

Hip. Very right.

Soc. [1] Whether is that man able to do what he wills, who can exerciſe his ability at whatever time he chooſes? that is, ſuppoſing him not hindered by ſome diſeaſe or [2] other thing of that kind: but in the ſame manner, I mean, as you are able, whenever you chooſe it, to write my name. Say you not, that every ſuch man is able, who has the like power in other caſes?

Hip. I do.

Soc. Tell me now, Hippias; are not you well verſed in numbers and accounts?

Hip. Perfectly well, Socrates.

Soc. Were a man to aſk you then, "How many are thrice ſeven hundred," would you not anſwer that queſtion, if you choſe ſo to do, perfectly well, and with the utmoſt readineſs?

Hip. I certainly ſhould.

Soc. And that, becauſe your ability and ſkill are excellent in ſubjects of that kind.

Hip. True.

[1] This ſentence is evidently intended by Plato as a queſtion, not as a poſitive conſequence from any thing before ſaid. Yet all the editors have given it this wrong turn, by falſely printing ἆρα inſtead of ἄρα. And all the tranſlators were in this, as in moſt other places, miſled by the erroneous printing of the Greek text.—S.

[2] That is, any outward impediment. In the vulgar uſe of the words, power and liberty, the abſence of outward obſtacles and impediments only is conſidered.—S.

Soc. Do you excel in ability and ſkill only? or is your virtue[1] equal to your ability and ſkill—with reſpect to the ſame ſubject; that is, numbers and accounts?

Hip. It is, Socrates.

Soc. You are perfectly well able, then, upon theſe ſubjects, to ſpeak the truth: are you not?

Hip. So I imagine.

Soc. But what; are you not equally able to ſpeak untruths upon the ſame ſubject? Anſwer me now, Hippias, as you did before, with a generous freedom and openneſs. Were a man to aſk you, then, "How many are thrice ſeven hundred?" would not you be the beſt able to impoſe on others, and always to give anſwers alike untrue upon that ſubject, if you had a conſtant inclination to impoſe falſehood for truth, and never at any time to give a right anſwer? Or would the unſkilled in computations be better able to deceive than you are, if they were ſo inclined? Might[2] not the ignorant, however deſirous of perſiſting in falſe anſwers, frequently happen to ſtumble on ſuch as were true, out of mere ignorance? But you, who have ſkill, ſhould you alſo have an inclination to deceive, would you not always invariably anſwer wrong?

Hip. Certainly; the caſe is as you repreſent it.

Soc. Now the man of thorough falſehood, is he a deceiver in other caſes only, but not ſo in numbering and computing?—Would he not deceive others, when numbers and computations were the points in queſtion?

Hip. By Jupiter, would he[3].

Soc. Let us ſuppoſe, then, Hippias, ſome certain perſon to be a falſe man, or a deceiver, upon the ſubject of numbers and computations.

Hip. Well.

Soc. What kind of perſon muſt he be? In order to be a deceiver, muſt he not, as you yourſelf juſt now acknowledged, have abilities to deceive?—

[1] Socrates here means juſtice, particularly that part of it which is called veracity.—S.

[2] In the original here we certainly ought to read ἢ ὁ μεν ἀμαθης, and not ἢ (or) as it has been hitherto printed, and accordingly tranſlated.—S.

[3] Numbers and accounts being the chief articles in which bad men are guilty of fraud and falſehood.—S.

for,

for, as to any other man, who wanted thoſe abilities, you admitted, if you remember, that ſuch a one would never be a good deceiver.

HIP. I remember, we agreed in this.

SOC. Was it not proved juſt now, that you yourſelf was in the higheſt degree capable of deceiving others, by falſe information, upon the ſubject of numbers and accounts?

HIP. In this too we agreed.

SOC. And are you not in the higheſt degree capable of giving true information upon the ſame ſubject?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. [1] One and the ſame perſon therefore has abilities beyond other men to give either falſe or true information upon the ſubject of numbers and accounts: and a good arithmetician is this perſon.

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. Who appears, then, Hippias, to be the man of falſehood [2], and the deceiver, with regard to numbers and accounts? Is it any other than the good arithmetician? for he it is who is the moſt able. And the ſame man is alſo the true accountant.

HIP. So it appears.

SOC. [3] You ſee then that it belongs to the ſame man to be a man of falſehood

[1] Both members of this ſentence, in the original, are by all the editors erroneouſly, as we apprehend, made interrogative; and are ſo tranſlated by Serranus and Bembo. The other verſions, in this place, concur with ours.—S.

[2] Ariſtotle obſerves, that Plato here makes uſe of a paralogiſm, or ſophiſtical way of arguing: for by ψευδης, or, a man of falſehood, Plato, ſays he, means a man δυναμενος ψευδεσθαι, capable of ſpeaking untruths; whereas the word properly ſignifies a man ευχερης και προαιρετικος των τοιουτων [ſc. ψευδων] λογων, μη δ' ἑτερον τι, αλλα δι' αυτο, και ὁ αλλοις εμποιητικος των τοιουτων λογων, apt to ſpeak falſities through choice, and with intention to deceive, and to beget in others falſe notions of things. Ariſtot. Metaphyſic. l. v. c. 29. And ſuch a man, it is true, is the ſubject of the preſent diſpute between Socrates and Hippias; but it is an innocent piece of ſophiſtry; ſince it is not employed for the purpoſe of deceiving any, but for that only of diſcovering truth; and turns into juſt reaſoning, when the inference comes afterwards to be drawn from all the inſtances enumerated. Ariſtotle does not condemn Plato as guilty of arguing unfairly, or of putting off one ſenſe of the word for another; but as he treats, in that chapter of his Metaphyſics, concerning the various meanings of the words falſe and falſity, he produces from this paſſage of Plato a ſingular inſtance of an improper uſe of the term ψευδης, falſe, when applied to man.—S.

[3] In this ſentence Socrates makes the application of his firſt inſtance, to prove the truth of his

falſehood and a man of truth on ſuch ſubjects; and that the man of truth is not a better man in this reſpect, than the man of falſehood: for indeed he is the ſame perſon; ſo far is he from being one of oppoſite character, as you juſt now imagined.

HIP. It appears ſo in this caſe, I own.

SOC. Shall we try how it appears in other caſes?

HIP. With all my heart; if you chooſe to go on to others.

SOC. Have not you great ſkill in geometry?

HIP. I have.

SOC. Well then; is it not ſo in geometry? Is not one and the ſame perſon capable of giving either true or falſe information concerning diagrams?

HIP. I admit he is.

SOC. Is any other perſon beſide good at diagrams?

HIP. No other.

SOC. A good and ſkilful geometrician, then, is equally capable, in either way, above other perſons: and, if there be any excellent deceiver upon the ſubject of diagrams, it muſt be ſuch a man: for he has abilities to deceive; whereas the bad geometrician is wanting in thoſe abilities: ſo that neither in this caſe can the man who has no abilities to deceive ever be a deceiver or man of falſehood, as you before admitted.

HIP. You are right.

SOC. Further now, let us conſider a third caſe, that of aſtronomy; in which ſcience you have a ſtill deeper knowledge than you have in thoſe mentioned before. Is it not true, Hippias?

HIP. It is.

SOC. Does not the ſame thing then hold good in aſtronomy?

HIP. It is probable that it does, Socrates.

SOC. In this caſe, therefore, it is the good aſtronomer who is, above all others, the man of falſehood; he who is able and well qualified to deceive: for it cannot be the man who is ignorant in aſtronomy; becauſe ſuch a one is unable and unqualified for that purpoſe.

general poſition: we have, therefore, with all the tranſlators, except Serranus, given it the air of an abſolute aſſertion; contrary to the printed editions of the Greek, in which it is turned into a queſtion.—S.

HIP.

HIP. It appears ſo.

SOC. One and the ſame man therefore, in aſtronomy alſo, is the man of truth and the man of falſehood.

HIP. So it ſeems to be, I confeſs.

SOC. Now, Hippias, let us proceed to conſider, in general and at large, [1] through all the arts and ſciences, if there be any caſe in which that poſition fails of being true. You muſt be a competent judge of this, becauſe your knowledge is univerſal, and you are maſter of more arts than any man living: [2] as I have heard you yourſelf declare, at ſome of the tables in the aſſembly-

[1] Whenever Plato brings inſtances from the mathematical ſciences, in order to prove or to illuſtrate any truth running through them all, he does it always with a view of leading the mind upward from them to that maſter-ſcience*, that from which they receive their principles, the ſcience of mind; or at leaſt to its immediate and nobleſt offspring, that of morals. See particularly his Theætetus, Republic, and Epinomis. We make this obſervation here, to ſhow the ſcope of the argument now uſed by Socrates. The ſmall company about him, all of them, except Hippias and Eudicus, were his own diſciples, and of his intimate acquaintance: conſequently they were uſed to this method of reaſoning in the diſcourſes of their maſter. It was eaſy for them therefore to apply the inſtances, which he brought from the lower ſciences, agreeably to his intention; and to infer from thence, that, if his preſent argument were juſt, it would hold good in thoſe higher ſciences. But the abſurdity of this muſt have been clearly apparent to them: for they knew that the truly wiſe and good man was, with a full and free choice, attached to truth; and conſequently, where veracity was concerned, was indeed μη δυναμενος ψευδεσθαι, incapable of uttering falſities, or untruths, in a moral ſenſe; and that in ſuch caſes, ψευδης, a man of falſehood, in Plato's enſe of the word, was the ſame with ψευδης in Ariſtotle's ſenſe of it, or ψευδολογος, a man given to peak falſities, and was the reverſe therefore of the man of truth. Hence they ſaw, it followed, that, contrary to the account given by Hippias, the falſe man, or deceiver in words, was under ſome natural inability either of body or of mind, or was ignorant and void of the beſt ſcience, or wanted ſkill and experience in the art of human life, that is, practic virtue. Ariſtotle rightly obſerves, that Plato produces theſe inſtances of falſehood, in the way of induction, to prove the ſame thing univerſally to be true of all moral evil. The inference, therefore, is, that no man is a wicked or bad man ἑκων, with a clear-ſighted and free choice, but ακων, through the power of ſome evil neceſſity.—S.

[2] Socrates, to put his meaning beyond all doubt with the intelligent part of his audience, preſents to their view next, in a very ſtrong light, the character of Hippias himſelf, as full of falſe boaſting and vain pretenſions, which in him were clearly the effects of a total ignorance in moral ſcience. He had been, it ſeems, though probably but for a ſhort time, a diſciple of Hegeſidamus, or, as he is called by Jamblichus, (in Vit. Pythag. cap. ult.) Ageſidamus, a Pythagorean philoſopher of Metapontum in Lucania; who taught, that the perfection, end, and happineſs of man

* This maſter-ſcience is by Plato called *dialectic*, and by Ariſtotle metaphyſics. For an account of which ſee the Introduction to the Parmenides.—T.

confiſted

assembly-hall [1]; where you were setting forth in ample detail, and glorying in, the variety of your valuable and rare knowledge. You there told us that you went once to the Olympic festival, with your attire, and every thing which you had about you; all the making of your own hands: in the first place, that the seal-ring which you wore on your finger, for you began with that, was your own work, proving thus your skill in cutting intaglios. Beside that,

consisted in αυταρκεια, self-sufficience; but Hippias was so blind, it seems, to the true meaning of that sublime doctrine, and so stupid with regard to truth, whether metaphysical or moral, as to imagine, that the being able to furnish himself from himself with all the conveniencies and even ornaments of life, and not to be indebted to any other artists for such as their respective arts afford, was the self-sufficience recommended by the philosopher. See Quintilian. Inst. Orat. l. xii. c. 11. where that most judicious writer seems to have accounted for the conduct of Hippias from this ridiculous error of his: for, in order to attain self-sufficience, Hippias aimed at acquiring skill in all the several arts requisite for that purpose; and, falling far short of an acquisition which is beyond the powers of any one man, he yet arrogantly pretended to it, through a desire of being admired by the multitude, and for want of that true self-sufficience taught by Hegesidamus: to understand which it may be necessary in this place to observe, that in the days of Thales the Ionian arose Pythagoras; who in the southern parts of Italy, where Grecian colonies had settled, founded a sect of philosophers, from their country called Italic. The chief object of their philosophy was the knowledge of mind; which they considered as the first-moving principle in nature, and the fountain of all action; moving the soul to act with a view always to some end, which end always is some good. They held, that, as the universe was perfect and complete, actuated by soul under the direction of mind, this universal mind was αυτοτελης, that is, had in himself his own end, the possession of all good, and was sufficient to his own perfect happiness: the universal soul, therefore, acted only for the sake of producing good to particular beings, as many as was possible, and of communicating to particular minds the happiness of its own. Now this arising from its self-sufficience, independence, and the contemplation of all being and beauty within itself, the great points of the Pythagorean moral were to free man from his dependance on things out of himself, to purge his soul from those passions by which he is attached to them, and to remove his life from those incumbering pursuits which hinder the contemplation of truth, and hide the view of archetypal and true beauty. Accordingly these philosophers taught, that the end of man was ὁμοιωσις τῳ Θεῳ, a resembling of God: which Hegesidamus explained by αυταρκεια, self-sufficience: and his explication is confirmed by what Socrates in Xenophon teaches, (Mem. l. i. p. 79. ed. Simpson.) that "to want nothing is peculiar to the divine nature; and to have the fewest wants is approaching to it the nearest." This self-sufficience, by which a man becomes independent; and is free, like God himself, to do good to all; is the same thing also with that freedom of the soul, the desire of which to raise in his disciples is the ultimate end of Plato in this Dialogue.—S.

[1] The αγορα, or place where the people met, and voted in their general assemblies, was the place likewise of exchange: for at certain hours of the day mercantile business was here transacted: and at certain other hours the shops within it all around were opened, and tables were brought out, on which

that, you had another ſeal of your own engraving: a ſtrigil too[1], and an unguent-box, of your own workmanſhip. Your father ſaid, that the ſlippers, which you then had on your feet, were of your own cutting out and making; and that the garments which you then wore, the upper and the under both, were of your own weaving. But, what ſeemed the ſtrangeſt thing of all, and a proof of your ingenuity and ſkill the moſt ſurpriſing, you told us, that the belt or girdle, which you wore round your veſt, (and it was of that rare and coſtly ſort, ſuch as they make in Perſia,) was entirely your own manufacture. Beſide all this, you carried with you thither, on that occaſion, poems, you ſaid, of your own compoſing, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic; together with a great number of your compoſitions in proſe upon various ſubjects. You aſſured us, that in the ſciences, thoſe we have juſt now been ſpeaking of, you was ſuperior to every perſon then at the Olympics; as you alſo was in the ſcience of rhythm and harmony, and that of grammar. You enumerated, as well as I remember, a multitude of other branches of knowledge which you excelled in. But, I think, I had like to have forgotten your art of memory, for which you are ſo famous. Many other arts I preſume you have, which I cannot recollect at preſent. But what I mean is this; to put you upon conſidering thoſe arts and ſciences, which you are maſter of, (and I have mentioned a ſufficient number of them,) and all thoſe beſide, which are ſeverally profeſſed by others; and then to aſk you, if you can think of any, where the man of truth and the

which all kinds of ſhop-commodities were expoſed to ſale, each kind ſeverally in a peculiar part of this vaſt edifice; that every perſon who came to purchaſe might know where to meet directly with what he wanted. At ſome of theſe ſhops and tables much time was ſpent by the talkative, the inquiſitive, and the idle.—S.

[1] This was an inſtrument uſed by the old Greeks and Romans to clean the ſkin; and ſerving them, beſides, for the ſame purpoſes with our fleſh-bruſh: for the antient politer nations took a much better care of their perſons than is cuſtomary amongſt the modern Europeans. Whenever their bodies were fouled, as after travelling, or walking in duſty roads, after wreſtling, or other exerciſes, which they uſed almoſt naked in rooms ſtrewed deep with a ſoft ſand, (to procure them, when they fell, an eaſy fall,) they rubbed themſelves gently with theſe ſtrigils; bathing at the ſame time in warm baths, which were very numerous, and to be met with in all great towns and cities. At other times a more vehement rubbing ſerved in the room of exerciſe itſelf. After uſing the ſtrigil, they anointed themſelves all over, eſpecially about their joints, with ſome perfumed oil or unguent. Thus the ſkin was cleanſed, the blood was equably circulated, the muſcles were ſtrengthened, and the joints made ſupple and pliant.—S.

man

man of falſehood, as we have deſcribed them, are diſtinct perſons; and where the ſame man is not equally fitted for ſpeaking truth and falſehood. Conſider the matter in any art you pleaſe, in any kind of wiſdom, ſkill, or cunning, or whatever elſe you chooſe to name it, and you will never find it ſo to be; ſince it is not there to be found. For if you know any, which affords ſuch an inſtance, tell me what it is.

HIP. I am not able, Socrates, thus on the ſudden.

SOC. Nor ever, as I imagine, will you be able. If I am in the right then, remember, Hippias, what concluſion follows from my reaſoning.

HIP. It does not readily occur to me, Socrates, what concluſion it is you mean.

SOC. You do not perhaps at preſent exerciſe your art of memory. No doubt, you think there is at preſent no occaſion for it. I will aſſiſt you therefore in recollecting. Do you not remember that you ſaid, Achilles was a man of truth, and Ulyſſes a man of cunning and falſehood?

HIP. I do.

SOC. But now you perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falſehood have proved to be the ſame perſon. So that, if Ulyſſes was a man of falſehood, it appears that he was no leſs a man of truth; and if Achilles was a man of truth, we find he muſt alſo have been a man of falſehood. Theſe two characters then are not heterogeneous, one from the other; much leſs are they oppoſite, as you imagined; but are ſimilar, and meet in the ſame man.

HIP. Socrates, you are always twiſting and winding arguments in this ſort of way. In every matter of debate, you always pick out that point in which moſt difficulty lies; you ſtick cloſe to that, and handle it with a moſt minute exactneſs: but you never meddle with the [1] whole of the ſubject, conſidered in one view. For I can produce you now a multitude of proofs,

[1] Hippias himſelf is here made to expoſe his own looſe, vague, and declamatory way of talking; ſo oppoſite to that cloſe, preciſe, and truly logical manner of Socrates in his diſcourſes, by which alone truth can be diſcovered, and the diſputes ariſing in converſation be brought to any rational or fair concluſion. But this not being now or ever the intention of Hippias, he expreſſes in this ſpeech his uneaſineſs at the preſent method of managing the debate, and his deſire of returning to his uſual long harangues; ſhowing himſelf in this reſpect alſo the ψευδης, or man of falſehood; according to the old maxim, "*Doloſus verſatur in generalibus*," The man, who means to deceive, deals only in generals, and avoids coming to particulars.—S.

if

if you are diſpoſed to hear them, ſufficient to convince you, that Homer has made Achilles a man of ſincerity, and of greater virtue than Ulyſſes; whom he has made crafty, falſe, and deceitful, in fine, a worſe man than Achilles. And to oppoſe my proofs, do you, if you have a mind to it, bring others on your ſide of the queſtion, to prove Ulyſſes the better man: by which means our little audience here may be the better enabled to judge which of us ſpeaks the beſt.

Soc. [1] I have no doubt, Hippias, but that your wiſdom is ſuperior to mine. But it is a conſtant rule with me, at the time when any man is ſpeaking, to give him my attention; eſpecially, if I think him a wiſe man: and, as I am deſirous of comprehending perfectly all he means, afterwards I interrogate, and ſift him thoroughly concerning all he has ſaid; I conſider it over again, and compare it with the account he gives me in his anſwers, in order to my own better information. But if I think the ſpeaker inſignificant, and not worth regarding, after he has done ſpeaking, I aſk him no queſtions, nor give myſelf any trouble about what he has been talking of. You may know by this, what perſons I account wiſe. You may alſo find, that I am ſtudious and ſolicitous about the ſayings of [2] ſuch a man; that I am buſy and reſtleſs in putting queſtions to him, with a view of being improved by the acquiſition of ſome piece of knowledge. Accordingly, I took particular notice, in my own mind, of ſomething [3] which ſeemed to me very ſtrange in that paſſage of Homer, if your interpretation of it be true, that which you repeated juſt now, to prove that Achilles treated Ulyſſes as a deceiver. This to me, I ſay, ſeemed ſtrange; becauſe Ulyſſes, your cunning Ulyſſes, no where appears to have ſpoken untruths: but it is Achilles, whom we find cunning, according to your account, as being a teller of falſities and deceiving others. For having premiſed that fair profeſſion, which you juſt now repeated,

[1] Socrates here intimates, that the ſource of that habit, which Hippias had, of lying and deceiving, was a fondneſs for unmerited or falſe praiſe, with an affectation of being thought wiſe.

[2] The word in the original here is printed ταῦτ, but we preſume ought to be either τοῦτου, agreeably to the tranſlations of Ficinus and Grynæus, or as we have ſuppoſed it in ours, ταυτα.—S.

[3] From the ſenſe it is evident, that we ought here to read in the Greek ὅ, τι—ἄτοπον, κ. τ. λ. not ὅτι δ' [ἴνος,] an error frequent throughout the printed text. Stephens has frequently indeed corrected it; but has paſſed it over in this and many other places.—S.

Not the black gates of hades are to me
More hoſtile or more hateful, than the man
Whoſe tongue holds no communion with his heart.

A little afterwards he declares, that he would not be diſſuaded from his purpoſe, not by Ulyſſes and Agamemnon together; nor would he be by any means prevailed on to ſtay in the Trojan territories; but, ſays he,

[1] To-morrow, after ſacrifice to Jove
And all that next in nature is divine,
My well-mann'd galleys launch I from the ſhore
Into the briny waves: and thou ſhalt ſee,
(If curious of the ſight, or thy concern
Thou mak'ſt it,) with the dawning hour of day,
My fleet ſpread o'er the fiſhy Helleſpont;
With many an eager ſtroke of the briſk oars
Short'ning the paſſage: and if Neptune grant
Proſperous voyage, the third returning light
Shall view me on rich Pthia's fertile plains.

Beſides, long before this, with an air of inſult he had ſaid thus to Agamemnon,

[2] And now with my full galleys I depart,
Steering my courſe for Pthia:—my beſt courſe
Is homeward,—here diſhonour'd.—Nor ſhalt thou
Meet better fare, I ween:—no more expect
Spoils and rich plunder ſhall attend thine arms.

Now though he had made this declaration, firſt in the face of the whole army, and afterwards to ſuch as were intimate with him, it no where appears, that he made any preparations for his voyage, or any attempts toward the launching of his ſhips, in order to his departure homeward; but, on the contrary,

[1] We meet with this paſſage in the ninth book of the Iliad, v. 357, &c. a little after the former; and both of them exactly as they are cited by Plato.—S.

[2] The verſes, here cited, occur in the firſt book of the Iliad, with a difference only in one word. For inſtead of λωϊον, which we read in Plato, we find in Homer φερέσσον: a difference not taken notice of by Barnes in his Var. Lect. Perhaps he thought it not of importance enough to mention. But, in editions of the fineſt writers of antiquity, too minute an accuracy, we think, never can be uſed.—S.

with a noble indifference, he diſregarded the keeping of his word and the ſpeaking truth. It was for this reaſon, Hippias, that I propoſed my firſt queſtion to you; becauſe I was at a loſs to know, which of thoſe two heroes the poet had made the better man: but I preſumed that both were excellent; and that it was difficult to determine whether was the ſuperior, as well with reſpect to ſpeaking truth and[1] falſehood, as every other kind of virtue; for in that point, no leſs than in others, they ſeemed nearly on a par.

Hip. You view not the matter in its true light, Socrates. For, though Achilles breaks his word, it is plain that he had no intention to deceive, nor any diſſembled meaning: but, againſt his inclination, he is obliged, by the diſtreſſes of the army, to ſtay and give them his aſſiſtance. But when Ulyſſes ſpeaks falſely, it is with deſign, and his falſehood is voluntary.

Soc. My dear friend Hippias, you deceive me; and are guilty, yourſelf, of doing as you ſay Ulyſſes did.

Hip. Far from it, Socrates. How mean you? and in what reſpect?

Soc. By telling me, that Achilles had no intention to deceive, nor any diſſembled meaning: whereas Achilles, in ſaying through arrogance what he had no ſerious intention of doing, was ſo[2] artful an impoſtor, as Homer has repreſented him, that he appears confident of outwitting Ulyſſes, and concealing from him the emptineſs of his arrogance; nay, to that degree confident, as to dare in his preſence to contradict himſelf. Accordingly we find Ulyſſes actually impoſed upon: for, as we ſee from his ſilence on that head, he diſcovered not that Achilles had told him any untruth.

Hip. Where is all this to be found, Socrates?

[1] Socrates here mentions falſehood as well as truth, in order to preſerve conſiſtence in his argumentation; having proved to Hippias, that the ſpeaking falſehood well was the effect of ſome kind of knowledge and virtue.—S.

[2] In the Greek, Γοης, or cunning juggler. By Achilles here, we ſuppoſe, is meant that very paſſion of arrogance in him, which is the moſt diſtinguiſhed part of his character. For all the great actions and events of Homer's Iliad turn upon the deſire of Achilles to ſhow to the Grecians the importance of his preſence and his aid. By the ſame name, Γοης, is the paſſion of love called in Plato's Banquet, and in the ſame metaphorical ſenſe; becauſe both theſe paſſions impoſe upon a man's own underſtanding, and force him to ſay and do things, to which his reaſon is by no means privy; putting him, as in this caſe of Achilles, upon contradictory promiſes and aſſertions; and by their bold aſſurance, making him believe them all, by turns, himſelf.—S.

Soc. Do you not remember, that [1] after he had declared (as he did to Ulyſſes), that he would ſet ſail early the next day; to Ajax on the other hand he ſays no ſuch thing, but tells him a quite different ſtory.

Hip. In what paſſage?

Soc. In this,

> [2] No more in bloody field ſhall I engage,
> I nor my forces; till great Priam's ſon,
> The godlike Hector, worthy of his ſire,
> Through heaps of ſlaughter'd Greeks, victorious reach
> My myrmidons; or till his hoſtile flames,
> Spreading from ſhip to ſhip, approach my own.
> Then,—near my veſſel, or my tent, I truſt,
> Shall Hector's fury, though impetuous, meet
> A bound impaſſable.——

Now can you imagine, Hippias, that he was ſo forgetful, this ſon of the goddeſs Thetis, this pupil of the ſage Chiron, as that, after throwing out the bittereſt reproaches upon ſuch as ſpeak what they mean not, he ſhould firſt tell Ulyſſes that he would ſail away, and then, through forgetfulneſs, aſſure Ajax that he would continue where he was? Do you not think that he muſt have talked in this manner with deſign, and from a ſuppoſal that Ulyſſes was a plain ſimple man, and that he ſhould get the better of him that very way, by artifice and lying?

[1] In the Greek this paſſage is read thus; Ουκ οισθ', ὁτι λεγων, ὑστερον, ἢ ὡς προς τον Οδυσσεα εφη ἁμα τη ἠοι αποπλευσεισθαι, κ. τ. λ. Stephens ſaw, that this was a corrupt reading; but an emendation of it not readily occurring to his mind, he ſuppoſed that many words were wanting. A ſlight alteration only will, as we imagine, correct the ſentence thus; Ουκ οισθ', ὁτι λεγων, τη ὑστεραιᾳ (ὡς προς τον Οδυσσεα εφη) ἁμα τη ἠοι αποπλευσεισθαι, κ. τ. λ. agreeably to which we have made our tranſlation.—S.

[2] Achilles ſpeaks of Hector thus highly on this occaſion, purpoſely to raiſe the higher, in thoſe who heard him, the idea of his own valour; none but himſelf, he tells them, being able to ſtop the progreſs of ſo mighty and formidable an enemy. Mr. Pope therefore, in omitting thoſe high terms in which Achilles here mentions Hector, has omitted an eſſential beauty in this paſſage, and particularly material to that purpoſe, for which it is cited by Socrates,—to ſhow, that the inconſiſtent falſities, uttered by Achilles, were owing to his arrogance and his thirſt of glory. See the Introduction to this Dialogue. The verſes are taken from the ninth book of the Iliad, v. 646, &c. But there is evidently a falſe reading in them, as cited by Plato, μεθησομαι inſtead of μεδησομαι, obſerved by Barnes, in his notes on Homer.—S.

Hip.

Hip. I think quite otherwiſe, Socrates: I think that he was impoſed upon, himſelf, by his own ſimplicity and undeſigning heart: and that want of reflection made him talk to Ajax in a ſtrain different from that in which he had been talking to Ulyſſes. But Ulyſſes, whenever he ſpeaks truth, has always an intention to deceive, no leſs than when he ſpeaks a falſehood.

Soc. Ulyſſes then is a better man, it ſeems, than Achilles.

Hip. By no means, Socrates, clearly.

Soc. Why, was it not proved juſt now, that the ſpeakers of falſehoods, knowing them ſo to be, and with intention to deceive, were [1] better men than thoſe, who ſpoke what was falſe merely through ignorance, and againſt their intention?

Hip. But how is it poſſible, Socrates, that ſuch as are guilty of injuſtice knowingly, ſuch as are deceitful, and inſidious, and wilfully do miſchief, ſhould be better men than thoſe, who, not knowing what they do, lead others into miſchiefs or miſtakes? To ſuch is due free pardon, ſhould any injuſtice be done by their means, or if any man be deceived by them, or ſuffer injury. The laws [2] accordingly are more ſevere to deſigning cheats, and to the wilfully injurious, than to ſuch as deceive or injure without intention of ſo doing.

Soc. You ſee, Hippias, that I ſpoke truth, when I told you, how buſy

[1] This is another inſtance, ſimilar to that, taken notice of by Ariſtotle, which we mentioned before, of a ſophiſtical way of arguing uſed by Plato againſt the ſophiſts. For the truth of the poſition, contended for, has indeed been proved; and is apparent enough, in every inferior art or ſcience; but Plato applies it in this place to morals, of which it has not been proved, but the direct contrary inſinuated. There is the ſame ambiguity of expreſſion in our own language; for we uſe the term, good man, with reference not only to moral goodneſs, but even ability or ſkill in any way whatever. Such a one, we ſay, is a good man, when we only mean, as to ſome particular kind of work or action which he performs well.—S.

[2] Demoſthenes in Orat. c. Midiam, § 11. p. 35 and 36 of Dr. Taylor's edition in 8vo. gives an account of theſe laws ſomewhat more at large, too long to be here inſerted, but ſo like this of Plato's, and ſo much in the ſame words, that it ſeems highly probable he had an eye towards it when he compoſed that part of his oration. For that incomparable orator was always a great admirer of Plato, and had been one of his favourite diſciples; as we are told by the writer of the lives of the ten orators, vulgarly aſcribed to Plutarch.—S.

and

and reſtleſs I was in putting queſtions to the wiſe [f]. I fear, indeed, that I have no other valuable quality belonging to me; the reſt which I have being inconſiderable and mean. For I am apt to be miſtaken in the natures of things, and ignorant of what they truly are. A ſufficient evidence of which appears, whenever I am in company with any of you celebrated wiſe men, whoſe wiſdom is acknowledged by the united voices of all the Grecians. It then appears that I know nothing: for ſcarcely in any point am I of the ſame opinion with you. And what greater evidence can there be of a man's want of knowledge, than his differing in opinion from the wiſe. I have this one admirable quality, however, which ſaves me from the fatal conſequences of ignorance and error; this, that I am not aſhamed to learn; but am given to inquiry, and to aſking queſtions. I am very thankful alſo to the perſon who vouchſafes me an anſwer: nor ever neglected I to pay him my due acknowledgments. For whenever I had acquired a piece of knowledge, I never denied my having learnt it; nor ever pretended, that it was of my own finding out. On the contrary, I celebrate the wiſdom of my teacher, whenever I produce the doctrine which he taught me. Thus at preſent, for inſtance, I agree not with you in that poſition, which you have laid down for truth; but am ſtrongly of a different opinion. And this, I am convinced, ariſes from ſomething in me, and muſt be attributed to my being ſuch a one as I am; to avoid uſing any term or epithet too high in ſpeaking of myſelf. To me, Hippias, the truth appears directly contrary to what you ſay. I think, that thoſe who injure others, who are guilty of injuſtice, who vent falſehoods, and deceive, or commit any other fault, knowingly and wilfully, are better men than ſuch as do the ſame evils ignorantly and without free choice. Sometimes, however, I am in the oppoſite way of thinking. In ſhort, my ſentiments are ever varying upon this ſubject, and driven backward and forward continually: the cauſe of which unſteadineſs is clearly want of knowledge. But I now find in myſelf a freſh acceſſion of my old malady: for the opinion, which prevails in me at preſent, is

[f] This and ſuch other ſayings, frequent in the mouth of Socrates, paſſed with the people even of his own time for mere ironies. Whence he was commonly called ὁ εἴρων, the diſſembler of his knowledge, or pretender to ignorance.—S.

this;

this;—that ſuch as commit wilful errors in any action whatever, are better men, with reſpect to actions in that way, than thoſe who err in the ſame way againſt their will or intention. This preſent turn of mind in me is owing, as I imagine, to the preceding part of our converſation: for our reaſoning upon the point, then debated, will, in all appearance at preſent, hold good through all things; and will prove, that the involuntary actors of ill, in any of thoſe inſtances we have mentioned, are more wicked than thoſe who are guilty of the ſame bad actions wilfully. Be ſo good therefore as to ſet my mind right: for in healing the diſeaſe of this, and freeing it from ignorance, you will do me a much greater piece of ſervice, than you would in healing any diſtemper incident to my body. But now, ſhould you have any intention to go through a long harangue, I can aſſure you beforehand, that you will never that way ſucceed in the affair: for my thoughts never will be able to keep even pace with you. But if you are diſpoſed to anſwer to my queſtions, as you did before, you will highly[1] profit and improve me; and, I preſume, receive no detriment yourſelf. I have a right, Eudicus, to beg your intereſt with Hippias on this occaſion; for you it was who engaged me in this diſpute with him. If he therefore is averſe to continuing the converſation in the way which I deſire, do you intercede with him to favour my requeſt.

Eud. There will be no occaſion, Socrates, I imagine, for my interceſſion. That is made unneceſſary by what Hippias himſelf ſaid at firſt,—that he never declined anſwering to any man's queſtions. Did you not ſay ſo, Hippias?

Hip. I own it, Eudicus. But Socrates is always entangling the argument with cunning fallacies; and behaves like a ſly deceiver.

Soc. My good Hippias! I do it not wilfully, I aſſure you, nor with any intention to deceive: for, if that were the caſe, I ſhould be a man of great wiſdom and abilities, according to your account. But, if I have that fault which you accuſe me of, it is wholly involuntary in me. I pray you therefore pardon me: for pardon, you ſay, is due to involuntary and ignorant deceivers.

[1] See the laſt ſentence but one in the Greater Hippias.—S.

Eud.

Eud. Do ſo, Hippias; forgive Socrates; and be not angry with him: but for my ſake, and out of regard to your own word, anſwer to whatever queſtions he ſhall propoſe to you.

Hip. Well, at your entreaty, I will anſwer to his queſtions.—Come then; propoſe any, which you deſire to have an anſwer to.

Soc. Truly, Hippias, I am greatly deſirous to have a thorough diſcuſſion of that very point juſt now mentioned;—Which are the better ſort of men; thoſe who commit errors knowingly, wilfully, and purpoſely; or thoſe others, who are guilty of the very ſame without knowing what they do, and without any will or purpoſe to err[1]. Now the beſt way we can take, to have this point well examined, is, in my opinion, by ſetting out thus;—but obſerve, and make your anſwers duly[2];—Are there not men, who are good at a foot-race?

[1] Every univerſal truth will hold good in all particular caſes, to which it is applicable. In the way of reaſoning therefore by induction, the enumerating of many particulars, however choſen, in which the hypotheſis to be proved is found true, ſerves to induce a probability at leaſt of its being true univerſally. And if the hypotheſis fails in no inſtance that can be thought of, the certainty of it is then ſufficiently eſtabliſhed.—It ſhould ſeem, therefore, that Plato might have been indifferent what inſtances he produced to prove a doctrine which, if true, might fairly be inferred from a multitude of any pitched upon at random. And indeed, had this been all he had in view, indifferent he would certainly have been to which he gave the preference. But his deſign, in ſelecting from all the ſeveral kinds of action the particular inſtances that follow, to the end of this ſecond part of the Dialogue, is to ſhow, what weakneſſes or diſorders in the human frame are the natural cauſes of ignorance and vice; and what natural diſpoſition of body and mind is favourable to knowledge and virtue. In the choice and arrangement of theſe inſtances will appear admirable art and contrivance: for the diſcovery of which he prepares us in this ſentence, by profeſſing to take a certain method and way of beginning, ſuch as is the moſt proper.—S.

[2] Plato begins, and takes his four firſt inſtances from ſuch actions as fundamentally depend on the ſtructure of the body and the conformation of its parts; in particular, running, wreſtling, dancing, and ſinging. For the well-performing of theſe exerciſes, ſo far as the body is concerned, ſeverally depends on agility, ſtrength, gracefulneſs, and a muſical voice: and theſe ſeverally ariſe from elaſticity of the fibres, firmneſs in the fabric of the bones, pliantneſs in the joints, and a perfect power of dilatation and contraction in the lungs and larynx. When all theſe concur, the natural conſequences will be an animated, free, and eaſy flow of the blood and humours, ſprightlineſs and vigour in the ſoul, and at the ſame time (if no obſtacle hinder) firmneſs in the mind.—S.

Hip.

Hip. There are.

Soc. And others in the ſame exerciſe who are bad?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Are not the good, thoſe who run well? and the bad, thoſe who run ill?

Hip. They are.

Soc. Do not the ſlow runners run ill? the ſwift runners, well?

Hip. They do.

Soc. In the race therefore, and in running, ſwiftneſs is a good thing; ſlowneſs, a bad thing.

Hip. Without diſpute.

Soc. Whether of theſe two then is the better man in the race? One, who runs ſlow wilfully and on purpoſe; or one, whoſe ſlowneſs in running is involuntary and undeſigned?

Hip. The firſt; he, who runs ſlow on purpoſe.

Soc. Is not running the doing ſomething?

Hip. It is.

Soc. And if ſo, is not ſome action performed in running?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. The man, therefore, who runs ill, performs an action which is bad and unſeemly in the race.

Hip. Undoubtedly ſo.

Soc. And the man runs ill, you ſay, who runs ſlowly.

Hip. True.

Soc. He therefore is the good man in the race, who wilfully and purpoſely commits this bad and unſeemly action: and he is the bad man, who does it againſt his will and his intention.

Hip. So it ſeems to be.

Soc. In the race therefore, the man, who is guilty of bad actions againſt his will and his intention, is a worſe man than the other, in whom thoſe bad actions are voluntary and intended.

Hip. In the race, I grant you, that it is ſo.

Soc. And how is it in wreſtling? Whether of the two is the better wreſtler? the man who, when he falls, falls deſignedly, or the man whoſe falls are involuntary and undeſigned?

Hip. Probably, the man who falls deſignedly.

Soc. And which is the worſe and more unſeemly action in wreſtling? for a man to fall himſelf, or to give his antagoniſt a fall?

Hip. To fall himſelf.

Soc. In wreſtling then alſo, the man, who is guilty of bad and unſeemly actions with deſign, is a better man than the other, who is guilty of the ſame without deſigning them.

Hip. It is probable that he is.

Soc. And how does the rule hold with reſpect to all other actions of the body? Is not the man, whoſe body is well-framed and fitly diſpoſed, equally able for actions either ſtrong or weak, either ſeemly and becoming, or unbecoming and awkward? So that the man who has a better habit of body, when he performs any bodily exerciſe or action ill, does it out of choice; but the man, whoſe body is in a worſe ſtate, performs ill againſt his inclination.

Hip. In actions which depend on ſtrength of body, I admit the truth of your hypotheſis.

Soc. And what ſay you as to thoſe, which depend on gracefulneſs of the body, Hippias? Does it not belong to that body, which is well formed and well habituated, to exhibit unſeemly and bad motions, geſtures, and attitudes, only when the mind ſo wills and directs; but to a body of worſe make and worſe habits, to behave, move, and carry itſelf awkwardly without ſuch will and direction? or how think you?

Hip. That it is, as you ſay.

Soc. Ungracefulneſs therefore alſo, when voluntary, belongs to the body in its better plight; when involuntary, is owing to an ill or depraved ſtate of body.

Hip. So indeed it appears.

Soc. And how think you as to the voice? Which voice do you ſuppoſe the better and more excellent? That which ſings out of tune wilfully and deſignedly; or that which does ſo becauſe it cannot do otherwiſe?

Hip. That which does ſo deſignedly.

Soc. And that you call a viler voice, which errs from the harmony, and cannot help it.

Hip.

Hip. I do.

Soc. Further[1];—the things which are yours, whether would you chooſe to have them in good condition and order, or to have them bad, depraved, and out of order?

Hip. To have them good, and ſuch as they ought to be.

Soc. Whether then would you chooſe to have your feet go lame at your own pleaſure, or to have them limp and ſtumble againſt your will?

Hip. To go lame at my own pleaſure.

Soc. Is not lameneſs in the feet a depravity of the feet; and the going lame an ungraceful way of walking?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. And is not ſquinting a depravity of the eyes?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Which ſort of eyes now would you chooſe to have, and to ſee with? Such as would look aſquint only when you pleaſed, or ſuch as could not avoid ſquinting?

Hip. Such as ſquinted only when I pleaſed.

Soc. Of the things then which are your own, you deem thoſe, whoſe wrong and depraved actions are voluntary, better than thoſe, the pravity of whoſe actions is involuntary.

Hip. In things of that kind, I admit it to be true.

Soc. All ſuch therefore, ears, and noſe, and mouth, and all other parts adminiſtering to ſenſation, are to be comprehended in the following general

[1] His five next inſtances he takes from thoſe parts of the body which are the more immediate ſervants of the mind: 1. The outward inſtruments of motion (particularizing in the feet), by which the will of the mind is executed: 2. The outward organs of ſenſation (enumerating them all), through which the mind perceives outward things: 3. That immediate ſource of motion and ſenſation, the brain; to ſignify which he uſes the metaphor of a rudder, ſteering the body as the mind pleaſes: 4. Thoſe inward inſtruments of motion, and vehicles of ſenſation, the nerves; which he compares to the ſtrings of muſical inſtruments, braced up or relaxed by the different paſſions of the ſoul, and vibrating juſt as they are touched from without, or played on by the muſician's hand within: 5. and laſtly, The organs of ſpeech, ſignified by wind-inſtruments of muſic, through which the mind expreſſes her meaning, or declares her will. How much the acquiſition of knowledge, the ſtate of the ſoul, and power of the mind to do what ſhe wills, depend on having all theſe organs in perfection, is by no means difficult to conceive.—S.

rule;—thoſe, in which the bad performance of their functions is involuntary, a man would be glad not to have, ſeeing that ſuch are evil; but thoſe, whoſe wrong action or operation is wilful, and according to the intention, are deſirable, ſuch being good.

HIP. I agree.

SOC. Well; and what ſort of inſtruments is it beſt to have to do with? thoſe, with which a man may execute his work ill through choice and deſign; or thoſe, with which he cannot work otherwiſe than ill? For inſtance: Whether of the two is the beſt rudder; that, with which the ſteering ill is unavoidable; or that, with which the pilot, if he ſteers ill, does it wilfully and on purpoſe?

HIP. The latter ſort.

SOC. Is it not ſo with the bow and lyre; ſo with the flute [1]; ſo with every other kind of tools and inſtruments?

HIP. It is true.

SOC. Well [2]; and of which horſe is it beſt to be the owner? Whether of a horſe with ſuch a kind of temper and ſpirit, as may ſerve his rider in riding

[1] To the inſtances already given, which are of more eſpecial moment, the other parts and members of the body are ſubjoined, in general; the regular frame and ſound condition of them all being, in the opinion of Plato, of ſome importance to the ſoul, to its affections and paſſions; more or leſs, in proportion to the more immediate or more remote action, or influence, of the one upon the other. This will open much of Plato's ſecret meaning in the latter part of his Timæus.—S.

[2] From the juſt frame of the body, and the right formation of every member of it, the philoſopher proceeds, in the ſame metaphorical manner, to deſcribe the other part of that *εὐφυΐα*, or good natural diſpoſition, which he holds to be the neceſſary foundation of virtue. This other part is the right frame or conſtitution of the ſoul herſelf. He begins with the paſſions; agreeably to that climax which he uſes through all theſe inſtances. The paſſions are, in the Platonic ſyſtem, all comprehended under two kinds, *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, the emotions of deſire and anger. The firſt of theſe kinds is characterized under the emblem of a horſe, the latter under that of a dog; and both with great propriety. For one of theſe animals is remarkably ſubject to vehement emotions of the former kind in purſuit of glory or pleaſure; the other to emotions of the latter kind no leſs violent, when the ſeizing of his prey or the deſtruction of an enemy is the end in view. Now both theſe animals, though irrational, are by nature formed to be manageable by man; and are highly ſerviceable to him, when their paſſions are directed to their proper objects, and reſtrained within due bounds.—S.

ill

ill purpoſely and through choice only; or of a horſe [1], upon which his rider muſt of neceſſity ride ill?

Hip. Of the horſe, upon which a man may ride ill only through choice.

Soc. This horſe then is of a better ſpirit and temper than the other.

Hip. True.

Soc. With this better-tempered horſe then a man may [2], if he has an evil intention, perform ſuch miſchievous and evil tricks as this animal is capable of; but with the bad-tempered horſe he cannot avoid doing miſchief.

Hip. Perfectly true.

Soc. And is it not equally true with reſpect to the ſpirit and temper of a dog? and ſo of every other ſpecies of animals?

Hip. I admit it to hold true in the caſe of every brute animal.

Soc. Well now; and how is it in our own ſpecies, and with reſpect to the human ſoul? Whether is it better to have in our ſervice a bowman, who, if he ever miſſes the mark, miſſes wilfully [3]; or one who is apt ſo to do, contrary to his intention and his aim?

Hip. One who miſſes wilfully.

Soc. Such a one then is a better man at ſhooting.

Hip. Right.

[1] The emendation of this ſentence muſt be attributed to Cornarius: for he has been beforehand with us, in reading *αμεινον, ἢ ἧττον*, inſtead of *αμεινον ἢ κακον*, as in all the editions of the Greek it is printed.—S.

[2] Thus in the Greek; *Τῳ αμεινον ἁρα ψυχη ἐντεῦθεν τα τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθεα τουτοις τα πονηρα ἐνοικίους ἂν ποιοι, τα δε της πονηριας, ἀποικίους.* It is evident, that this reading is faulty. We have always imagined, that the fault lay in the tranſpoſition of ſome of the words, with the corruption of only one in conſequence of that tranſpoſition; and that the right reading was this; *Τ. α. ἀ. ψ. ἀ. τ. ἀ. τ. τα τῆς πονηριας, ἀποικίους ἂν ποιοι, τῳ δε πονηρα, ἐνοικίους.* But Cornarius is of opinion, that the ſentence may be amended by altering only *τα δε της πονηριας* into *τῳ δε π. π.* which he is pleaſed to ſay, ſignifies the ſame with *τῳ δε πονηροτερᾳ.*—S.

[3] In the editions of the Greek text, the ſentence ſtands thus; *Τι δε δη; ἀνθρωπε ψυχην κεκτησθαι τοιοῦτο ἁμαρτανοντος ἐστιν, ὅτις ἑκοντας ἁμαρτανει τα σκοπα, ἢ ὅτις ἀκοντας;* but we ſhould be glad to read it as follows; *Τι δε δη ἀνθρωπε; ψυχην κεκτησθαι τοιοῦτο ἁμαρτανον ἐστιν, κ. τ. λ.* tranſferring the firſt point of interrogation to the word *ἀνθρωπε*, and altering the word *ἁμαρτανοντος* into *ἁμαρτανον*, which latter emendation was made before us by Cornarius. Both together will render this ſentence much more agreeable to the turn of thoſe which precede, than the alteration of it propoſed by Stephens.—S.

Soc.

Soc. In our own ſpecies therefore, and with reſpect to the human ſoul[f], the man, who miſſes aim or errs without intending ſo to do, is a worſe man than the other, whoſe miſſing of the mark is undeſigned, or whoſe error is involuntary.

Hip. In the bowman's art I grant you that it is ſo.

Soc. And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not he the better phyſician, who, if he hurts or brings any diſorder on the bodily frame, does it knowingly and purpoſely?

Hip. He is.

Soc. In this art alſo then, ſuch a one is a better man than one who hurts when he would heal.

Hip. True.

Soc. And how is it in muſic, whether of the ſtring or of the wind-kind? how, in all other arts and ſciences? Is not he the better man, who purpoſely performs ill, and commits voluntary errors? and is not he the bad man, who blunders and errs, without deſigning it?

Hip. Probably ſo.

Soc. And we certainly ſhould chooſe to have under our command ſuch ſlaves as committed voluntary faults, and were guilty of bad actions purpoſely, rather than ſuch as could not help blundering, doing wrong, and acting perverſely; the former ſort being better for our ſervice.

Hip. In that alſo we agree.

Soc. Well then; do we not wiſh to be as good and excellent as poſſible ourſelves?

Hip. To be ſure.

Soc. Would not our own mind, ſpirit, and temper, be better, if we did evil and committed faults wilfully and freely, than if we could not avoid thoſe faults and evil actions?

Hip. It would be a ſtrange thing, Socrates, if the wilfully unjuſt and diſhoneſt were better men than thoſe who unwittingly or unwillingly did a baſe action.

[f] The original, as printed, runs thus; Και ψυχη αρα ακουσιως αμαρτανουσα, κ. τ. λ. But the reaſoning requires the word ανθρωπε to be inſerted after the word αρα. It was eaſily dropped in tranſcribing ſome manuſcript, on account of the ſimilitude of the letters which follow it: the antient manner of writing it being this; Και ψυχη αρα ανε ακουσιως, κ. τ. λ.—S.

Soc.

Soc. And yet this appears to be the juſt concluſion from thoſe premiſes [1], in which we are agreed.

Hip. It appears not ſo to me.

Soc. To you yourſelf, I imagined, it muſt ſo appear. Let me put to you then a queſtion or two more.—Is not honeſty either ſome certain power in the mind, or ſome certain knowledge, or both together? Is it not neceſſary that true inward honeſty ſhould be one or other of theſe?

Hip. It is.

Soc. If honeſty then be ſome power in the mind, does not honeſty inhabit that mind moſt which is poſſeſſed of the moſt power? And this correſponds with what appeared true to us before, if you remember,—that the man who had the moſt abilities and powers within him was the beſt man in every caſe that we conſidered.

Hip. It did ſo appear.

Soc. And if honeſty be ſome knowledge in the mind, does not honeſty reſide moſt in that mind, which hath the moſt knowledge, and is the wiſeſt? and is not, in ſuch caſe, that mind the moſt diſhoneſt which is the moſt undiſciplined and ignorant?—But if honeſty ſhould ariſe from knowledge and power, meeting both together in the ſame mind, is not that mind which is the beſt furniſhed with both, with knowledge and power, the moſt filled with honeſty? and are not the greateſt degrees of ignorance [2] and impotence

[1] That is, upon the abſurd ſuppoſition, that there are any ſuch men. But if ſtill the queſtion ſhould be aſked, Whence is it, that a man may err wilfully in executing any work or energy of art, or in performing any action merely natural (for ſo is it with great truth ſuppoſed throughout the Dialogue), and that power and will may in all ſuch caſes be ſeparated; yet that it is otherwiſe with reſpect to moral actions; that no error here is truly voluntary, and no bad man is free? The reaſon is this; that in all other caſes the workman, or performer, may aim at ſome other end than the excellence of his work, or the rectitude of his performance: but that in every action, where morality is concerned, that is, in every action morally good or evil, the attainment of what a man thinks his good is the only end for which he acts: and that no man can poſſibly purſue, will, or aim at his own evil, fully and clearly knowing it to be what it is; nor help aiming at, willing, and purſuing what upon the whole he determines to be for himſelf the beſt. The will therefore in all theſe caſes muſt of neceſſity follow, or rather accompany, the judgment.—S.

[2] That, in the Greek text, after the words ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτιστέρα, the words καὶ ἀδυνατωτέρα ought to be inſerted, will be evident to every one who knows how to reaſon, and in what part an argument is defective.—S.

in the mind parents of the greateſt villany?—Muſt not theſe things through neceſſity be ſo?

HIP. So indeed they appear.

SOC. Did it not appear before, that a man of the moſt knowledge and wiſdom, as well as of the moſt abilities and powers, was the beſt man, and the moſt capable of performing either well or ill, at his own pleaſure, in every operation?

HIP. It did.

SOC. Such a man therefore, whenever he performs any thing ill, does it with deſign; does it through his powers and his knowledge. Now it is evident, that on theſe honeſty depends, either on both of them, or at leaſt on one or other.

HIP. Probably it does.

SOC. It is further evident, that acting diſhoneſtly is doing ill; and that acting honeſtly is doing well.

HIP. Clearly ſo.

SOC. Will not that man then, whoſe mind is the moſt filled with honeſty and virtue, whenever he ſhall do any diſhoneſt or baſe action, do it through choice and with deſign? but the man whoſe mind is evil and diſhoneſt, will no he be guilty of villanous and baſe actions through unavoidable neceſſity?

HIP. So it appears.

SOC. Is not a good man, one whoſe mind is good and honeſt? and is not he a bad man, whoſe mind is evil and diſhoneſt?

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. It belongs to the good man, therefore, to act diſhoneſtly through free choice; to the bad man without free choice, and through unavoidable neceſſity; if it be true that the mind of a good man is good.

HIP. And that certainly is true.

SOC. The man, therefore, who does wrong, and is guilty of villanous and baſe actions wilfully and out of free choice, if ſuch a man there be,[1] Hippias, he can be no other than the good man.

HIP.

[1] Meaning, that the ſuppoſition was abſurd. See the Introduction. Plato here preſents us with a key to this Dialogue, opening it ſo eaſily, and letting us into the ſecret of it ſo freely, that every unprejudiced mind may well wonder how it came to be ſo greatly miſunderſtood, as it will appear to have generally been, if any of our readers will take the pains to examine the annotations and comments on it, written by the moderns. But the wonder will ceaſe, on reflecting what

Hip. I know not, Socrates, how I can grant you this.

Soc. Nor can I eaſily grant it to myſelf, Hippias. It muſt however, of neceſſity, appear true to us both at preſent, having been proved by the force of our preſent argument. But, as I ſaid before, with regard to this point[r], my

what unphiloſophical and vulgar notions concerning the freedom of the will have generally prevailed in Europe ever ſince the extinction of thoſe antient ſchools of philoſophy which once enlightened it. Hence it has come to paſs, that learned men, involved in the common prejudices, have underſtood all the paſſages of antient authors, relating to this point, in a ſenſe favourable to their own notions. For error, that diſeaſe of the mind, reſembles in this reſpect certain diſeaſes in the humours of the body; it imparts ſomewhat of its own flavour, and gives a tinge of its own colour, to every object of the taſte or ſight which is ſo diſeaſed. Thoſe prejudices on the point in queſtion, and the conſequences of them, here complained of, are evidently ſeen in the late Mr. Jackſon's Defence, as he is pleaſed to term it, of Human Liberty. For that learned man appears to have had a heart purer and clearer than his head; and therefore cannot be ſuppoſed to have miſrepreſented the ſenſe of thoſe antient authors, whom he cites, knowingly and wilfully. The truth ſeems to be, that over much zeal, though in a good cauſe, that of theiſm, ſo far blinded him, as well as ſome greater men before him, that he thought he ſaw a ſimilitude between two hypotheſes, quite different and even oppoſite; the one, that of a material or mechanical neceſſity, maintained by Mr. Hobbes and by the author of Cato's letters, an hypotheſis utterly inconſiſtent with the doctrine of an all-directing mind in nature; the other, that of a rational or moral neceſſity, no leſs inconſiſtent with atheiſm, and neceſſarily connected with the idea of a governor of the univerſe, ruling as well the rational part of it, as the reſt, not by mere will, but wiſdom. For if the appearances of good are not cogent to man, and he is not of neceſſity obliged to follow thoſe only rational motives, but is by nature referred afterwards to ſome other power within him called will, diſtinct from reaſon, and able to control it, then is mere will in man, and, for aught we can tell, in nature too, a principle higher and more divine than intellect.—S.

[r] Should there be any man now, after all, who is inclined to think that Socrates, through this whole converſation, was but in jeſt, and meant nothing ſerious; or that, like the ſophiſts, he uſed fallacious arguments, with a villanous intent to impoſe on the underſtandings of the company, by confounding truth and falſehood, right and wrong; or ſhould any imagine, with Serranus, that the philoſopher had no other end in view than merely to confute or puzzle Hippias, and expoſe him to ridicule; or ſhould there poſſibly be ſome other who follows Ficinus in fancying, that his ſecret meaning was the very reverſe of that which we have repreſented it to be in the Introduction, and contended for in the notes; for that the will was independent of the judgment or underſtanding; and vice was owing neither to impotence, nor ignorance, nor both together, but to malice only or perverſeneſs in the will; and that Socrates himſelf embraced, as truly philoſophical, this diſtinction of the forum, received in after-ages by the pretended followers of Ariſtotle; but that he left it forſooth for Hippias to diſtinguiſh thus nicely, on purpoſe to ſhow the ignorance of that ſophiſt if he did it not; ſhould any of our readers be apt to entertain any of theſe notions, on account of the ſtrangeneſs of the paradox advanced or inſinuated in this Dialogue, we ſhall content ourſelves with obſerving that, ſtrange as it may ſeem, it is entirely

my mind is driven backward and forward continually, and never remains long in the ſame opinion. Indeed, there is nothing wonderful in the caſe that I ſhould wander in uncertainty; or that any other man ſhould, who is only one of the multitude. But if you wiſe men ſhould run in the ſame perplexed mazes, this muſt be to us a heavy misfortune; ſince we could never in this caſe, even though we applied to you, be freed from our perplexities.

conſonant with the doctrine of Socrates, as delivered to us by Plato in many other of his writings. This was ſo notorious to the antients, that Arrian, in his Diſſertations of Epictetus, l. i. c. 28. and l. ii. c. 22. and Marcus Antoninus, l. vii. § 63. cite the authority of Plato to confirm the truth of this doctrine. The principal paſſages in our author, where he inculcates it expreſsly and openly, have been collected by Gataker in his Annotations on Antoninus, p. 286 and 399. and by our late learned friend Mr. Upton, in his Notes on Arrian, p. 91. Above all, ſee Alcinous, Introduct. c. 23. where his account of the Platonic doctrine upon this ſubject ſeems to be chiefly extracted from this Dialogue, and ſhows that he underſtood it exactly in the ſame ſenſe with us.—S.

THE END OF THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

THE

THE EUTHYDEMUS:

A DIALOGUE

EXPOSING

THE VAIN TRIFLING OF THE SOPHISTS.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

PLATO, in the following Dialogue; has given an illuſtrious ſpecimen of that philanthropy, which he often diſplays in his other dialogues. For he here ſtudies to avert the reader from the vain trifles of the ſophiſts, by ſhowing that theſe men, even when they diſcuſs the moſt weighty ſubjects, jeſt and delude the expectation of the hearers. Both in this Dialogue, however, and elſewhere, he deſcribes theſe men to be curious and vain diſputants in verbal altercation, and prompt to refute whatever may be ſaid, whether it be true or falſe. And, in the firſt place, indeed, he ſhows how avaricious the genius of the ſophiſts is, ſince the brother ſophiſts, Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, are prepared to teach for money the military art, in which they boaſt, and which no one ever ſold. In the next place, how ambitious, ſince they at the ſame time profeſs judicial together with military ſkill, and together with both the ſophiſtic art, though all theſe widely differ from each other. In the third place, how vain; ſince, though now old men, they betake themſelves from things to words, and from the ſtudy of truth to falſehood. And, in the fourth place, how deſpicable; ſince, in a ſhort time, any one may become a proficient in this cavilling art.

In the courſe of this Dialogue, Socrates, with a moſt facetious irony, beſeeches the ſophiſts, that after jeſting they would come to ſerious concerns; and he propoſes a certain formula, conformable to which, as a pattern, he hopes to receive from them an exhortation to philoſophy. In this formula he firſt defines felicity, by a common conception, to be *living well*. Afterwards

wards he proves that this living well conſiſts either in obtaining things agreeable to the will, or in the right uſe of the things themſelves. And he concludes that wiſdom alone renders its poſſeſſors bleſſed, ſince it alone obtains what is agreeable to the will, and rightly uſes what it obtains. In the courſe of the argument an illuſtrious dogma preſents itſelf to the view, and which afterwards became the foundation of the Stoic philoſophy, viz. that things external and corporeal ought rather to be called indifferent and common, than good or evil; and that wiſdom is properly good, and folly properly evil: ſince through the former we partake of every good, and through the latter of every evil. But that all the power of felicity conſiſts in wiſdom, the three appellations of felicity, inſtituted by the antient authors of the Greek language, ſufficiently evince, viz. εὐδαιμονία, εὐτυχία, εὐπραγία, *eudaimonia, eutuchia, eupragia.* For the firſt of theſe appellations ſignifies the knowledge of good; the ſecond, the attainment of it; and the third, the uſe of it; all which are accompliſhed for us by wiſdom.

Near the concluſion of this Dialogue, the artificial, polite, facetious, and elegant irony of Socrates collects the reprehenſion of ſophiſtic cavilling into three heads. Firſt, that the moſt worthy men deſpiſe trifles of this kind. Secondly, that the ſophiſms confute themſelves. And thirdly, that even boys might acquire this moſt trifling artifice in the ſpace of two days. Soon after this, he deſcends from the ſophiſt to the rhetorician, for each of theſe falſely profeſſes political virtue, as we learn from the Gorgias. And he ſhows that rhetoricians, while they profeſs themſelves to be both politicians and philoſophers, are perfectly uſeleſs for the purpoſes of either.

I only add, that this Dialogue appears to have been juſtly ranked by the antients among thoſe of the *anatreptic*, or *ſubverſive* character, and that it belongs to that energy of Plato's dialectic, which, as we have already obſerved in the Introduction to the Parmenides, conſiſts in confuting falſe opinions.

THE

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITO,	DIONYSODORUS,
SOCRATES,	CLINIAS,
[EUTHYDEMUS,	CTESIPPUS [1].]

CRITO.

WITH whom, Socrates, did you yeſterday converſe in the Lyceum? For you were ſurrounded with ſo great a crowd, that though I approached, deſirous to hear, yet I could not hear any thing clearly. I raiſed myſelf indeed on my feet that I might ſee more diſtinctly, and it appeared to me that it was a certain ſtranger with whom you were converſing. Who was this ſtranger?

Soc. You muſt aſk, Crito, which of them it was; for not one only, but two were preſent.

CRITO. He, of whom I ſpeak, ſat the third from your right hand; but in the middle of you was a lad [2], the ſon of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great proficiency in learning, and who does not

[1] I have followed Dr. Routh, in his excellent edition of this Dialogue, in including the names of Euthydemus, Dionyſodorus, Clinias, and Cteſippus, in brackets, becauſe, as he juſtly obſerves, theſe perſons do not ſpeak, but the diſputation is delivered, as if the thing were narrated, and not acted.

[2] The name of this youth was Clinias, at whoſe requeſt Socrates, together with Axiochus, in a dialogue of that name, which is generally aſcribed to Æſchines, diſputes againſt the fear of death.

much

much differ in age from our Critobulus [1]; though he indeed is very ſlender, but this lad looks older than he is, and is of a fair and engaging aſpect.

Soc. It is Euthydemus, Socrates, of whom you inquire; but he who ſat with me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionyſodorus, who alſo partook of the diſcourſe.

Crito. I know neither of them, Socrates.

Soc. They are recent ſophiſts, as it appears.

Crito. Whence do they come; and what is the wiſdom which they profeſs?

Soc. They are, I think, natives of Chius, but they migrated to the Thurians [2], and flying [3] from thence, dwelt for many years about theſe places. But in anſwer to your inquiry reſpecting their wiſdom, they are indeed very wiſe, Crito; but I have been hitherto ignorant that they were pancratiaſts: for they are ſkilled in every kind of conteſt, not after the manner of thoſe brother panacratiaſts of Acarnania; ſince they are only able to contend with the body; but theſe, in the firſt place, are moſt powerful in body, and excel in that conteſt which conſiſts in vanquiſhing all men [4]. For they are very ſkilful in contending with arms, and they know how to impart this ſkill to another who gives them a reward for it. In the next place, they are moſt powerful in judicial conteſts, and are able both to contend themſelves, and inſtruct others, to deliver and compoſe forenſic orations. At firſt, therefore, they were only ſkilled in theſe things, but now they have carried the pancratiaſtic art to its utmoſt perfection: for they are now ſo ſkilled in that kind of conteſt, which it remained for them to acquire, that no one is able to reſiſt them; ſo ſkilful are they become in verbal contention, and in always confuting whatever is ſaid, whether it be true or falſe. I therefore, Crito,

[1] Xenophon often makes mention of this perſon, and ſometimes Plato. He was the friend of Clinias, and was a youth of admirable beauty. Vid. Xen. Sympoſ. p. 882. ed. Leunclav. See alſo more concerning this ſon of Crito near the end of the Dialogue.

[2] Thurii, or Thurium, was a town of Magna Græcia, ſituated between the rivers Sybaris and Crathis.

[3] Others of the antient ſophiſts alſo were baniſhed from Grecian cities, as we learn from Philoſtratus and others who have written their lives.

[4] Theſe ſophiſts were not in reality ſkilled in the *pancratium*; but Socrates ſays this ironically of them, becauſe they pretended to poſſeſs *univerſal ſkill in confutation*.

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intend to deliver myself to these men: for they say that, in a short time, they can render another person skilled in the same things.

CRITO. But are you not afraid, Socrates, that you are too old for this purpose?

SOC. By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument and remedy against fear: for these very men, as I may say, who are now old, have entered on the study of this wisdom, which I desire, viz. the art of contending. For last year, or the year before last, they were not in the least skilled in this art. But I am only afraid of one thing, lest I should be a disgrace to these strangers, in the same manner as I am to Connus the harper, the son of Metrobius, who even now teaches me to play on the harp. The boys, therefore, who are my fellow disciples, on seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the preceptor of old men. Lest therefore some one should reproach these strangers with the same thing, and they dreading this should be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other elderly men to attend me thither as my fellow disciples, and here also I am persuading others to accompany me. Do you also join us. Perhaps too, as an allurement, we may bring your sons to them: for, in consequence of desiring to have them as their pupils, I know that they will also instruct us.

CRITO. Nothing hinders, Socrates, if you are so disposed. But, in the first place, tell me what this wisdom of these men is, that I may also know what it is which we shall learn.

SOC. You will be disappointed, if you think that I am not able to tell you as if I did not attend to them. For I paid great attention, and very well remember what they said: and I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For, by a certain divine allotment, I had seated myself where you saw me, alone, in the Apodyterium[1]: and I then intended to have risen; but as I was about to rise, the dæmon gave me the accustomed signal. I again therefore sat down, and soon after Euthydemus and Dionysodorus entered, and, together with these, many others, who appeared to me to be their disciples; and having entered, they walked in the covered porch[2] of the Gymnasium. But they had not yet walked twice or thrice round this place, when Clinias entered, who you say has made a great proficiency, and

[1] That part of the Gymnasium, in which those who washed or exercised put off their clothes.

[2] In this place the athletæ were exercised in the winter.

in ſo ſaying you ſpeak the truth. Behind him there were many lovers and others, and beſides theſe Cteſippus[1], a Pæanean youth, very beautiful and naturally very worthy, but wanton in conſequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, as ſoon as he entered, ſeeing me ſitting alone, came towards me, and ſat down on my right hand, as you ſay. Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus perceiving him, at firſt ſtopped and converſed with each other, occaſionally looking at us: for I beheld them very attentively. Afterwards approaching nearer, they ſat down, Euthydemus indeed by the lad, but Dionyſodorus by me, on my left hand. The reſt ſeated themſelves juſt as it happened. Theſe therefore I ſaluted, becauſe I had not ſeen them for ſome time. After this, I ſaid to Clinias, Theſe men, Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, O Clinias, are not wiſe in ſmall, but in great things. For they are ſkilled in every thing pertaining to war, in all that a good general ought to know, and in the arrangement and management of an army. They likewiſe know how to render a man able to defend himſelf in courts of juſtice, when he is injured by any one. For thus ſpeaking however they deſpiſed me, and both of them laughed, looking at each other. And Euthydemus indeed ſaid, We no longer engage in theſe matters ſeriouſly, Socrates, but incidentally. And I being ſurpriſed ſaid, Your purſuit muſt indeed be beautiful, if ſuch great affairs are with you incidental. And, by the gods, inform me, what this beautiful ſtudy is.—We are of opinion, ſaid he, Socrates, that we are able to teach virtue in the beſt manner, and with the greateſt celerity of all men. —O Jupiter! I replied, what a mighty thing do you announce. Whence was this gain derived? I indeed had hitherto conceived reſpecting you, as I juſt now ſaid, that you were very ſkilful in military conteſts; and this I had aſſerted to others. For when you firſt came hither, I remember that you announced this. But now, if in reality you poſſeſs this ſcience, be propitious. For indeed I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreating you to pardon what I have before ſaid. But ſee, Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, if you have ſpoken the truth: for it is by no means wonderful if the magnitude of the promiſe ſhould occaſion diſbelief.—Be aſſured, Socrates, that it is ſo, was the anſwer.—I therefore conſider you as much more bleſſed through this poſſeſſion, than the great king through his dominion. Thus

[1] He was one of thoſe that were preſent at the death of Socrates. See the Phædo.

much

much however inform me, whether you intend to exhibit this wiſdom, or how have you determined to act.—We came hither, Socrates, for this very purpoſe, to demonſtrate and to teach, if any one is willing to learn.—But that all men who do not poſſeſs wiſdom are willing to learn, I readily admit: for, in the firſt place, I myſelf am willing, and, in the next place, Clinias here; and beſides theſe Cteſippus, and all the reſt that you ſee, pointing out to him the lovers of Clinias, by whom we were then ſurrounded: for Cteſippus at that time happened to be ſitting at a conſiderable diſtance from Clinias. And as it appeared to me, Euthydemus, while he was diſcourſing with me, prevented, by the inclination of his body, Cteſippus from ſeeing Clinias, who was ſeated in the middle of us. Cteſippus therefore wiſhing to ſee his familiars, and at the ſame time being anxious to hear what was ſaid, was the firſt that roſe, and ſtood oppoſite to me. Afterwards the reſt ſeeing him, ſtood round us, viz. the lovers of Clinias, and the companions of Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus. I therefore introducing theſe to Euthydemus, informed him that they were all ready to learn. And Cteſippus indeed, and the reſt, very readily aſſented; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wiſdom. I therefore ſaid, O Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, theſe perſons muſt by all means be gratified, and you muſt exhibit your wiſdom to them for my ſake. And it is evident indeed, that to demonſtrate moſt things pertaining to this ſubject will be no ſmall labour; but inform me whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already perſuaded that he ought to be inſtructed by you, or him alſo, who is not yet perſuaded in conſequence of not believing that virtue is a thing to be taught, or that you are the teachers of it: for, it is the buſineſs of the ſame art, to perſuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are capable of teaching it in the beſt manner. Or is it not?—It is the buſineſs, Socrates, ſaid Dionyſodorus, of the ſame art.—You therefore, I replied, O Dionyſodorus, can in the beſt manner, of all the men that now exiſt, exhort to philoſophy and the ſtudy of virtue. Is it not ſo?—We think we can, Socrates.—Of other things, therefore, I ſaid, you will afterwards give us the demonſtration, but of this now: and you will perſuade this youth, that he ought to philoſophize, and ſtudy virtue; and in ſo doing you will oblige me, and all that are preſent: for it ſo happens that both I, and all theſe, are deſirous that this lad may become the beſt of men. He is the ſon

of Axiochus, who deſcended from the antient Alcibiades, and the couſin of the now-exiſting Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is young, and we are fearful, as it is likely we ſhould be concerning one of his age, leſt ſome one previous to our endeavours ſhould turn his dianoëtic part to another ſtudy, and thus corrupt it. You therefore are very opportunely come: and if it is the ſame thing to you, make trial of the lad, and diſcourſe with him before us.—When I had thus nearly ſaid theſe things, Euthydemus boldly, and at the ſame time confidently, replied, It makes no difference, Socrates, if the lad is but willing to anſwer.—But indeed, I replied, he is accuſtomed to do this. For theſe frequently meeting together aſk many queſtions, and diſcourſe much with each other; ſo that it is likely that he will anſwer with confidence.

But how, O Crito, ſhall I diſcloſe to you, in a proper manner, what follows? For it is no trifling labour to narrate ſuch immenſe wiſdom. So that I, after the manner of the poets, in beginning this narration, find it neceſſary to invoke the Muſes and Mnemoſyne. Euthydemus, therefore, as I think, began after this manner.—Whether, O Clinias, are thoſe men that learn, wiſe or unwiſe?—And the lad through the magnitude of the queſtion bluſhed, and being dubious, looked at me. But I, perceiving his perturbation, ſaid, Be confident, Clinias, and boldly anſwer what appears to you to be the truth: for perhaps the greateſt advantage will thence enſue. Upon this Dionyſodorus wiſpering in my ear, and ſmiling, Indeed, Socrates, ſaid he, I predict that in whatever manner the lad may anſwer he will be confuted. However, while he was thus ſpeaking, Clinias happened to anſwer, ſo that it was not poſſible for me to admoniſh the lad any further. But he anwſered, that thoſe that learnt were wiſe men. Euthydemus, therefore, ſaid, Do you admit that there are certain teachers, or not?—He admitted that there are.—Are not therefore preceptors the preceptors of thoſe that learn? As, for inſtance, a harper and a grammarian, were the preceptors of you and other boys, but you were their diſciples.—He aſſented to this.—When you learned, therefore, were you not ignorant of theſe things which you learned?—Yes.—Were you, therefore, wiſe, when you were ignorant of theſe things?—By no means.—If, therefore, you were not wiſe, were you not ignorant?—Entirely ſo.—You therefore, when learning things of which you had no knowledge, learned them being ignorant?—The lad aſſented

aſſented to this.—The ignorant therefore learn, O Clinias, and not the wiſe, as you thought.—On his ſpeaking in this manner, juſt like a choir, on a ſignal given by the maſter, the followers of Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus loudly applauded what was ſaid and laughed. And before the lad could well take breath, Dionyſodorus ſaid to him, But what, Clinias, when the grammarian recites, whether are the boys who learn what he recites, wiſe, or unwiſe?—They are wiſe, ſaid Clinias.—The wiſe therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and conſequently you did not rightly juſt now anſwer Euthydemus.—But on this, the lovers of theſe men more loudly laughed and applauded, admiring the wiſdom of Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus; but the reſt of us being aſtoniſhed were ſilent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our aſtoniſhment, that we might yet ſtill more admire him, did not diſmiſs the lad, but further interrogated him; and, after the manner of ſkilful dancers, turned twofold inquiries about the ſame thing. For, ſaid he, whether do thoſe who learn, learn the things which they know, or things which they do not know? And again Dionyſodorus ſaid to me whiſpering, This alſo, Socrates, is juſt ſuch another queſtion as the former.—By Jupiter, ſaid I, the former queſtion appeared to me to be beautiful.—We always aſk, ſaid he, Socrates, ſuch like inevitable queſtions.—You appear therefore to me, ſaid I, to poſſeſs a great reputation among your diſciples. In the mean time Clinias anſwered Euthydemus, that thoſe who learn, learn that of which they are ignorant. And Euthydemus interrogated him as before—Do you not, ſaid he, know your letters?—I do.—Do you not, therefore, know all of them?—He acknowledged that he did.—When therefore any one recites, does he not recite letters?—He confeſſed it.—Hence, ſaid he, he recites things which you know, ſince you know all the letters.—This alſo he acknowledged.—What then? he replied, Do you not learn that which ſome one recites?—Yes.—But do you learn, not knowing your letters?—I do not, he replied, but I learn in conſequence of knowing them.—Do you not therefore learn the things which you know, ſince you know all the letters?—He acknowledged that he did.—Hence, ſaid he, you have not anſwered rightly.—Euthydemus had ſcarcely thus ſpoken, when Dionyſodorus, taking up the diſcourſe as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as a mark, and ſaid, Euthydemus deceives you, O Clinias. For tell me, is not to learn, to receive the ſcience of that which any one learns?—Clinias aſſented.—But, he replied, is to

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know ſcientifically any thing elſe than to poſſeſs ſcience when thus knowing?—He granted it was nothing elſe.—Not to know ſcientifically, therefore, is not yet to poſſeſs ſcience.—He aſſented to this.—Whether, therefore, are thoſe that receive any thing, thoſe who now poſſeſs it, or thoſe who do not poſſeſs it?—Thoſe who do not poſſeſs it.—Have you not then confeſſed that thoſe who have not ſcientific knowledge, are among the number of thoſe who do not poſſeſs?—He acknowledged that he had.—Thoſe that learn, therefore, belong to thoſe that receive, and not to thoſe that poſſeſs.—He granted it.—Thoſe therefore, ſaid he, Clinias, learn who have not a ſcientific knowledge, and not thoſe who have. After this, again wreſtling as it were the third time, Euthydemus attacked the youth. But I, ſeeing the merged condition of the lad, and wiſhing to give him ſome reſpite, leſt he ſhould be afraid of us, ſaid, in order to conſole him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if theſe diſcourſes appear to you to be unuſual; for perhaps you do not perceive the intention of theſe ſtrangers. They act however in the ſame manner as thoſe in the myſteries of the Corybantes, when they place him whom they are about to initiate on a throne[1]: for there alſo there are dancing and ſports, as you know, if you have been initiated in theſe myſteries. And now they do nothing elſe than dance, and as it were ſportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the firſt part of ſophiſtical ſacred rites. For, in the firſt place, as Prodicus ſays, it is neceſſary to learn the proper ſignification of names; which theſe ſtrangers alſo have indicated to you, becauſe you have not perceived that men employ the verb *to learn* in a thing of this kind, when any one, at firſt poſſeſſing no ſcience concerning a certain thing, afterwards receives the ſcience of that thing. They alſo employ this verb, when any one now poſſeſſing ſcience, conſiders this very thing by this ſame ſcience, either while the thing is effected or while it is enunciated. Or they rather call this *to apprehend* than *to learn*,

[1] The *Curetes* are gods of an unpolluted guardian characteriſtic, and firſt ſubſiſt in that order of gods which is called by the Chaldæan theologiſts νοερος, intellectual. The *Corybantes*, who form the guardian triad of *ſupermundane* gods, are analogous to theſe. Thoſe that were initiated in the myſteries of the Corybantes were *inſanely* and *enthuſiaſtically moved*, as we learn from the Lexicon of Timæus. When he who was about to be initiated in the myſteries of theſe, or any other gods, was inveſted with a ſacred and myſtic dreſs, he was placed in a ſolemn manner on a throne, while in the mean time the other myſtics danced round him. This ceremony was called θρονισμος.

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though ſometimes they call it *to learn*. But of this, as they indicate, you are ignorant, viz. that the ſame name pertains to men affected in a contrary manner, viz. with reſpect to him who knows, and him who is ignorant. Similar to this is that which took place in the ſecond queſtion, in which they aſked you, whether men learn things which they know, or things of which they are ignorant. Theſe indeed are the ſports of diſciplines: on which account I ſay that theſe men play with you. But I uſe the word *play* on this account, becauſe, though ſome one ſhould learn many, or all ſuch particulars as theſe, yet he would not be in any reſpect wiſer with reſpect to the manner in which things ſubſiſt. However, he may ſport with men, by ſupplanting and ſubverting what they aſſert, through the difference of names; juſt as they who draw away the ſeats from thoſe that are going to ſit down rejoice and laugh when they ſee him whom they have overturned ſupine. Conſider therefore what has happened to you from theſe men as ſport; but what follows will be exhibited to you by them as ſerious concerns: and I will ſhow them the way that they may fulfil their promiſe to me. For they promiſe to exhibit their exhortatory wiſdom: but now, as it appears to me, they have thought it was requiſite firſt to ſport with you.

Thus far therefore, O Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, you have ſported, and perhaps ſufficiently: but in the next place ſhow, exhorting the lad, in what manner it is requiſite to pay attention to wiſdom and virtue. Firſt of all, however, I will indicate to you my conceptions on this affair, and what I deſire to hear concerning it. If, therefore, I ſhall appear to you to do this, in a fooliſh and ridiculous manner, do not deride me: for, through a deſire of hearing your wiſdom, I will venture for a time to ſpeak before you. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your diſciples, without laughing: but do you, O ſon of Axiochus, anſwer me.—Do we not all then wiſh to do well? Or is this queſtion, of which we were juſt now afraid, one among thoſe that are ridiculous? For indeed, it is ſtupid to aſk queſtions of this kind. For who is there that does not wiſh to do well?—No one, ſaid Clinias.—Be it ſo, ſaid I.—But in the next place, ſince we wiſh to do well, in what manner ſhall we be able to accompliſh this? Shall we ſay, by having many good things? Or is this anſwer ſtill more ſtupid than the former? For it is evident that this alſo muſt be the caſe.—He aſſented.—But come, what are the things which are good to us? Or does it appear to

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be a thing neither difficult, nor the province of a venerable man, to diſcover this? For every one will tell us that it is good to be rich. Will they not?—Certainly, ſaid he.—And is it not alſo good to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be ſufficiently furniſhed with other things pertaining to the body?—So it appeared to him.—But nobility alſo, power, and honours, in one's own city, are alſo good.—He granted that they were.—What then, ſaid I, yet remains for us among things good? What is it to be temperate, juſt, and brave? Whether, by Jupiter, Clinias, do you think that, if we conſider theſe things as good, we ſhall conſider them properly? Or that this will be the caſe if we conſider them not as good? For perhaps this may be diſputed by ſome one. But how does it appear to you?—That theſe things are good, ſaid Clinias.—Be it ſo, ſaid I; but in what choir ſhall we place wiſdom? Among things good? Or how do you ſay?—Among things good.—But conſider, leſt among things good, we ſhould omit any one which is worthy to be related.—But, ſaid Clinias, it appears to me that we have not omitted any one.—However, I then recollecting, ſaid, But, by Jupiter, we appear to have omitted the greateſt of goods.—What is that? ſaid he.—Felicity, O Clinias, which all men, and even thoſe that are perfectly depraved, aſſert to be the greateſt of goods.—What you ſay is true, ſaid he.—And I again, correcting myſelf, ſaid, We have nearly, O ſon of Axiochus, rendered ourſelves ridiculous to theſe ſtrangers.—Why ſo? ſaid he.—Becauſe, having placed felicity in the things which we before enumerated, we now again ſpeak concerning it.—But why is this improper?—Becauſe it is certainly ridiculous again to adduce that which was formerly propoſed, and to ſay the ſame things twice.—How do you mean? ſaid he.—Wiſdom, I replied, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.—He indeed wondered, ſo young and ſimple was he. And I perceiving his admiration, ſaid, Do you not know, Clinias, that in performing well on the pipe, pipers[a] are moſt happy?—He granted that they were.—Are not therefore, ſaid I, grammarians alſo moſt happy in the writing and reading of letters?—Entirely ſo.—But what? In dangers of the ſea, do you think that any in ſhort are more happy than wiſe pilots?—Certainly not.—Again: In battle,

[a] Felicity is the *proper perfection* of a vital being. An artiſt therefore is happy, ſo far as pertains to his being an artiſt, when he arrives at *perfection* in his art.

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with which will you more pleaſantly partake of danger and fortune? with a wife, or with an ignorant general?—With a wiſe general.—And when you are dangerouſly ill, with which will you be more pleaſantly circumſtanced? with a wife, or with an ignorant phyſician?—With a wiſe phyſician.—Is it not therefore, ſaid I, becauſe you think that you will act more proſperouſly, by acting with one wiſe, than with one unwiſe?—He granted it.—Wiſdom, therefore, every where, renders men happy. For certainly no one can ever err through wiſdom; but it is neceſſary that through this he ſhould act rightly, and obtain his end: for otherwiſe it would not be wiſdom.—At length, but I do not know how, we ſummarily agreed that this was the caſe; viz. that when wiſdom is preſent, nothing of felicity is wanting.

After we had agreed in this particular, I again aſked him how we ſhould be affected with relation to the things which we had formerly granted. For, ſaid I, we granted that if many good things were preſent with us we ſhould be happy, and act well.—He aſſented to this.—Whether, therefore, ſhould we be happy through preſent good, if it were of no advantage to us, or if it benefited us?—If it benefited us, ſaid he.—Would then any thing benefit us, if we alone poſſeſſed it, but did not uſe it? As, for inſtance, if we poſſeſſed much food, but did not eat it, or drink, but did not drink it, ſhould we in any reſpect be benefited by this?—Certainly not, ſaid he.—But what? If all artificers had every thing requiſite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not uſe them when thus procured, would they act well through the poſſeſſion of theſe, viz. merely becauſe they poſſeſſed every thing which an artificer ought to poſſeſs? Thus, for inſtance, if a carpenter had all kinds of inſtruments and wood prepared for him ſufficient for his purpoſe, but yet ſhould faſhion nothing, would he derive any advantage from this poſſeſſion?—By no means, ſaid he.—But what? If any one ſhould poſſeſs riches, and all ſuch things as we now denominate good, but ſhould not uſe them, would he be happy through the poſſeſſion of theſe goods?—He certainly would not, Socrates.—It is neceſſary therefore, ſaid I, as it ſeems, that he who intends to be happy ſhould not only poſſeſs good things of this kind, but ſhould likewiſe uſe them.—What you ſay is true.—Is not therefore, O Clinias, the poſſeſſion and the uſe of good, ſufficient to make any one happy?—It appears ſo to me.—Whether, I replied, if any one uſes good things properly, or if he does not?—If he uſes them properly.—You ſpeak

well, ſaid I. For I think that the improper uſe of a thing is worſe than the neglect of it. For the former is vicious, but the latter is neither good nor bad. Or do we not ſay ſo?—He aſſented.—What then? In the operation and uſe pertaining to wood, is there any thing elſe which produces a right uſe than the tectonic ſcience?—Certainly not, ſaid he.—Perhaps alſo, in producing proper apparatus, it is ſcience which produces with rectitude.—He granted that it was.—Whether therefore, ſaid I, with reſpect to the uſe of thoſe goods which we firſt mentioned, viz. riches, health, and beauty, is it ſcience, leading and properly directing the practice, which enables us to uſe every thing of this kind properly, or is it any thing elſe?—It is ſcience, ſaid he.—Science, therefore, imparts to men in every poſſeſſion and action, not only felicity, as it ſeems, but likewiſe ſucceſs.—He confeſſed that it was ſo.

Is there then, ſaid I, by Jupiter, any advantage to be derived from other poſſeſſions, without prudence and wiſdom? Or will a man be benefited who poſſeſſes many things, and performs many actions, but without intellect? Or rather will not this be the caſe, if he poſſeſſes and performs but a few things, but is endued with intellect? However, conſider thus. Will he not by doing leſs, err leſs? And erring leſs, will he not act leſs improperly? And acting leſs improperly, will he not be leſs miſerable?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Whether, therefore, will he rather perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?—Being poor, ſaid he.—But whether if he is weak or ſtrong?—If he is weak.—Whether alſo, if he is honoured, or diſhonoured?—If diſhonoured.—But whether, if he is brave and temperate, will he do leſs, or if he is timid?—If he is timid.—Will not this then alſo be the caſe, if he is indolent rather than if he is active?—He granted that it would.—And if he is ſlow rather than if he is quick? And if his ſight and hearing are blunt rather than if they are ſharp?—In every thing of this kind we agreed with each other.—But in ſhort, ſaid I, O Clinias, it appears that, with reſpect to all thoſe things which we firſt aſſerted to be good, the diſcourſe about them is not that they are naturally eſſentially good, but, as it ſeems, that they ſubſiſt in the following manner; viz. that if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of becoming ſubſervient to that evil leader; but that if they are led by prudence and wiſdom, they are greater goods; but that neither of them, when they are conſidered by themſelves, is of any worth.—It appears, ſaid he,

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to be as you ſay.—What then happens to us, from what has been ſaid? Is it any thing elſe than this, that no one of other things is either good or evil? But theſe being two, that wiſdom is good, and ignorance evil?—He aſſented.

Further ſtill then, ſaid I, let us conſider what remains. Since we all of us ſtrive to be happy, and we appear to become ſuch from uſing things, and from uſing them rightly, but ſcience affords rectitude and ſucceſs, it is requiſite, as it ſeems, that every man ſhould by all poſſible means endeavour to become moſt wiſe. Is it not ſo?—It is, ſaid he.—And he ſhould think that he ought to receive this from his father, his tutors, his friends, and from others who profeſs themſelves to be his lovers, much more than wealth, and ſhould requeſt and ſuppliantly implore ſtrangers and his fellow citizens to impart wiſdom. Nor is it in any reſpect baſe or reprehenſible, O Clinias, for the ſake of this, to be obſequious and ſubſervient both to a lover and to every man, willingly obeying him in worthy ſervices, through an ardent deſire of becoming wiſe. Or does it not appear ſo to you? ſaid I.—You entirely, ſaid he, appear to me to ſpeak well.—If, ſaid I, Clinias, wiſdom can but be taught, and does not caſually ſubſiſt among men. For this is yet to be conſidered by us, and has not yet been aſſented to by me and you.—But to me, ſaid he, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.—And I, being delighted, ſaid, You ſpeak beautifully, O beſt of men, and you have done well in liberating me from a long ſpeculation about this very thing, whether wiſdom can, or cannot be taught. Now, therefore, ſince it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and proſperous, do you ſay any thing elſe than that it is neceſſary to philoſophize? And is it your intention to do this?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he, Socrates, as much as poſſible.—And I, rejoicing to hear theſe things, ſaid, My example, O Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory diſcourſes, ſuch as I deſired it to be, is of this kind; vulgar perhaps and ſcarcely unfolded by a multitude of words: but let whichever of you is willing, conſidering this very thing according to art, render it apparent to us. But if you are unwilling to do this, point out to the lad what follows, from that part in which my diſcourſe ended, viz. whether he ought to procure for himſelf every ſcience, or whether there is one particular ſcience which, when he receives, he will neceſſarily be happy and a good man; and what that ſcience is. For, as I ſaid

in the beginning, it is of great conſequence to us that this youth ſhould become wiſe and good.

I therefore, Crito, ſaid theſe things; but I paid very great attention to what followed, and conſidered after what manner they would diſcourſe, and whence they would begin, while they were exhorting the youth to the ſtudy of wiſdom and virtue. Dionyſodorus then, who was the elder of them, firſt began the conference. And all of us beheld him, as thoſe who were immediately to hear certain very wonderful diſcourſes; which indeed was the caſe. For the man, O Crito, began a certain admirable diſcourſe, which it is proper you ſhould hear, becauſe it exhorted to virtue.—Tell me, Socrates, ſaid he, and the reſt of you who expreſs a deſire that this youth ſhould become wiſe, whether you are jeſting when you make this aſſertion, or truly and ſeriouſly deſire this?—Then I perceived that they were of opinion that we had, prior to this, been jeſting, when we exhorted them to converſe with the youth, and that on this account they alſo jeſted and had not diſcourſed ſeriouſly with him. Perceiving this therefore to be the caſe, I further ſaid, that we were ſerious in a wonderful degree. And Dionyſodorus ſaid, See, Socrates, that you do not hereafter deny what you now aſſert.—I have conſidered this, ſaid I: for I ſhall never deny what I have aſſerted.—What is it then, ſaid he, that you aſſert? Do you wiſh that he ſhould become wiſe?—Entirely ſo.—But now, ſaid he, whether is Clinias wiſe or not?—Not yet, according to his own confeſſion: and he does not, ſaid I, ſpeak idly.—But do you, ſaid he, wiſh that he ſhould become wiſe, and not be unlearned?—We acknowledged that we did.—Do you not therefore wiſh him to become that which he is not; and no longer to be that which he now is?—And I, on hearing this, was diſturbed. But he, taking advantage of my perturbation, Since, ſaid he, you wiſh him to be no longer that which he now is, you wiſh, as it ſeems, that he may periſh; though thoſe friends and lovers would certainly be but of little worth, who ſhould be deſirous above all things that the objects of their love may be deſtroyed. Cteſippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his attachment to the youth, and ſaid, O Thurian ſtranger, if it were not more ruſtic than is becoming, I ſhould call you to an account for this aſſertion, and ſhould aſk you why you falſely aſcribe to me and the reſt a thing of this kind, which I think it is not holy to aſſert, viz. that I ſhould wiſh that this youth might periſh.

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But what? O Cteſippus, ſaid Euthydemus, does it appear to you, that it is poſſible to ſpeak falſely?—By Jupiter, ſaid he, it does, unleſs I were inſane.—But whether will this be the caſe, when aſſerting a thing which is the ſubject of diſcourſe, or when not aſſerting it.—When aſſerting it.—When, therefore, he aſſerts that thing, is it not true, that he does not ſpeak of any thing elſe than that which he aſſerts?—For how ſhould he do otherwiſe, ſaid Cteſippus?—But that is one of the things which exiſt, of which he ſpeaks, ſeparate from others.—Entirely ſo.—Does he not therefore, when he ſpeaks of that thing, ſpeak of that which has a being?—Yes.—But he who ſpeaks of that which is, and of beings, ſpeaks of things which are true. So that if Dionyſodorus ſpeaks of beings, he ſpeaks of things which are true, and according to you utters nothing falſe.—He does ſo, ſaid he.—But he who ſays theſe things, ſaid Cteſippus, does not ſpeak, O Euthydemus, of beings.—To this Euthydemus replied, Are non-beings any thing elſe than things which are not?—They are not.—By no means, therefore, are non-beings, beings.—By no means.—Can therefore any one perform any action about theſe non-beings, ſo as to make things which in no reſpect are?—It does not appear to me, ſaid Cteſippus, that he can.—What then? Do rhetoricians, when they ſpeak to the people, perform nothing?—They do ſomething, he replied.—If, therefore, they do ſomething, do they not alſo make ſomething? To ſpeak then is to do and to make.—He aſſented.—No one therefore, ſaid he, ſpeaks of non-entities: for if he did, he would make ſomething. But you acknowledge that no one can make non-entities. So that, according to you, no one can aſſert things which are falſe; but if Dionyſodorus ſpeaks, he ſpeaks things which are true, and he ſpeaks of beings.—By Jupiter, ſaid Cteſippus, it is ſo, Euthydemus: yet he ſpeaks of beings after a certain manner, though not as they ſubſiſt.—How do you ſay, Cteſippus, ſaid Dionyſodorus? Are there ſome who ſpeak of things as they are?—There are indeed, ſaid he; and theſe are men worthy and good, and who aſſert things which are true.—What then? ſaid he. Are not things good, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?—He granted that they were.—And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good ſpeak of things as they are?—I do.—The good therefore, ſaid he, O Cteſippus, ſpeak of evil things evily, if they ſpeak of them as they are.—Truly, ſaid he, by Jupiter, they do very much ſo of bad men, among which, if you are

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perſuaded by me, you will be careful that you may not be numbered, leſt the good ſhould ſpeak evily of you; becauſe you well know that the good ſpeak evily of the bad.—Do they not alſo, ſaid Euthydemus, ſpeak magnificently of great men, and warmly of thoſe that are fervent?—Very much ſo indeed, ſaid Cteſippus.—Of cold men, therefore, they ſpeak coldly, and aſſert that they ſpeak frigidly.—You revile, O Cteſippus, ſaid Dionyſodorus, you revile.—Not I, by Jupiter, ſaid he, Dionyſodorus, for I love you; but I admoniſh you as my companion, and I endeavour to perſuade you, that you ſhould never in my preſence make ſuch a ruſtic aſſertion, as that I wiſh the deſtruction of thoſe whom I very much eſteem.

I therefore, as they appeared to me to conduct themſelves in a ruſtic manner towards each other, jeſted with Cteſippus, and ſaid, it appears to me, Cteſippus, that we ought to receive what is aſſerted by the ſtrangers, if we wiſh to impart it to others, and not contend about words. For if they know how to deſtroy men in ſuch a manner as to make them, from being depraved and unwiſe, worthy and wiſe, whether they have diſcovered this themſelves, or have learnt from ſome other, a corruption and deſtruction of this kind, ſo that having deſtroyed him who is depraved, they afterwards render him worthy; if they know how to effect this (but it is evident that they do poſſeſs this knowledge; for they affirm that the art of making men worthy that were depraved, is an art which they have recently invented;) we muſt therefore permit them to deſtroy the lad, and to make him and all the reſt of us wiſe. But if you young men are afraid of me, make trial of me, as if, according to the proverb, in Car[1], ſince, though an elderly man, I am prepared for danger: and I deliver myſelf to this Dionyſodorus, as to Medea the Colchian. Let him deſtroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever elſe he pleaſes with me, if he does but render me worthy. And Cteſippus ſaid, I alſo, Socrates, am prepared to deliver myſelf to theſe ſtrangers, though they ſhould be willing to excoriate more than they do at preſent, provided my ſkin does not end in a bladder like that of Marſyas, but in virtue. Indeed Dionyſodorus, here, thinks that I am angry with him: I am not however angry, but I contradict thoſe things which, in my opinion, he has not well advanced

[1] That is to ſay, make trial of me as if I were ſome vile man or thing, in which, if the event is not fortunate, not much loſs will be ſuſtained. See Eraſmus in Chiliad. p. 227.

againſt

againſt me. But do not, ſaid he, O Dionyſodorus, call contradiction reviling; for reviling is a different thing.

To this Dionyſodorus replied, Do not you, Cteſippus, diſcourſe as if you contradicted?—Entirely, and very much ſo, ſaid he.—Or do not you think that I ſpeak as if I contradicted? You cannot therefore at any time demonſtrate that, if you have heard no one contradicting another.—True, ſaid he: but let us now hear whether I can demonſtrate to you that Cteſippus contradicts Dionyſodorus. Or can you bear a diſcourſe of this kind?—By all means, ſaid he.—What then? he replied; are there definitions of every thing which exiſts?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Whether, therefore, is there a definition of every thing, as it is, or as it is not?—As it is. For if you remember, ſaid Cteſippus, we have juſt now ſhown that no one ſpeaks of a thing as it is not. For no one appears to ſpeak of that which is not. But why this? ſaid Cteſippus. Shall you and I, on this account, contradict the leſs?—Whether therefore, he replied, ſhall we contradict, if we both of us know the definition of the ſame thing, or ſhall we indeed thus ſay the ſame things?—He granted that we ſhould.—But, ſaid he, when neither of us gives the definition of that thing, ſhall we not then contradict? Or, indeed, will it not follow, that thus no mention whatever of that thing will be made by either of us?—He granted this alſo.—When therefore, ſaid he, I give the definition of that thing, but you of ſomething elſe, do we then contradict each other? Or do I then ſpeak of that thing, but you do not ſpeak of it in any reſpect whatever? But how can he who does not ſpeak of a thing contradict him who does?

Cteſippus indeed was then ſilent; but I, wondering at the diſcourſe, ſaid, How do you ſay, Dionyſodorus? For, though I have heard this aſſertion often, and from many, yet I always wondered at it. For it was much uſed by Protagoras and his followers, and by others more antient than theſe; but to me he always appears to be a wonderful perſon, who both ſubverts others and himſelf. I think, however, that I ſhall eſpecially learn the truth of this aſſertion from you. Is the aſſertion then any other than this, that it is not poſſible to aſſert things which are falſe? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not? And that he who ſpeaks, aſſerts things which are true, or otherwiſe does not ſpeak?—He granted that it was ſo.—Whether, therefore, is it not poſſible to aſſert things which are falſe, but to form an opinion

of

of them is poſſible?—It is not even poſſible, ſaid he, to form an opinion of them.—Neither therefore, ſaid I, is there any ſuch thing as falſe opinion.—There is not, ſaid he.—Neither therefore is there ignorance, nor are there unlearned men. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were any ſuch thing, viz. to ſpeak falſely of things?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—But, I replied, this is not poſſible.—It is not, ſaid he.—Do you make this aſſertion, O Dionyſodorus, for the ſake of diſcourſe, that you may ſpeak that which is wonderful; or does it truly appear to you that no man is unlearned?—Confute, ſaid he, the aſſertion. Or, according to your aſſertion, can confutation take place, while no one ſpeaks falſely?—It cannot, ſaid Euthydemus.—Neither therefore do I, ſaid Dionyſodorus, order you to confute. For how can any one order that to be done which is not?—O Euthydemus, ſaid I, I do not well underſtand theſe wiſe and excellent aſſertions, but I haſtily as it were conceive them. Perhaps, therefore, I ſhall aſk ſomething which will be troubleſome; but you will pardon me. See then. For if it is neither poſſible to ſpeak falſely, nor to entertain falſe opinions, nor to be unlearned, neither is it poſſible for any one to err when he does any thing. For he who acts cannot err in that which he does. Do you not ſay ſo?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—This, ſaid I, is the troubleſome queſtion which I juſt now mentioned. For if we do not err, neither acting nor ſpeaking, nor thinking, if this be the caſe, of what, by Jupiter, do you come as the teachers? Or did you not juſt now ſay, that you could teach him virtue who was willing to learn it, the beſt of all men?—Are you ſo dull, Socrates, ſaid Dionyſodorus, taking up the diſcourſe, as that you now remember what we firſt ſaid, and would even now remember any thing which I may have ſaid laſt year, yet do not know how to uſe what has been ſaid at preſent?—I replied, The things which have been now aſſerted are difficult: and this very properly; for they have been aſſerted by wiſe men. And likewiſe this laſt thing which you ſaid cannot be uſed without extreme difficulty: for what will you ſay, Dionyſodorus, is the meaning of this aſſertion, There is ſomething which I do not know how to use? Does it not mean this, that I do not know how to confute it? Or tell me, what other conception you form of theſe words, I do not know how to uſe theſe aſſertions?—Do you affirm, ſaid he, that they mean any thing elſe than this, that it is very difficult to uſe them? Anſwer me.—Before you have anſwered, ſaid I, Dionyſo-

dorus?

dorus?—Will you not anſwer, ſaid he.—Is it juſt that I ſhould?—It is certainly juſt, ſaid he.—After what manner? I replied. Is it becauſe you, being a perſon very wiſe, have now entered into a diſcuſſion with us reſpecting diſcourſe, and becauſe you know when it is proper to anſwer, and when not; and now will not give any anſwer, becauſe you know that it is not requiſite?—You babble, ſaid he, neglecting when it is proper to anſwer, and when not. But, good man, be obedient and anſwer; ſince you acknowledge that I am a wiſe man.

We muſt obey, ſaid I, and as it ſeems it is neceſſary: for you are the ruler. Aſk, then.—Whether therefore do thoſe that underſtand, underſtand having a ſoul? or do inanimate natures alſo underſtand?—They underſtand having a ſoul.—Do you know, therefore, ſaid he, any aſſertion which has a ſoul?—Not I, by Jupiter.—Why, then, did you juſt now aſk me what was the meaning of my aſſertion[1]?—For what other reaſon, I replied, than that I have erred through indolence: or ſhall I ſay, that I have not erred, but that I have alſo ſaid this rightly, when I aſſerted that my words underſtood? Whether will you ſay that I erred, or not? For if I have not erred, neither do you confute though you are a wiſe man, nor have you any thing to reply to my aſſertion: but if I have erred, neither thus do you ſpeak rightly, in ſaying that it is not poſſible to err. And I ſay theſe things, not in oppoſition to what you have aſſerted laſt year. But this diſcourſe, ſaid I, O Dionyſodorus and Euthydemus, ſeems to remain in the ſame condition, and even now as formerly, having thrown down others, to fall itſelf; nor has your art diſcovered a method of preventing this, though it is ſo wonderful with reſpect to accuracy of arguments.—Cteſippus then ſaid, You certainly ſpeak wonderful things, O Thurian or Chian men, or by whatever other name it may delight you to be called, as you are not in the leaſt concerned whether you are delirious or not.—And I, fearing leſt defamation ſhould take place, again appeaſed Cteſippus, and ſaid, O Cteſippus; and now indeed, O Cteſippus, what I have ſaid to Clinias, I alſo ſay to you, that you do not know that the wiſdom of theſe ſtrangers is admirable. They

[1] In the original ὁ, τι μοι νοει το ρημα, which is literally "what my aſſertion *underſtands* for me." The words of Socrates, therefore, are perverted by the ſophiſt from their natural meaning, in order that he might play on the word *underſtand*.

are however, unwilling to exhibit it to us ſeriouſly, but imitate Proteus the Egyptian ſophiſt, and deceive us by enchantments. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus, and not ſuffer the men to leave us, till they have unfolded to us what it is in which they are ſerious: for I think that ſomething pertaining to them very beautiful will appear, when they begin to act ſeriouſly; but we requeſt, we exhort, and we beſeech them to unfold themſelves.

I therefore again appear to myſelf to be about to relate in what manner I beſeech them to unfold themſelves to me: for I will endeavour to the beſt of my ability to diſcuſs what I formerly left unfiniſhed, if I can in a certain reſpect allure them, and induce them to pity and commiſerate me thus ſtrenuouſly and ſeriouſly acting, and to act ſeriouſly themſelves. But do you, Clinias, ſaid I, enable me to recollect whence we at that time diſcontinued our diſcourſe: for I think we ended there, whence we acknowledged we ſhould philoſophize: did we not?—We did, he replied.—But philoſophy is the poſſeſſion of ſcience: is it not ſo? ſaid I.—It is, ſaid he.—By the poſſeſſion therefore, of what ſcience ſhall we rightly poſſeſs? is not this indeed obvious, that it muſt be by the poſſeſſion of that ſcience which will benefit us?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Should we therefore be in any reſpect benefited, if we ſcientifically knew, while travelling, in what part of the earth much gold is buried?—Perhaps ſo, ſaid he.—But formerly, I replied, this was our deciſion, that we ſhould gain nothing, even though without labour, and without digging the earth, all the gold that exiſts ſhould be ours. So that neither if we knew how to make golden ſtones would this ſcience be of any worth: for if we knew not how to uſe gold, no advantage would be apparent from the poſſeſſion of it. Or do you not remember? ſaid I.—I do very well remember it, he replied.—Nor, as it ſeems, will any advantage be derived from any other ſcience, neither from that which is employed in the negotiation of money, nor from the medicinal ſcience, nor from any other, which knows how to make any thing, but does not know how to uſe that which it makes. Is it not ſo?—He granted that it was.—Nor even, if there were a ſcience by which men could be made immortal, but without knowing how to uſe immortality, neither from this does it appear that there would be any advantage, if it is proper to argue from what has been previouſly granted.—To all theſe particulars we mutually aſſented.

A certain ſcience, therefore, is requiſite for us, O beautiful boy, of ſuch a kind,

kind, in which both to make, and to know how to uſe that which is made, may concur.—It appears ſo, ſaid he.—It is of much conſequence therefore, as it ſeems, whether we are ſkilful makers of the lyre, or in poſſeſſion of a certain ſcience of that kind: for here the art which makes is ſeparated from the art which uſes, about the ſame thing. For the lyre-making and the harp-making arts differ very much from each other. Is it not ſo?—He granted that it was.—Nor ſhall we indeed require the pipe-making art: for this is another ſuch-like art.—He granted that it was.—But, by the gods, ſaid I, if we ſhould learn the art of compoſing orations, is this the art from the poſſeſſion of which we ſhould be happy?—I do not think it is, ſaid Clinias.—What argument, ſaid I, do you employ in thinking thus?—I ſee, he replied, certain framers of orations, who do not know how to uſe the very orations which they themſelves have compoſed: juſt as the makers of lyres are unſkilled in the uſe of the lyre; but here others are able to uſe the orations which theſe have framed, though they are incapable of framing orations themſelves. It is evident, therefore, with reſpect to orations, that the art of making is ſeparate from the art of uſing them.—You appear to me, ſaid I, to adduce a ſufficient argument that the art of compoſing orations is not that art by the acquiſition of which any one will be happy; though I thought that here that ſcience would be apparent which we ſome time ſince inveſtigated: for to me thoſe very men who compoſe orations appear, O Clinias, to be tranſcendently wiſe, when I am converſant with them; and this very art of theirs alſo appears to be ſomething divine and elevated. This indeed is by no means wonderful: for it is a portion of the art of enchantments, to which it is but a little inferior; for the art of enchantments is that art by which vipers, ſpiders called phalangii, and ſcorpions, are allured; but this allures and ſoothes judges, thoſe that frequent aſſemblies, and other tumultuous aſſociations. Or are you of a different opinion?—I am not, ſaid he; but it appears to me as you ſay.—Where then ſhall we yet further turn ourſelves? and to what art?—I do not well know, ſaid he.—But I think, ſaid I, that I have diſcovered this art.—What is it? ſaid Clinias.—The art of commanding an army, ſaid I, appears to me, more than any other art, to be that which will confer felicity on its poſſeſſor.—It does not appear ſo to me.—Why not? ſaid I.—This is certainly an art of hunting men.—What

then? ſaid I.—No part, ſaid he, of the hunting art extends beyond hunting and ſubjugating; but when they have ſubjugated that which they have hunted, they are not able to uſe it. But hunters and fiſhermen aſſign this to cocks; while, on the contrary, geometricians, aſtronomers, and thoſe ſkilled in the logiſtic art (for theſe alſo are hunters) do not make diagrams, but inveſtigate things themſelves. As therefore they do not know how to uſe theſe, but are alone ſkilled in hunting, they deliver their inventions to be uſed by thoſe who are expert in dialectic; I mean that this is done by ſuch among theſe as are not entirely ſtupid.—Be it ſo, I replied, O moſt beautiful and wiſe Clinias.—After the ſame manner, ſaid he, the commanders of armies alſo, when they have hunted any city or camp, deliver it to the care of politicians; for they know not how to uſe thoſe things which they have hunted: juſt, I think, as the hunters of quails deliver them to thoſe by whom quails are nurtured. If, therefore, he replied, we are in want of that art which its poſſeſſor, whether he makes or hunts it, will know how to uſe, and an art of this kind will render us bleſſed, ſome other art, ſaid he, muſt be inveſtigated inſtead of that of commanding an army.

CRITO. What do you ſay, Socrates? Did that lad aſſert things of this kind?

SOC. Do you not think he did, Crito?

CRITO. By Jupiter, I do not indeed. For I think if he had ſaid theſe things, that he would not have required the aſſiſtance either of Euthydemus, or any other man, with reſpect to erudition.

SOC. But, by Jupiter, was it Cteſippus then that ſaid theſe things? for I do not remember.

CRITO. What, Cteſippus?

SOC. This, indeed, I well know, that neither Euthydemus nor Dionyſodorus ſaid theſe things. But, O divine Crito, was it not ſome one of the beings more excellent than man, who being preſent ſaid theſe things? For I well know that I heard them.

CRITO. It is ſo, by Jupiter, Socrates; and it appears to me, and indeed very much ſo, to have been ſome one of the more excellent order of beings. But after this, what art have you ſtill inveſtigated? And have you diſcovered that art for the ſake of which you engaged in this inveſtigation?

SOC. Whence, bleſſed man, ſhould we have diſcovered it? But we were perfectly

perfectly ridiculous, juſt like boys that purſue larks; for we continually thought that we ſhould immediately apprehend each of the ſciences, but they always fled from our view. Why therefore ſhould I ſpeak to you concerning many ſciences? But when we came to the royal art, and conſidered whether it is that art which imparts and produces felicity, here falling as it were into a labyrinth, when we thought that we had now arrived at the end, we again proceeded in a winding courſe, as if we appeared to be in the beginning of our inquiry, and were as much diſtant from the object of our ſearch as when we began the inveſtigation.

CRITO. But how has this happened to you, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you. For the political and the royal art appear to us to be the ſame.

CRITO. But what then?

SOC. The art of commanding an army, and the other arts, appear to impart dominion over thoſe works of which they are the artificers, as alone knowing how to uſe them. Hence it clearly appeared to us to be the art which we were inveſtigating, and the cauſe of good conduct in a city, and, in ſhort, according to the Iambic of Æſchylus, that it alone is ſeated in the ſtern of the city, governing and ruling over all things, and rendering all things uſeful.

CRITO. Does not this therefore appear to you to be well ſaid reſpecting this art?

SOC. You ſhall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after theſe things will happen to us. For again, let us nearly conſider as follows. What work will that royal art which rules over all things produce for us? Shall we ſay none? But we have ſaid to each other that it certainly will produce ſome work. For did not you aſſert this, Crito?

CRITO. I did.

SOC. What then will you ſay is the work of it? Juſt as if I ſhould aſk you what work the medicinal art produces in all thoſe things over which it rules? Would you not ſay it is health?

CRITO. I ſhould.

SOC. But what? With reſpect to your art, agriculture, what does it effect in all thoſe things over which it rules? Would you not ſay that it affords us food from the earth?

CRITO.

CRITO. I ſhould.

Soc. But what does the royal art effect while it governs every thing over which it has dominion? Perhaps you do not clearly perceive this.

CRITO. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Nor do we, Crito. But thus much indeed you know, that if it is that art which we inveſtigate, it ought to be uſeful.

CRITO. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?

CRITO. Neceſſarily ſo, Socrates.

Soc. But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is nothing elſe than a certain ſcience.

CRITO. You did indeed ſay ſo.

Soc. Do not therefore other works, which may be ſaid to belong to the political art, (but theſe will be many, ſuch as to render the citizens rich, free, and without ſedition,) do not all theſe appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is neceſſary that this art ſhould make men wiſe, and impart wiſdom, if it is to be that art which will benefit and render men happy.

CRITO. It is ſo: and thus you accord with each other conformably to your narration.

Soc. Does therefore the royal art make men wiſe and good?

CRITO. What ſhould hinder, Socrates?

Soc. Does it therefore make all men to be ſo, and to be entirely good? And is it that art which imparts every ſcience, that of the ſhoemaker, of the ſmith, and of all other artificers?

CRITO. I do not think it is, Socrates.

Soc. But what ſcience is it? Or to what purpoſe do we employ it? For it is requiſite that it ſhould not be the artificer of any work which is neither good nor evil, and that it ſhould impart no other ſcience than itſelf. Let us therefore ſay what it is, or to what purpoſe we ſhould uſe it. Are you willing, Crito, we ſhould ſay it is that by which we make others good?

CRITO. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But in what will theſe be good, and to what purpoſe will they be uſeful? Or ſhall we alſo ſay that they will make others good, and that thoſe others will make others to be ſo? However, it will no where appear to us in what they are good, becauſe we have rejected the works which are ſaid

to

to belong to the political ſcience. But in reality, according to the proverb[1], Corinthian Jupiter is preſent; and as I have ſaid, we are ſtill equally, or more than equally, remote from knowing what that ſcience is which will make us happy.

CRITO. By Jupiter, Socrates, you have arrived as it ſeems at abundant doubting.

SOC. I myſelf, therefore, Crito, ſince I was fallen into this doubt, with every poſſible exertion of voice entreated the ſtrangers, and called upon them as if they had been the Dioſcuri[2] to ſave us, viz. me and the lad from the overwhelming billows of this diſcourſe, to be by all means ſerious, and ſeriouſly to ſhow us what that ſcience is, by the poſſeſſion of which we may paſs through life in a becoming manner.

CRITO. What then? was Euthydemus willing to unfold any thing to you?

SOC. How could he do otherwiſe? And he began, my friend, the diſcourſe very magnificently thus: Whether, ſaid he, Socrates, ſhall I teach you this ſcience about which you formerly doubted, or evince that you poſſeſs it?—O bleſſed man, I replied, are you able to effect this?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Show me, therefore, by Jupiter, ſaid I, that I poſſeſs it: for this will be much eaſier than to inſtruct a man ſo far advanced in years.—Come then, ſaid he, anſwer me. Is there any thing which you know?—Certainly, ſaid I, there are many things which I know, and theſe of ſmall importance.—It is ſufficient, ſaid he. Does it therefore appear to you to be poſſible, that any thing which exiſts ſhould not be that thing which it is?—It does not, by Jupiter.—Do you not therefore, ſaid he, know ſomething?—I do.—Are you not therefore knowing, if you know?—Entirely ſo, in this very thing which I know.—It is of no conſequence. Is it not then neceſſary that you ſhould know all things, in conſequence of poſſeſſing knowledge?—It is not, by Jupiter, ſaid I, ſince there are many things which I do not know.—Will it not therefore follow, if there is any thing which you do not know, that you are not knowing?—

[1] A wearineſs from words repeated in vain, is ſignified by this adage. Concerning the origin of this proverb, which is obſcure, ſee the Greek Scholia on Plato, p. 96. and Eraſmus in Chiliad. p. 678.

[2] The Dioſcuri are Caſtor and Pollux, the ſons of Jupiter from Leda. Theſe brother deities were invoked by ſailors when in danger of ſhipwreck.

It will follow that I am not knowing in that thing, my friend, I replied.—Will you then, ſaid he, be leſs deſtitute of knowledge? For you juſt now ſaid, that you were knowing: and thus you will be the ſame perſon, and again not the ſame perſon, according to the ſame, and at the ſame time.—Be it ſo, I replied, Euthydemus; for, according to the proverb, you ſay all things well. How then do I know that ſcience which we inveſtigate? Since it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not be: if knowing one thing, I know all things. For I cannot poſſeſs, and at the ſame time be deſtitute of knowledge. But if I know all things, I alſo poſſeſs that knowledge. Is this then what you ſay? And is this that wiſe thing?—You yourſelf, ſaid he, Socrates, confute yourſelf.

But what? ſaid I, O Euthydemus, does not the very ſame thing happen to you? For I, whatever I may ſuffer with you and this Dionyſodorus, the beloved head, ſhall not be very indignant. Tell me, do you not know ſome things, and are you not ignorant of others?—By no means, Socrates, ſaid Dionyſodorus.—How do you ſay? I replied. Do you therefore know nothing?—Very far from it, ſaid he.—Do you then know all things, ſaid I, ſince you alſo know any thing?—All things, he replied. And you likewiſe, if you know one thing, know all things.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a wonderful thing you ſpeak of: and a mighty good becomes apparent. But do all other men likewiſe know all things, or nothing?—They certainly, ſaid he, do not know ſome things, but are ignorant of others; and are not at the ſame time ſcientifically knowing, and deprived of ſcience.—But how is this? ſaid I.—All men, he replied, know all things, if they know one thing.—O, by the gods! ſaid I, Dionyſodorus, (for it is now manifeſt to me that you are ſerious, though I with difficulty incited you to be ſo,) do you in reality know all things, ſuch as the carpenter's and the ſhoemaker's art?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—And are you alſo able to ſew ſhoes, in the ſame manner as ſhoemakers?—I am, by Jupiter, ſaid he, and alſo to mend them.—Do you alſo know ſuch things as theſe, viz. the number of the ſtars and the ſands?—Perfectly ſo, he replied. Do you not think, we ſhould confeſs that we do?—And Cteſippus then taking up the diſcourſe, By Jupiter, ſaid he, O Dionyſodorus, exhibit to me ſuch a proof of theſe things, that I may know that you ſpeak the truth.—What ſhall I exhibit, ſaid he.—Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?

have?—Is it not ſufficient for you, ſaid he, to have heard that we know all things?—By no means, ſaid he; but only tell us this one thing more, and ſhow that you ſpeak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you ſhall appear to know this on our counting them, we ſhall then alſo believe you in other things. Conceiving, therefore, that they were derided, they were unwilling to comply, but they acknowledged that they knew all things, while they were ſeverally interrogated by Cteſippus. For there was not any thing at length, which Cteſippus did not aſk them without any heſitation, and even aſked them, if they knew the moſt indecent things. They however moſt bravely advanced to the interrogations, confeſſing that they knew, like wild boars ruſhing on the blow; ſo that I alſo myſelf, Crito, was at length compelled, through my incredulity, to aſk Euthydemus, whether Dionyſodorus knew alſo how to dance? But he replied, Perfectly ſo.—However, ſaid I, he certainly does not know how to precipitate himſelf upon ſwords, and to be whirled on a wheel, being ſo much advanced in years as he is. Or is he maſter of this piece of wiſdom alſo?—There is nothing, ſaid he, which he does not know.—But whether, ſaid I, do you now only know all things, or has this always been the caſe?—Always, ſaid he.—And when you were boys, and as ſoon as you were born, did you know all things?—All things, ſaid both of them together.—And to us, indeed, the thing appeared to be incredible. But Euthydemus ſaid, You do not believe, Socrates.—Except this one thing, I replied, that it is likely you are wiſe men.—But, ſaid he, if you are willing to anſwer me, I will alſo ſhow you, giving your aſſent to theſe wonderful things.—I replied, I ſhall moſt gladly be confuted in theſe things. For if it is concealed from me that I am wiſe, and you demonſtrate that I know all things, and that I have always poſſeſſed this knowledge, what greater gain than this ſhall I be able to diſcover through the whole of life?—Anſwer then, ſaid he.—Aſk me as one that will anſwer.

Whether, therefore, Socrates, ſaid he, do you know any thing or not?—I do.—Do you then know by that thing through which you are knowing, or by any thing elſe?—By that by which I am knowing: for I think that you ſpeak of the ſoul. Or do you not ſpeak of this?—Are you not aſhamed, ſaid he, Socrates, to interrogate when you are interrogated?—Be it ſo, ſaid I; but what ſhall I do? Shall I do as you bid me, when I know not what it

is you aſk me, though at the ſame time you order me to anſwer and not to interrogate?—You, doubtleſs, ſaid he, apprehend what I ſay.—I do, I replied.—Now therefore anſwer to that which you apprehend.—What then? ſaid I, if you indeed aſk conceiving one thing, but I apprehend another, and afterwards I ſhould anſwer to this, would it be ſufficient for you if I anſwered nothing to the purpoſe?—To me it would, he replied, but not to you, as I think.—I will not therefore, by Jupiter, ſaid I, anſwer, till I underſtand.—You will not anſwer, ſaid he, to the things which you always apprehend, becauſe you trifle, and are more ſimple than is becoming.—And I perceived that he was indignant with me for diſputing what was ſaid, he being deſirous to catch me by encloſing me with words. I recollected, therefore, that Connus was always indignant with me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid leſs attention to me, as one that was ignorant. As, therefore, I had formed the deſign of becoming inſtructed by theſe men, I thought it was neceſſary to ſubmit to them, leſt, conſidering me as an illiterate perſon, they ſhould reject me. Hence I ſaid, If you are diſpoſed to act in this manner, Euthydemus, let it be done: for you, in every reſpect, better know how to diſcourſe than I do, you who poſſeſs art, than I who am a rude unlettered man. Again, therefore, interrogate from the beginning.—Anſwer then again, ſaid he, whether you know thoſe things which you know, by ſomething or not.—I do, ſaid I; for I know them, by my ſoul.—Again, ſaid he, in his anſwer, he adds to what he is aſked. For I did not aſk by what you know, but if you know by any thing.—Again, ſaid I, I have anſwered more than is ſufficient, through my want of erudition; but pardon me. For I will now anſwer ſimply that I always know by a certain thing what I know.—But whether, ſaid he, do you always know by this very ſame thing? Or do you at one time know by this, and at another by ſomething elſe?—Always by this, ſaid I, when I know.—Again, ſaid he, you will not ceaſe to ſpeak ſuperfluouſly.—But I am afraid leſt this certain ſomething always ſhould deceive us.—It will not deceive *us*, ſaid he; but if at all, it will deceive you. Anſwer me, however, whether you always know by this.—Always, I replied; ſince it is neceſſary to take away the when.—Do you therefore always know by this? And always knowing, whether do you know ſome things by this by which you know, but other things by ſomething elſe? Or do you know all things by this?—All things by this, ſaid I, which I do know.—This latter part of your anſwer,

anſwer, ſaid he, is again ſuperfluous.—But I take away, ſaid I, the words which I do know.—You ſhould not, however, ſaid he, take away even one word; for I want none of your aſſiſtance. But anſwer me; would you be able to know all things unleſs you could know all things?—This would be a prodigy, I replied.—And he ſaid, Add now whatever you pleaſe: for you confeſs that you know all things.—I appear to have done ſo, ſaid I, ſince the words, the things which I know, poſſeſs no power whatever; but I know all things.—Have you not therefore alſo confeſſed that you always know by this thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in whatever way you pleaſe: for you have acknowledged that you always know, and at the ſame time, that you know all things. It is evident therefore that you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begot, and when you was born. Hence, before you was born, and before heaven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always poſſeſſed knowledge. And by Jupiter, ſaid he, you always will know, and will always know all things, if I am willing that you ſhould.—But be willing, I replied, O much-honoured Euthydemus, if you ſpeak the truth in reality. But I cannot entirely believe that you are ſufficient to accompliſh this, unleſs this your brother Dionyſodorus aſſiſts you with his counſel: and thus perhaps what you ſay may be accompliſhed.

But tell me, I ſaid; for in other things I cannot contend with you, who are endued with ſuch portentous wiſdom, nor deny that I know all things, ſince you ſay that I do;—how ſhall I ſay that I know ſuch things as the following, O Euthydemus, viz. that good men are unjuſt? Come, inform me, do I know this, or do I not know it?—You certainly know it, ſaid he.—What, I replied, do I know?—That good men are not unjuſt.—This, ſaid I, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I do not aſk this; but where did I learn that good men are unjuſt?—No where, ſaid Dionyſdorus.—I do not therefore, ſaid I, know this.—Euthydemus then ſaid to Dionyſodorus, You deſtroy the converſation; and he will appear to be not knowing, and to poſſeſs, and at the ſame time to be deprived of knowledge. And Dionyſodorus bluſhed. But you, Euthydemus, ſaid I, how do you ſay? Does not your brother appear to you to ſpeak rightly, who knows all things?—But am I the brother of Euthydemus? ſaid Dionyſodorus, haſtily replying.—And I ſaid, Excuſe me from anſwering you, O good man, till Euthydemus has taught me

that I know that good men are unjuſt, and do not envy me the diſcipline.—You fly, Socrates, ſaid Dionyſodorus, and are not willing to anſwer.—It is reaſonable that I ſhould, ſaid I: for I am inferior to either of you, ſo that there is an abundant neceſſity that I ſhould fly from two. For I am much more imbecile than Hercules, who was not able to contend with the hydra (a ſophiſt who, by her wiſdom, if one head of the diſcourſe was cut off, preſented many inſtead of one), and at the ſame time with the crab, a certain other ſophiſt, who, as it appears to me, recently drove on ſhore from the ſea); and when Hercules had in a ſimilar manner tormented the crab) by ſpeaking to and biting him on the left-hand ſide, he called upon Iolaus, the ſon of his brother, to aſſiſt him: and he gave him ſufficient aid. But my Iolaus Patrocles, if he ſhould come, would rather effect the very contrary.

Anſwer then, ſaid Dionyſodorus, ſince theſe things are celebrated by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.—It is therefore beſt for me, O Dionyſodorus, ſaid I, to anſwer you. For you will not deſiſt from interrogating, nearly envying (for this I well know), and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that wiſe thing.—Anſwer, however, ſaid he.—But I will anſwer, I ſaid, that Iolaus was the ſon of the brother of Hercules, but, as it appears to me, is by no means my nephew. For Patrocles, who is my brother, was not his father; but Iphicles, who reſembles him in name, was the brother of Hercules.—But is Patrocles, ſaid he, your brother?—Certainly, ſaid I; for he had the ſame mother, though not the ſame father with me.—He is your brother therefore, and not your brother.—I ſaid, He was not from the ſame father, O beſt of men: for his father was Chæredemus, but mine Sophroniſcus.—But the father, ſaid he, was Sophroniſcus and Chæredemus. Was he not?—Certainly, ſaid I; the former was my, and the latter his father.—Was not therefore, ſaid he, Chæredemus different from the father?—From my father, ſaid I.—Was he therefore a father, being different from a father? Or are you the ſame thing as a ſtone?—I am afraid, ſaid I, leſt through you I ſhould appear to be the ſame; but I do not appear to myſelf to be the ſame.—Are you not therefore, ſaid he, different from a ſtone?—Different certainly.—Being different from a ſtone, therefore, you are ſomething elſe, and not a ſtone: and being different from gold, you are not gold.—Granted.—Will not Chæredemus therefore, ſince he is different from father, not be a father?—It ſeems, ſaid I, he is not a father.—For certainly,

ſaid Euthydemus, taking up the diſcourſe, if Chæredemus is a father, again Sophroniſcus, on the contrary, being different from father, is not a father; ſo that you, O Socrates, are without a father.—And then Cteſippus, taking up the diſcourſe, ſaid, Does not your father ſuffer theſe very ſame things? for he is different from my father.—Very far from it, ſaid Euthydemus.—Is he then the ſame? he replied.—The ſame, indeed.—I ſhould not conſent to this. But whether, O Euthydemus, is he alone my father, or is he the father alſo of other men?—Of other men alſo, ſaid he.—Or do you think that the ſame perſon being father, is not father?—I ſhould indeed think ſo, ſaid Cteſippus.—But what? ſaid he. A thing being gold, is it not gold? Or being man, is it not man?—You do not, ſaid Cteſippus, according to the proverb, connect, O Euthydemus, thread with thread [1]. For you ſpeak of a dire thing, if your father is the father of all men.—But he is, ſaid he.—Whether is he the father of men, ſaid Cteſippus, or alſo of horſes? Or likewiſe of all other animals?—Of all others animals, ſaid he.—Is a mother alſo the mother of all animals?—And a mother likewiſe.—Your mother therefore, ſaid he, is alſo the mother of marine hedge-hogs.—And yours too, ſaid he.—Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, whelps, and pigs.—For you alſo are, ſaid he.—And beſides this, your father alſo is a dog.—For your father is likewiſe, ſaid he.—But, ſaid Dionyſodorus, if you anſwer me, you will in a ſhort time acknowledge theſe things. For tell me, have you a dog?—And a very bad one, ſaid Cteſippus.—Has he therefore whelps?—He has indeed, ſaid he, others very much like himſelf.—Is not the dog then the father of them?—I, ſaid he, ſaw him having connection with a bitch.—What then? Is he not your dog?—Certainly, ſaid he.—Being a father therefore, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of whelps.—And again, Dionyſodorus haſtily took up the diſcourſe, that Cteſippus might not ſay any thing in reply prior to him; and ſtill further, ſaid he, anſwer me a trifling particular. Do you ſtrike this dog?—And Cteſippus laughing, By the gods, ſaid he, I do; for I cannot ſtrike you.—Do you not therefore, ſaid he, ſtrike your father?—I ſhould much more

[1] This proverb, according to the Greek Scholiaſt on Plato, is applied to thoſe who ſay or do the ſame things through the ſame, or who connect ſimilars into friendſhip. This proverb is alſo mentioned by Ariſtotle in the third book of his Phyſics.

juſtly,

juſtly, ſaid he, ſtrike your father, and aſk him what he meant, by begetting ſuch wiſe ſons. But certainly, O Euthydemus, ſaid Cteſippus, your father and the father of the whelps has obtained the poſſeſſion of many good things from this your wiſdom.

But he is not in want of many good things, O Cteſippus, neither he, nor you.—Nor are you, O Euthydemus, ſaid he, in want of them.—Neither I nor any other man am in want of them. For tell me, O Cteſippus, whether you think it good for a ſick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good, when it is requiſite he ſhould drink it; or when any one is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or without arms?—To me, ſaid he, it appears to be better to do the former of theſe; though I think that you are about to ſay ſomething beautiful.—You underſtand moſt excellently, ſaid he; but anſwer me. For ſince you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink a medicine when it is requiſite, it is alſo neceſſary to drink abundantly of this good, and it will in this caſe be well, if ſome one bruiſing it, ſhould mingle with it a cart load of hellebore.—And Ctesippus ſaid, This would be very proper indeed, O Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the ſtatue in Delphi.—As therefore, ſaid he, it is alſo good to have arms in battle, is it not neceſſary to have a great number of ſhields and ſpears, ſince it is a good thing?—Very much ſo, ſaid Cteſippus. But you are not of this opinion, O Euthydemus; for you think that one ſhield and one ſpear are ſufficient. Or do you not?—I do.—Would you alſo, ſaid he, arm Gorgon and Briareus after this manner? But I think that you are more ſkilful than to act in this manner, as being one who fights with military weapons, as is alſo the caſe with this your aſſociate.—And Euthydemus indeed was ſilent; but Dionyſodorus ſaid, in reply to thoſe things which had been before anſwered by Cteſippus, Does it not therefore alſo appear to you to be good to poſſeſs gold?—Certainly, ſaid Cteſippus, and alſo to have a great quantity of it.—What then? Does it not appear to you to be a good thing always to poſſeſs riches, and every where?—Very much ſo, ſaid he.—Do you not therefore alſo acknowledge gold to be a good thing?—We have acknowledged it, ſaid he.—Is it not then neceſſary always to poſſeſs it, and every where, and eſpecially in one's ſelf? And would not a man be moſt happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his ſkull, and a ſtater of gold in each of his eyes?—They ſay indeed, O Euthydemus, ſaid

Cteſippus, that thoſe among the Scythians are the moſt happy and the beſt men, who have much gold in their ſkulls, juſt as you lately ſaid, that a dog was your father: and, what is ſtill more wonderful, they ſay, that they drink out of their own golden ſkulls, and view the gold within them, having their own head in their hands.

But whether, ſaid Euthydemus, do the Scythians and other men ſee things which may be ſeen, or things which cannot be ſeen?—Things which can be ſeen, certainly.—Is this, therefore, alſo the caſe with you? ſaid he.—It is.—Do you therefore ſee our garments?—Yes.—Are theſe then things which may be ſeen?—Tranſcendently ſo, ſaid Cteſippus.—But what? ſaid he.—Nothing. But you perhaps do not think that they are ſeen; ſo pleaſant are you. To me however, Euthydemus, you appear, not ſleeping to be aſleep, and if it were poſſible for a man when ſpeaking to ſay nothing, that you alſo do this.—Is it not therefore poſſible, ſaid Dionyſodorus, for him who is ſilent to ſpeak?—By no means, ſaid Cteſippus.—Is it alſo impoſſible for him who ſpeaks to be ſilent?—This is ſtill leſs poſſible, ſaid he.—When therefore you ſpeak of ſtones, and pieces of wood and iron, do you not ſpeak of things ſilent?—I do not, ſaid he, if I walk in braziers' ſhops; but the pieces of iron are called things which ſound, and make the greateſt noiſe, if any one meddles with them. So that in this particular, it is concealed from you through your wiſdom, that you have ſaid nothing. But further ſtill, explain to me the other aſſertion, how it is poſſible for one who ſpeaks to be ſilent.—And Cteſippus appeared to me to contend in a tranſcendent manner, on account of the youth, the object of his love.—When you are ſilent, ſaid Euthydemus, are you not ſilent as to all things?—I am, ſaid he.—Are you not therefore ſilent, as to things which are ſaid, if things which are ſaid are among the number of all things?—But what? ſaid Cteſippus, are not all things ſilent?—Certainly not, ſaid Euthydemus.—Do therefore, O beſt of men, all things ſpeak?—Thoſe things certainly do, which do ſpeak.—But, ſaid he, I do not aſk this; but I aſk whether all things are ſilent, or ſpeak?—They do neither, and they do both, ſaid Dionyſodorus, haſtily taking up the diſcourſe. For I well know that you have not any thing to ſay to this anſwer.—And Cteſippus, as was uſual with him, laughing very loudly, O Euthydemus, ſaid he, your brother has loſt his poſition in both caſes, and his aſſertion periſhes and is vanquiſhed. And Clinias was very much delighted and laughed;

laughed; ſo that Cteſippus became ten times greater than he was. But Cteſippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have ſtolen theſe things from theſe very men. For a wiſdom of this kind is not now poſſeſſed by any other perſons.

And I ſaid, Why do you laugh, O Clinias, at things ſo ſerious and beautiful?—Why have you now, Socrates, ever ſeen a beautiful thing? ſaid Dionyſodorus.—I have, ſaid I, and many ſuch, O Dionyſodorus.—Were they therefore, ſaid he, things different from the beautiful, or the ſame with the beautiful?—And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had ſuffered juſtly for having granted. At the ſame time, however, I replied, They are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is preſent to each of them.—If, therefore, ſaid he, an ox is preſent with you, you are an ox; and becauſe I now am preſent with you, you are Dionyſodorus.—Predict better things, ſaid I.—But after what manner, ſaid he; when one thing is preſent with another, will that which is different be different?—Are you then, ſaid I, dubious reſpecting this? But I will now endeavour to imitate the wiſdom of men, as being one who is deſirous of it.—How ſhould I not doubt, ſaid he, both I and all other men, reſpecting that which is not?—What do you ſay? ſaid I, O Dionyſodorus. Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the baſe, baſe?—If, ſaid he, it appears to be ſo to me.—Does it not therefore appear to be ſo to you?—Entirely ſo, ſaid he.—Is not therefore alſo the ſame, ſame? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the ſame. But I ſhould not think that even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. But, O Dionyſodorus, this indeed you willingly paſs by; ſince in other things you appear to me to reſemble artiſts on whom it is incumbent to accompliſh certain particulars; for it is proper that you ſhould accompliſh the buſineſs of diſcourſe in an all-beautiful manner.—Do you know therefore, ſaid he, what is proper to each of the artiſts? And, in the firſt place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in braſs?—I know that this belongs to copper-ſmiths.—But to whom does it belong to faſhion things from clay?—To a potter.—And whoſe buſineſs is it to cut throats, to excoriate, and cutting off ſmall pieces of fleſh to boil and roaſt them?—It is the buſineſs of a cook, ſaid I.—If then, ſaid he, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?—Eſpecially ſo.—But it is proper, as you ſay, that a cook ſhould cut and excoriate. Have you

you aſſented to theſe things or not?—I have aſſented, I ſaid; but pardon me.—It is evident, therefore, ſaid he, that if any one, cutting the throat of a cook, and chopping him into ſmall pieces, ſhould boil and roaſt him, he would do what is proper; and that if any one ſhould work on a copper-ſmith himſelf after the manner of braziers, and on a potter after the manner of potters, he alſo would do what is proper.—O Neptune, ſaid I, now you place a ſummit[1] on your wiſdom. Will it therefore ever be preſent with me, ſo as to become familiar to me?—You will know it, Socrates, ſaid he, when it becomes familiar to you.—That is to ſay, ſaid I, if you are willing that it ſhould.

But what? ſaid he, Do you think you know the things pertaining to yourſelf?—Unleſs you ſay any thing to the contrary. For it is neceſſary to begin from you, but to end in Euthydemus here.—Whether therefore, ſaid he, do you think theſe things to be yours, over which you have dominion, and which you can uſe as you pleaſe? As, for inſtance, with reſpect to oxen and ſheep, do you think that ſuch among theſe are yours as it is lawful for you to ſell and give, and ſacrifice to whatever god you pleaſe? And that thoſe of them over which you have not this power, are not yours?—And I (for I knew that from thoſe queſtions ſomething beautiful would emerge, and at the ſame time being deſirous to hear very quickly) ſaid, it is perfectly ſo: things of this kind are alone mine.—But what? ſaid he. Do you not call theſe things animals, which poſſeſs a ſoul?—Yes, I ſaid.—Do you acknowledge then, that theſe alone among animals are yours reſpecting which you have the liberty of doing all theſe things which I have juſt now mentioned?—I acknowledge it.—And he pauſing, very ironically, as if conſidering ſomething of great conſequence, Tell me, ſaid he, Socrates, is Jupiter with you *Patrius*?—And I, ſuſpecting that the diſcourſe would come to that place, in which it would end, fled with a certain ambiguous craftineſs, and now turned myſelf as if I had been caught in a net. And I ſaid, He is not, O Dionyſodorus.—You therefore are a miſerable man; nor are you an Athenian, ſince you have neither gods called *Patrii*, nor ſacred rights, nor any thing elſe beautiful and good.—Spare me, ſaid I, O Dionyſodorus, predict better things, and do not inſtruct me with ſeverity. For

[1] This was uſually ſaid when the laſt hand was put to any thing, or when that was added without which a buſineſs could not be finiſhed. See Eraſmus in Chiliad. p. 570.

I have altars, and domeſtic ſacred concerns, and ſuch as belong to my country, and whatever other things of this kind are poſſeſſed by the reſt of the Athenians.—In the next place, ſaid he, is not Jupiter Patrius to the reſt of the Athenians?—That appellation, ſaid I, does not belong to any one of the Ionians, nor to ſuch as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is Patrius [1], through the nativity of Ion. Jupiter, however, is not called by us Patrius, but Herceus [2] and Phratrius; and Minerva alſo is called Phratria.—This is ſufficient, ſaid Dionyſodorus; for you have, as it ſeems, Apollo, Jupiter, and Minerva.—Entirely ſo, ſaid I.—Will not theſe therefore, ſaid he, be your gods?—My progenitors, ſaid I, and maſters.—They will be ſo then to you, ſaid he. Or have you not confeſſed that they are yours?—I have confeſſed it, ſaid I. For what can I do?—Are not therefore, ſaid he, thoſe gods alſo animals? For you have acknowledged that ſuch things as have a ſoul are animals. Or have not thoſe gods a ſoul?—They have [3], ſaid I.—Are they not therefore alſo animals?—Animals, ſaid I.—But of animals, ſaid he, you have acknowledged theſe to be yours, which you can give and ſell, and ſacrifice to any god you pleaſe.—I have acknowledged it, ſaid I. For I do not recant, O Euthydemus.—Come then, ſaid he, tell me immediately, ſince you acknowledge that Jupiter is yours and the other gods, are you therefore permitted to ſell them, or give them, or to uſe them in any other way you pleaſe, in the ſame manner as other animals?—I therefore, O Crito, as if ſtruck by what he ſaid, lay ſpeechleſs; but Cteſippus coming as it were to my aſſiſtance, Pypax [4], O Herules, ſaid he, a beautiful diſcourſe!—And then Dionyſodorus, Whether, ſaid he, is Hercules Pypax, or Pypax Hercules?—And Cteſippus, O Neptune, ſaid he, what weighty queſtions! I yield; the men are unconquerable.

[1] Some, ſays the Greek ſcholiaſt on Plato, p. 98. ſay that the Greeks were indigenous, and that their parents were the earth and the ſun who is the ſame with Apollo. But others aſſert that Apollo having connexion with Creuſa, the daughter of Erectheus, begot Ion, from whom the Athenians were at one time called Ionians, and that on this account they have Apollo Patrius.

[2] The Athenians called houſes ἕρκη *erkē*; and hence Jupiter is with them Herceus, whom they eſtabliſh in theſe for the ſake of a guard. But Phratria is the third part of every tribe; and Minerva Phratria is the inſpective guardian of theſe. Schol. in Plat. p. 98.

[3] This paſſage, among numberleſs others that might be adduced, muſt convince the moſt careleſs reader that the gods of the antients were not conſidered by thoſe that worſhipped them to be nothing but ſtocks and ſtones, as ſome have ſtupidly pretended they were.

[4] The Greek Scholiaſt on Plato informs us, that this word expreſſes both indignation and praiſe.

Here

Here indeed, my dear Crito, there was not any one preſent, who did not in the higheſt degree praiſe what was ſaid; and the men were almoſt ready to die with laughing, applauding, and exulting. For before this, the lovers alone of Euthydemus applauded every thing that was ſaid in a very beautiful manner; but here, not far from the pillars in the Lyceum, they applauded the men, and were delighted with what they ſaid. As to myſelf, my feelings were ſuch, that I was forced to acknowledge that I had never at any time ſeen men ſo wiſe; and being perfectly enſlaved by their wiſdom, I applied myſelf to the praiſing and paſſing encomiums on them; and I ſaid, O bleſſed ye for your admirable genius, who have ſo rapidly, and in a ſhort time, accompliſhed a thing of ſuch magnitude! Your arguments indeed, O Euthydemus and Dionyſodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the moſt magnificent thing in them, that you pay no attention to the multitude of mankind, nor to things venerable, and which appear to be of ſome conſequence, but only to thoſe who are like yourſelves. For I well know, that very few men, and thoſe ſuch as are ſimilar to you, delight in theſe arguments; but others are ſo ignorant of them, that I well know, they would be more aſhamed to confute others with ſuch like arguments, than to be themſelves confuted. This too again is another popular and mild thing in your arguments, that when you ſay there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or any thing elſe of this kind, and, in ſhort, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality ſew up the mouths of men, as you alſo acknowledge that you do; but that you not only ſew up the mouths of others, but appear alſo to ſew up your own, this is very polite, and removes that which is oppreſſive in your arguments. The greateſt thing however is, that theſe arguments ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner, and are ſo artificially invented by you, that any one may learn them in a very ſhort time. This I have perceived, and I have noticed how rapidly, and indeed immediately, Cteſippus has been able to imitate you. This wiſdom therefore of yours, with reſpect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful, but is not adapted to be diſcuſſed before men. But if you will be perſuaded by me, be careful that you do not ſpeak before many, leſt rapidly learning, they ſhould not thank you for your inſtruction. But eſpecially diſcourſe together by yourſelves alone: if not, if you diſcourſe before another, let it be before him alone, who gives you ſilver for what you ſay. Theſe ſame things too if you are wiſe you will alſo admo-

niſh your diſciples, viz. That they never diſcourſe with any man, unleſs with you and themſelves. For that which is rare, O Euthydemus, is honourable; but water may be bought for a vile price, being the beſt of things, as Pindar ſays. But come, ſaid I, make Clinias and me partakers of your diſcipline.

Having ſaid theſe thing O Crito, and a few others, we departed. Conſider therefore now, how you will accompany me to theſe men. For they ſay that they are able to teach any one who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any genius or age. They likewiſe aſſert that which it is eſpecially proper for you to hear, that an attention to gain does not hinder any one from eaſily receiving their wiſdom.

CRITO. And indeed, Socrates, I am deſirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn ſomething from them; though indeed I alſo appear to be among the number of thoſe who do not reſemble Euthydemus, but thoſe whom, as you ſaid, would more willingly be confuted by ſuch like arguments, than confute them. It ſeems however to me to be ridiculous to admoniſh you, at the ſame time I wiſh to relate to you what I have heard. Do you not know, that among thoſe that left you, a certain perſon came to me as I was walking, a man who thought himſelf to be very wiſe, and one of thoſe who are ſkilful in forenſic harangues, and that he ſaid to me, O Crito, have you heard nothing of theſe wiſe men?—By Jupiter, I have, not ſaid I. For I could not ſtand before others, ſo as to hear, on account of the crowd.—But, ſaid he, it was worth while to have heard them.—Why? ſaid I.—Becauſe you would have heard men diſcourſing, who are the wiſeſt of all thoſe who at preſent engage in ſuch like arguments.—And I ſaid, What then do you think of their arguments?—What elſe, ſaid he, than that they are ſuch as you will always hear from ſuch like triflers, who beſtow vile attention on things of no worth. For theſe were his very words.—And I ſaid, But certainly philoſophy is an elegant thing.—How, elegant, ſaid he, O bleſſed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been preſent juſt now, I think that you would have been very much aſhamed on account of your aſſociate, who was ſo abſurd as willingly to put himſelf in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they ſay, but adhere to every word. And theſe men, as I juſt now ſaid, are among the beſt of thoſe that exiſt at preſent. But indeed, Crito, ſaid he, both the thing itſelf, and the men who are converſant with it, are very vile and ridiculous.—But to me, Socrates,

tes, neither he appears rightly to blame the thing, nor any other who blames it. To be willing, however, to diſcourſe with theſe men before many appears to me to be rightly blamed.

Soc. O Crito, men of this kind are wonderful. But I do not yet know what I am about to ſay. To what claſs of men did he belong who came to you, and blamed philoſophy? Was he among the number of thoſe who are ſkilful in contending in courts of juſtice, a certain orator; or was he one of thoſe who introduce men of this deſcription, a compoſer of the orations with which orators contend?

Crito. The leaſt of all, by Jupiter, was he an orator; nor do I think that he ever went into a court of juſtice; but they ſay that he is knowing in the thing itſelf, by Jupiter, and likewiſe that he is ſkilful, and that he compoſes ſkilful orations.

Soc. I now underſtand: for I myſelf was juſt now about to ſpeak concerning theſe men. For theſe are they, O Crito, whom Prodicus ſays exiſt in the confines of a philoſopher and politician. But they think themſelves to be the wiſeſt of men; and beſides being ſuch *in their own opinion*, they alſo entirely appear to be ſo among the many. Hence, as they are celebrated by all men, no others are an impediment to them, than thoſe who are converſant with philoſophy. They think therefore, if they can eſtabliſh an opinion, that philoſophers are of no worth, they ſhall obtain the palm of wiſdom without contention in the opinion of all men. For they conſider themſelves to be in reality moſt wiſe; but think that their authority is leſſened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted in their private diſcourſes. But they are very reaſonably thought to be wiſe men: for moderately to poſſeſs philoſophy, and moderately to engage in political concerns, is very convenient; ſince this is to partake of both, as much as is requiſite, and to enjoy the fruits of wiſdom, ſecure from dangers and conteſts.

Crito. What then? Do they appear to you, O Socrates, to ſay any thing of conſequence?

Soc. They do not, indeed.

Crito. But the diſcourſe of the men poſſeſſes a certain gracefulneſs.

Soc. For it has in reality, O Crito, gracefulneſs rather than truth. For it is not eaſy to perſuade them, that men and all other things which ſubſiſt

between

between two certain things, and participate of both, viz. ſuch particulars as conſiſt from good and evil, become better than the one, and worſe than the other; but that ſuch things as conſiſt from two goods, not tending to the ſame, are worſe than both with reſpect to that for which each of the things is uſeful from which they are compoſed; and that ſuch things as are compoſed from two evils, not tending to the ſame, and which are in the middle, are alone better than each of thoſe things, a part of both of which they participate. If, therefore, philoſophy and political action are good, but each tends to that which is different, and theſe men, while they participate of both, are ſituated in the middle, they ſay nothing to the purpoſe; for they are viler than both. But if philoſophy and political action are both good and bad, theſe men are better than ſome and worſe than others. And if both are bad, thus they will aſſert ſomething which is true, but by no means otherwiſe. I do not therefore think they will acknowledge, either that both theſe are bad, or that the one is bad, and the other good; but they in reality partaking of both, are inferior to both with reſpect to the performing of either, with a view to which both the political ſcience and philoſophy are worthy of regard; and though in reality they rank as the third, they endeavour to appear to be the firſt. It is requiſite, therefore, to pardon their deſire, and not to be indignant with them. We ſhould however conſider them to be ſuch as they are: for it is requiſite to embrace every man who ſays any thing which adheres to intellect, and who valiantly labours in endeavouring to do ſo.

Crito. And indeed, Socrates, I alſo (as I always ſay to you) am dubious with reſpect to the management of my own children. For the youngeſt is yet but a little one; but Critobulus is now an adult, and requires the aſſiſtance of ſome one. I therefore, when I converſe with you, am led to think that it is madneſs to be ſo much concerned about other things for the ſake of children, ſuch as about marriage, that they may be born from the moſt generous mother, and about riches, that they may become moſt wealthy, and yet neglect their education. But when I look at any one of thoſe who profeſs to inſtruct men, I am ſtruck with aſtoniſhment; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me to be unfit for the purpoſe; ſo that I cannot exhort the lad to philoſophy.

Soc. O, my dear Crito, do you not know that in every purſuit, the many are vile, and of no worth, and that the few are worthy of all regard? For

do

do not the gymnaſtic art, the art of acquiring money, rhetoric, and the art of commanding an army, appear to you to be beautiful?

CRITO. To me they certainly do, in every reſpect.

SOC. What then? In each of theſe do you not ſee that the multitude are ridiculous with reſpect to the ſeveral employments of theſe arts?

CRITO. Yes, by Jupiter; and you ſpeak moſt truly.

SOC. Would you, therefore, on this account avoid all purſuits, and not ſuffer your ſon to engage in them?

CRITO. This indeed, Socrates, would not be juſt.

SOC. You muſt not, therefore, O Crito, do that which ought not to be done; but bidding farewell to thoſe who ſtudy philoſophy, whether they are good or bad, explore the thing itſelf, well and properly; and if it ſhould then appear to you to be a vile thing, diſſuade every man from it, and not your ſons only; but if it ſhould appear to you ſuch as I think it is, confidently purſue and cultivate it, as it is ſaid, both you and your children.

THE END OF THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE

THE HIPPARCHUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

THE LOVE OF GAIN.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE deſign of the Hipparchus is to ſhow that all men naturally deſire good, ſince even thoſe who wander from it through avarice, wander through a deſire of obtaining it; but they err in conſequence of miſtaking good, which is a mean, for ultimate good. For good is two-fold, one being the end, the other ſubſiſting for the ſake of the end. Hence the poſſeſſion of the former is called *beatitude*, and of the latter *gain*. Hence too, gain is the acquiſition of that good, which contributes to the poſſeſſion of ultimate good. But that which does not contribute to this, is neither uſeful, nor is the acquiſition of it gain. The deſire therefore of gain thus defined, and which is naturally inherent in all men, is laudable; but the falſe opinion is to be reprobated, which, while it is ignorant of the truly uſeful and lucrative, diſtorts to things adverſe the natural appetite of man. Plato latently teaches this, while he confutes the falſe definitions which are introduced in this Dialogue, concerning the deſire of gain. But he employs this propoſition, *that all men deſire good* as manifeſt, in order to conclude that all men naturally deſire gain, and that this *natural* deſire is laudable. And this is the concluſion which Socrates after a manner directly introduces by three modes of arguing, viz. by example, by induction, and by reaſoning. But from the whole Dialogue we collect, that all men deſire good; and this is its ultimate end. For its firſt end is to ſhow that all men are deſirous of gain, and that

this desire is not to be blamed when directed to gain according to its true definition.

It appears from Ælian (Var. Hist. viii. 2.) that it was dubious with some of the antients, whether this Dialogue was in reality composed by Plato. If I may be allowed to give my own opinion, I do not find any thing, either in its manner or matter, for which its authenticity deserves to be called in question.

THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPARCHUS.

SOCRATES.

WHAT is the love, and who are the lovers of gain?

HIP. It appears to me that thoſe are lovers of gain, who think it worth while to acquire wealth from things of no worth.

SOC. Whether therefore do they appear to you to do this in conſequence of knowing, or being ignorant that theſe are things of no worth? For if they do this through ignorance, you call the lovers of gain ſtupid.

HIP. But I do not call them ſtupid, but perfectly crafty and baſe; men who are vanquiſhed by gain, who know that the things from which they have the boldneſs to acquire wealth, are of no worth, and yet at the ſame time, through their impudence, dare to love gain.

SOC. Do you, therefore, call a character of the following kind a lover of gain? I mean, as if a huſbandman, planting a tree or herb, and knowing that it is of no worth, ſhould nevertheleſs think it worth while to enrich himſelf from the cultivation of ſuch a plant? Do you call ſuch a one as this a lover of gain?

HIP. A lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to enrich himſelf from every thing.

SOC. Do not thus raſhly anſwer me, like a man who has been injured by ſome one; but, attending to what I ſay, anſwer me as if I ſhould again interrogate you from the beginning. Do you agree with me, that a lover of

gain

gain knows the value of that thing whence he thinks it worth while to enrich himſelf?

Hip. I do.

Soc. Who then is he that has a knowledge of the worth of plants; and who likewiſe knows in what region, and at what time of the year it is worth while to plant them? that we alſo may adopt ſomething from thoſe words of the wiſe, which lawyers employ for the ſake of elegance.

Hip. A huſbandman, I think.

Soc. Do you, therefore, ſay that the term, It is worth while to acquire wealth, is any thing elſe than to think that it is requiſite to acquire wealth?

Hip. I ſay it is this very thing.

Soc. Do not therefore you, who are ſo young, endeavour to deceive me, who am now an elderly man, by anſwering, as you do at preſent, what you by no means think; but anſwer me truly, whether you think that the man who is a huſbandman, and who knows that it is not worth while to ſet a certain plant, will yet expect to be enriched by ſuch a plant?

Hip. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. What then? Will a jockey who knows that the food which he gives a horſe is of no worth, be ignorant that by ſuch food he will deſtroy the horſe?

Hip. I do not think he will.

Soc. He will not, therefore, think that from ſuch aliment as this, which is of no worth, he ſhall be enriched.

Hip. He will not.

Soc. What then? Do you think that a pilot who furniſhes a ſhip with a rudder and ſails, which are of no value, can be ignorant that he ſhall ſuſtain an injury, be himſelf in danger of periſhing, and both deſtroy the ſhip and all it contains?

Hip. I do not.

Soc. He will not therefore think that he ſhall be enriched by furniture of no value.

Hip. He will not.

Soc. Will the general of an army, likewiſe, when he knows that his ſoldiers have arms which are of no value, think that he ſhall acquire wealth, or that it is worth while to be enriched by theſe?

Hip. By no means.

Soc. In like manner, if a piper poſſeſſes a pipe of no value, a lyriſt a lyre, an archer a bow, or in ſhort if any other artiſt or ſkilful perſon poſſeſſes inſtruments, or any other apparatus of no value, will he think that he ſhall be enriched by theſe?

Hip. It appears he will not.

Soc. Who then do you call lovers of gain? For they are certainly not thoſe whom we have already mentioned, who expect to be enriched from things which they know are of no value. And thus, O wonderful man, according to what you ſay, no one is a lover of gain.

Hip. But I, Socrates, wiſh to ſay, that thoſe are lovers of gain, who, through inſatiable avidity, tranſcendently aſpire after things very ſmall and trifling, and which are of no value, and this for the ſake of gain.

Soc. But certainly, O beſt of men, they do not act in this manner, knowing that they are things of no worth; for we have granted that this is impoſſible.

Hip. So it appears to me.

Soc. If, therefore, they do not act in this manner knowingly, it is evident that their conduct muſt be the effect of ignorance; the conſequence of thinking that things which are of no worth are highly valuable.

Hip. It appears ſo.

Soc. Do the lovers of gain, love any thing elſe than gain?

Hip. Nothing elſe.

Soc. But do you ſay that gain is contrary to loſs?

Hip. I do.

Soc. Is it therefore good to any one to ſuffer a loſs?

Hip. To no one.

Soc. Is it then an evil?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Are men, therefore, injured by loſs?

Hip. They are injured.

Soc. Is then loſs an evil?

Hip. It is.

Soc. And is gain contrary to loſs?

Hip. Contrary.

Soc.

Soc. Is gain therefore good?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Do you, therefore, call thoſe that love good, lovers of gain?

Hip. So it ſeems.

Soc. You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain inſane perſons. But with reſpect to yourſelf, whether do you love that which is good, or do not love it?

Hip. I love it.

Soc. Is there a certain good which you do not love, but a certain evil which you do?

Hip. By Jupiter, there is not.

Soc. But you love all good things equally.

Hip. I do.

Soc. Aſk me, if I alſo do not. For I alſo ſhall acknowledge to you, that I love things good. But beſides I and you, do not all other men appear to you to love things good, and hate ſuch as are evil?

Hip. To me it appears ſo.

Soc. But have we not acknowledged that gain is good?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. After this manner, therefore, all lovers of gain appear; but according to that mode which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of gain. By employing which of theſe two, then, ſhall we not err?

Hip. If any one, Socrates, rightly apprehends what a lover of gain is, I think he will rightly conſider him to be a character of this kind, who earneſtly applies himſelf to the acquiſition of wealth, and thinks it worth while to enrich himſelf from thoſe things from which good men never dare to enrich themſelves.

Soc. But do you not ſee, O ſweeteſt of men, that we juſt now acknowledged that to be enriched is to be benefited?

Hip. But what then?

Soc. Becauſe this alſo we previouſly admitted, that all men always aſpired after things good.

Hip. We did.

Soc. Will not, therefore, good men wiſh to poſſeſs every thing lucrative, ſince every thing lucrative is good?

Hip.

Hip. But they will not, Socrates, deſire things lucrative, by which they may be injured.

Soc. Do you ſay that to be injured, is to ſuffer a loſs, or that it is ſomething elſe?

Hip. I ſay it is no other than to ſuffer a loſs.

Soc. Do men, therefore, ſuffer a loſs through gain, or through loſs?

Hip. Through both. For they ſuffer a loſs through loſs, and through baſe gain.

Soc. Does it therefore appear to you that any thing uſeful and good is baſe?

Hip. It does not.

Soc. Did we not then, a little before this, acknowledge that gain is contrary to loſs, which is an evil?

Hip. We did.

Soc. And that being contrary to evil, it is good?

Hip. We granted this.

Soc. You ſee therefore that you endeavour to deceive me, and that you deſignedly aſſert the contrary to that which we juſt now granted.

Hip. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates: but, on the contrary, you deceive me; and I do not know how it is, but in your diſcourſe you turn all things upwards and downwards.

Soc. Good words, I beſeech you. For indeed I ſhould not act well, if I were not perſuaded by a good and wiſe man.

Hip. Who is he? and to what purpoſe is this?

Soc. My fellow citizen, and likewiſe yours, Hipparchus the ſon of the Philædonic Piſiſtratus, and the eldeſt and wiſeſt of the ſons of Piſiſtratus. This man, beſides exhibiting many other illuſtrious works of wiſdom, was the firſt that introduced into this land the writings of Homer, and compelled the rhapſodiſts to recite them in the Panathenaia, alternately, and in order, juſt as you know they do at preſent. He likewiſe brought back Anacreon, who was ſent to Teium, in a ſhip of fifty oars: and always had about him Simonides of Chius; perſuading him to reſide with him, by great rewards and gifts. He did theſe things, wiſhing to perſuade his citizens, that thus he might rule over the beſt of men; thinking, that it was not proper to

envy any man the poſſeſſion of wiſdom, and this becauſe he himſelf was a worthy and good man. As, therefore, his fellow citizens were well educated men, and admired him for his wiſdom, he likewiſe endeavoured to inſtruct the huſbandmen, and in order to this, placed Hermæ for them in the roads, in the middle of the city, and in each of the towns. Afterwards, from this wiſdom of his, which he partly learned, and partly himſelf diſcovered, ſelecting ſuch things as he thought were the wiſeſt, he inſerted them in an elegy, and inſcribed this work, HIS POEMS, and SPECIMENS OF WISDOM. This he did, in the firſt place, that his citizens might not admire thoſe wiſe inſcriptions in the temple of Delphi, "Know thyſelf," "Nothing too much," and the reſt of this kind, but that they might think the words of Hipparchus were to be preferred for wiſdom to theſe: and, in the next place, that by every where reading and receiving a taſte of his wiſdom, they might come from the fields, and be inſtructed in the other branches of learning. But there are two epigrams, one on the left hand part of each of the Hermæ, in which, according to the inſcription, Hermes ſays, that the column ſhould ſtand in the middle of the city, and the people; and the other on the right hand part; which was thus inſcribed: "This monument was raiſed by Hipparchus—Perſiſt in paying attention to juſtice." There are alſo many other beautiful inſcriptions, on other Hermæ; and the following is to be ſeen in the Stiriac road: "This monument was raiſed by Hipparchus—Do not deceive your friend." I therefore, being your friend, dare not deceive you, and oppoſe the mandate of ſo great a man; after whoſe death, the Athenians were under tyrannic ſubjection to his brother Hippias. And you muſt have heard from all old men, that there never was a tyranny in Athens till theſe three years paſt, and that during every other time, the Athenians lived ſomewhat nearly after the ſame manner, as when Saturn reigned. But it is ſaid by more elegant men, that he did not die in the way which the multitude report, viz. through the ignominy of his ſiſter Canephoria; (for it is abſurd to ſuppoſe that this was the caſe;) but that Harmodius was beloved and inſtructed by Ariſtogiton, who valued himſelf very highly on this account, and thought that Hipparchus would be his antagoniſt. But at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of a certain noble and beautiful youth, whoſe name I have heard, but do not at preſent remember. This

young

young man then at firſt admired Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, as wiſe men, but afterwards aſſociating with Hipparchus, he deſpiſed them; and they being very much afflicted with the diſgrace, ſlew Hipparchus.

Hip. You appear, therefore, Socrates, either not to conſider me as a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, not to be perſuaded by Hipparchus: for I do not know how to perſuade myſelf that you have not deceived me in the preceding diſcourſe.

Soc. But indeed, juſt as in the game of cheſs, I am willing to retract whatever you pleaſe, that you may not think I have deceived you. Whether therefore ſhall I retract this aſſertion for you, that all men deſire good?

Hip. Not for me.

Soc. Shall I retract this then, that neither to ſuſtain a loſs, nor a loſs itſelf, is an evil?

Hip. Not for me.

Soc. Shall it be this then, that gain, and to acquire gain, are contrary to loſs, and to ſuffer a loſs?

Hip. Nor this neither.

Soc. Shall I retract this aſſertion, that to acquire gain, as being contrary to evil, is good?

Hip. You ſhall not retract any thing of this.

Soc. It appears to you, therefore, as it ſeems, that of gain one part is good, and another part evil.

Hip. To me it does appear ſo.

Soc. I will therefore retract this for you. For let it be that one kind of gain is good, and another kind evil: but gain itſelf is not more good than evil. For is it?

Hip. Why do you aſk me?

Soc. I will tell you. Is there good, and is there likewiſe bad, food?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is therefore one of them more food than the other? or are both of them ſimilarly food? and does the one in no reſpect differ from the other, ſo far as each is food, but ſo far as one is good, and the other bad?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And does it not likewiſe follow with reſpect to drink, and all other things which participate of the good and the bad, that they differ in no

reſpect from each other, in that in which they are the ſame? Juſt as with reſpect to our own ſpecies, one man is good, and another bad.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. But with reſpect to men, I think that one man is neither more nor leſs a man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the bad than the good.

Hip. True.

Soc. Muſt we not therefore think in the ſame manner reſpecting gain, that both the good and the bad are ſimilarly gain?

Hip. It is neceſſary.

Soc. He, therefore, who poſſeſſes good gain, is not in any reſpect more enriched than he who poſſeſſes bad gain: for we have granted that neither of theſe appears to be more gain than the other.

Hip. True.

Soc. For neither the more nor the leſs is preſent to either of theſe.

Hip. It is not.

Soc. But how can any one do, or ſuffer, more or leſs with reſpect to a thing to which neither of theſe pertains?

Hip. It is impoſſible.

Soc. Since, therefore, both are ſimilarly gain and lucrative, it is requiſite that we ſhould ſtill further conſider this; on what account you call both of them gain, and what it is that you diſcover to be in both the ſame. Juſt as if you ſhould aſk me why I juſt now called both good and bad food ſimilarly food, I ſhould ſay, It is becauſe each is a dry aliment of the body. And this you will alſo grant. Or will you not?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And there will be the ſame mode of anſwering reſpecting drink, that we give this appellation to the moiſt aliment of the body, whether it is good or bad: and the reply in other things will be ſimilar. Do you, therefore, endeavour to imitate me, by anſwering as follows: You ſay with reſpect to good and bad gain, that each of them is gain. What ſame thing is it then which, perceiving in theſe, you denominate gain? But if you are not able to anſwer me this queſtion, attend to what I am now going to ſay. Do you then call every poſſeſſion which any one obtains gain, when he either ſpends nothing, or receives more than he ſpends?

Hip.

Hip. It appears to me that this ſhould be called gain.

Soc. Do you, therefore, thus denominate ſuch things as follow: If any one at a feaſt ſhould ſpend nothing, but when ſatiated ſhould become diſeaſed?

Hip. Not I, by Jupiter.

Soc. But if he ſhould obtain health from feaſting, would he acquire gain, or ſuffer a loſs?

Hip. He would acquire gain.

Soc. This, therefore, is not gain, to acquire any kind of poſſeſſion whatever.

Hip. It is not.

Soc. Does it therefore follow that gain is not to be acquired from every kind of poſſeſſion, whether it be good or bad?

Hip. It appears ſo.

Soc. And does it likewiſe follow that loſs will not be ſuſtained from every thing, whether it be good or bad?

Hip. To me it appears ſo.

Soc. Do you, therefore, perceive how you again revolve to the ſame thing? For gain appears to be good, but loſs evil.

Hip. I am dubious what to ſay.

Soc. And this not unjuſtly. But ſtill further, anſwer me this: If any one obtains more than he ſpends, do you ſay that this is gain?

Hip. I do, if his gain is not baſe, but if he receives more than he ſpends, either of gold or ſilver.

Soc. And I ſhall alſo aſk you this: If any one, ſpending half a pound of gold, ſhould receive double this weight of ſilver, would he be a gainer, or a loſer?

Hip. A loſer, certainly, Socrates: for he would only receive half the value of what he ſpent.

Soc. But yet he would receive more. Or is not double more than half?

Hip. But ſilver is not of the ſame value as gold.

Soc. It is requiſite therefore, as it ſeems, to add value to gain: for in this caſe, though the ſilver is more than the gold, yet you ſay it is not of equal value.

Hip.

Hip. And very much ſo: for thus it is.

Soc. Value, therefore, is lucrative, whether it is ſmall or great: but that which is without value is without gain.

Hip. It is.

Soc. Do you ſay that value is any other value than that which deſerves to be acquired?

Hip. I do not.

Soc. But what do you call that which deſerves to be acquired? The uſeleſs, or the uſeful.

Hip. The uſeful, certainly.

Soc. The uſeful, therefore, is good.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Hence, O moſt virile of all men, have we not a third or a fourth time granted that the lucrative is good?

Hip. So it ſeems.

Soc. Do you remember, therefore, whence this diſcourſe of ours originated?

Hip. I think I do.

Soc. If you do not, I will remind you. It originated from your denying that good men would be willing to acquire every kind of gain, but that they would wiſh to poſſeſs good, and not baſe gain.

Hip. It did originate from this.

Soc. But did not our diſcourſe compel us to acknowledge, that all kinds of gain, both ſmall and great, are good?

Hip. It did compel, Socrates, rather than perſuade me.

Soc. But perhaps, after this, it will alſo perſuade you. Now, however, whether you are perſuaded, or in whatever manner you may be affected, do you agree with us, that all gain is good, both ſmall and great?

Hip. I do.

Soc. And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men aſpire after all things that are good?

Hip. I do.

Soc. But you ſaid that bad men love gain of every kind, both ſmall and great.

Hip.

Hip. I did ſay ſo.

Soc. According to your aſſertion, therefore, all men will be lovers of gain, both good and bad men.

Hip. It appears ſo.

Soc. No one, therefore, who blames the love of gain will blame rightly, ſince he who does ſo is himſelf alſo a lover of gain.

THE END OF THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE RIVALS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE RIVALS.

THE general ſubject of this ſhort Dialogue is ſo evident, that it is no wonder all the copies agree in the entitling it "Concerning Philoſophy." But in the naming it there is ſome difference. For this is one of thoſe few Dialogues of Plato, which take not their names from any one of the ſpeakers: the reaſon of which in this is much the ſame with that in The Banquet; it is becauſe the two ſubordinate ſpeakers are placed on an equal footing of importance in the Dialogue; where we ſee their characters contraſted, one to the other. They are preſented to our view, at their firſt appearance, contending together for the honour of their reſpective ſtudies or ways of life, which are of quite oppoſite kinds, and jealous of each other in the gaining of partiſans or followers. It was neceſſary, therefore, that the Dialogue ſhould have ſuch a name, as might compriſe both theſe perſons. The name, uſually prefixed to the copies of it, and confirmed by Olympiodorus, is Ερασται, ſignifying all thoſe perſons, mentioned in the beginning of the Dialogue, an account of whom is given in note 4. The other name, found in ſome copies, and authorized by Diogenes Laertius and Proclus, is Αντερασται. We have given the preference to this latter; which, we think, will appear to be the genuine name, and the former to be ſpurious, from the following obſervations. In the firſt place, the former name is too general, and [1] comprehends many other perſons preſent at the converſation,

[1] Much the ſame reaſon with this our firſt is aſſigned by Dr. Forſter in the notes to his edition, for the preference which he alſo gives to this name of the Dialogue.—S.

who are mute, and merely auditors: whereas the latter peculiarly characterizes the two ſubordinate ſpeakers, excluſive of the reſt of the company. Another reaſon, which alone ſeems ſufficient to prove the authenticity of the name we have choſen, is this, that the contention or rivalſhip between theſe two, beſides forming the moſt entertaining part of the Introduction, gives occaſion to the ſubject of the Dialogue, and is the very foundation on which the ſtructure of it is built. Our laſt reaſon is, that where the Man of Learning makes his firſt appearance, he is [1] by Plato himſelf called Rival to the Man of Exerciſe; a name, which could not properly be attributed to either, till they were both brought upon the ſtage: however, it is ſoon afterwards repeated, and applied to the Man of Exerciſe; which needed not to have been done, but for the ſake of marking them the more ſtrongly with this name, common to them both; becauſe terms of reciprocal relation, as well as other correlatives, always ſuppoſe and imply one another. In other parts of the Dialogue they are denoted, each by his proper and peculiar epithets; ἐρῶμενος, ἀμαθης· σοφωτερος, σοφος [2]. Thus much concerning the name of the Dialogue, the Introduction to it, and the general ſubject which gives the title.—The particular ſubject is the peculiar nature and eſſence of true philoſophy. That by which it is diſtinguiſhed from all thoſe other kinds of knowledge, that falſely aſſumes its name, the ſtudy of which has in all ages pretended to be, and been ſet up for, the ſtudy of wiſdom, or philoſophy. For the deſign of this Dialogue is to ſhow [3], that the completely juſt and good man, who is ſuch upon the principles of ſcience, is alone the wiſe man or true philoſopher. In order to this end, firſt is detected and expoſed that appearance or ſhow of wiſdom, which conſiſts in polymathy [4] in gene-

[1] Part of this third reaſon is agreeable likewiſe to an obſervation of Menage in favour of the name Αντερασται. See Menagii Obſervat. in Laertium, p. 137.—S.

[2] Beſides Menage and Forſter, Stanley alſo and Fabricius approve of the name Αντερασται. It is probable, that the *wrong* name owed its origin merely to an accidental omiſſion of the firſt ſyllable in the *right* name, and prevailed with the after-copiers the more eaſily, as they were ſo much uſed to the work ερασται in tranſcribing other Dialogues of *Plato*; and eſpecially as it occurred in the very firſt ſentence of this.—S.

[3] From conſidering, as it ſeems, this deſign of the Dialogue, the antients agree in referring it to the ethic kind.—S.

[4] It was beautifully ſaid therefore, by Heraclitus, that "*polymathy* does not teach intellect;" πολυμαθιη νοον ου διδασκει.—T.

ral,

ral, or much learning and knowledge of various kinds. Next, are diſproved and diſallowed thoſe pretenſions, claimed by the mathematical ſciences or by any of the liberal arts, which in the Platonic diſcipline do but ſmooth and pave the way to true philoſophy. The falſe ſpecies being thus rejected, laſtly is exhibited this wiſdom in her genuine form, as the knowledge of ourſelves; the ſcience of that divine principle in man, his mind; the ſcience of juſtice and goodneſs, therein included; and the ſcience of government thence immediately derived.—This ſhort bill of fare preſents to our readers all they are to expect in the following repaſt; ſmall in quantity; but great in value, as being a juſt ſample of thoſe rich and plentiful entertainments provided for them by Plato in his longer Dialogues.—The outward form of this piece is purely narrative. But the converſation, recited in it, is peculiarly dramatic. For, beſides the other excellencies of the drama, common to it with the reſt of Plato's Dialogues, it has this ſingular beauty, that the figures of the two Rivals are deſcribed in as exact and lively a manner, as painting itſelf could draw them: a circumſtance that well may recommend the ſcene to ſome ingenious profeſſor of that art, to deſign after and delineate.—The inward form or genius of the Dialogue correſponds to what has been before ſaid of the conduct of it: for it is partly diſputative, of that ſpecies where the adverſe party is confuted; and partly, to do particular honour to an adverſary far ſuperior to the ſophiſts, it is demonſtrative, of that ſpecies where the proof is by induction.—S.

THE

THE RIVALS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, [1] MAN OF LEARNING, MAN OF EXERCISE.

SCENE.—The SCHOOL of DIONYSIUS.

SOCRATES.

I [2] WENT into the School of Dionyſius [3] the grammarian; and I there ſaw the comelieſt and fineſt of our young gentry, accompanied by ſuch as

[1] Proclus, if that paſſage, cited from him in note 1, p. 376, be not corrupted, muſt have ſuppoſed this Man of Learning to be Theodorus of Cyrene, the mathematician. It muſt be confeſſed, that the character of Theodorus the Cyrenean, given us by Plato in his Theætetus, tallies well enough with that of the Man of Learning, or univerſal ſcholar, in this Dialogue. But we preſume, the note referred to makes it appear highly probable, at leaſt, that the paſſage there cited is groſsly corrupt; and that Proclus could not entertain any ſuch ſuppoſition. We therefore embrace the opinion of Thraſyllus, who, as Diogenes Laertius informs us, pronounced him to be Democritus. To this opinion Laertius himſelf ſubſcribes, and Dr. Forſter ſeems to agree with them. The reaſons, by which it may be ſupported, together with anſwers to ſome objections, to which it may be liable, will be given in our notes to the Dialogue.—S.

[2] The narration is made in the perſon of Socrates: who is here feigned by Plato to relate to ſome of his friends a certain converſation, in which he had been engaged; but how long before this narration is left undetermined.—Now we know, it is uſual and natural for all men to begin their relation of any thing paſt, whether it conſiſted of facts or words, with an account of the time when thoſe facts happened or thoſe words were ſpoken; unleſs the relation immediately ſucceeds the thing related.—Accordingly Plato, in every one of his narrative Dialogues, points out the preciſe time of the converſation there related, except in this, and in The Lyſis: but the words, with which he begins The Lyſis, manifeſtly, we think, imply the time to have been the morning of the ſame day. The Rivals therefore, remaining a ſingle exception to the general rule, it ſeems neceſſary

as courted their eſteem and friendſhip [4]. Two of theſe youths happened at that time to be diſputing: but what was the ſubject of their diſpute I did

neceſſary to ſuppoſe, that Plato in this Dialogue, agreeably to the uſage of all men, dictated to them by nature and common ſenſe, and agreeably to his uſual dramatic manner, intended to repreſent Socrates, immediately on his quitting the ſchool of Dionyſius, meeting with ſome of his friends, who happened not to have attended him thither, and relating to them a converſation, to which they had not been witneſſes. For Socrates appears never to have uſed the didactic manner, in the inſtructing his diſciples: but to have taught them his divine doctrine in the more engaging way of familiar converſation. If then he be ſuppoſed to have made them this narration in anſwer to theſe queſtions of theirs,—Where have you been, and what have you been doing ſince you left us?—the time, Juſt now, is evidently implied in the very firſt ſentence. Or if he be ſuppoſed to have given them the recital from his own motion, as being yet warm from the diſcourſe recited, and having his head ſtill full of the argument,—in this caſe, the abrupt manner of beginning, without mention of the time, is more animated, and ſhows the mind pregnant with the matter to be delivered.—Dacier, in his tranſlation of this Dialogue, has here thruſt in, without any warrant from the original, the words "*l'autre jour*;" which give an air of coldneſs to the whole narration. But it muſt be obſerved, that he is every where more attentive to make his tranſlation of Plato agreeable to modern readers, than to preſerve thoſe ſeemingly ſlight and trivial dramatic circumſtances, which would have coſt him the trouble of many a note to illuſtrate and explain.—S.

[3] Γραμματικου. Thus all the editions of Plato, and conſequently thoſe manuſcript copies, from which the four firſt were printed. But Dr. Forſter, in his late excellent edition of this and other Dialogues of Plato, prefers the reading of Γραμματιστου, that is, *teacher of the elements of grammar*, which has the authority of only one manuſcript to ſupport it. It appears indeed, from the very paſſage now before us, that teaching the elements of grammar was the profeſſion of this Dionyſius; and we learn, from ſeveral antient writers, that he had taught Plato. But if it be true, what Olympiodorus ſuppoſes, and the ſuppoſition ſeems very natural and juſt, that Plato introduces the mention of his maſter in this paſſage, on purpoſe to record his memory, and to give his name what place he could in his writings, it is probable that, in purſuance of the ſame ſolicitude for his maſter's honour, he would mention him in the moſt reſpectful manner, and though Dionyſius was Γραμματιστης, a grammar-ſchoolmaſter by profeſſion, yet that his grateful ſcholar would give him here the more honourable title of Γραμματικος——. It is further to be obſerved, that Olympiodorus, when he calls him Γραμματιστης, ſpeaks of him hiſtorically, and not citing the words of Plato in this paſſage, as Dr. Windet in his notes on Olympiodorus, and Dr. Forſter after him, erroneouſly ſeem to think.—S.

[4] There was a law or cuſtom in Sparta, inſtituted by Lycurgus, that young gentlemen, who had gone through the whole courſe of their ſtudies, and were become perfect in the practice of thoſe virtues they had learnt, ſhould take under their own immediate eye the younger ſort, who were then training up in the ſame diſcipline. The intention of which law was this; that the continual preſence and example of thoſe adepts might animate the learners, and fire them with emulation and an ardour to arrive at the ſame excellence. To further this end, particular friendſhips were

did not perfectly apprehend. There was reaſon however to ſuppoſe it related either to Anaxagoras or to Oenopides[1]: for they appeared to be deſcribing

were highly encouraged, and grew into great faſhion, between two ſuch perſons. They were contracted in this manner: the elder choſe out from among the youth one, whoſe genius he thought ſimilar to his own, and whom he had conceived the beſt hopes of being able to improve; attached himſelf to him, and accompanied him in all his ſtudies, his performances in muſic, and his gymnic exerciſes, the two principal parts of a Spartan education; encouraging and applauding him, endeavouring to acquire his confidence, and engage him to a reciprocal eſteem and friendſhip. In imitation of this cuſtom amongſt the Spartans, Solon either introduced or authorized friendſhips of this kind amongſt the Athenians; laying them under the ſame reſtrictions as in Sparta; and prohibiting ſlaves, though frequently employed as ſchoolmaſters and pedagogues to their youth, from aſpiring to be their private tutors, guides, and conſtant companions, in this way of intimacy and friendſhip. This was all the caution deemed requiſite, in thoſe antient and virtuous times, to preſerve their youth from the contagion of baſe ſentiments and bad manners. But when afterwards the riches of Aſia flowed into Athens, and thence into the reſt of Greece, through the channels of trade and commerce; and when luxury and effeminacy, which always come with the tide of riches, had corrupted the Grecians, and debauched their manners; friendſhip, which only can ſubſiſt amongſt the virtuous, no longer flouriſhed in its purity, but degenerated into a commerce of lewdneſs; entered into and managed, at firſt, under the maſk of friendſhip, and thoſe laudable motives before mentioned; but at length, eſpecially amongſt the rich and great, carried on more openly, and with little or no diſguiſe. Inſtances in both ways we meet with frequently in Plato; in the way of virtuous friendſhip, Socrates in particular, every where ſeeking out the beſt diſpoſed amongſt the youth, attracting their regards and cultivating their eſteem, with a view to communicate to them his wiſdom, to avert them from the parties of bad men, and to engage them on his own ſide, the ſide of virtue. The Man of Learning in this Dialogue is plainly enough, from his whole deſcription, another inſtance of like kind. Of which ſort were the other perſons, mentioned in the paſſage here before us, is uncertain: and examples of the vicious kinds in ſome other Dialogues need not to be pointed out. The ſpeech of Alcibiades in The Banquet is too flagrant a proof, that the profligacy of that young nobleman was no very aſtoniſhing or ſingular thing at Athens. When any other ſuch paſſages occur in Plato, it will be ſufficient to refer our readers to this note.—S.

[1] Proclus, in giving a ſhort hiſtory of the riſe and progreſs of geometry, refers to this place in the following words: *Αναξαγορας ὁ Κλαζομενιος πολλων εφηψατο κατα γεωμετριαν, και Οινοπιδης ὁ Χιος, ὁ τον του μηνισκου τετραγωνισμον ευρων, και Θεοδωρος ὁ Κυρηναιος, ολιγῳ νεωτερος ων της Αναξαγορου· ὡν και ὁ Πλατων εν τοις αντερασταις εμνημονευσεν,, ὡς επι τοις μαθημασι δοξαν λαβοντων.* "Anaxagoras the Clazomenian touched on many points in geometry; as alſo did Oenopides the Chian, he who found out the ſquaring of the Meniſcus; and Theodorus the Cyrenean, ſomewhat junior to Anaxagoras; who are recorded by Plato in The Rivals, as men of reputation for mathematical ſcience." Procl. Comment. in Euclid. l. ii. p. 19. But we find no where in this Dialogue any mention made of Theodorus by name. It ſhould ſeem, therefore, that Proclus imagined, one of the two nameleſs

deſcribing circles; and by holding their hands in an inclining and oblique poſition, ſeemed to be repreſenting, not in play, but with much ſerioufneſs, certain inclinations of the pole. Upon which, as I had ſeated myſelf next to an admirer of one of the young diſputants, I moved him with my elbow to turn his face to me, and then aſked him what point it was which engaged

namelefs Rivals, the Man of Learning, to be this very Theodorus. But indeed the ſentence, here cited from Proclus, appears to us erroneouſly copied by ſome old tranſcriber. For it is immediately followed by this other ſentence; ἐφ' οἷς Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χῖος, ὁ τὸν τοῦ μηνίσκου τετραγωνισμὸν εὑρών, καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, ἐγένοντο περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἐπιφανεῖς. "After whom Hippocrates the Chian, he who found out the ſquaring of the Meniſcus, and Theodorus the Cyrenean, became illuſtrious for their ſkill in geometry." Now theſe two ſentences, taken together, evidently contain two egregious blunders; one is, that the [firſt] diſcovery of ſquaring the Meniſcus, is attributed to two different perſons; the other is, that one and the ſame perſon, Theodorus, is introduced as poſterior in point of time to himſelf. We have therefore no doubt but that the whole paſſage in Proclus ought to be read as follows: Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος πολλὰ ἐφήψατο καὶ περὶ γεωμετρίαν, καὶ Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χῖος· ὧν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς ἀντερασταῖς μέμνηται, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθήμασι δόξαν λαβόντων. ἐφ' οἷς Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χῖος, ὁ τὸν τοῦ μηνίσκου τετραγωνισμὸν εὑρών, καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, ὀλίγῳ νεωτέρῳ ὢν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, ἐγένοντο περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἐπιφανεῖς. "Anaxagoras the Clazomenian touched on many points in geometry; as alſo did Oenopides the Chian; who are [both of them] recorded by Plato in The Rivals, as men of reputation for mathematical ſcience. After whom, Hippocrates the Chian, he who found out the ſquaring of the Meniſcus, and Theodorus the Cyrenean, who was ſomewhat junior to Anaxagoras, became illuſtrious for their ſkill in geometry." The miſtake of the tranſcriber of this paſſage is eaſy to be accounted for by ſuch as are uſed to antient manuſcripts, in the following manner. The tranſcriber, we preſume, had no other perſon to read to him; as thoſe had, who copied books, for which there was always a great demand, ſuch as Homer, for inſtance; in which caſe there was one reader to many ſcribes. But the writings of Proclus were the purchaſe only of a few. The tranſcriber, therefore, being alone, his eye muſt have been often changing from his own writing to that which he wrote after. We ſuppoſe, that the words Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χῖος occured in the next line to, and immediately under, the words Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χῖος. We ſuppoſe that the tranſcriber having written ſo far as Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χῖος, and looking into his original, had his eye caught by ὁ Χῖος in the next line; from which words there he went on tranſcribing, with the omiſſion of a whole line: and that afterwards on a review finding his miſtake, tranſcribed in the margin the words omitted (a large margin being always left for ſuch purpoſes); and added a few words which followed, to point out where the omiſſion was made. But when this very tranſcript came afterwards to be copied, we ſuppoſe that the latter tranſcriber inſerted the marginal words into the body of his copy, in a wrong place, after the words τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου. But the matter is put out of diſpute by Simplicius, who, in his learned Commentary on Ariſtotle's Phyſics, fol. 12. has ſhown us mathematically how to ſquare the Meniſcus; the invention, as he expreſsly tells us, of Hippocrates the Chian, as a ſtep to the diſcovery of ſquaring the Circle.—S.

thoſe two youths ſo earneſtly in debate; adding, it muſt certainly be ſomething of great importance, and a matter of fine ſpeculation, that, on which they beſtowed ſo ſerious an attention.—What call you great and fine[1]? ſaid he. They are[2] prating[3] about things up in the ſky, and trifle away their time in

[1] The Greek is thus printed; Ὁ δ' εἰπε, Ποιον, εφη, μεγα και καλον: "And he replied, What mean you, ſaid he, by great and fine?" If this reading be right, Dr. Forſter rightly ſays, there is a pleonaſm here in the words εἰπε and εφη. But, perhaps, inſtead of εφη, we ſhould read φης. Grammarians, in explaining antient authors, love all opportunities of having recourſe to figures of ſpeech; and verbal critics take as much delight in all occaſions to amend the text. But as this makes only a ſmall part of the office we have undertaken, we hope we are moderate in the execution of it. We therefore contend not in this place, but leave it to the determination of our learned readers.—S.

[2] In the Greek, ἀδολεσχουσι περι των μετεωρων. Ἀδολεσχειν is to talk idly and impertinently, and in the Phædo is oppoſed to περι προσηκοντων λογους ποιεισθαι, "the ſpeaking about what concerns a man." But by the multitude, by the men of buſineſs, and all other the enemies of philoſophy, it was ſpecially uſed to ſignify thoſe who held much converſation together on philoſophical ſubjects. Thus Strepſiades in Ariſtophanes at firſt calls the houſe, where men addicted to ſuch ſtudies uſed to aſſemble, ψυχων σοφων φροντιστηριον, "the conſidering place of wiſe ſouls:" and when afterwards he is made to change his mind, he calls it την οικιαν των αδολεσχων, "the houſe of the philoſophic praters." The ſenſe of this paſſage is expreſſed in The Phædrus by one word, μετεωρολεσχειν.—S.

[3] Περι του μετεωρου. Ariſtotle reſtrained the meaning of the word μετεωρα to ſignify the phænomena in the air or lower ſky, with their influences on the water; and thoſe only in the upper ſky which ſeem mutable or tranſient, ſuch as comets; or indiſtinct, as the milky way; excluſively of thoſe which appear diſtinct in their forms, and are conſtant and invariable in their motions, called the heavenly bodies. But Plato by the word μετεωρα always means principally, if not ſolely, theſe laſt, as the word commonly ſignified. Thus in The Clouds of Ariſtophanes, where Socrates is called one of the μετεωροσοφισται, he is made to ſay, Αεροβατω, και περιφοιτω τον ἡλιον; "I walk in air, and contemplate the ſun." And preſently after,

——Οὐ γαρ αν ποτε
Ἐξευρον ορθως τα μετεωρα πραγματα,
Ει μη, κ. τ. λ.

For the real nature of theſe things on high
Ne'er had I found out rightly, if, &c.——

And near the end of the comedy, where Strepſiades, in mimicry, repeats the former of theſe two paſſages, Αεροβατω, κ. τ. λ. he adds, ſpeaking to Socrates in ſcoff,

Και της σεληνης εσκοπεισθε την ὁδον;

The dwellings of the moon too have ye ſpy'd?

ridiculing

in philoſophizing.—This anſwer of his ſeemed to me a ſtrange one; and I ſaid, Young man, do you then think it mean and diſhonourable for a man to philoſophize? or for what other reaſon do you ſpeak ſo harſhly of what they are employed about?—On my putting this queſtion to him, another perſon [1], who happened to be a rival of his for the eſteem of the youths I mentioned,

ridiculing in this the doctrine of Anaxagoras and his followers, that the moon was inhabited, like the earth, which the poets called

——————ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί.

——————the firm and ever-fix'd abode
Of gods and mortals.

[1] It will ſoon appear probable, that Socrates knew who this perſon was; for he tells us what kind of life he led; which reſembled rather that of a philoſopher than that of a ſophiſt. It is probable that he was a ſtranger at Athens, and choſe to be concealed. It was polite, therefore, in Socrates to ſuppreſs the mention of his name. Had he been an Athenian, it would have been natural for Socrates to ſpeak of him by name, as he was ſpeaking to his fellow-citizens. And had he been a ſophiſt, we could not fail to have been told his name, becauſe Socrates never ſpared the ſophiſts. He appears then to have been ſome foreign philoſopher, whom Socrates had diſcovered notwithſtanding his affected privacy. Now none of the philoſophers of that age lived a life ſo retired, or ſo obſcure, as did Democritus. He ſought not fame: ſpeculative knowledge for its own ſake ſeemed to be his only end. For he deſpiſed, not only the multitude, but all men. He concerned not himſelf with any human affairs; but laughed at all human purſuits, and even at all ſocial engagements. Quite oppoſite in this reſpect was the character of Socrates. For he always lived the moſt ſocial life, in the midſt of the moſt populous city at that time in the known world. He converſed familiarly with all ſorts of men, with a ſimple and conſtant view to make them better men in private life, and better citizens, whether as governors or as ſubjects. His peculiar philoſophy was wholly of the practic kind. He was indeed the firſt who inveſtigated the principles of morals and of politics, and thus raiſed them into ſciences: whereas before his time political and even moral precepts lay unconnected, looſe, and ſcattered; and were conſequently vague and uncertain. He firſt diſcovered them to be founded in the ſtable and eternal eſſence of mind, and in the government of mind, by nature, over all things inferior to itſelf. Thus the philoſophy of Socrates is like the ladder in the patriarch Jacob's dream: his metaphyſics aſcend gradually up to the firſt cauſe of things; from which depend, and from whence come down to earth, the ſciences of ethics and of politics, to bleſs mankind. Such being the ſum of the Socratic doctrine; and the drift of this Dialogue in particular being to ſhow, that no other doctrine than this deſerves the name of philoſophy; none of the philoſophers, ſo called, was ſo proper to be oppoſed here to Socrates, as Democritus; not only for the reaſons already given, but becauſe alſo, like moſt modern philoſophers, he was merely a naturaliſt; making body the ſole ſubject of his philoſophical reſearches; attributing to body a natural and neceſſary motion; and in the nature

mentioned, and was therefore ſeated near us, having heard my queſtions, with his anſwers to them, interpoſed, and ſaid to me, It is unworthy of you, Socrates, to aſk the opinion of this man, whether he thinks it mean and diſhonourable to philoſophize. Know you not him, that he has ſpent all his time in wreſtling[1], cramming himſelf, and ſleeping? What other anſwer then can you expect from him than this, that the ſtudy of philoſophy is diſhonourable and baſe.—Now the perſon, who thus ſpake to me, ye are to underſtand, employed his whole time in the improvement of his mind, and in the ſtudy of the arts[2] and ſciences: the other, whom he had vilified,

of body ſeeking for the cauſe of all things. There ſeems to be another propriety too in introducing Democritus in this Dialogue, as attentive to the aſtronomical diſpute between the two youths. For we have ſome reaſon to think, that he favoured the Pythagorean, or at leaſt the Semi-Tychonic, ſyſtem of the world. His maſter in natural philoſophy we know was Leucippus: and by all writers of philoſophic hiſtory he is accounted of the ſame ſect, the Eleatic. Now Leucippus, as we are informed by Diogenes Laertius, held *την γην οχεισθαι περι το μεσον δινουμενην*, "that the earth was carried wheeling round the middle." If the middle here means a central body at ſome diſtance from the earth, (and it is certain, that *οχεισθαι* every where elſe ſignifies to ride, or to be carried aloft,) it follows, that Leucippus held the Pythagorean ſyſtem of the world. But if it means only the axis of the earth's motion, then the doctrine of Leucippus is agreeable to that hypotheſis, ſince called the Semi-Tychonic.—S.

[1] In the Greek, *τραχηλιζομενος*. Moſt of the interpreters agree in the general meaning of the word in this place, that it relates to wreſtling. But as they all differ in the manner how, we beg leave to differ from them all, and to ſuppoſe it means, "held by the neck," as is uſual in the action of wreſtling. The word, thus underſtood, preſents to the imagination the moſt ridiculous image, and is therefore the moſt proper in a deſcription intended to be ridiculous. Agreeably to this, Lucian, in ſeveral places of his Anacharſis, repreſents theſe wreſtlers as throttling and half ſtrangling each other. As to the reſt of the deſcription, it agrees with the account, given us by Plutarch, of the life of the athletics, *ὑπνῳ τε πολλῳ, και πλησμοναις ενδελεχεσι, και κινησεσι τεταγμεναις και ἡσυχιαις, αυξοντων τε και διαφυλαττοντων την ἑξιν.* "By much ſleep and continual full feeding, by regulated motions, and ſtated times of reſt, improving and preſerving in its improvement the habit of their bodies." Plutarch, in his Life of Philopœmen.—The main of the deſcription is juſtly applicable to the life of every man, who makes the exerciſe of his body in general his ſole buſineſs, or is addicted to the violent exerciſe of it in any one way. Galen, with this very deſcription apparently in his mind, has improved and heightened the colouring of it, in a paſſage cited by Dr. Forſter, to which we refer our learned readers.—S.

[2] In the Greek, *περι μουσικην*. See Dr. Forſter's note on this place, to which nothing needs to be here added.—S.

ſpent

ſpent his in the care and improvement of his body by the gymnic [1] exerciſes. I therefore thought it proper to deſiſt from putting my queſtions to him, [2] this robuſt body of a man; ſeeing that he profeſſed not to be well-practiſed in the arts of reaſoning and diſcourſing, but in feats only of activity and ſtrength: and I choſe rather to interrogate and ſift the other, who pretended to be the wiſer man; [3] in hopes that, if it were poſſible for me, I might receive from him ſome improvement in knowledge. Addreſſing myſelf therefore to him, I told him that I had propoſed my queſtion before all who heard me; [4] and if you think yourſelf, ſaid

[1] Theſe exerciſes were, running, leaping, caſting of quoits, throwing of javelins, wreſtling, and boxing: but wreſtling was the principal. They were called γυμνικοι, gymnic, becauſe they were all of them uſually, and wreſtling was always, performed with the limbs and the upper part of the body quite naked. They were taught according to rules of art: maſters were appointed to teach them; and ſchools were built, and places ſet apart, proper for the exerciſe of them. Skill in them, particularly in wreſtling, and the exerciſe according to art, was called γυμναστικη, the word here uſed by Plato.—S.

[2] In all editions of the Greek we read, τον ερωμενον, a word juſtly ſuſpected by every learned and careful reader not to have been written in this place by Plato. Dr. Forſter, in his edition of this Dialogue, propoſes an emendation, made by a very ingenious and learned man, Mr. Mudge, formerly of Exeter College in Oxford; it is τον ερρωμενον: in favour of which we heartily reſign two former conjectures of our own;—one was τοιν ερασμενοιν, in the ſame ſenſe, in which Plato had juſt before ſaid ουτος τοιν ερασταιν:—the other was τον ερασμενον, a word which we imagined might diſtinguiſh this man's regard for the youth from that of the other, the μουσικος. We embrace Mr. Mudge's emendation the more readily, becauſe the deſcription, given of the Man of Exerciſe in the word ερρωμενον, is well oppoſed to the deſcription of the Man of Learning, given us by Plato preſently afterwards.—S.

[3] One of the moſt ſtriking features in the character of Socrates was the ironical manner which he uſed in converſing with the ſophiſts, complimenting them on their pretended wiſdom, and diſſembling his own real knowledge. For before them he affected ignorance even in thoſe ſubjects, which he had ſtudied the moſt and knew the beſt of any man; and was always aſking them queſtions on thoſe very points, ſeemingly for the ſake of information. By this conduct he engaged them to expoſe their own ignorance, and by that means undeceived their followers and admirers, who by them were miſled and had their minds corrupted. But the ſentence now before us, where Socrates is ſpeaking, not to the Man of Learning himſelf, but of him to his own friends and diſciples, we preſume, cannot be ironical: it is one of thoſe many paſſages in Plato, where appears another, equally ſtrong, but more amiable feature, in the character of that wiſe and good man; his unaſſuming modeſty, and truly polite regard to others, according to their rank or merit.—S.

[4] In the original here is a tranſition from the narrative or hiſtorical ſtyle to the dramatic or that

ſaid I, capable of giving me a better anſwer than that man, I repeat the ſame queſtion to you, Whether you think it honourable, or not, to philoſophize?—About the time we had proceeded thus far in our converſation, the two youths, overhearing what we ſaid, became ſilent; and breaking off the diſpute between themſelves, gave their attention to us. Now, what were the ſentiments of their profeſſed friends and admirers on this occaſion I know not; but, for my own part, I was ſtruck with admiration at the ſcene; as I always am, when I ſee ſuch a diſpoſition in the young and handſome. One of them, however, the perſon to whom I had propoſed my queſtion laſt, ſeemed to me no leſs charmed with it than myſelf: not but that he anſwered with a free and open air, as if ambitious only of having the preference and the praiſe given to his own ſtudies.—[1] Should I ever, Socrates, ſaid he, come to think meanly of philoſophy, I ſhould no longer deem myſelf a human being; as I deem not any perſon, who entertains ſuch a ſentiment worthy of that character;—hinting at his Rival, and raiſing his voice, that he might be heard by the youths, of whoſe eſteem both of them were emulous.—You then, ſaid I, think highly of philoſophy. —Moſt highly, replied he.—But what? ſaid I: do you ſuppoſe it poſſible for a man to know the true dignity of any thing, to know whether it be baſe or honourable, unleſs he firſt knows what the nature of that thing is?—

that of dialogue. But as we uſe no ſuch figure or mode of ſpeech in our language, the tranſlator has inſerted the words, "ſaid I," to make his ſentence good Engliſh.—S.

[1] Thoſe, called ſophiſts, were not only proud of this very title, which ſignifies men who knew things wiſe, that is, things above the knowledge of the vulgar, but they alſo affected to be thought and called *σοφοι*, wiſe men. The Pythagoreans, after their maſter, only aſſumed the title of philoſophers, lovers of wiſdom, or ſtudents in it. Thus, in the beginning of this Dialogue, philoſophizing means, applying the mind to the ſtudy of wiſdom. We are told by Laertius, that Democritus admired Pythagoras, and emulated the Pythagoreans. Now it is certain, that he was no follower of their doctrines, or way of teaching; it muſt be meant therefore of their manners, their modeſty, and their other virtues. We find our Man of Learning here profeſſing nothing more than a high eſteem for philoſophy. The ſentiment, here attributed to him, is the very ſame with that of Democritus, in Stobæus, Serm. 1. *Ανθρωποις αρμοδιον, ψυχης μαλλον η σωματις ποιεισθαι λογον.* "It is a thing befitting human beings, to make more account of the ſoul, than of the body. For the ſoul, improved in the higheſt degree, rectifies what is amiſs in its tabernacle," meaning the body; "whereas ſtrength of this, without the exerciſe of reaſon, betters not a whit the condition of the ſoul." *Ψυχη μεν γαρ τελεωτατη σκηνεος μοχθηριαν ορθοι· σκηνεος γαρ ισχυς ανευ λογισμου ψυχην ουδεν τι αμεινω τιθησι.*—S.

I do

I do not, anſwered he.—Know you then, ſaid I, what it is to philoſophize?—Perfectly well, ſaid he.—What is it then? ſaid I.—What other thing, anſwered he, than that deſcribed by Solon [1] in theſe verſes,

To various knowledge, I had gain'd before,
I add each year variety of more;
And thus old age increaſes ſtill my ſtore.

Agreeably to this is my opinion, ſaid he, that the man, who would philoſophize, ought to be always, in his old age as well as in his youth, ſtill adding to his ſtock of knowledge by ſome new acquiſition; making uſe of life to learn as many things as poſſible.—Now this account of his [2] ſeemed to me, at

[1] Γηρασκω δ', αιει πολλα διδασκομενος. In theſe words is this celebrated verſe of Solon's cited here by Plato. And we have given a paraphraſe of it according to this reading, and anſwering the purpoſe for which it is introduced. A more literal tranſlation would be this: "Old as I grow, I ſtill learn many things." But the verſe, as cited by other antient writers, is this,

Αιει γηρασκω, πολλα μαθησομενος.

to be tranſlated thus:

Older and older every day I grow,
Yet have to learn much more than yet I know.

Or, if the word μαθησομενος, in the future tenſe, has here the force of a verb deſiderative or meditative, and ſignifies reſolved, or ready, or about to learn, it may then be thus tranſlated:

I ſtill grow older; yet I ſtill aſpire
In many things more knowledge to acquire.

The verſe, we ſee, whichever be the true reading, and whichever the preciſe ſenſe of it, is evidently in praiſe of polymathy; and conſequently is agreeable to the mind and taſte of our Man of Learning: but the meaning of it, laſt given, ſeems to be ſo the moſt; the ſecond has indeed a greater appearance of modeſty; and the firſt perhaps ſavours too much of vanity and oſtentation.—S.

[2] For indeed at firſt ſight it looks very like to that, which Socrates in Xenophon gives of himſelf and his own ſtudies, where he ſays; εξ ουτου περ ξυνηναι τα λεγομενα πρξαμην, ου ποτε διελιπον και ζητων και μανθανων ὁ τι εδυναμην αγαθον. Xen. in Soc. Apolog. "Ever ſince I began to underſtand the ſubjects of diſcourſe, I have never ceaſed inquiring into and learning every GOOD thing I was able." But on nearer inſpection, the ſame difference will be found between them, that appears in this Dialogue between philoſophy, as deſcribed at firſt by the Man of Learning, and that which at the concluſion proves to be genuine philoſophy, that knowledge which is eminently good and uſeful

at firſt appearance, to have ſome weight in it: but after reviewing it a little within myſelf, I aſked him, whether philoſophy in his judgment conſiſted in multiplicity of knowledge.—That, replied he, is entirely my opinion.—And is it your opinion too, ſaid I, that philoſophy is only a becoming and an honourable ſtudy? or do you deem it alſo good and beneficial?—Good and beneficial, replied he, in the higheſt degree.—Does this appear to you the peculiar property of philoſophy? or think you that other ſtudies partake of the ſame advantage? For inſtance, love of the gymnic exerciſes, do you deem it not only honourable and becoming a man, but good for him alſo? or think you otherwiſe?—To this queſtion, he facetiouſly replied, I have two anſwers to give. To this man here I would ſay, It is neither: but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both, to be good for a man, as well as becoming him.—Then I aſked him, whether in theſe exerciſes he thought the undergoing much toil to be the ſame thing with love of exerciſe.—By all means, ſaid he; juſt as in philoſophizing, I take [1] the acquiſition of much knowledge to be the ſame thing with philoſophy.—Do you think then, ſaid I, that the lovers of thoſe exerciſes have any other view than to acquire a good habit of body?—No other, replied he.—Is a good habit of body then, ſaid I, acquired by uſing much exerciſe, and under-

uſeful to man, that which our elegant philoſophic poet terms, the only ſcience of mankind.—One cannot but wonder, that Wower, in his treatiſe de Polymathiâ, c. ii. § 7. could ſo much miſtake Plato's meaning, as to cite him aſſerting in this very Dialogue that philoſophy is polymathy. We cannot ſuppoſe Wower to have meant, that ſuch an account of philoſophy was given us ſomewhere in this Dialogue, that is, by the Man of Learning: for to confirm what he tell us as the opinion of Plato himſelf, he immediately adds the following quotation, as out of Plato's Republic, τουτε πολυμαθες και φιλοσοφον ταυτον. Unhappily for his argument, the word in this laſt paſſage is not πολυμαθες, but φιλομαθες, and means a love of that knowledge which by nature is familiar to the mind of man; which is indeed the ſame thing with the love of wiſdom, or philoſophy. It is not at all ſurpriſing, that Wower ſhould elevate above meaſure the charms of his own miſtreſs; for ſuch ſentiments inſeparably attend the paſſion of love: but to imagine that every other man muſt ſee her in the ſame light, can proceed only from being in love to a degree of madneſs. Beſides; men, who aſpire to the fame of vaſt erudition, are apt to read in too haſty and curſory a manner.—S.

[1] Την πολυμαθειαν.—Agreeably to this, Clemens of Alexandria, citing a paſſage out of Democritus, where this philoſopher boaſts of his much travelling through various countries, of the accurate reſearches which he made in them all, of his long abode in Egypt, and of his ſkill ſuperior to that of all men every where in geometrical demonſtrations, obſerves, that the philoſopher wrote thus, επι τη πολυμαθιᾳ σεμνυνομενος, "glorying in his polymathy." Stromat. l. i.—S.

going

going much toil and labour in it?—Certainly, ſaid he: for how ſhould a man, who labours little, or uſes little exerciſe, acquire a good habit of body. —Here I thought it moſt adviſable to call in to my aſſiſtance our champion for the gymnaſtic art, on account of his experience. I therefore ſaid to him, How can you ſit ſilent, my friend, and hear this man talk ſo ſtrangely? Are you of opinion too, that a good habit of body is acquired through great toil, labour, and exerciſe, and not rather by means of ſuch as are moderate?—For my part, Socrates, ſaid he, I was thinking that I had an evident proof before my eyes, at this very time, to confirm the truth of that well-known ſaying, that moderate labour is beſt for the body.—How ſo? ſaid I.—Do I not ſee [1] him there, ſaid he, in want of ſleep and good nouriſhment, [2] ſcarce able to turn his head, and worn away to a ſhadow with much ſtudy and hard labour of the brain?—At this ſarcaſm, the youths, who heard him, were pleaſed, and could not refrain from laughing; a circumſtance which put our great ſtudent a little out of countenance.—I then ſaid to him, Well; do you now agree with us, that a good habit of body is procured neither by much nor by little labour, but by that only which is moderate? or will you diſpute the point with us, one againſt two?—Againſt him, replied he, I would enter the liſts with much pleaſure, well aſſured that I ſhould be able to ſupport my ſide of the argument, [3] even though it were worſe and weaker than it is: for in ſuch combats, he is a mere nothing. But againſt you, Socrates, I would not chooſe to contend for

[1] This deſcription of our Man of Learning, in his perſon and appearance, agrees exactly with the deſcription given of Democritus by Hippocrates, in that epiſtle of his cited before;—that he was ωχριακως παυυ και λειποσαρκος, "extremely pale in his viſage and waſted in his fleſh;"—that he found him with a book," βιβλιον επι τοιν γονατοιν, "which lay [open] on his knees;" ετερα δε τινα εξ αμφοιν τοιν μεροιν αυτω παρεβεβλητο, "and that other books lay by him, ſome on each ſide;"—οτε μεν συντονως εγραφεν εγκειμενος, that "by turns he wrote, poring over his writing with earneſt attention;" οτε δε ηρεμει, παμπολυ—εν εαυτω μερμηριζων, "and by turns reſted, pondering very much within himſelf."—S.

[2] This muſt ever be the caſe of ſuch a man as Democritus, who was always poring on his books, his experiments, and his diſſections. From hence it was, and from extreme attention to his ſtudies, that he did not at firſt, as Laertius relates, know his own father, when he came to viſit him.—S.

[3] Theſe athletic gentlemen were remarkable for their ſlowneſs, heavineſs, and want of adroitneſs, in all exerciſes of the mind. See the third book of the Republic.—S.

any kind of paradox: and therefore I admit, that [1] not violent but moderate exercise procures men a good habit of body.—And how is it with reſpect to food? ſaid I. Is it much or moderate, which contributes to the ſame end?—[2] With reſpect to food alſo he acknowledged moderation to be beſt. And thus I led him on through all other things which had relation to the body; urging him to own, that it was beſt to be moderate in the uſe of them all, and neither to exceed, nor to be deficient: and all this he granted me.—Well; and how is it with reſpect to the ſoul? ſaid I. Is this benefited moſt by a moderate or by an immoderate quantity of thoſe things which it receives?—By a moderate quantity, ſaid he.—Is not learning one of the things adminiſtered to the ſoul?—It was admitted.—Moſt beneficial therefore to the ſoul is moderate learning, and not an immenſe heap.—He granted it.—Who now is the proper perſon for us to adviſe with concerning the body; would we know, what kinds and degrees of exerciſe are moderate, and what is a moderate quantity of food? We muſt all three of us agree, that it is either a phyſician or [3] a maſter of exerciſe. And concerning corn, what

[1] We underſtand the following paſſage of Xenophon, as having a view to the vehement lovers of bodily exerciſe, a character common amongſt the young men of that age: το μεν ουν υπερισθιοντα υπερπονειν απεδοκιμαζε (ſc. Σωκρατης,) το δε οσα ηδεως η ψυχη δεχεται, ταυτα ικανως εκπονειν εδοκιμαζε. Memorab. l. i. c. ii. § 4.—S.

[2] In the Greek, Και τα σιτια ωμολογει. In this ſentence the word ομοιως, or ωσαυτως, or other word of like import, ſeems wanting, and muſt be underſtood. But we ſuſpect that, inſtead of τα σιτια, we ſhould read τα μετρια. This conceſſion of the Man of Learning thus agrees exactly, and in the ſame terms, with his two ſubſequent conceſſions on the ſame point. We have, however, given ſuch a turn to our tranſlation of this ſentence, as to adapt it to either way of reading it.—See a paſſage, parallel to this, in Ariſtotle's Nicomach. Ethics. l. ii. c. ii.—S.

[3] Παιδοτριβην. This properly ſignifies the maſter, appointed to teach the youth their exerciſes, and direct every motion to be uſed in them. But Plato here, and in other places, uſes the word to ſignify a perſon whoſe knowledge was of the ſame kind with that of the γυμναστης, or gymnaſtic phyſician; to know the power of each particular exerciſe in the cure of each particular diſeaſe; and how much of it was to be uſed in each particular caſe; a ſcience, which has for many ages been too much neglected. Perhaps, from the time of Herodicus, (who as Plato tells us in his 3d book de Republicâ, παιδοτριβης ων εμιξε γυμναστικην ιατρικη,) for a few ages, the offices of παιδοτριβης and γυμναστης belonged to men verſed in the ſame kinds of knowledge; though in proceſs of time they came to be very different, and were aſſigned to men of very different abilities. It is certain, that in the time of Galen, the παιδοτριβης, "the maſter of the exerciſes," was ſubordinate to the γυμναστης, "the phyſician" who preſcribed the proper exerciſe; and that he was under his direction. Such an alteration

what is a moderate and due quantity for ſowing, we muſt agree, that the huſbandman is the fitteſt perſon to be conſulted. But concerning the ſoul, and the diſcipline or learning to be there ſown and planted, of whom ought we to inquire, what meaſure and what ſhare is to be accounted moderate?— We were here all of us at a ſtand. Upon which, in a jocular way, I ſaid, Since we are at a loſs, ourſelves, what to anſwer, will you conſent to aſk the opinion of theſe youths here on the point in queſtion? But perhaps we are above that; [1] like the wooers of Penelope, of whom Homer ſays, that they

alteration in the practice was very natural: for when any art is conſiderably improved, and the principles of it come to be eſtabliſhed on ſcience, the inferior branches of it, thoſe which require manual operations, or any labour of the body, of courſe devolve to inferior perſons.—What confirms our ſuppoſition is, that Æſchines the Socratic, Plato's fellow-diſciple, in his Dialogue περὶ ἀρετῆς, εἰ διδακτόν, attributes to the παιδοτριβαι knowledge and judgment in the conſtitution and habit of men's bodies. The ſame writer, in his Dialogue named Axiochus, mentions the παιδοτριβαι and γυμνασται together, as perſons equal in authority over the youth committed to their care and teaching. Neither Mercurialis nor Peter Faber cite theſe laſt-mentioned Dialogues: they ſeem indeed to have overlooked them, as being in their days numbered amongſt the ſuppoſititious Dialogues of Plato; for otherwiſe they would not ſo haſtily have concluded, nor ſo raſhly have aſſerted, that by παιδοτρίβης Plato means γυμναστης. See the former of theſe writers in his treatiſe de Arte Gymnaſticâ, lib. i. c. xii. and the latter, in Agoniſticôn, lib. ii. c. vi.—In the next age after that of Plato, very little alteration ſeems to have been made. For Ariſtotle, in the beginning of the 4th book of his Politics, having mentioned this kind of general knowledge, the knowing what ſort of exerciſe is agreeable to each particular habit of body, attributes this knowledge to the παιδοτρίβης, as well as to the γυμναστης, which laſt word we beg leave to read in that paſſage, inſtead of γυμναστικος; for we know of no maſter or teacher of the exerciſes, or any ſubordinate officer or miniſter in the teaching them, who was ever called by the name of γυμναστικος. The corruption of the text of Ariſtotle in this paſſage aroſe perhaps from comparing it with another paſſage in the ſame work, at the end of the 3d chapter of the 8th book, where the arts γυμναστικη και παιδοτριβικη are mentioned together; and where (by the way) the exact diſtinction is made between them, as they were practiſed at that time; and the latter, the art of th παιδοτρίβης, is ſhown to be inſtrumental to the former, the art of the γυμναστης, though knowledge of the ſame kind ſtill belonged to both.—S.

[1] Socrates ſpeaks here jocoſely, as if he thought the Man of Learning might poſſibly be affronted, and piqued in point of honour, if the queſtion were referred to the two youths, perſons who ſeemed ſo much leſs able to anſwer it: in like manner as the wooers of Penelope pretended, that the offer of the ſeeming beggar to try his ſtrength with them was an affront to their ſuperior rank. Monſ. Dacier, in his note on this paſſage, ſeems to inſinuate, that Plato has given a turn to the paſſage in Homer here alluded to, different from the intention of the poet. For he ſays that Penelope's wooers openly avowed their fear of the ſuperior ſtrength of the concealed Ulyſſes, and

they diſdained to ſuffer any to draw the bow beſide themſelves.—[1] When they now ſeemed to be giving up the argument, in deſpair of coming to a concluſion; I bethought myſelf how to put the inquiry on another footing. And accordingly I propoſed this queſtion, What ſorts of learning, to the beſt of our conjecture, does it become a philoſopher to acquire principally? ſince

their apprehenſions of his doing that to which they found themſelves unequal. But this criticiſm of his ſhows that he entered not thoroughly into the ſenſe either of Plato or of Homer in this place: for, in the lines to which he refers us, Homer ſays, that when Ulyſſes had offered to try his ſtrength in drawing the bow, they (his rivals) were beyond meaſure offended, and overflowed with indignation and reſentment; being afraid leſt Ulyſſes ſhould ſucceed in the attempt, if they permitted it; that is, they were at the ſame time ſecretly afraid of his ſucceſs: for we are to obſerve, that Homer writes this as inſpired by the Muſe, who was ſuppoſed not only cogniſant of all the paſt actions and ſpeeches of thoſe who were the ſubjects of his poem, but alſo privy to the ſecret motives of the actors, and to the minds of the ſpeakers. But the avowed motives of Antinous and Eurymachus, in rejecting the offer made by Ulyſſes, were indignation at his preſumption, and a ſenſe of honour, not ſuffering them to enter the liſts with an antagoniſt deemed ſo much their inferior. In refuſing therefore to admit of his propoſal, they pleaded, not the danger they were in of his prevailing, but the ſhame that would ariſe to them in caſe he ſhould happen to prevail. Thus, under the pretence of the ſuperiority of their rank to his, they concealed the ſenſe they had of their own deficience, and their opinion of his real ſuperior excellence. Affected haughtineſs and contemptuouſneſs is the uſual maſk of conſcious meanneſs. In this light Plato ſaw the behaviour of Antinous and his aſſuming companions, deſcribed in the twenty-firſt book of the Odyſſey; and in that ſlily jocoſe manner, which he every where attributes to Socrates, he inſinuates that his Man of Learning on the preſent occaſion might naturally have his mind poſſeſſed with the ſame ſentiments. When Socrates propoſed a reference to the two youths, it ſhould ſeem, from what he immediately adds, that a ſmile of diſdain appeared in the countenance of the profeſſed philoſopher. But the likening his caſe to that of Penelope's ſuitors contains a hint that he was under ſecret apprehenſions of having his ignorance expoſed. The proper anſwer to the queſtion of Socrates he knew was obvious; but his very profeſſion of philoſophy would not admit him to ſpeak it openly himſelf: he was conſcious of not poſſeſſing any ſuch ſcience as that of mind, and of not having ſtudied any ſuch art as that of medicine for the ſoul. Therefore, though Socrates at the end of their converſation drives him to ſhame, and expoſes his ignorance in the nature and ends of philoſophy, he endeavoured to conceal this ignorance as long as he could, and was unwilling to have the anſwer given by any. At the ſame time it is ſuggeſted to our thoughts by Plato, that nothing more than common ſenſe and a candid mind, chiefly to be found in youths of good diſpoſitions, was requiſite to make that anſwer; and that fair reaſoning, joined to theſe, was ſufficient to lead a man to true philoſophy.—S.

[1] This knot, or rather break, in the thread of the argument, forewarns us of new matter to be now brought upon the carpet. But there is, beſides, a peculiar reaſon for the pauſe in this place; and

therefore

ſince we have already found, that it is not all ſorts, nor even many.—To this my learned companion anſwered, That the fineſt ſorts of learning, and the moſt becoming to the philoſophic character, were thoſe which give a man the higheſt reputation as a philoſopher: and this reputation, ſaid he, that man would gain, who ſhould appear converſant [1] in all the arts and ſciences, at leaſt in as many as poſſible, eſpecially in thoſe which are held in eſteem the moſt, and are the moſt deſerving of it;—the man, who having ſtudied theſe arts, as far as is requiſite to a liberal education, hath acquired ſo much knowledge in them, as depends on taſte and judgment, not on the mechanical exerciſe of any, or on the labour of the hands.—Do you mean in the ſame way, ſaid I, as it is in building? For in that affair, if you have occaſion for artificers and artists, a bricklayer or a carpenter you may hire for five or ſix minas [2],

therefore it has here a peculiar beauty. It ſeems to be contrived on purpoſe to give every reader an opportunity of conſulting his own mind, and of finding there the proper anſwer to the laſt queſtion put by Socrates: it prepares him, therefore, for what is to follow, where he will ſee his inward conjecture explicitly confirmed, and the conceptions of his own mind from the precedent part of the argument produced to light, in a plain and full deſcription of what is juſtly to be called the ſtudy of wiſdom or philoſophy.—S.

[1] Dr. Forſter very juſtly obſerves that the character which the Man of Learning here gives of a philoſopher exactly agrees with the character of Democritus himſelf, as given us by Diogenes Laertius; that, beſides his being a great naturaliſt and moraliſt, beſides his being verſed in mathematical learning, and in all the popular erudition, he had a thorough experience in the arts, περὶ τεχνων πᾶσαν εἰχεν εμπειριαν. If the right reading of this ſentence in Laertius be, as we ſuſpect, πασαῖν or πασῶν, inſtead of πᾶσαν, the agreement with the words of Plato in this place is ſtill more exact. However, though Laertius in this paſſage plainly uſes the word τεχνων in the philoſophical and proper ſenſe, to ſignify arts as diſtinct from ſciences; yet Plato, in the paſſage to which this annotation belongs, ſeems to include in the word τεχνων all the particular ſciences: and if it be ſo, then the whole account which Laertius gives of the knowledge of Democritus, anſwers in every part to the philoſophic character, as here drawn by our Man of Learning. It is certain, that every particular ſcience has ſome art immediately derived from it, and particularly dependent on it. In mathematics, the art of numbering and computing depends on the ſcience of arithmetic; the art of meaſuring on the ſcience of geometry; the art of muſic on the ſcience of the ſame name; and the art of calculating eclipſes, &c. on the ſcience of aſtronomy. In the arts and ſciences of higher order it is the ſame: the art of government thus immediately depends on the ſcience of mankind; the art of leading a good and happy life, on the knowledge of ourſelves; and the art of reaſoning, on the ſcience of mind. We the rather produce theſe latter inſtances, for that they have a near relation to, and ſerve to illuſtrate, the laſt part of this Dialogue.—S.

[2] Leſs than twenty pounds of our money. For the attic μνα was equal to 3l. 4s. 7d. Engliſh.—S.

but

but an architect will coſt you above ten thouſand drachmas [1], ſo few of theſe are to be found in all Greece. Do you mean to diſtinguiſh in ſome ſuch way as this?—He admitted ſuch to be his meaning.—On this, I aſked him, if it was not impoſſible for one man to be a perfect maſter of any two arts, much more to attain a maſterſhip in any conſiderable number, eſpecially of ſuch as are great and excellent.—Do not imagine, Socrates, ſaid he, that I mean, it is requiſite for a philoſopher to have ſo thorough a knowledge of any art, as the man who makes it his profeſſion; but to be able, as becomes a gentleman of a liberal education, to underſtand what the artiſt ſays, when he is ſpeaking of his work, better than any of the byſtanders; and to interpoſe judiciouſly his own advice about the workmanſhip: ſo as always to appear, in every converſation relating to the arts, and in criticiſing on every performance of the artiſts, to have a finer taſte, and more knowledge, than any other perſon preſent.—Then I, for I was not yet quite certain what he meant, ſaid to him thus; Do I conceive rightly, what kind of man you call a philoſopher? You ſeem to me to have deſcribed ſuch a man, as the [2] general combatants are in the Olympic games, compared with the racers [3] or

[1] Equal to 322l. 18s. 4d. The μνα was worth 100 δραχμαι. Plato therefore, in this place, might have ſaid one hundred minas inſtead of ten thouſand drachmas: but he choſe to expreſs the ſum according to its value in the ſmaller coin, to give it at firſt ſight the greater appearance: as the French chooſe to compute by livres rather than by pounds ſterling.—Architect ſeems here to mean no other artiſt than the maſter-builder.—S.

[2] The particular combatants in theſe games were ſuch as had devoted themſelves wholly to one particular ſort of exerciſe, and therefore had attained to excel in it beyond all other men. The general combatants were ſuch as had divided their ſtudies, and had been exerciſed in them all, and conſequently could not be ſuppoſed equal in any one to thoſe who had made it their peculiar ſtudy. They engaged in all the combats at theſe games, but contended only with ſuch as themſelves. They were called πενταθλοι, the term here uſed by Plato, Combatants in the five Exerciſes, becauſe the ſixth, that is, boxing, or fighting with fiſts, was not introduced till the 23d Olympic, having been thought till then too mean and ignoble. And after it was introduced, the general combatants ſtill retained the name of πενταθλοι. All the learning on this ſubject has been collected by Peter Faber in his Agoniſtica. But an Engliſh reader, curious to be further informed, may find full ſatisfaction in an excellent diſſertation, written by Mr. Weſt.

[3] By an unaccountable error, all the editions of Plato read here πελτασταις. But according to a moſt certain emendation of Mr. Le Clerc's, with which Dr. Forſter is highly pleaſed, we ought to read παλαισταις. Which reading we have not ſcrupled to follow in our tranſlation; as Dacier has had the judgment to do in his.—S.

the

the wreſtlers. For in each kind of competition, thoſe univerſaliſts fall ſhort of the reſpective excellencies of the particular profeſſors, and are but the next beſt men to them in their own way, but at the ſame time are ſuperior to the profeſſors of the other kind, and eaſily get the better of theſe, whoſe excellence lies only in the other way. Such a degree of ſkill as this, you may perhaps mean, that the ſtudy of philoſophy begets in thoſe who are addicted to it; a degree, by which they fail of ſupreme excellence in knowledge of the arts, but attaining an excellence which is next to the ſupreme, they excel all men except the artiſts: ſo that he, who has ſtudied philoſophy, is, in every employment or buſineſs of life, a ſecond-rate man, and below the pitch of perfection. Some ſuch man, I think, as this you point out to us for a philoſopher.—You ſeem, Socrates, replied he, to have a juſt conception of what belongs to a philoſopher, in likening him to [1] a general combatant in the public games. For he is abſolutely ſuch a man, as not to be a ſlave to any thing; nor has he ſtudied any branch of knowledge ſo accurately and minutely, as, through entire attention to that one, to be deficient in all the reſt, like vulgar artiſts, and the profeſſors of one only ſcience; but he has beſtowed a competent meaſure of application on them all.—After he had made me this anſwer, I, deſirous he ſhould explain himſelf more fully and clearly, aſked him, whether he thought the good, in any way of life, to be uſeful men, or uſeleſs.—Uſeful, without doubt, Socrates, ſaid he.—If then the good are uſeful, are not the bad uſeleſs?—He agreed.—Well then, ſaid I; do

[1] The whole paſſage of Laertius, referred to in note 1 to p. 319, and alſo in note to perſons of the Dialogue, is this, as amended;—ειπερ οι Αντερασται Πλατωνος εισι, φησι Θρασυλλος, ουτος αν ειη ὁ παραγενομενος ανωνυμος, των περι Οινοπιδην και Αναξαγοραν ἑταιρος, ὁς [inſtead of ἑτερος, as it is printed] εν τῃ προς Σωκρατην ὁμιλιᾳ διαλεγομενος περι φιλοσοφιας [here we omit the ᾧ] φησιν, ὡς πενταθλῳ εοικεν ὁ φιλοσοφος· και ην ὡς αληθως εν φιλοσοφια πενταθλος Τα γαρ φυσικα ησκητο [as If. Caſaubon rightly reads from Suidas] και τα ηθικα, αλλα και τα μαθηματικα, και τους εγκυκλιους λογους, και περι τεχνων πασῶν [inſtead of πᾶσαν] ἰσχεν εμπειριαν. D. Laert. l. ix. §. 37. "If the Rivals be a dialogue of Plato's, ſays Thraſyllus, the anonymous perſon there introduced, as the friend of thoſe who were diſputing about Oenopides and Anaxagoras, muſt be this Democritus; who in the converſation he had with Socrates concerning philoſophy, there related, ſays, that a philoſopher is like a general combatant in the games. And he himſelf was in fact a general combatant in philoſophy. For he had cultivated phyſics, and ethics; moreover, mathematics, and all the common learning of thoſe times: and in all the arts he was experienced."—S.

you

you take philoſophers to be uſeful men, or not?—He acknowledged they were uſeful: and not only ſo, ſaid he, but I account them the moſt uſeful of all men.—Come now, ſaid I; let us examine whether this be true. How can they be even of any uſe at all, theſe ſecond-rate men? For it is plain, that your philoſopher is inferior in every art or ſcience to the man who is a perfect maſter of it.—This he acknowledged.—Well; ſuppoſe now, ſaid I, that you yourſelf, or any friend of yours, for whom you have a great regard, ſhould happen to fall ſick, I aſk you, whether, with a view to the recovery of health, you would ſend for that ſecond-rate man, the philoſopher; or whether you would ſend for a phyſician.—For both of them, ſaid he.—I aſk you not that, ſaid I; but which of the two you would ſend for in the firſt place, or in preference to the other.—No man, ſaid he, would doubt, in ſuch a caſe, to give the preference to the phyſician.—And how in the caſe of a ſtorm at ſea, ſaid I? to whom rather would you chooſe to intruſt yourſelf and your concerns; to a pilot, or to a philoſopher?—To a pilot, ſaid he, I for my part.—And thus it is in every other affair, ſaid I; ſo long as a man, profeſſing ſkill in it, is to be found, a philoſopher is of no uſe.—Thus it appears, ſaid he.—A philoſopher therefore, ſaid I, we have diſcovered to be a man entirely uſeleſs; ſince it is clear, that in every affair of life, men, who profeſs ſkill therein, are to be found. And we agreed before, that the good in any way were the uſeful men, and the bad were the uſeleſs.—He was forced to own it.—But now, ſaid I, that we have carried our reaſoning to this length, may I go on with my queſtions? or would it not be rather unpolite and rude to puſh the point further?—Aſk any queſtions that you pleaſe, ſaid he.—Nay, ſaid I; I deſire nothing elſe, than to recapitulate what has been already ſaid. The preſent ſtate of the argument then is this: We acknowledged, that philoſophy was an honourable ſtudy, and profeſſed to be philoſophers ourſelves: we acknowledged that philoſophers were, in their way, good as well as honourable; that the good, in any way, were uſeful men, and the bad uſeleſs. On the other hand, we acknowledged that philoſophers were uſeleſs, whenever we could find good workmen and men of ſkill of every kind; and that good workmen of every kind, profeſſors of the ſeveral ſciences, and practiſers of the ſeveral arts, were always to be found. For was not all this granted?—It was, ſaid he.—We grant therefore, agreeably

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to thoſe our own conceſſions, that, if philoſophy be, what you ſay it is, knowledge in the arts and ſciences, the ſpending our time in philoſophizing is then a bad and uſeleſs way of life, and philoſophers are uſeleſs men, and good for nothing. But what, my friend, if their caſe be otherwiſe? what, if the philoſophic life conſiſt not in ſtudying the arts; nor [1] in buſying a man's ſelf about a multitude of experiments, and continually poring over them; nor in acquiring a multiplicity of knowledge; but in ſomething elſe? For I thought, that ſuch employments were accounted diſhonourable and baſe, and that thoſe who followed them were called, by way of reproach, dirty mechanics and bellows-blowers [2]. Whether my ſuſpicions are juſt or

[1] Πολυπραγμονουντα. Concerning this kind of πολυπραγμοσυνη, our learned readers may conſult Wower de Polymathiâ, cap. ii. §. 3. or Suidas in voce Ασκληπιοδοτος. Democritus not only took the pains to diſſect the bodies of animals, in order to inveſtigate the animal œconomy, but alſo expreſſed the juices of every plant and herb he met with, to make experiments of their ſeveral virtues. *Omnium herbarum ſuccos Democritus expreſſit*, ſays Petronius; *et ne lapidum virgultorumque vis lateret, ætatem inter experimenta conſumpſit*. We have ſome inſtances of his knowledge of this kind recorded in Pliny's Natural Hiſtory.—S.

[2] In the greek, βαναυσους. By this name were called all artiſts, who operated by means of fire; but properly ſpeaking, they were ſuch only as uſed furnaces in their operations. For ſo Heſychius,—Βαναυσια, πασα τεχνη δια πυρος, κυριως δε ἡ περι τας καμινους. In uſing this word, Plato ſeems to allude to the metallurgic and the chymical experiments of Democritus. Concerning this very fact indeed, whether Democritus made any ſuch experiments, or not, much controverſy has ariſen, particularly between Olaus Borrichius and Conringius, in contending, the firſt of them for the high antiquity of chymiſtry, the other for the novel invention of that uſeful art. Each of them perhaps has puſhed his point further than the truth will bear him out. The treatiſe which Democritus wrote περι της λιθου, was certainly not concerning the philoſopher's ſtone, as Borrichius and the alchymiſts pretend; but concerning the magnet, or loadſtone, which, perhaps, for its peculiar and celebrated virtues, was by the antients eminently ſtyled *the ſtone*. Yet we do not ſee how it can with reaſon be denied, that the great man in queſtion was *philoſophus per ignem*; becauſe he could not, but through fuſion by fire, have done what antient writers agree he did, coverted common ſtones into precious; nor could he well have found out the virtues of herbs and plants without the help of chymical experiments. However, we would not lay too much ſtreſs on the interpretation of the word βαναυσια, given by Heſychius, though it agrees with the etymology. It ſeems too confined. The word, as uſed by many of the antients, particularly by Ariſtotle in the 8th book of his Politics, and by Plutarch in many places, ſeems to compriſe all thoſe arts we call mechanical: Plato's argumentation requires that we ſhould underſtand it to be uſed here with the ſame latitude; and this larger meaning beſt confirms the ſuppoſition, that our Man of Learning and Knowledge in this Dialogue was Democritus. To expreſs therefore the whole meaning of Plato in this place, we have uſed in our tranſlation both thoſe terms of contempt, which may anſwer to the full ſenſe of the word βαναυσος.—S.

not, will evidently appear, if you but anſwer [1] to the following queſtions—What [2] men are thoſe who underſtand how to give proper chaſtiſement to vicious

[1] We are now come to the third and laſt part of the Dialogue. In the two former we have ſeen what philoſophy, truly ſo called, is not; in this latter, Plato will ſhow us what it is; for which he here briefly prepares his readers, by informing them, that Socrates will now open a new ſcene, and begin a new ſeries of queſtions.—S.

[2] Plato lays the foundation of true philoſophy in the knowledge of ourſelves, that is, of our own ſouls. He begins with the inferior part of the ſoul; the ſeat of the paſſions and animal affections. Theſe he characterizes, as is uſual with him, under the allegorical names of brute animals, horſe and dog; to which ſoon afterwards he adds that of ox. The horſe is a proper emblem of the love of glory; becauſe of all brute animals the horſe is the only one which appears to be delighted with fine trappings, to be oſtentatious, to be emulous of glory, and fond of proving his ſuperiority over his rivals. No leſs properly does the dog repreſent the paſſion of anger; becauſe of all animals he is the moſt ſubject to it, has it rouſed in him on the ſlighteſt occaſions, entertains it the longeſt, and is the moſt vindictive. And the ox is the fitteſt repreſentative of ſenſuality, becauſe that animal, when not employed by man in laborious offices, is always either eating or chewing the cud, that is, eating over again what he had eat before: as ſenſual men, after they have feaſted, are apt to feaſt it over again in reflection; as well as before they feaſt, to feaſt in imagination. Plato makes a diſtinction at the ſame time between the good, and the bad or vicious, amongſt theſe animals. Of the latter ſort are the perverſe and refractory; horſes, that are almoſt unmanageable by their riders; dogs, that hardly can be broken, or made to obey their maſter's will; oxen, that are ſtubborn, that refuſe to quit the ſtall, and to labour. Theſe are the emblems of bad men; whoſe paſſions, ſuch as correſpond to the tempers of thoſe ſeveral animals, are immoderate or inordinate, and not to be governed, or reſtrained within their due bounds, without much difficulty. Good horſes, dogs, and oxen, he calls thoſe, whoſe natural temper is gentle, and pliant, and eaſily made obedient. And by ſuch he ſignifies to us men naturally good, that is, men, whoſe brutal paſſions of each kind are by nature moderate, and eaſily obey the government of reaſon, that ſuperior part of the ſoul, whoſe whole office and government he delineates or ſketches out in the following manner.—If any of our paſſions are wild and irregular, if our horſe, for inſtance, would throw off and trample on his rider, if our dog barks at his maſter or his maſter's friends, or if our ox knows not his owner and his feeder, they are to be chaſtiſed and reduced to order. If our paſſions are all tame and gentle, it is the buſineſs of reaſon to employ them in her own ſervice, to apply them each to its proper uſe, and thus to make them highly beneficial to the whole man. But neither of theſe offices can be well performed, unleſs it be known what is moderate and regular in the paſſions, and what the contrary; that is, unleſs the boundaries between good and evil be well ſettled, ſo that the one may be diſtinguiſhed from the other. The making this diſtinction, therefore, is the inward operation of knowledge in the mind; as the application of it to practice, in the diſcharge of thoſe offices, is an exertion of the mind's power over the inferior man. The former is the theory of morals; the latter is practic virtue. This properly is art; that, ſcience. But Plato in this place

vicious horſes? are they thoſe very men who can give a horſe all the improvement he is capable of; or are they a different ſort of men?—The very ſame men, he anſwered.—And thoſe, ſaid I, who are able to improve the uſeful qualities of a dog, do not the ſame men know how properly to chaſtiſe dogs which are vicious?—They do, ſaid he.—By one and the ſame art then, ſaid I, are thoſe animals improved and properly chaſtiſed.—I agree, ſaid he.—Well; but, ſaid I, is it alſo the ſame art, through which a man diſtinguiſhes amongſt thoſe animals the good from the vicious? or is this an art different from that, through which they receive improvement and due correction?—It is ſtill, ſaid he, the ſame art.—Will you admit then, ſaid I, that this holds true with regard to the human ſpecies in like manner; that the art, whatever it be, by which men are made to excel in virtue, is the ſame art with that through which bad men are properly chaſtiſed, and the ſame alſo with that though which the good and the bad are known and diſtinguiſhed one ſort from the other?—By all means, ſaid he.—[1] Now the art, which

uſes the term art to expreſs both; as he frequently does elſewhere, when he means any art which is founded on ſcience, and without ſcience cannot be exerciſed. For this note thus much ſuffices.—S.

[1] Plato proceeds in the next place to the knowledge of mankind; that is, to the knowledge of the ſame paſſions and affections in the ſouls of other men that we feel in our own. He ſhows it to be conſequently one and the ſame kind of knowledge with the knowledge of ourſelves, differing only in the objects of it; as it is applied either to many men, or to a ſingle one; for of men every one is a man. He therefore, who thoroughly knows himſelf, who knows what is right and good in his own ſoul, and what is there wrong and evil, muſt know at the ſame time all men in general, muſt know what is good and what is evil in the whole human nature: and he who thus knows others, muſt alſo thus know himſelf. The ſubject of all this knowledge is the ſuperior part of the ſoul of man, mind and reaſon: the object is itſelf, and alſo that part which is inferior, with the paſſions and animal affections there ſeated. The knowledge of itſelf implies the knowledge of its power over the inferior part. Now as no man can help following known good, nor can help avoiding known evil; the true knowledge of good and evil muſt be attended with an exerciſe of that power over the inferior part, improving what is there found right and good, and rectifying what is wrong and evil. And ſince all men partake of the ſame nature, the ſame knowledge, through which a man manages himſelf rightly, betters what in himſelf is good, and corrects what in himſelf is evil, muſt qualify him as well to diſpenſe juſtice to other men, to encourage the good and to correct the bad. Now this is the office of the judge and of the magiſtrate; and the ſcience, which enables him to execute his office well is the judicial ſcience, which is no other than the ſcience of juſtice. It follows, therefore, that the wiſe and good man, he who is maſter of this ſcience, and employs it in the proper management of himſelf, is qualified for the office of a judge and of a magiſtrate.—S.

gives this power and this knowledge with reſpect to one man, has it the ſame efficacy with reſpect to many men? And the art of thus managing and judging of many, has it the ſame abilities with reſpect to one?—Certainly, ſaid he.—Is it ſo in the caſe of horſes too, ſaid I, and in all other caſes after the ſame manner?—Beyond a doubt, ſaid he.—Now what ſcience, ſaid I, is that, through which proper chaſtiſement is given to the licentious and the lawleſs in civil ſtates? Is it not the judicial ſcience, that of judges and other magiſtrates?—It is, ſaid he.—Is the ſcience of juſtice, ſaid I, any other than this ſcience?—No other, anſwered he.—And is it not through the ſame ſcience that the good and the bad are both known?—He replied, it was through the ſame ſcience.—And the ſcience, ſaid I, through which one man is known, will give equal ſkill to know many men.—True, ſaid he.—And whoever, ſaid I, through want of this ſcience, hath not the ſkill to know many, will be equally deficient in the knowledge of one.—Right, ſaid he.—If a horſe therefore, ſaid I, as being but a horſe, be incapable of knowing and diſtinguiſhing between good and bad horſes, muſt he not be ignorant of which ſort he himſelf is?—Certainly, ſaid he.—And if an ox, ſaid I, being but an ox, knows not how to diſtinguiſh and judge of good and bad oxen, is it poſſible that he can know of which ſort he is himſelf?—Certainly not, ſaid he.—And is not the ſame thing certain, ſaid I, with reſpect to the ignorance of dogs?—It is, ſaid he.—And how is it in the caſe of men? ſaid I. When a man knows not who are the good men and who the bad, is he not at the ſame time ignorant of himſelf, and unable to tell whether he is good or bad, in as much as he alſo is a man?—He allowed it to be true.—Now to be ignorant of oneſelf, ſaid I, is it [1] to be found of mind, or to be inſane?—To be inſane, he replied.—To know oneſelf therefore, ſaid I, is to be found of mind.—I agree, ſaid he.—This then, ſaid

[1] Σωφρονειν, ἢ ου σωφρονειν. No words have more puzzled us, in the tranſlating of Plato than the words σωφρονειν, σωφρων, and σωφροσυνη. The difficulty ariſes from this,—that in different places they are uſed in different ſenſes; and we could find no words in the Engliſh language anſwering to them every where. At length, therefore, we found ourſelves obliged, if we would every where expreſs their preciſe meaning, to uſe different words in different places. Our labours, however, on this point have enabled us to give a kind of hiſtory of thoſe words, and of the ſeveral alterations they have undergone in their meaning. Homer, the moſt antient Greek writer extant, by the word σωφροσυνη evidently means prudence, or diſcretion. See his Odyſſey,

ſaid I, ſhould ſeem to be the precept contained in the [2] Delphic inſcription; it is to exerciſe wiſdom and juſtice.—It ſhould ſeem ſo, replied he.—And through the ſame ſcience we know how to correct others duly and rightly.—True,

Odyſſey, book xxiii. ver. 30. from which we conclude, that the true etymology of the word is from σως φρην, *a ſound mind*. To which agrees this of Porphyry,—και γαρ σωφροσυνη σαοφροσυνη τις. Apud Stobæum, Serm. 19.—In the time of Homer, and for a long time after, the doctrine of morals was far from being improved to ſuch a degree of perfection as to become a ſcience. It was delivered in looſe and unconnected precepts, agreeing to the experience of wiſe men, without any known principles for their foundation. The firſt, who attempted to raiſe it into a ſcience, and to treat of it with order and method, were the Pythagoreans. Theſe philoſophers, having conſidered that the ſoul of man was the ſubject of virtue and of vice, conſidered next the conſtitution and œconomy of this ſoul: they ſaw it diſtinguiſhable into two parts, the rational and the irrational, and the irrational part again into iraſcible and concupiſcible. Now as every thing in nature has a peculiar virtue of its own belonging to it, the defect of which is its imperfection, and the contrary quality its vice, the Pythagoreans made their primary diſtinction of the virtues of man, according to their diſtinction of the parts of his ſoul. The virtue of the rational part they termed φρονησις, *prudence*; the virtue of the iraſcible part, ανδρεια, *fortitude*; that of the concupiſcible, σωφροσυνη, *temperance*; and the virtue of the whole ſoul, or the habit produced therein by the harmony of all its parts, they called δικαιοσυνη, *juſtice*.—Thus far did theſe philoſophers advance in the ſcience of morals; deducing all the other, the particular virtues, which are exerciſed but occaſionally, from theſe four, which in every good man are in conſtant practice: but they aſcended no higher. It was left for a Socrates and a Plato to put a head to this beautiful body of moral philoſophy, to trace all the virtues up to one principle, and thus repreſent them to our view united. Yet thus only can the doctrine of morals be properly termed a ſcience. This principle is mind; for mind, being meaſure itſelf, and being alſo the governor of all things, contains the meaſures of rectitude in all things, and governs all things aright and for the beſt. The principle of virtue therefore being mind, on the ſoundneſs of mind is all ſincere and uncorrupt virtue eſtabliſhed; for the ſoundneſs of every thing depends on the ſoundneſs of its principle. And thus alſo, as morals are founded on mind, and as no true ſcience of any thing, according to Plato, can be without the ſcience of its principle, the ſcience of morals either is the ſame thing with the ſcience of mind, or is immediately thereon dependent. Accordingly, Plato, in the Charmides, uſes the word σωφροσυνη in its original ſignification, as it means ſoundneſs of mind. In the ſame ſenſe is the word σωφροσυνη uſed by Xenophon, in Απομνημ. l. i. c. i. § 16. where it is oppoſed to μανια. See Dr. Simpſon's annotation to that paſſage. So it is again uſed by Plato, and oppoſed to μανια, in his firſt book de Republicâ, p. 16. ed. Cantab. Moſt commonly, however, Plato uſed this word in the Pythagorean ſenſe, to ſignify one of the four cardinal virtues: in which ſenſe it is uſed by Ariſtotle in all his moral treatiſes. Yet even in this particular ſenſe, the peculiar relation which it has to prudence, the proper virtue of the rational part of the ſoul, is well obſerved by the very learned author of Hermes, in his notes (for his they are) to Ariſtotle's treatiſe, περι Αρετων και Κακιων, lately publiſhed by Mr. Fawconer, p. 116. Zeno likewiſe,

True, ſaid he.—Now that, through which we have this knowledge, is the ſcience of juſtice; and that, through which a man has the knowledge of himſelf, and of other men, is ſoundneſs of mind, or wiſdom.—It appears ſo to be, ſaid he.—The ſcience therefore of juſtice, ſaid I, and the ſcience belonging to every ſound mind, wiſdom, are one and the ſame ſcience.—It appears, ſaid he, to be ſo proved.—[3] Again, ſaid I, by the ſame means are civil ſtates well governed; that is, when the doers of injuſtice are duly puniſhed.

wiſe, who followed the ſame diſtinction of the cardinal virtues, defined every one of them by ſcience of one kind or other; as appears from Stobæus, Eclog. l. ii. p. 167. And one ſcience, the ſcience of mind, includes them all.—S.

[2] The inſcription here meant, is that moſt antient one, in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΤΤΟΝ, KNOW THYSELF. This was generally ſuppoſed to be the dictate or reſponſe of the Pythian oracle to the queſtion aſked of it;—What was man's greateſt good. See Menag. Annotat. in Laertium, p. 22 and 23, and Dr. Simpſon's note on Xenophon's Memorab. l. iv. c. ii. §. 24. In what ſenſe Plato underſtood this truly divine precept, is evident from his brief definition of it in this ſentence, as explained by the preceding argumentation. From which it appears, that by the knowledge of one's ſelf he means the knowledge of the whole ſoul, or the knowledge of what is good and what is evil. For the ſuperior part of the ſoul contains in itſelf the ſeeds of all moral good; the inferior, the ſeeds of all moral evil. But the ſubject of all this knowledge, of both kinds, is only the ſuperior part of the ſoul, the rational. For, as the Stoics well expreſs themſelves on this point, no other faculty in man contemplates and knows itſelf, beſides the faculty of reaſon. This alone alſo knows and judges of all other things, whether without or within the ſoul: for in itſelf it hath the rule and ſtandard of right, according to which it judges, and diſtinguiſhes between right and wrong; approving the one, which is agreeable to its own nature, and diſapproving the other, which is diſagreeable and contrary to it. Truly and properly ſpeaking, mind itſelf is rule and meaſure, being the meaſure and the rule of all things. The ſcience of mind, therefore, which is wiſdom, is the ſcience of right and wrong, gives the diſcernment of good and evil in ourſelves, and enables us at the ſame time to diſtinguiſh rightly between good and bad men; and thus is it the ſcience of juſtice, and the judicial ſcience, belonging to the magiſtrate and to the judge. After what has been ſaid, we preſume it needleſs to make any apology, or to give any further reaſon for tranſlating σωφροσυνη in this place *wiſdom*.—But concerning this wiſdom, or knowledge of ſelf, ſee more at large in Plato's Firſt Alcibiades, where it makes the principal ſubject.—S.

[3] From the ſcience of ethics, and that of law, truly ſo called, (for, in a philoſophical ſenſe, right only is law, law eternal and divine,) Plato makes a ſhort and eaſy ſtep to the ſcience of politics and the art of government. The art of government is founded on knowledge of the different tempers and humours, minds and characters of men. For none can have the ſkill to manage them, but thoſe who know them, and who know by what methods to lead the good and gentle to obedience, and to prevent the diſobedience of the perverſe and evil. This knowledge of mankind

punished.—Right, said he.—The same science therefore, said I, is the science of politics.—He assented.—And when a civil state is thus well governed by one man, is not that man called [1] either a tyrant [2], or a king?—He is, said he.

kind supposes the knowledge of who are the good and who the evil; which supposes also the knowledge of what is good and what is evil; the same, which is the knowledge of ourselves.—S.

[1] In the Greek, τυραννος τε και βασιλευς, translated literally, "both a tyrant and a king." But Plato does not mean, that tyrant and king are synonimous terms: so far from that is his meaning, that in his Dialogue called Πολιτικος, "The Politician," he says, that "a tyrant and a king are ανομοιοτατοι, most unlike one to the other:" and in his 9th book de Republicâ, that "the best of all governments is the kingly, and that the worst of all is the tyrannic." What he means by a king, and what by a tyrant, will be explained in the very next note. But in this they agree; that government by a king and government by a tyrant are both of them governments by one man: which is the whole of his meaning in the place now before us. However, to prevent his meaning from being misunderstood, we have taken the liberty of using the conjunctions disjunctive in translating this sentence. Mons. Dacier, as well here as in what follows, has entirely omitted the words tyrant and tyrannic, through excessive caution we imagine: but for such caution in England we have no occasion. A king of England, while the English constitution lasts, and the fundamental laws of English government subsist, can never be suspected of being, what it is impossible for him to be, a tyrant.—S.

[2] The word in the original here is τυραννος. The meaning of which word, as it is always used by Plato, and fully explained by Aristotle in Politic. l. iii. answers to our idea of an arbitrary monarch, governing his people, not according to established laws, but according to his own will and pleasure; whether such his will and pleasure be agreeable to natural law, to justice and equity, or not. On the other hand, by the word βασιλευς, or king, was understood a person who made the laws established in his country, whether written or customary, the rules of his government. The regal office was to put these laws into execution, and to administer the government; which, properly speaking, was a government of the laws. Such were the most antient kings in Greece, where kingly government at first universally prevailed, long before any laws were written for the rule of conduct both to prince and people. And, whatever some men pretend concerning the high antiquity of arbitrary or despotic governments; or others fancy concerning governments originally vested in the people; the most antient records of history in all nations prove, that kingly government took place the first every where upon earth. It is natural to suppose that general customs in all countries were founded originally on reason, one universal reason adapting itself to the genius of each country, that is, to the peculiar situation and other relative circumstances of each, and to the peculiar temper of the inhabitants naturally thence arising: so that, although in some instances, what was reasonable and right to practise in one country was unreasonable and wrong in another, yet one universal reason, the natural law of all men, was the dictator and legislator to them all. And, whereas all true authority is founded in the opinion of superior wisdom, it is natural also to suppose, that in the infancy of every state, the little multitude should look up to a person deemed the wisest amongst them; that they should hear, attend

he.—Does he not thus govern, ſaid I, through the kingly art, or the tyrannic? —He does, ſaid he.—Theſe arts therefore, ſaid I, the kingly and the tyrannic,

attend to, and obey him, as the beſt conſervator and guardian of their unwritten laws or general cuſtoms, acknowledged by them all to be right. It is further, as natural to ſuppoſe that theſe petty princes, having eſtabliſhed their authority with the people by wiſdom and good government, ſhould derive a particular regard in that people towards their families; and that their ſons, trained up in obedience to the laws, and being preſumed to have learnt, from the examples and private inſtructions of their fathers, the art of government, ſhould eaſily, by the tacit conſent of all the people, ſucceed to their fathers in their authority and dignity; unleſs they were apparently unfit, through nonage, known want of underſtanding or of prudence, or other incapacity for government. The firſt regal families, being thus for many generations well ſettled in the throne or ſeat of royalty, claimed a kind of legal right, the right of cuſtom, to their kingly thrones: and in that claim the people acquieſced for the ſake of peace and order. And thus aroſe hereditary kingdoms. In proceſs of time, as the people increaſed in number, and many private perſons increaſed in riches, and in power thence ariſing, neither the rich nor the poor were any longer to be governed by the mere authority of one man: the multitude grew ſeditious, and the powerful grew factious. It became neceſſary to rule by force and compulſion, if the regal eſtabliſhment was ſtill to be preſerved. The perſon of the king was to be defended by a guard, and the people were to be kept in awe and obedience by a ſtanding army. Then was the king poſſeſſed of power to change the laws and cuſtoms of his country at his own pleaſure, and to make all his people ſubmiſſive to his will. Such was the origin and riſe of tyranny, the natural degeneracy of kingly government in a great and powerful kingdom. Now it is well known that unlimited power in man is every moment liable to be abuſed. To wiſe men indeed right reaſon is law; and in the government of themſelves and of others they follow the dictates of wiſdom. But men unwiſe are in the principal part of their conduct, in that which is the moſt important to themſelves and others, governed by their paſſions: and the evil conſequences of human paſſions under no reſtraint, either from within the ſoul or from without, are infinite. Few men, therefore, being wiſe, what evil is not to be expected from tyrants, that is, arbitrary monarchs? In fact, the tyrants of old were, moſt of them, guilty of numberleſs and flagrant acts of injuſtice, in open violation of the antient unwritten laws. But things could not remain long in this ſituation, wherever common ſenſe remained in men, a ſenſe of their natural and juſt rights. Among ſuch people then were found patriots, men of true fortitude, deſpiſing all danger in the public cauſe; and theſe undertook to free their country from ſo inſupportable a yoke. Their undertakings were ſucceſsful. The tyrants and their families were either expelled or murdered. New civil eſtabliſhments were formed; but not on the antient plan: that was the work of nature; and began naturally in the infant ſtate of civil ſocieties. Government was now to be the work of art and reaſon. And what proved very favourable to this work, was the cultivation of true philoſophy about the ſame time, and the great advances conſequently made in moral and political ſcience. Accordingly it is to be obſerved, to the honour of philoſophy, that wherever this favourable conjuncture happened not, in all countries whither philoſophy never travelled, when the people could no longer bear their tyrants,

tyrannic, are the ſame with that art and ſcience juſt before mentioned.—So they appear, ſaid he.—Well, ſaid I, and when a family[1] is in like manner well governed by one man, what is this man called? Either the ſteward[2] of the houſehold, or elſe the maſter[3] of the family; is he not?—He is, ſaid

tyrants, they only changed them for others; the tyranny ſtill continued. For wiſdom was wanting to frame good conſtitutions of government: ſo that, if ever they had the ſpirit to emerge from ſlavery, and riſe to freedom, immediately they ſunk again. But wherever true philoſophers were found, they undertook on ſuch occaſions the office of legiſlators. New laws were made, written and promulged, obligatory alike to all. By theſe laws was the power of princes and of magiſtrates limited and aſcertained; and by their known ſanctions the general obedience of the people was ſecured. And thus were legal governments firſt eſtabliſhed, of different forms in different countries, monarchies, ariſtocracies, democracies, or mixed governments, as beſt ſuited the numbers and the genius of each people. The antient kingly governments, however, ſtill remained in ſome places in the time of Plato; and the few tyrants, ſubſiſting amongſt a people enlightened by philoſophy, now ruled with ſome degree of equity and mildneſs, through fear of their intelligent ſubjects, ready to be ſuccoured and protected, on occaſion, by their free and therefore brave neighbours. This ſhort hiſtory of civil governments, from their beginning down to the age when Plato lived, we thought neceſſary to ſhow the diſtinction then made between the kingly and the tyrannic; giving an account of the riſe of each; of the former built upon authority and eſteem, and by them alone ſupported; of the latter, acquired often by falſe pretences, and intriguing practices at home, and ſometimes by conqueſts from abroad made in war; but always maintained by military force. A tyrant, therefore, according to the foregoing explanation of the word, may, as well as a king, be a wiſe and good governor, if he has wiſdom and the ſcience of juſtice; though the ways and means, by which he governs, muſt be very different from thoſe of a king.—S.

[1] We are now arrived at the ſcience of œconomics. This indeed in the order of things precedes the ſcience of politics. For a civil ſtate is compoſed of many families; and ariſes from the agreement of their minds, in perceiving the neceſſity of civil or kingly government for their common good. But Plato here ſpeaks of it the laſt, probably for this reaſon, that the government of a family is βασιλικη τε και τυραννικη, partly authoritative and kingly, partly compulſive and tyrannical: the paternal part of it is kingly; and thus a king is as the father of all his people, and governs them as through paternal authority and filial awe: the deſpotic part is tyrannical; and thus a tyrant is the lord and maſter of the whole people, ruling them by compulſion, as a maſter rules his ſlaves, and ſuch were all domeſtic ſervants in the age and country of Plato.—S.

[2] Οικονομος. It was uſual in antient times, as well as it is in modern, for princes, and other rich and great men, who kept a multitude of domeſtics, to depute the care and management of them all, and the diſpenſation of juſtice among them, to one man, whom they called οικονομος, and we call major-domo, maitre d'hôtel, or, in the Engliſh term we chooſe to make uſe of in an Engliſh tranſlation, ſteward of the houſehold.—S.

[3] Δεσποτης, that is, the lord and maſter himſelf, governing in his own right, with authority and power underived.—S.

he.—Whether is it the ſcience of juſtice now, ſaid I, which enables this man alſo to govern well his family? or is it any other art or ſcience?—The ſcience of juſtice only, ſaid he.—The ſame kind of perſon, it ſeems then, ſaid I, is a king, a tyrant, a politician[1] a ſteward of a houſehold, a lord and maſter of a family, a man of wiſdom, and a juſt and good man. And one and the ſame art is the kingly, the tyrannic, the political, the deſpotic, and the œconomical, the ſame with the ſcience of juſtice, and the ſame with wiſdom.—So, ſaid he, it appears.—Well then, ſaid I: is it a ſhame for a philoſopher not to underſtand what the phyſician ſays, when ſpeaking of his patient's malady; nor to be able to give a judicious opinion, himſelf, upon the caſe? and ſo with regard to other artiſts and their arts, is it a ſhame for him to be ignorant? and yet, when a magiſtrate, or a king, or any of the others, juſt now enumerated, is ſpeaking of the affairs or functions of his office, is it not ſhameful in a philoſopher not to underſtand perfectly what any of theſe perſons ſay, nor to be able to give good counſel himſelf in ſuch caſes?—How, Socrates, ſaid he, can it be otherwiſe than ſhameful to him, to have nothing pertinent to ſay on ſubjects ſo important?—Are we of opinion then, ſaid I, that in theſe caſes it becomes a philoſopher to be like a general combatant, a ſecond-rate man, to come next behind all who have theſe offices, and to be uſeleſs, ſo long as any ſuch are to be found? or do we hold quite the contrary, that he ought, in the firſt place, not to commit the management of his domeſtic affairs to another man, nor to come next behind ſome other in his own houſe; but that he ought himſelf to be the ruler, corrector, and impartial judge, if he would have right order and good government at home?—This he granted me.—And beſides this, ſaid I, if his friends ſhould ſubmit their differences to his arbitration, or if the ſtate ſhould refer to his judgment the deciſion of any controverted point, is it not a ſhame that he ſhould appear in ſuch caſes

[1] Πολιτικος. This word, as uſed by Plato, and the other antient writers on politics, is of a very large and extenſive import, including all thoſe ſtateſmen, or politicians in ariſtocracies and democracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, inveſted with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto belonging: and ſuch are here particularly meant by Plato. Agreeably to this paſſage, he tells us in his Politicus, that the ſcience of a politician differs only in name from the kingly ſcience. For the proof of which poſition we refer our readers to that Dialogue, where the nature of the kingly office is ſo admirably well elucidated and explained.—S.

to

to be but a ſecond or a third rate man, and not to have the lead?—I muſt own myſelf of that opinion, ſaid he[1].—Philoſophizing, therefore, my friend, is a thing quite different, we find, from the acquiring a multiplicity of various knowledge, or the being buſied in the circle of arts and ſciences.—When I had ſaid this, the Man of Learning, aſhamed of what he had before aſſerted, was ſilent: the man without learning ſaid, I had made it a clear caſe: and the reſt of our audience gave their aſſent and approbation.

[1] It equally follows from the foregoing reaſoning, that a king ought himſelf, in the firſt place, truly to philoſophize: in the next place, that he ought to chooſe a true philoſopher, *if ſuch a man can be found*, to be of his council: and laſtly, it follows that a true philoſopher, when duty to his prince or to his country, or other good occaſion, ſent to him from above, calls him forth to light, and places him in his proper ſphere of action, muſt always be found adequate to any part of the kingly office. Theſe concluſions may ſeem to ſavour a little of what is called philoſophic arrogance; and for this very reaſon perhaps it is, that Plato has declined the making them, eſpecially as from the mouth of his great maſter, a man ſo remarkable for his rare modeſty.—S.

THE END OF THE RIVALS.

THE MENEXENUS:

OR,

AN ORATION

IN PRAISE OF THOSE ATHENIANS WHO DIED IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MENEXENUS[1].

THIS piece of Plato, though entitled a Dialogue, conſiſts chiefly of an Oration, to which the Dialogue was intended to ſerve only for an introduction or vehicle; and is accordingly very ſhort. The ſubject of this Oration is the commemoration of all thoſe Athenians, who, from the beginning of the commonwealth to the time of Plato, had died in the ſervice of their country; a ſubject that takes in ſo conſiderable a portion of the hiſtory of Athens, that I rather chooſe to refer the reader to thoſe authors who have treated at large of the tranſactions of that ſtate, than to ſet down the ſeveral events here alluded to in notes, which would ſoon ſwell to a bulk much larger than the Oration itſelf. It may not, however, be improper to premiſe a ſhort account of the cuſtom, which gave birth to this and many other orations, ſpoken by ſome of the greateſt orators of Athens; as ſuch an account may tend to put the reader into a proper ſituation of mind to judge of the beauties of this famous panegyric, by leading him as it were to Athens, and making him one of the audience. Take it, therefore, in the words of Thucydides, thus tranſlated.

"In the ſame winter (namely, in the firſt year of the Peloponneſian war) the Athenians, in obedience to the laws of their country, performed, at the public expenſe, the obſequies of thoſe citizens who firſt loſt their lives in

[1] This Introduction is extracted from the Argument of Mr. Weſt to this Dialogue, by whom alſo it was tranſlated into Engliſh. I have adopted his verſion of it wherever I found it to be ſufficiently faithful, and given my own tranſlation where it was otherwiſe.——T.

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this war: the manner of which is as follows. Three days before that appointed for the funeral, they erect a pavilion, underneath which they lay out the bones of the deceaſed, allowing to their reſpective friends and relations the liberty of bringing whatever they judge proper to add, by way of ſhowing their particular concern or regard for thoſe who belonged to them. On the day of the interment there are brought in waggons (or hearſes) ſo many cheſts (or coffins) made of cypreſs, one for every tribe, in which are put the bones of the deceaſed, each man according to his tribe. Beſides theſe there is an empty bier, properly covered in honour of thoſe whoſe bodies could not be found and brought away in order for their interment. In the funeral proceſſion, whoſoever is diſpoſed, whether he be a citizen or foreigner, has leave to march, together with the female kindred of the deceaſed, who aſſiſt at the ſepulchre, making great lamentations. After this they depoſite the bones in the public cœmetery, which is ſituated in the moſt beautiful ſuburb of the city; and here they have always been accuſtomed to bury all who fall in battle, thoſe only excepted who were ſlain at Marathon, to whom, as to men of diſtinguiſhed and uncommon virtue, they performed their obſequies in the very place where they loſt their lives. As ſoon as the remains are buried in the ground, ſome Athenian, eminent as well for his wiſdom as his dignity, is appointed by the ſtate to pronounce a ſuitable oration in honour of the dead: after which the whole company depart. This is the manner in which the Athenians perform the funerals of thoſe who are ſlain in battle, and this cuſtom they conſtantly obſerve in every war, as often as the caſe happens, in conformity to a law enacted for that purpoſe."

From this account, and ſome other particulars mentioned in the enſuing Oration, it is evident that theſe public funerals were performed with great pomp and ſolemnity by the whole body of the Athenian people; to whom therefore, conſidered upon this occaſion under two heads, namely, as citizens of Athens and as relations and friends of the deceaſed, the orator was in reaſon obliged to accommodate his diſcourſe: which from hence he was under a neceſſity of dividing likewiſe into two heads. Under the firſt he was to apply himſelf to the citizens of Athens in general; under the ſecond, to the parents, children, and kindred of the deceaſed in particular. For the topics proper to be inſiſted upon under theſe two heads, he was left at liberty

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to ſelect ſuch as he judged moſt ſuitable to the occaſion on which he was to ſpeak. The occaſion was ſolemn and mournful. Conſolatories, therefore, were to be adminiſtered as well to the public as to individuals, who were there come together to perform the laſt offices to their fellow-citizens and relations. To the public, no topic of conſolation could be ſo effectual as that which, by ſetting before them the glory and advantages accruing to the commonwealth from the actions of thoſe brave citizens who had loſt their lives in the ſervice of their country, tended to call off their attention from the calamity which they were then aſſembled to commemorate. And this topic was very naturally ſuggeſted to the orator by the many public monuments erected in honour of thoſe who had fallen in battle, and ſcattered up and down the place where he was to pronounce his oration. Plato accordingly made choice of this topic; and hath dwelt upon it with equal judgment and eloquence through the greater part of the following panegyric.

The remaining part of this firſt diviſion contains an artful and noble panegyric in honour of the ſtate and people of Athens; which evidently proves, what indeed will appear to any one who attentively examines the Grecian hiſtory, that the Athenians were unqueſtionably the firſt and greateſt people of Greece.

The ſecond part, in which the orator addreſſes himſelf to the relations of the deceaſed, is as beautiful a piece of oratory as is to be met with in all antiquity. I ſhall not here foreſtall the reader's judgment or pleaſure, by pointing out the particular paſſages worthy of admiration. They are ſo ſtriking that he cannot fail taking notice of them; and the more they ſurpriſe, the more they will pleaſe.

THE MENEXENUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND MENEXENUS.

SOCRATES.

FROM the Forum, Menexenus? Or whence come you?

MEN. From the Forum, Socrates, and from the Senate-houſe.

Soc. What particular buſineſs called you to the Senate-houſe? Is it that you think yourſelf, O wonderful young man, arrived at the ſummit of learning and philoſophy, and as being every way ſufficiently qualified, you are purpoſing to turn yourſelf to affairs of greater importance; and that we may never want a ſupply of magiſtrates out of your family, you yourſelf are thinking, young as you are, of governing us old fellows.

MEN. Indeed, Socrates, I ſhould moſt readily entertain ſuch an ambition, encouraged by your permiſſion and advice; but otherwiſe, I would by no means think of it. The occaſion of my going to the Senate-houſe to-day was the having heard that they intended to make choice of the orator who is to ſpeak the funeral oration in praiſe of the dead. For you know they are now preparing to celebrate their obſequies.

Soc. Entirely ſo. But whom have they choſen?

MEN. No one as yet. They have deferred that conſideration till to-morrow: but I think that either Dion or Archinus will be appointed.

Soc. Sure, Menexenus, it muſt needs be a fine thing for a man to die in battle; for be he ever ſo poor and inconſiderable, he will have the good fortune at leaſt to be buried with ſplendour and magnificence, and to have his praiſes ſet forth by wiſe and ingenious men; not in crude and extempo-

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rary panegyrics, but in diſcourſes well conſidered and prepared for a long time before. And indeed ſo magnificent, ſo copious, and even exuberant upon every topic, and ſo beautifully variegated with fine names and words are the panegyrics which our orators give us upon theſe occaſions, that they as it were bewitch our ſouls; and what with the encomiums which they ſo plentifully pour out upon the city, upon thoſe who have at any time died in battle, upon the whole ſeries of our anceſtors, even to the remoteſt ages, and what with thoſe which they beſtow upon the audience, I myſelf, Menexenus, have often been very generouſly diſpoſed; and, liſtening to their panegyrics, have for the time been charmed into an opinion that I was grown greater, more noble, and more illuſtrious, and have fancied that not only I myſelf appeared more conſiderable in the eyes of thoſe ſtrangers, who at any time accompanied me upon thoſe occaſions, but that they alſo were affected in the ſame manner, and perſuaded by the orator to look upon me and Athens with more admiration than before. And this veneration of myſelf has often remained upon me for more than three days. Nay, with ſo powerful a charm has the diſcourſe and even the voice of the ſpeaker ſunk into my ears, that for four or five days I have ſcarcely been able to recollect myſelf, or perceive in what part of the earth I was; but imagined myſelf ſometimes an inhabitant of the Fortunate Iſlands. So dexterous are our orators!

MEN. You are always, Socrates, rallying the orators. However, I am afraid the perſon they ſhall now appoint will not perform his part very well; for, as he will be choſen on a ſudden, he will be obliged to ſpeak without any preparation.

SOC. How ſo, my good friend? Each of theſe has orations ready prepared. Beſides, it is no difficult matter to ſpeak extempore upon ſuch topics. For if it were requiſite to celebrate the praiſes of the Athenians, in an aſſembly of Peloponneſians, or of the Peloponneſians in an aſſembly of Athenians, a man muſt be an excellent orator indeed to gain the aſſent and approbation of his auditory. But when a man is to perform before an audience, whoſe praiſes are the ſubject of his diſcourſe, it ſeems to be no great affair to make a good ſpeech.

MEN. Is that your opinion, Socrates?

SOC. It is, by Jupiter.

MEN. Do you think that you ſhould be able to make a ſpeech if it were requiſite, and the ſenate ſhould appoint you?

SOC. If I ſhould, O Menexenus, it would not be wonderful, conſidering I have been inſtructed by a miſtreſs, who is by no means contemptible in rhetoric, but who has made many good orators, one in particular who excelled all the Greeks, Pericles, the ſon of Xanthippus.

MEN. Who is ſhe? I ſuppoſe you mean Aſpaſia [1].

SOC. I mean her, and Connus, the ſon of Metrobius, alſo. For theſe two

[1] Aſpaſia, the lady to whom Socrates gives the honour of the enſuing Oration, as well as of that ſpoken formerly by Pericles on the like occaſion, was born at Miletus, and was indeed in great favour with Pericles, as may be ſeen in Plutarch. What is here ſaid of her having inſtructed Pericles, and many other good orators beſides Socrates, in rhetoric, whether ſtrictly true or not, ſhows at leaſt that ſhe had as great a reputation for wit as for beauty. But it appears from this paſſage that rhetoric, which is the art of compoſition, was not, in the opinion of the Athenians, alone ſufficient to make a complete orator: muſic, which, as far as it relates to oratory, and whenever it is put in contradiſtinction to rhetoric (as in this paſſage) can only mean an harmonious pronunciation, or a melodious modulation of the voice; muſic, I ſay, in the ſenſe now mentioned, was likewiſe deemed a ſcience neceſſary to be learnt by all who intended to ſpeak in public. And hence I am confirmed in an opinion, which I have entertained many years, and in which I find I am not ſingle, viz. that accents were originally muſical notes ſet over words to direct the ſeveral tones and inflections of the voice requiſite to give the whole ſentence its proper harmony and cadence. The names of the Greek accents, *οξυς, βαρυς, περισπωμενος, acute, grave,* and *circumflex,* ſpeak their muſical origin, and correſpond exactly to three terms made uſe of in our modern muſic, namely, *ſharp, flat,* and a *grave,* called the *turn,* conſiſting, like the *circumflex,* of a *ſharp* and a *flat* note. I ſhall not here enter into the queſtion concerning the antiquity of accents, which many learned men take to be of modern invention; though if they were uſed for muſical marks, as I am perſuaded they were, they were probably as antient as the application of that ſcience, from whence they were borrowed to form a right pronunciation and harmonious cadence, which was as antient at leaſt as the time of Plato. It is no wonder, however, that many old manuſcripts and inſcriptions are found without accents: as they were intended ſolely for the inſtruction of thoſe who were deſirous of reading and ſpeaking properly, they were in all likelihood made uſe of only by maſters of muſic in the leſſons which they gave their ſcholars upon pronunciation. Neither is it ſurpriſing that the antient Greeks ſhould deſcend to ſuch minute niceties in forming their orators, when it is conſidered that oratory, from its great uſe and importance in their public aſſemblies, was in the higheſt eſteem among them, and carried by them to its utmoſt perfection.

From what has been ſaid I am induced to beg leave to obſerve, that from not underſtanding, or not attending to the original and right uſe of accents in the Greek, however tranſmitted down to theſe times, has ariſen one of the groſſeſt perverſions and abuſes that ignorance or barbariſm itſelf could poſſibly have introduced into any language; and that is, reading by accent, as it is called, and practiſed in moſt of the ſchools (Eton excepted), and in the univerſities of this kingdom, not to

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two are my maſters: he in muſic, ſhe in rhetoric. That a man thus educated ſhould be a ſkilful ſpeaker is nothing wonderful, ſince, even one who has been worſe educated than I have, and who has indeed learnt muſic from Lamprius, but rhetoric from Antiphon the Rhamnuſian;—I ſay, it is not impoſſible even for ſuch a one to gain the good opinion of the Athenians when he makes their praiſes the theme of his oration.

MEN. And what would you have to ſay were you to ſpeak?

SOC. From myſelf perhaps nothing. But yeſterday I heard Aſpaſia pronounce a funeral oration concerning theſe very perſons; for ſhe had heard what you tell me, that the Athenians were going to chooſe an orator for the occaſion: upon which ſhe immediately ran over to me ſuch things as it would be proper to ſay; and what ſhe had formerly made uſe of, when

ſay of all Europe. For by this method of reading, in which no regard is paid to the long or ſhort vowels or diphthongs, the natural quantity of the words is overturned; and the poets, who never wrote, and indeed are never read, and can never be read by accent, muſt be ſuppoſed to have meaſured the language by a rule different from that followed by the writers and ſpeakers in proſe, that is, all the reſt of their countrymen; which indeed is an abſurdity too great to be ſuppoſed; and therefore I imagine it will not be pretended that the antient Greeks ſpoke by accent. If this therefore be an abſurdity too great to be charged upon the antient Greeks, why ſhould it be impoſed upon thoſe who now ſtudy that language, and who, by this method, are obliged, when they read poetry, to neglect the accent, and when they read proſe to diſregard the quantity; which is to make two languages of one? Much more might be ſaid againſt this prepoſterous uſage of accents, which ſeems to me to have ariſen at firſt from the ignorance and idleneſs of ſchool-maſters, who not knowing the true quantity of the words, and not caring to acquaint themſelves with it, took the ſhort and eaſy way of directing themſelves and their ſcholars by thoſe marks which they ſaw placed over certain ſyllables. Theſe they took for their guides in reading proſe, though in poetry, as has been ſaid, they were neceſſitated to obſerve a different rule, viz. the meaſure of the verſe where known, as that of hexameters, iambics, anapæſts, &c.; but in the great variety of meaſures made uſe of by Pindar, and the dramatic writers, they were ſtill at a loſs, and therefore in reading thoſe odes, were obliged to have recourſe to accents, to the utter ſubverſion of all quantity and harmony. If it ſhould be thought worth the while to correct this illiterate abuſe in our ſchools and ſeminaries of learning, it may be proper either to print ſuch books as are put into the hands of young beginners without accents, or to ſubſtitute in their ſtead ſuch marks as may ſerve to ſhow the quantity of the ſeveral ſyllables: to which end I would recommend to all future compilers of lexicons and grammars, to mark, after the example of many Latin lexicographers, the quantities of all the ſyllables: many of which are reducible to general rules, and others may be diſcovered and aſcertained by carefully comparing the correſpondent meaſures of the ſtrophé, antiſtrophé, epode, &c. in the Greek ode.—W.

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ſhe compoſed the funeral oration ſpoken by Pericles; out of the ſcraps of which ſhe patched up this diſcourſe.

MEN. Can you remember what ſhe ſaid?

SOC. Elſe I ſhould be unjuſt; for I learnt it from her, and there wanted but little of my being beaten for forgetfulneſs.

MEN. Why then do you not repeat it?

SOC. My miſtreſs may be offended, if I make her diſcourſes public.

MEN. By no means, Socrates: however, ſpeak and oblige me; whether you are willing to ſpeak what Aſpaſia ſaid, or any thing elſe, it is of no conſequence if you will but ſpeak.

SOC. But you will perhaps laugh at me, if I, being an elderly man, ſhould appear to you ſtill to jeſt.

MEN. Not at all, Socrates: ſpeak, I entreat you, by all means.

SOC. Well, I find I muſt gratify you, though you ſhould even order me to fall a dancing. Beſides, we are alone. Attend then. She began her oration, I think, with mentioning the deceaſed in the following manner:

Whatever was requiſite to be done for theſe brave men, has been performed on our part. They have received their dues, and are now proceeding on their fated journey, diſmiſſed with theſe public honours, paid them as well by the whole ſtate as by their own families and friends. But to make theſe honours complete, ſomething remains to be ſaid; which not only the laws require to be rendered to them, but reaſon alſo. For an eloquent and well-ſpoken oration impreſſes on the mind of the audience a laſting admiration of great and virtuous actions. But the preſent occaſion demands an oration of a particular kind; an oration that may at one and the ſame time do juſtice to the dead; benevolently admoniſh the living; excite the children and brethren of the deceaſed to an imitation of their virtues; and adminiſter comfort to the fathers and the mothers, and whoever of their remoter anceſtors are yet alive. Where then ſhall we find ſuch an oration as this? Or whence ſhall we rightly begin the praiſes of thoſe brave men, who when living made their friends happy by their virtues, and by their deaths procured the ſafety of thoſe who ſurvive.

As they were naturally good, it is in my opinion neceſſary to begin their panegyric with an account of their original: for that they were virtuous was owing

owing to their being deſcended from virtuous anceſtors. Let us then celebrate, in the firſt place, their noble birth; in the ſecond, their nurture and education; and afterwards, by exhibiting their actions to view, make it appear that *theſe* alſo were virtuous, and ſuch as correſponded to all thoſe advantages. Firſt, then, as to the nobility of their deſcent: they are ſprung from a race of anceſtors, not adventitious, not tranſplanted from I know not where, but natives of the *ſoil*, dwelling and living really and properly in their own country; nurſed, not like other nations, by a ſtep-mother, but a parent, the very land which they inhabited, in which they now lie buried; the ſoil which bred, which nurſed them, and which, as her own, has again received them into her boſom. It is moſt juſt, therefore, to beſtow ſome encomiums, in the firſt place, on this mother; for thus the nobility of theſe her children will at the ſame time be adorned. This country, indeed, deſerves to be celebrated by all mankind, not only by us, and that upon many accounts; but principally becauſe ſhe is dear to divinity, of which the ſtrife of the gods, who contended for her, and the deciſion that followed thereupon, is a clear evidence. And how is it poſſible that it ſhould not be juſt for all men to celebrate that which the gods have praiſed? Another topic of deſerved praiſe is this, that at the very time when the earth bred and produced animals of all kinds, both wild and tame, this country of ours preſerved her purity; was unprolific of ſavage beaſts; and among all animals choſe to produce man only, who ſurpaſſes the reſt in underſtanding, and who alone legally cultivates juſtice and the gods. As a great argument in confirmation of what I here advance, that this earth is the genuine parent of our forefathers, I muſt obſerve that every thing that brings forth is provided with nouriſhment adapted to what it has produced; and that a woman is proved to be really and in fact a mother, from her being ſupplied with native fountains of nouriſhment for the ſuſtenance of the child. In like manner our country and mother affords a ſufficient argument of her having procreated men; for ſhe alone at that time and firſt produced the grain of wheat and barley, the proper and the beſt food of man; as being in reality the parent of this ſpecies of animals; and to her theſe proofs apply more ſtrongly than to a woman. For the earth did not in breeding and producing imitate woman, but woman imitated earth: neither did ſhe enviouſly withhold theſe her fruits, but diſtributed them to others. For her offſpring,

offspring, in the next place, ſhe produced the olive, the ſupport of toil; and after ſhe had thus nouriſhed and reared them up to manhood, ſhe introduced to them gods for their governors and inſtructors, whoſe names it is unneceſſary to mention in this place. We all know who furniſhed us with the neceſſaries and ſecurities of life; who inſtructed us in the arts requiſite for our daily ſupport; who gave us and who taught us the uſe of arms for the defence of our country. Our anceſtors, thus born, and thus brought up, framed a polity of which it may not be improper to ſpeak a few words. For a polity is the nurſe of men; a good one of virtuous men, a bad one of wicked men. That thoſe who went before us, therefore, were educated under a good polity, it is neceſſary to ſhow; for indeed it was owing to this that both they and their deſcendants, the fathers of the deceaſed, became virtuous. The polity then was, as it now is, an ariſtocracy. Under this form of government we ſtill live, and for the moſt part have done ſo from that time to this. Let others call it a democracy, or by what name they pleaſe: it is in truth an ariſtocracy accompanied with renown. We have always had magiſtrates inveſted with kingly power, ſome of whom were hereditary, others elective: but the people were generally the moſt powerful; and they always beſtowed the authority and power of the ſtate upon thoſe whom they judged moſt worthy. No man was excluded for the meanneſs, the obſcurity, or the poverty of his family; nor advanced for the contrary qualifications of his anceſtors, as is practiſed in other cities. Their choice was confined by one boundary. Whoever was eſteemed to be wiſe and good, he had the authority, and he the power. The cauſe of this our polity was the equality of our original. For other ſtates are compoſed of men of every country, and of different extractions; whence their governments are unequal, tyrannies, or oligarchies; in which one part of the people conſider the other as their ſlaves, and thoſe who are conſidered as ſlaves look upon the other part as their maſters. But we, who are all brethren, born of one mother, do not think it fit that we ſhould be the ſlaves or the lords of one another. On the contrary, the natural equality of our births compelled us to ſeek after a legal equality in our government; and forbade us to yield ſubjection to any thing, except to the opinion of virtue and wiſdom. Hence it came to paſs that all our anceſtors, the fathers of the deceaſed, and they themſelves, being thus excellently born, thus nurtured

tured in all liberty, exhibited to all men many and beautiful deeds, both privately and publicly, thinking it their duty as well to protect Grecians againſt Grecians, as to maintain the general liberty of Greece againſt the Barbarians. How they repelled the invaſions of Eumolpus, of the Amazons, and of other enemies before them, and in what manner they defended the Argives againſt the Thebans, and the Heracleide againſt the Argives, the time will not permit me fully to relate: beſides, their virtues having been finely celebrated by the poets in their melodious ſongs, they have been made public to all men; ſo that we ſhould but diſgrace ourſelves in attempting the ſame ſubject in ſimple proſe. For theſe reaſons, therefore, I think proper to paſs over theſe matters. Juſtice has been done to their merits. But I think myſelf obliged to recall the memory of thoſe exploits which, worthy as they were, the poets have not thought worthy of their notice, and which are now almoſt buried in oblivion; that by ſetting forth the praiſes of the great men who performed them, I may woo the poets to admit them into their ſongs and verſes. The chief of theſe are the actions of our forefathers, the progeny of this ſoil, who held the hands of thoſe lords of Aſia, the Perſians, when they attempted to enſlave Europe; whoſe virtue, therefore, in the firſt place deſerves to be commemorated and to be praiſed. To praiſe them as they deſerve, we ought to take a view of it in that period of time, when all Aſia was in ſubjection to the third king of the Perſian race. The firſt of theſe was Cyrus, who by his own great abilities freed his countrymen the Perſians, enſlaved the Medes his maſters, and brought under his dominion the reſt of Aſia, as far as Egypt. His ſon ſubdued Egypt, and as much of Lybia as was acceſſible, by his arms. Darius, the third king, extended the limits of his empire by his land forces as far as Scythia, and by his fleets made himſelf maſter of the ſea and of the iſlands; ſo that no one durſt oppoſe him. The very opinions of all mankind ſeem to have been ſubdued: ſo many, ſo powerful, and ſo warlike were the nations which the government of the Perſians involved. This Darius accuſing us and the Eretrians of an attempt upon Sardis, made that a pretence for ſending an army of five hundred thouſand men on board his ſhips and tranſports, and a fleet of three hundred ſail, over which he appointed Datis to be general, ordering him, under the forfeiture of his head, to bring back the Eretrians and Athenians captive. Datis ſailing to Eretria, againſt a nation

which of all the Greeks had at that time the greateſt reputation for valour, and was moreover very numerous, ſubdued them in three days; and that none of them might eſcape, he took this method of ſearching the whole iſland. Cauſing his troops to march to the utmoſt limits of the Eretrians, and extend themſelves from ſea to ſea, he ordered them to join their hands, and ſweep the country, that he might be able to aſſure the king that not a man had eſcaped him. With the like deſign he paſſed from Eretria to Marathon, imagining he had nothing to do but to place the ſame inevitable yoke upon the neck of the Athenians, and carry them off as he had done the Eretrians. During theſe tranſactions, part of which were accompliſhed and part attempted, no nation of the Greeks came to the aſſiſtance either of the Eretrians or the Athenians, except the Lacedæmonians, and they did not join us till the day after the battle. The reſt, ſtruck with terror, and preferring their preſent ſafety, kept quiet at home. By this a judgment may be formed of the bravery of thoſe men who received the attack of the Barbarians at Marathon, chaſtiſed the arrogance of all Aſia, and were the firſt who erected trophies for their victory over a barbarous enemy; by their example inſtructing others that the power of Perſia was not invincible, and that wealth and numbers muſt yield to virtue. I call theſe men, therefore, not only the fathers of our bodies, but alſo of our liberty, and of the liberty of all Europe. For the Grecians, ſurveying this day's work, were taught by their Marathonian maſters to hazard new battles in the defence of their country. Upon theſe, therefore, ought we in reaſon to beſtow the firſt palm, and give the ſecond to them who afterwards fought and conquered in the ſea-fights of Salamis and Artemiſium. He who would diſcuſs the ſeveral actions of theſe brave men, enumerate the many difficulties they had to encounter both by ſea and land, and tell how they ſurmounted them, would have much to ſay. But I ſhall only mention what appears to me to be the greateſt exploit after that of Marathon: for by that victory the Greeks had been only taught, that upon land it was poſſible for a ſmall number of Grecians to overcome a multitude of Barbarians; but that at ſea they were able to effect the ſame thing was not yet evident. The Perſians had the reputation of being invincible at ſea, by the ſuperiority of their numbers, their riches, their naval ſkill, and ſtrength. Now what is moſt praiſe-worthy in thoſe brave men, who ſignalized themſelves at ſea, is, that they

they did thereby, as it were, looſen thoſe bands of terror, what had held the Grecians ſo faſt bound, and cauſed them no longer to ſtand in awe of numbers, whether of ſhips or men. From theſe two actions, this of Salamis, and that of Marathon, all Greece was inſtructed and accuſtomed not to be afraid of the Barbarians, either by land or ſea. The third great exploit for the deliverance of Greece, as well in order as in degree, is the action of Platæa; in the glory of which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians had an equal part. This great, this arduous enterpriſe was achieved, I ſay, by theſe two nations; and for this their merit are they now celebrated by us, and will be by our poſterity to the lateſt times. After this, many ſtates of Greece ſtill ſided with the Barbarian, and the king himſelf was reported to have a deſign of invading Greece once more. It would then be highly unjuſt not to take notice of thoſe alſo, who completed the work of their forefathers, and put the finiſhing hand to our deliverance, by ſcouring and expelling from the ſea every thing that had the name of Barbarian. Theſe were they, who were engaged in the naval fight at Eurymedon, in the expeditions to Cyrus, to Egypt, and many other places. Theſe ought we therefore, to commemorate, and to acknowledge our obligations to them, for having taught the *great king* to fear; to attend to his own ſafety, and not to be plotting the overthrow of Greece. This war againſt the Barbarians did our commonwealth, with her own forces only, draw out to the very dregs, for her own ſecurity, and that of her allies. Peace being made, and the city honoured, there came upon her that which uſually falls on each that are ſucceſsful, firſt emulation, and from emulation envy, which drew this city, though unwilling, into a war againſt the Grecians: upon the breaking out of which war the Athenians fought a battle with the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra, for the liberties of Bœotia. Though the iſſue of this battle was doubtful, yet the following action proved deciſive: for ſome of the allies of the Bœotians having deſerted thoſe, to whoſe aſſiſtance they came, our countrymen having on the third day after obtained a victory, we recovered to a ſenſe of their duty thoſe who, without reaſon, had fallen off from it. Theſe brave men having fought againſt Grecians for the liberties of Grecians, and delivered thoſe whoſe cauſe they had undertaken to defend, were the firſt, after the Perſian war, upon whom the commonwealth conferred the honour of being buried in this public cœmetery. After this the war became more general; all Greece

attacked us at once, and ravaged our country, ill requiting the favours they had received from this city. But the Athenians having defeated their enemies in a ſea-fight, and taken priſoners in the iſland of Sphacteria their leaders the Lacedæmonians, when it was in their power to have put them to death, ſpared their lives, forgave them, and made peace with them; thinking, that although in a war againſt Barbarians nothing leſs than their utter ruin ſhould be aimed at, yet that in a war between Grecians and Grecians the conteſt ſhould be carried on as far as victory indeed, but that the common intereſt of Greece ought not to be ſacrificed to any particular reſentment. Are not theſe brave men, therefore, worthy to be praiſed, who were engaged in that war, and who now lie buried here? They who made it appear, if indeed it was a queſtion, whether in the firſt Perſian war another nation was not at leaſt equal to the Athenians: they, I ſay, who made it appear that ſuch a queſtion was entirely groundleſs. Theſe men made the ſuperiority of the Athenians ſufficiently evident, by being victorious in that war, in which all Greece took part againſt them, and vanquiſhing in battle, with the forces of Athens only, thoſe who had ſet themſelves up for the chiefs of Greece, though they could pretend to no more than an equal ſhare with the Athenians in their victories gained over the Barbarians. After the peace, aroſe a third dreadful and unexpected war, in which many brave men fell, who here lie buried. Some of theſe erected many trophies in Sicily; to which country they had ſailed in order to protect the Leontines in their liberties, whom we were by oath bound to aſſiſt. But before they could arrive, the paſſage being long, the Leontines were reduced to extremities, and diſabled from yielding them any aſſiſtance; for which reaſon they gave over the attempt, and were unfortunate; though it muſt be owned, their enemies, thoſe againſt whom they came to fight, behaved with ſuch virtue and moderation, that they deſerved far greater praiſe than ſome who were only confederates in that war. Others ſignalized themſelves in the Helleſpont, by taking all the ſhips of the enemy in one day, and by ſeveral other victories. I called this a dreadful and unexpected war, becauſe ſome of the ſtates of Greece carried their enmity to this city ſo far, as to preſume to ſend an embaſſy to the king of Perſia, *their* and *our* moſt inveterate enemy, to invite, upon their own particular views, that barbarian into Greece, whom, for the common cauſe, they had formerly joined with

with us to drive out of Europe; thus uniting in a league againſt Athens all the Greeks and Barbarians. Upon which occaſion the ſtrength and valour of this ſtate became moſt conſpicuous. For our enemies conſidering Athens as already vanquiſhed, and having ſeized ſome of our ſhips at Mitylene, theſe gallant men (for ſo they confeſſedly were) whom we now commemorate, went to their relief with ſixty ſail, and boarding the enemy's ſhips, gained a victory over them, and delivered their own allies, but met with a lot unworthy of their valour; for their bodies were not, as they ought to have been, taken up out of the ſea, but had their burial there. And ſurely they deſerve to be remembered ever with praiſe and honour. For by their valour we became victorious, not in that engagement only, but throughout the whole war; and through their bravery was it that our city gained the reputation of being invincible, though attacked by the united forces of all mankind. Neither has this reputation been falſified in fact. For we were conquered, not by our enemies, but by our own diſſenſions. As to them, we remain invincible even to this day. But we have vanquiſhed, have ſubdued ourſelves. After theſe tranſactions a calm enſuing, and a peace between us and all other nations, a civil war broke out, which was carried on in ſuch a manner, that if, by the decrees of fate, diſſenſions muſt neceſſarily ariſe, a man would pray that his country might be ſo and no otherwiſe diſtempered. For how benevolently and familiarly did the people of the Piræus, and thoſe of the city, mingle with each other! And with how much moderation did they lay aſide their hoſtility againſt thoſe of Eleuſis, contrary to the expectations of all Greece! All which is to be aſcribed to no other cauſe than their real conſanguinity, which imparts firm friendſhip not in words but in deeds. We ought not, therefore, to paſs over in ſilence even thoſe, who in this war were ſlain on either ſide, but as far as in us lies endeavour to reconcile them to each other; praying and ſacrificing upon theſe occaſions to thoſe powers who have the command and direction over them, in as much as we ourſelves are reconciled. For they did not attack each other out of hatred and malice, but from the malignity of their fortune. Of this we ourſelves are living evidences; who, being of the ſame common original with them, have forgiven each other, both what we did and what we ſuffered. After this the city had reſt, and enjoyed a profound peace, eaſily pardoning the Barbarians, who having been ill enough treated

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by this ſtate, returned it but as they ought. But ſhe was indignant with the Greeks, when ſhe called to mind the benefits they had received, and the retribution they made, by uniting with the Barbarians, depriving us of our ſhips, to which they formerly owed their own deliverance, and pulling down our walls, in return for our having ſaved theirs from ruin. The city then having taken the reſolution not to give for the future any aſſiſtance to the Greeks, whether oppreſſed by Grecians or Barbarians, remained quiet: upon which the Lacedæmonians, imagining that Athens, the patroneſs of liberty, was fallen, and that now was the time for them to purſue their proper buſineſs, the enſlaving of others, ſet immediately about it. I need not enlarge upon what followed. Thoſe tranſactions are neither of an antient date, nor perplexed by the variety of actors. We all know in what a conſternation the chief ſtates of Greece, the Argives, the Bœotians, the Corinthians, applied to this city for ſuccour; and what was the moſt divine of all, that the king of Perſia himſelf was reduced to ſuch a ſtrait, as to have no hopes of ſafety from any other quarter than from this very city, whoſe deſtruction he had ſo eagerly purſued. And, indeed, if Athens can be juſtly accuſed of any thing, it is of having been always too compaſſionate, too much inclined to heal the wounds of the fallen. For at this very time ſhe was not able to perſevere, and to keep to her reſolution, of not aſſiſting thoſe in the preſervation of their liberties, who had maliciouſly and deſignedly injured her. She yielded, ſhe aſſiſted them, and by that aſſiſtance reſcued them from ſlavery, and gave them their liberty, till they ſhould think fit to enſlave themſelves again. She had not indeed the aſſurance to act ſo prepoſterous a part as to ſend the king of Perſia any ſuccours; ſhe bore too great a reverence to the trophies of Marathon, of Salamis, and Platæa: yet, by conniving at the aſſiſtance given him by fugitives, and ſuch as voluntarily entered into his ſervice, ſhe was confeſſedly the cauſe of his preſervation. At this time ſhe repaired her fortifications and her fleets, and prepared again for war; finding herſelf under the neceſſity of entering into one with the Lacedæmonians for the protection of the Parians. The king of Perſia, on his part, as he ſaw the Lacedæmonians had given over all thoughts of carrying on a war by ſea, took umbrage at the Athenians, and reſolving to break the peace, demanded thoſe Grecian ſtates which were upon the continent of Aſia to be delivered up to him (thoſe very ſtates which the Lacedæmonians had formerly

merly conſented to give up) as the condition of his continuing his amity with us and our allies. This demand he did not imagine would be complied with, and he made it only that he might, upon its being rejected, have a fair pretence for breaking the treaty. But he was miſtaken as to ſome of his allies; for the Corinthians, the Argives, and the Bœotians, determined to comply with his demand, and even entered into a treaty with him, which they confirmed by oath, to give up the Greeks upon the continent of Aſia, provided he would furniſh them with money. But we, and we alone, had not the aſſurance to abandon thoſe ſtates, much leſs to ſwear to ſuch a treaty. That the city of Athens is ſo generous, free, and firm, that ſhe is ſo ſound, and as it were by nature ſo averſe to the Barbarian, muſt be aſcribed to her being wholly *Greek*, and unmingled with Barbarians. For none of your foreign heroes, Pelops, Cadmus, Ægyptus, Danaus, and many others, who, though living under Grecian laws, were Barbarians by extraction; none of theſe, I ſay, are of the number of our citizens. We are genuine Greeks, no half-barbarians. Hence proceeds the genuine and unadulterated enmity of Athens to all Barbarians. Wherefore we were once more left alone, for refuſing to do an action ſo infamous, and ſo impious as that of delivering up Grecians into the hands of Perſians. But being reſtored to what we had been deprived of in the former war, by the aſſiſtance of divinity, we proſecuted this with more ſucceſs. For, becoming once again maſters of a fleet, having rebuilt our walls, and recovered our colonies, we were ſoon freed from a war, from which our enemies were very glad to be liberated. In this war we loſt indeed many gallant men, ſome at Corinth, by the diſadvantage of their ſituation, others at Lechæum by treachery. Nor were they leſs gallant, who ſaved the king of Perſia, and drove the Lacedæmonians out of the ſeas. Theſe are the men I would recall to your remembrance, and in honouring and praiſing ſuch as theſe it becomes all of you to join.

Such were the exploits of thoſe brave men who here lie buried; ſuch were the exploits of thoſe others alſo who, though unhappily deprived of burial, died like them in the ſervice of their country; exploits many and great indeed, as has been related: but more and ſtill greater yet remain untold; to enumerate all which many whole days and nights would ſcarce ſuffice. It is the duty, therefore, of all and of every particular man to bear theſe things in mind, and as in battle to exhort the children of ſuch fathers

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not to quit the rank, in which their anceſtors have placed them, by a baſe and cowardly retreat. Accordingly, I myſelf, O ye ſons of virtuous men, do now exhort you, and as long as I ſhall remain among you will never ceaſe reminding and exhorting you, to uſe your utmoſt endeavours to become the beſt of men. But upon this occaſion it is my duty to tell you what your fathers, when they were going to expoſe their lives for their country, commanded us to ſay to thoſe whom they left behind, in caſe any accident ſhould befall themſelves. I will repeat to you what I heard from their own mouths, and what, if I may judge from the diſcourſe they then held, they would now gladly ſay to you themſelves, were it in their power. Imagine, therefore, you hear them ſpeaking what I ſhall now relate. Theſe were their words: O children! that ye are the ſons of virtuous fathers is evident from our preſent circumſtances. For having it in our option to live with diſhonour, we have generouſly made it our choice to die, rather than bring ourſelves and our poſterity into diſgrace, and reflect infamy back upon our parents and forefathers; perſuaded as we were, that the life of one who diſhonours his family is not worth living, and that ſuch a man can have no friend either here upon earth among mankind, or among the gods hereafter in the realms beneath. It behoves you, therefore, to bear theſe our words in remembrance, to the end that all your undertakings may be accompanied with virtue; aſſuring yourſelves that without virtue every acquiſition, every purſuit, is baſe and infamous. For wealth can add no ſplendour to an unmanly mind. The riches of ſuch an one are for others, not for himſelf. Neither are beauty, and ſtrength of body, when joined with baſeneſs and cowardice, to be deemed ornamental, but diſgraceful: ſince if they make a man more conſpicuous, they at the ſame time make the baſeneſs of his ſoul conſpicuous alſo. Science too, when ſeparated from juſtice and the reſt of the virtues, is not wiſdom but cunning. Wherefore, in the firſt place, and in the laſt, and throughout the whole courſe of your lives, it is incumbent upon you to labour with all your faculties to ſurpaſs us and your progenitors in glory. Otherwiſe be aſſured that, in this conteſt of virtue, if we remain victorious, the victory will cover us with confuſion, which, on the contrary, if obtained by you, will make us happy. The moſt effectual way for you to ſurpaſs us, and obtain this victory, is ſo to order your conduct, as neither to abuſe nor waſte the glory left you by your anceſtors. For can any thing be more ignomi-

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nious for a man, who would be thought ſomething, than to receive honour, not from his own merit, but from the reputation of his forefathers. Hereditary honour is indeed a beautiful and magnificent treaſury. But to enjoy a treaſury of riches and honours, and, for want of a proper ſupply of wealth and glory of your own, not to be able to tranſ[illegible] it to your poſterity, is infamous and unmanly. If you endeavour after theſe things, you will be welcome to us and we to you, whenever your reſpective fates ſhall conduct you to us in the world below: but if you diſregard them and become profligate, not one of us ſhall be willing to receive you. Thus much be ſpoken to our children: but to our fathers and mothers, if any of them ſhould ſurvive us, and it ſhould be thought neceſſary to adminiſter comfort to them, ſay, that it is their duty patiently to bear misfortunes, whenever they happen, and not give themſelves up to grief: otherwiſe they will never be without ſorrow; for the ordinary occurrences of life will afford ſufficient matter for affliction. They ſhould ſeek to heal and mitigate their troubles in the remembrance, that as to the moſt conſiderable point the gods have heard their prayers. For they did not pray that their children might be immortal, but virtuous and renowned. And this, the greateſt of all bleſſings, they have obtained. It is not eaſy for mortal man to have every thing happen according to his wiſhes in this life. Beſides, by bearing their misfortunes with reſolution and fortitude, they will gain the opinion of being the genuine parents of magnanimous children, and of being themſelves men of courage and magnanimity; whereas by ſinking under their ſorrows, they will raiſe a ſuſpicion of their not being our fathers, or thoſe who ſhall praiſe us will be thought to have ſpoken falſely; neither of which things ought to come to paſs. They themſelves rather ſhould bear chief teſtimony to our praiſe, ſhowing by their actions that they are indeed men and the fathers of men. The old proverb, "Not too much of any thing," ſeems to be well ſaid, and in fact it is ſo. For he who has within himſelf all that is neceſſary to happineſs, or nearly ſo, and who does not ſo depend upon other men, as to have himſelf and his affairs in a perpetual fluctuation, according to their good or ill conduct, he, I ſay, is beſt provided for this life; he is moderate, he is prudent, he is brave; and he, upon all occaſions, whether he obtains or loſes an eſtate or children, will pay the greateſt regard to this proverb: for placing all his confidence in himſelf, he will neither be

too much elevated with joy, nor depreſſed with ſorrow. Such men we ſhould think worthy to be our fathers; ſuch we wiſh them to be, and ſuch we affirm they are; ſuch likewiſe are we now proved to be, by neither murmuring nor trembling at death, though we were to meet it this inſtant. And this ſame ſtate of mind do we recommend to our fathers and our mothers; entreating them to make uſe of ſuch ſentiments as theſe through the remaining part of their lives; and to be perſuaded that they will do us the greateſt pleaſure by not weeping and lamenting for us; that if the dead have any knowledge of what paſſes among the living, their afflicting themſelves, and bearing their misfortunes heavily, will be very unacceptable to us; whereas, on the contrary, by bearing their afflictions lightly, and with moderation, they will be moſt pleaſing to us. Our lives and actions are now going to have an end; but ſuch an end as among men is deemed moſt glorious, and which therefore ought rather to be graced with honour than ſullied with lamentations. By taking care of our wives and children; by educating the latter, and turning themſelves and their minds wholly to ſuch-like employments, they will the more readily forget their misfortunes, and lead a life more exemplary, more agreeable to reaſon, and more acceptable to us. Let this ſuffice to be ſpoken on our part to our relations and friends. To the commonwealth we recommend the care of our parents and children; beſeeching her to give theſe an honourable education, and to cheriſh thoſe in their old age, in a manner worthy of them: but we are ſenſible that without this recommendation, all proper care will be taken of both."

Theſe things, O ye children, and ye parents of the deceaſed, have they given me in charge to ſay to you on their part; and I have moſt willingly, and to the beſt of my power, executed their commands. On my own part and for their ſakes I beſeech you, ye ſons! to imitate your fathers: you fathers, to take comfort for the loſs of theſe your ſons; aſſuring yourſelves, that both in our public and private capacities, we will take care of you, and cheriſh your old age, as the reſpective duties and relations of every one of us may require. You yourſelves well know what proviſions the commonwealth has made; that by expreſs laws ſhe has ordered care to be taken of the children and parents of thoſe who die in battle; and has given it in charge to the chief magiſtrate, to take them, above all others, into his particular protection; that the latter may be guarded from all injuries, and the former

former not be ſenſible of their orphan ſtate, nor feel the want of a father; whoſe place the commonwealth ſupplies, by aſſiſting in the care of their education while they are children, and when they are grown up to manhood, diſmiſſing them to their ſeveral vocations with an honourable preſent of a complete ſuit of armour. And this ſhe does, not only with a view of intimating to them, and reminding them of the occupations of their fathers, by preſenting them with thoſe implements of valour which their fathers had ſo glorioufly employed; but alſo that being arrived to the full ſtrength, and furniſhed with the armour of a man, when they firſt go to take poſſeſſion of their houſehold gods, they may ſet out with a good omen. Moreover, ſhe fails not from time to time to pay theſe anniverſary honours to the deceaſed; taking upon her to perform in general, with regard to them, whatever is due to each from their reſpective relations; and to complete all, by exhibiting games of different kinds, equeſtrian and gymnaſtic, muſical and poetical, ſhe effectually ſupplies the office of ſons and heirs to fathers; of fathers to ſons; and that of guardians and protectors to their parents and kindred: diſcharging at all times all and every part of the duties that belong to all. Learn, therefore, by reflecting upon theſe things, to bear your afflictions with more patience; for by ſo doing you will act the moſt friendly part as well to the dead as to the living, and be better able to give and receive comfort, to cheriſh and aſſiſt each other. And now, having jointly paid the tribute of your ſorrow to the deceaſed, as the law directs, you may all depart.

This, Menexenus, is the ſpeech[1] of Aſpaſia the Mileſian.

[1] This Oration, which Plato (either from undervaluing his own performance, or with a view of abating the too great eſteem which the Athenians entertained for their orators, whom he rallies very finely in the beginning of the dialogue) hath here given to Aſpaſia the Mileſian, was however held in ſuch eſtimation at Athens, that, as Tully informs us, it was ordered to be repeated every year, on the day appointed for the commemoration of thoſe who had been ſlain in battle: a plain evidence of the preference which the Athenians gave to this Oration of Plato before all others ſpoken on the ſame occaſion, though ſome of them were compoſed by their greateſt orators, as Pericles, Lyſias, Hyperides, and Demoſthenes. Thoſe of Hyperides and Demoſthenes are not now extant. That aſcribed to Pericles by Thucydides, and preſerved in his Hiſtory, was moſt probably written by that hiſtorian. Lyſias's Oration is yet remaining. We have therefore but one genuine oration of any of theſe orators, upon this ſubject, with which we can compare this Oration of Plato; to whom I ſhall not ſcruple to give the advantage upon the compariſon. For the reſt, we have the deciſion of the Athenians, who were acquainted with all the others, in favour of Plato; and in their judgment, I think, we may ſafely acquieſce.—W.

MEN. By Jupiter, Socrates, you ſay that Aſpaſia is bleſſed, if being a woman ſhe can make ſuch ſpeeches as theſe.

SOC. If you doubt it, come along with me, and you ſhall hear her herſelf.

MEN. I have often been in her company, and know what ſhe is.

SOC. Well then, do you not admire her, and are you not obliged to her for this Oration?

MEN. I am greatly obliged, Socrates, either to her or to him, whoever was the author of it, but more particularly to you, who have repeated it to me.

SOC. Very well: but remember not to ſpeak of it, that I may hereafter be at liberty to communicate to you ſome more of her fine political diſcourſes.

MEN. You may depend upon my not betraying you. Do you only relate them.

SOC. I will not fail.

THE END OF THE MENEXENUS.

THE

THE CLITOPHO:

AN

EXHORTATORY DIALOGUE.



THE CLITOPHO[1].

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND CLITOPHO.

SOCRATES.

A CERTAIN perſon lately informed me that Clitopho, the ſon of Ariſtonymus, converſing with Lyſias, blamed the purſuits of Socrates, but praiſed immoderately the converſation of Thraſymachus.

CLI. Whoever he was, Socrates, he has not accurately related to you my diſcourſe with Lyſias about you. For in ſome things I did not praiſe you, but in others I did. But ſince you evidently blame me, though you pretend to care nothing about this report, I will moſt willingly relate to you my converſation with Lyſias, eſpecially ſince we happen to be alone, that you may ſee I am not ſo ill diſpoſed towards you as you might be induced to ſuppoſe. For now perhaps you have not rightly heard, and on that account are more exaſperated with me than is proper. But if you will permit me to ſpeak freely, I ſhall moſt cheerfully relate the affair to you.

Soc. But it would be ſhameful, when you are willing to benefit me, that I ſhould not ſuffer you. For it is evident that when I know in what

[1] In this Dialogue, Clitopho, the ſon of Ariſtonymus, being aſked by Socrates why he preferred Thraſymachus, anſwers, that though he had often heard excellent exhortations to virtue from Socrates, yet hitherto he had not been able to perceive in what virtue itſelf conſiſted, and in what manner he ſhould happily proceed in the ſtudy it. Hence, he adds, if Socrates either is ignorant of this, or is unwilling to teach it him, he may with great propriety betake himſelf to Thraſymachus, or to any other, for the ſake of obtaining this knowledge. As the anſwer of Socrates to this complaint is not added, there is every reaſon to believe that this Dialogue is imperfect.

reſpect

reſpect I am better and worſe, I ſhall purſue ſome things, and avoid others, to the utmoſt of my power.

Cli. Hear then. For when I am with you, Socrates, I am often aſtoniſhed on hearing you diſcourſe, and you appear to me, compared with other men, to ſpeak moſt beautifully, when reproving men, you exclaim like a god from a tragic machine, "Whither are you borne along? Of this you are ignorant, and your conduct is in no reſpect becoming. For all your attention is employed in the acquiſition of wealth; but you neglect the children to whom you are to leave it, and are not at all anxious that they may know how to uſe it juſtly; nor that they may acquire this knowledge, do you procure for them teachers of juſtice, if juſtice can be taught, and who may ſufficiently exerciſe them in it, if it is to be obtained by meditation and exerciſe. Nor yet, prior to this, do you thus cultivate your own minds: but perceiving that you and your children have ſufficiently learnt grammar, muſic, and gymnaſtic (which you conſider as the perfect diſcipline of virtue), though afterwards you are no leſs depraved with reſpect to riches than before, yet you do not deſpiſe the preſent mode of education, nor inquire after thoſe who might liberate you from this unſkilful and inelegant condition of life. Though through this confuſion and indolence, and not through the diſcordant motion of the foot to the lyre, brother riſes againſt brother, and city againſt city, immoderately and unharmoniouſly; and warring on each other, both do and ſuffer all that is lawleſs and dire. But you ſay, that thoſe who are unjuſt, are unjuſt voluntarily, and not through want of diſcipline, nor through ignorance; and again, you dare to aſſert that injuſtice is baſe, and odious to divinity. How then can any one voluntarily chooſe this which is ſo great an evil. It is choſen by him, you ſay, who is vanquiſhed by pleaſure. Is not this therefore involuntary, ſince to vanquiſh is voluntary? So that reaſon perfectly convinces us, that to act unjuſtly is involuntary. Every man, therefore, privately, and all cities publicly, ought to pay more attention to juſtice than at preſent."

When therefore, Socrates, I hear you perpetually aſſerting theſe things, I am very much delighted, and praiſe you in a wonderful manner. This is likewiſe the caſe with me, when you ſay as follows: That thoſe who cultivate their bodies, but neglect their ſoul, pay attention to that which is naturally in a ſtate of ſubjection, but neglect that which governs. Likewiſe, when

when you assert that it is better for him who does not know how to use a thing to discuss the consideration of its utility. And that for him who does not know how to use his eyes, ears, and his whole body, it is better neither to hear, nor see, nor to use his body in any respect, than to use it. In a similar manner too, with respect to art. For it is evident, as you say, that he who does not know how to use his own lyre, will not know how to use that of his neighbour. Nor will he who is ignorant of the use of any other instrument or possession belonging to another, know how to use that which belongs to himself. And, in the last place, you beautifully add, that for him who does not know how to use his soul, it is better to be at rest with respect to his soul, and not to live, than to live and act from himself. But if there is any necessity for such a one to live, that it is better for him to lead the life of a slave, than of one free born. This however is to deliver the helm of the dianoetic part as of a ship to another, who has learnt how to govern men; viz. who has learnt what you, Socrates, have often called the political science, and which is likewise judicial and justice. To these, and many other all-beautiful sentences, in which you assert that virtue[1] can be taught, and that a man ought above all things to pay attention to himself, I have never at any time been adverse, nor do I think that I ever shall be. For I think that these assertions are most exhortatory and useful, and vehemently excite us, as if we were asleep. I have attended, therefore, as one who is to hear what follows, and I have asked, not you, in the first place, Socrates, but your equals in age, those who have the same desires with you, or your companions, or in whatever manner it may be proper to call those that are thus disposed towards you. For among these I have first of all asked those that are most esteemed by you, what will be the discourse after this, and proposing to them to dispute after your manner, I have said to them, O best of men, how are we to receive the present exhortation of Socrates to virtue? Are we to receive it as nothing more than an exhortation, and not apply it to practice? But this will be our employment through the whole of life, to exhort those who are not yet incited. Or is it requisite, after this, that we should ask Socrates and each other, since we confess this conduct should be adopted, what is next to be done? How ought we to

[1] See the Meno, for the manner in which this is to be understood.

begin reſpecting the diſcipline of juſtice? For juſt as if ſome one ſhould exhort *us* to pay attention to the body, who like boys do not in any reſpect perceive that the care of the body is gymnaſtic and medicinal, and ſhould afterwards reproach us by ſaying, that we paid every attention to wheat and barley, and ſuch other things as we labour to obtain for the ſake of the body, but that we ſearch after no art nor device, by which the body may be rendered in the beſt condition, though there is ſuch an art,—ſhould any one thus reproach us, might not we aſk him, Do you ſay there are ſuch arts as theſe? perhaps he would ſay that there are, and that theſe are the gymnaſtic and medicinal arts. After the ſame manner, let ſome one now inform us what that art is which we conſider as converſant with the virtue of the ſoul. But he who appears to be moſt robuſt in anſwering ſuch queſtions as theſe, will ſay, This art which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other than juſtice. To this I reply, You ſhould not only tell me the name of the art, but thus explain the art itſelf. Medicine is ſaid to be a certain art. But by this, two things are effected: for phyſicians are always formed by phyſicians; and health is produced by medicine. But one of theſe is no longer art, but the work of the medical art teaching and acquired; and this work we denominate health. After a ſimilar manner, two things are effected by the tectonic art, viz. an edifice, and the tectonic art, one of which is a work, and the other a document. Thus too, with reſpect to juſtice, one of its effects is to make men juſt, in the ſame manner as each of the above-mentioned arts makes artiſts; but what ſhall we ſay the other is, which a juſt man is able to accompliſh for us? One perſon will, I think, anſwer us, that it is the profitable; another, that it is the becoming; another, that it is the uſeful; and another, that it is the convenient. But I in anſwering to this have objected, that theſe very names are to be found in each of the arts, viz. to act rightly, conveniently, profitably, and the like. But that to which all theſe tend, is the peculiarity of each art. Thus, in the tectonic art, the right, the beautiful, and the becoming, tend to this, that wooden furniture may be aptly made, which is not art, but the work of art. In like manner, let ſome one anſwer me, reſpecting the work of juſtice. Laſtly, one of your aſſociates, Socrates, who appeared to ſpeak moſt elegantly, anſwered me that the peculiar work of juſtice is this, which is not effected by any other ſcience, viz. to produce friendſhip

friendſhip in cities. But he being again interrogated, replied, that friendſhip was a thing good, and by no means evil: and being aſked reſpecting the friendſhips of boys and wild beaſts, as we denominate the attachments of theſe, he would not admit that ſuch attachments ſhould be called friendſhips, becauſe they more frequently happen to be noxious than good. He likewiſe ſaid, that they were falſely called friendſhips, but that real and true friendſhip was moſt clearly concord. But being aſked whether he called concord agreement in opinion, or ſcience, he deſpiſed the former, becauſe there is a neceſſity that there ſhould be many and noxious agreements in opinion among men; but he had granted that friendſhip was a thing perfectly good, and the work of juſtice. So that he ſaid, concord was the ſame with ſcience, and not with opinion. But when we were at this part of our diſcourſe, thoſe who were preſent, doubting the truth of theſe aſſertions, called to him, and ſaid, that the diſcourſe revolved to what was at firſt advanced. They likewiſe affirmed that the medicinal art is a certain concord; that this is the caſe with all the other arts; and that they are able to declare what the ſubject is with which they are converſant. But with reſpect to that which is called by you juſtice, or concord, we know not whither it tends, and it is not manifeſt what is its work.

Concerning theſe things, Socrates, I have at length aſked you; and you tell me that the work of juſtice is to injure our enemies, and benefit our friends. But afterwards it appeared to you, that the juſt man will never injure any one, but will act to the advantage of every one in all things. Theſe things have been the ſubject of diſcuſſion, not once, nor twice only; but having aſſiduouſly attended you, Socrates, for a long time, I became at length weary; thinking, indeed, that you, in the moſt excellent manner of all men, exhorted to the ſtudy of virtue, but that one of theſe two things muſt take place, either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further, which may happen to be the caſe reſpecting any other art; as for inſtance, he who is not a pilot may endeavour to praiſe the pilot's art, as a thing moſt worthy the attention of mankind; and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to the other arts. This may perhaps apply to you concerning juſtice, viz. that you have not a greater knowledge than others of its nature, becauſe you praiſe it in a beautiful manner. However, I do not think that this is the caſe. But as I ſaid, one of theſe two things muſt take place, either that you

do not know what juſtice is, or that you are unwilling to impart this knowledge to me. On this account, I think I ſhall betake myſelf to Thraſymachus, and wherever elſe I am able, in order that I may be liberated from my doubts. Not indeed, that I ſhould apply to any one elſe, if you were willing to finiſh your exhortatory diſcourſes to me. I mean, if, as you have exhorted me to that care of the body which belongs to gymnaſtic, and which it is not proper to neglect, you would unfold to me, after an exhortation of this kind, what the nature is of my body, and what the attention which it requires. Let this be done at preſent. Take it for granted, that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous, to pay attention to other things, and in the mean time neglect the ſoul, for the ſake of which we labour in other things; and ſuppoſe me to admit every thing elſe which is conſequent to this, and which we have now diſcuſſed. I requeſt you not to act in any reſpect otherwiſe, that I may not be obliged hereafter, as at preſent, partly to praiſe and partly to blame you before Lyſias and others. For I ſay, Socrates, that you are ineſtimably valuable to the man who is not yet exhorted; but that to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment; ſince you prevent him from becoming happy, by arriving at the end of virtue.

THE END OF THE CLITOPHO.

THE

THE ION:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

POETRY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE ION.

THE general ſubject, ſays Mr. Sydenham, of this Dialogue, is Poetry; but various titles are found prefixed to the copies of it, aſſigned probably by the antients. Some ſtyle it a Dialogue "concerning the Iliad:"[1] while others, aiming to open the ſubject more fully and diſtinctly, entitle it, "Of the Interpretation of the Poets:" and others again, with intention to expreſs the deſign or ſcope of it in the title, have invented this, "Concerning the Mark or Characteriſtic of a Poet." But none of theſe titles, or inſcriptions, will be found adequate or proper. The firſt is too partial and deficient. For the Dialogue, now before us, concerns the Odyſſey as much as the Iliad, and many other poets no leſs than Homer. As to the next title, the Interpretation or Expoſition of the Poets, is but an occaſional or acceſſory ſubject, introduced only for the ſake of ſome other, which is the principal. The laſt title is erroneous, and miſtakes the main drift and end of this Dialogue,

[1] "Concerning the Iliad." This however appears to be the moſt antient, being the only one found in Laertius; and the others being too preciſe and particular to be of an earlier date. For the titles of all the proſaic works of the antients, whether dialogues, diſſertations, or methodical treatiſes, written before the age of Plutarch, were as general and as conciſe as poſſible, expreſſing the ſubject uſually in one word. The title that we have choſen appears not indeed in any of the copies of this Dialogue; but perhaps may be ſupported by the authority of Clemens of Alexandria, a writer little later than Laertius. For citing a paſſage out of the Io, he has theſe words, περι μεν ποιητικης Πλατων—γραφει. Stromat. l. vi. near the end. Though it muſt be owned not abſolutely clear, whether he means it as the known title of the Dialogue, or as the ſubject only of the paſſage there quoted.—S.

which

which is by no means ſo ſlight or unimportant, as merely to ſhow that enthuſiaſm[1], or the poetic fury, is the characteriſtic of a true poet; but makes a part of the grand deſign of Plato in all his writings, that is, the teaching true wiſdom: in order to which, every kind of wiſdom, falſely ſo called, commonly taught in the age when he lived, was to be unlearnt. The teachers, or leaders of popular opinion, among the Grecians of thoſe days, were the ſophiſts, the rhetoricians, and the poets; or rather, inſtead of theſe laſt, their ignorant and falſe interpreters. Men of liberal education were miſled principally by the firſt of theſe: the ſecond ſort were the ſeducers of the populace, to whoſe paſſions the force of rhetoric chiefly is applied in commonwealths: but the minds of people[2] of all ranks received a bad impreſſion

[1] Yet only in this light was the Io conſidered by Ficinus, as appears from his Commentary on this Dialogue. And his repreſentations of it have been blindly followed by all who have ſince his time written concerning it, as Janus Cornarius in his ſeventh Eclogue, Serranus in his Argument of the Io, and Franciſcus Patritius in his Diſſertation de Ordine Dialogorum. Nor muſt we conceal from our readers the oppoſite opinion of a very ingenious friend, who ſuppoſes Plato to have no other view in this Dialogue, than to expoſe Io to ridicule, and to convince him of his own ignorance. Whatever, therefore, is ſaid, on the ſubject of enthuſiaſm in poetry, appears to him wholly ironical, and Socrates to be abſolutely in jeſt, throughout the Dialogue. To this conjecture we ſhall only ſay, in the words of Horace, which a reader of Plato ought always to have in mind,

——— *Ridentem dicere Verum*
Quid vetat ——?

What hinders, but that ſerious truth be ſpoke
In humour gay, with pleaſantry and joke?

As to the other opinion, that which is generally received, we contend not that it has no foundation, nor even at all diſpute the truth of it; but deny only the importance of that truth to the Io. For though the immediate and direct end of Plato, in this Dialogue, was to prove that the wiſdom, which appears in the writings of the elder poets, eſpecially in thoſe of Homer, was not owing to ſcience: yet another thing, which he had obliquely in his view, was the intimating to his readers, to what cauſe poſitively it was owing that ſo many profound truths were contained in thoſe antient poems. The cauſe aſſigned by the philoſopher is ſome univerſal and divine principle, operating in various ways: partly acting only occaſionally, in which reſpect he terms it, agreeably to the language of thoſe days, the inſpiration of the muſe; and partly with a continual and conſtant energy, being a divine genius, but limited, and confined to certain ſubjects, operating differently in different perſons; though in Homer, moſt of all men, exerting its full force, and the moſt according to its own nature, that is, univerſal and divine.—S.

[2] As ſoon as boys had been taught letters, they were introduced to the reading of the poets; their minds were charged with the memory of ſhorter poems, and of many paſſages from the longer;

impreſſion from thoſe of the laſt-mentioned kind. To prevent the ill influence of theſe, is the immediate deſign of the Io; and the way which the philoſopher takes to leſſen the credit of their poems is not by calling in queſtion the inſpiration of the poet, or the divinity of the Muſe. Far from attempting this, he eſtabliſhes the received hypotheſis, for the foundation of his argument againſt the authority of their doctrine: inferring, from their inability to write without the impulſe of the Muſe, that they had no real knowledge of what they taught: whereas the principles of ſcience, as he tells us in the Philebus, deſcend into the mind of man immediately from heaven; or, as he expreſſes it in the Epinomis, from God himſelf, without the intervention of any lower divinity. The true philoſopher, therefore, who attends to this higher inſpiration, he alone poſſeſſing that divineſt ſcience, the ſcience of thoſe principles, is able to teach in a ſcientific way. But Plato, of all the polite writers among the antients the moſt polite, makes not his attack upon the poets themſelves directly: for, as the diſaffected to any government, ſo long as they retain their reſpect for it, ſtrike at the ſovereigns only in the perſons of their miniſters; in the ſame reſpectful manner does the courtly Plato ſeem to ſpare thoſe ſacred perſons, the anointed of the Muſes, making free with the rhapſodiſts only, their interpreters. This he does in the perſon of Io, one of that number, who profeſſed to interpret the ſenſe of Homer; proving out of his own mouth, that he had no true knowledge of thoſe matters, which he pretended to explain; and inſinuating at the ſame time, that the poet no leſs wanted true knowledge in thoſe very things, though the ſubjects of his own poem. For every thing that he ſays of the rhapſodiſts and of rhapſody, holds equally true of poets [1] and of poetry.

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longer; and they had maſters appointed to explain, criticiſe, and comment upon what they had learnt. From the poets conſequently did the youth imbibe principles of manners, and general opinions of things: their odes were as commonly ſung as ballads among us; and their verſes were cited, not only to grace converſation, but even to add weight to grave diſcourſes. Juſtly therefore does Ariſtides the orator call them κοινους των Ελληνων τροφεας και διδασκαλους, "the common tutors and teachers of all Greece." Ariſtid. tom. iii. p. 22. ed. Canter.—S.

[1] This appears to have been ſo underſtood by the poets themſelves of thoſe days. For what other provocation Socrates could have given them than by ſome ſuch talk as Plato in this Dialogue puts into his mouth is not eaſy to conceive. The enemies that Socrates had made himſelf by his free-

The purſuit of this argument naturally leads to a twofold inquiry: one head or article of which regards the ſciences, the other concerns the arts. By this partition does Plato divide his Io; throwing, however, here, as he does every where elſe, a graceful veil over his art of compoſition, and the method with which he frames his dialogues; in order to give them the appearance of familiarity and eaſe, ſo becoming that kind of writing: in the ſame manner as he always takes care to conceal their ſcope or deſign; that, opening itſelf unexpectedly at laſt, it may ſtrike the mind with greater efficacy. Upon the article of ſcience, Plato repreſents the poets writing through the inſpiration of the Muſes, of all things, whether human or divine; of morals, politics, and military affairs; of hiſtory, and antiquities; of meteorology, and aſtronomy; in fine, of the whole univerſe; yet without any intimate acquaintance with the nature of thoſe things, and without having had any other than a ſuperficial view. Under the other article, that of art, Plato ſhows that the poets deſcribe, and in deſcription imitate, the operations and performances of many of the arts, though in the principles of thoſe arts uninſtructed and ignorant; as having ſkill in one art only, that, through which they ſo deſcribe and imitate, the art of poetry: while every other artiſt hath ſkill in ſome one other, his own proper, art; and to the true philoſopher, as he tells us in his Dialogue called the Politician, belongs the knowledge of that art, in which are comprehended the principles of all the reſt. Hence it follows, that of ſuch poetical ſubjects as have any relation to the arts, whether military or peaceful, whether imperatorial, liberal, or

dom of ſpeech, as we are informed by himſelf in his Apology, reported to us by Plato, were of three ſorts; the politicians, the rhetoricians, and the poets. That the former ſort reſented his expoſing their conceited ignorance, and vain pretenſions to political ſcience, is told us by Laertius, b. ii. and is indeed abundantly evident from Plato's Meno. That Socrates treated the rhetoricians in the ſame manner, will appear very ſufficiently in the Gorgias. Is it not then highly probable, that the reſentment of the poets was raiſed againſt him by the ſame means; and that they well underſtood his attack upon the rhapſodiſts, a ſet of men too inconſiderable for any part of his principal notice to be intended againſt themſelves? We ſhould add to this argument the authority of Athenæus, were it of any weight in what regards Plato. For he gives this as one inſtance of Plato's envious and malignant ſpirit, which his own malignity againſt the divine philoſopher attributes to him, that in his Io he villifies and abuſes the poets. See Athen. Deipnoſoph. l. xi. p. 506.—S.

mechanical,

mechanical, the knowing in each art are reſpectively the only proper judges. Such is the deſign, and ſuch the order of this Dialogue. As to its kind, it is numbered by the antients among the peiraſtic: but according to the ſcheme propoſed in our ſynopſis, the outward form or character of it is purely dramatic: and the genius of it is ſeen in this, that the argumentation is only probable; and in this, alſo, that the concluſion leaves the rhapſodiſt Io perplexed and filenced, bringing off Socrates in modeſt triumph over the embarraſſment of his half yielding adverſary [1].

[1] See what has been already obſerved concerning the Io, in the note at the beginning of the tenth book of the Republic, in which we have given, from Proclus, a copious and admirable account of the different ſpecies of poetry, and the nature of poetic fury.—T.

THE IO.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND IO.

SCENE[1]*.—ATHENS.*

SOCRATES.

JOY be with Io*. Whence come you now? what; do you come directly from home, from Epheſus?

Io.

[1] The ſcene, though not preciſely marked out to us by Plato, evidently lies within the city; and ſome circumſtances make it probable to be the public ſtreets; where Socrates, in paſſing along, caſually met with Io. Not to inſiſt on that of Io's recent arrival at Athens, nor on that other of the ſeeming haſte of Socrates, expreſſed in his poſtponing Io's impertinent harangue, and his endeavouring to draw the converſation into a narrow compaſs, circumſtances perhaps ambiguous: one more deciſive is the reſtriction of the number of perſons compoſing the Dialogue to thoſe two. For whenever Plato lays his ſcene in ſome public place, frequented for the ſake of company, exerciſe, or amuſement; many perſons are made parties, or witneſſes at leaſt, to the converſation; and this out of regard to probability; becauſe a converſation-party, conſiſting of more than two perſons, may naturally be ſuppoſed the moſt frequent in places, where few of the aſſembly could fail of meeting with many of their acquaintance. Another circumſtance, contributing to determine where the ſcene lies, is the brevity of this Dialogue. For Plato, to his other dramatic excellencies, in which he well might be a pattern to all dramatic poets, adds this alſo, to adjuſt the length of the converſation to the place where it is held: a piece of decorum little regarded even by the beſt of our modern writers for the ſtage. Accordingly, the longeſt converſations, related or feigned by Plato, we may obſerve to be carried on always in ſome private houſe, or during a long walk into the country; unleſs ſome peculiar circumſtance permits the diſcourſe to be protracted in a place otherwiſe improper. For the ſame reaſon of propriety, the exchange, where much talk would be inconvenient; or the ſtreet, where people converſe only as they paſs along together; and ſometimes, removed a little from the throng, ſtanding ſtill a while, is generally made the ſcene of the ſhorteſt dialogues. And in purſuance of the ſame rule, thoſe of middling length

Io. [3] Not ſo, Socrates, I aſſure you; but from Epidaurus[4], from the feaſts of Æſculapius[5].

Soc. The people of Epidaurus, I think, upon this occaſion, propoſe a trial of ſkill among the rhapſodiſts [6], in honour of the god. Do they not?

Io. They do; and a trial of ſkill in every other branch of the Muſe's art?

Soc.

length have for their ſcene ſome public room, a gymnaſtic or a literary ſchool, for inſtance, in which were ſeats fixed all round, for any of the aſſembly to ſit and talk; but in a place of this kind the converſation muſt be abridged, becauſe liable to interruption; beſides that decency, and a regard to the preſence of the whole aſſembly, regulate the bounds of private converſation in thoſe detached and ſeparate parties, into which uſually a large company divides itſelf; appointing it to be confined within moderate compaſs. As this note regards all the dialogues of Plato, the length of it, we hope, wants no apology.—S.

[2] To wiſh joy, was the uſual ſaluation of the antient Greeks, when they met or parted: as ours is, to hope or wiſh health; an expreſſion of our courteſy, derived to us from the old Romans.—S.

[3] As much as to ſay, "It is not ſo bad with me neither, as to be obliged ever to be at home." Plato makes him expreſs himſelf in this manner, partly to ſhew the roving life of the rhapſodiſts, inconſiſtent with the attainment of any real ſcience; but chiefly to open the character of Io, who prided himſelf with being at the head of his profeſſion, and conſequently in having much buſineſs abroad. The very firſt queſtion therefore of Socrates, who knew him well, is on purpoſe to draw from him ſuch an anſwer: as the queſtions that follow next are intended to put him upon boaſting of his great performances. Nothing in the writings of Plato, not the minuteſt circumſtance, is idle or inſignificant. It would be endleſs to point out this in every inſtance. Scarce a line but would demand a comment of this ſort. The ſpecimen, however, here given, may ſuffice to ſhow, with what attention ſo perfect a maſter of good writing ought to be read; and with ſuch a degree of attention, as is due, the intelligent reader will of himſelf diſcern, in ordinary caſes, the particular deſign of every circumſtance, and alſo what relation it bears to the general deſign of the whole Dialogue.—S.

[4] In this city was a temple of Æſculapius, much celebrated for his immediate preſence. An annual feſtival was here likewiſe held in honour to that god.—S.

[5] Ἐκ τῶν Ἀσκληπιείων. Ficinus ſeems to think, this means the worſhippers of Æſculapius. Bembo tranſlates it "*da Figliuoli di Eſculapio,*" an appellation given only to phyſicians. Seranus interprets it in the ſame ſenſe that we do, and that this is the true one, appears from Jul. Pollux, Onamaſt. i. 1. c. 13.—S.

[6] Theſe were a ſet of people, whoſe profeſſion ſomewhat reſembled that of our ſtrolling players. For they travelled from one populous city to another, wherever the Greek was the vulgar language, rehearſing, acting, and expounding the works of their antient poets, principally thoſe of Homer. They reſorted to the feaſts and banquets of private perſons, where ſuch rehearſals made part of the entertainment;

Soc. Well; you, I preſume, were one of the competitors: What ſucceſs had you?

Io. We came off, O Socrates, with the chief prize.

Soc. You ſay well: now then let us prepare to win the conquett in the Panathenæa [1].

Io. That we ſhall accompliſh too, if fortune favour us.

Soc. Often have I envied you rhapſodiſts, Io, the great advantages of

entertainment; and in the public theatres performed before the multitude. Eſpecially they failed not their attendance at the general aſſemblies of the people from all parts of Greece; nor at the religious feſtivals, celebrated by any particular ſtate. For on theſe ſolemn occaſions it was uſual to have prizes propoſed to be contended for, not only in all the manly exerciſes faſhionable in thoſe days, but in the liberal arts alſo; of which even the populace among the Grecians, then the politeſt people in the world, were no leſs fond. The principal of theſe was poetry: (ſee the ſecond of Mr. Harris's three Treatiſes:) and poets themſelves often contended for the prize of excellence in this art. But poets were rare in that age. Their places therefore on theſe occaſions were ſupplied by the rhapſodiſts; who vied one with another for excellence in reciting. Whoever deſires a more particular account of the rhapſodiſts, ſo often mentioned in this Dialogue, than can be given within the compaſs of theſe notes, may conſult the commentary of Euſtatius upon Homer, with the notes of the learned Salvini, v. i. p. 15, &c. as alſo a treatiſe of H. Stephens de Rhapſodis.—S.

[1] This was a feſtival kept at Athens yearly in honour of Minerva, who was believed by the Athenians to be the divine protectreſs of their city. Every fifth year it was celebrated with more feſtivity and pomp than ordinary; and was then called the Great Panathenæa, to diſtinguiſh it from thoſe held in the intermediate years, termed accordingly the Leſs. We learn from Plato, in his Hipparchus, from whence Ælian almoſt tranſcribes it in his Various Hiſt. l. viii. c. 2. that there was a law at Athens, appointing the works of Homer to be recited by the rhapſodiſts during the ſolemnization of this feſtival: in order, ſays Iſocrates in his Panegyrical Oration, to raiſe in the Athenians an emulation of the virtues there celebrated. From a paſſage in the Oration of Lycurgus the Orator it appears, that this law regarded only the Panathenæa. On this very ſolemn occaſion it is highly probable, that Io was come to Athens on purpoſe to ſhow his abilities, and contend for the prize of victory. We cannot help obſerving by the way, that many writers, antient as well as modern, expreſs themſelves as if they imagined the Greater and the Leſs Panathenæa to be two different feſtivals: ſee in particular Caſtellan. de Feſt. Græc. p. 306, 7. whereas it is clear from the words of Lycurgus, that there was but one feſtival of that name, though held in a more ſplendid manner every fifth year. As they nearly concern the ſubject now before us, we preſent them to the learned reader at full length: *ουτω γαρ ὑπελαβον ὑμων οἱ πατερες σπουδαιον ειναι ποιητην* (ſc. *τον Ὁμηρον*) *ὡστε νομον εθεντο, καθ' ἑκαστην πενταετηριδα των Παναθηναιων, μονου των αλλων ποιητων ῥαψῳδεισθαι τα επη.* P. 223. of Dr. Taylor's edition. "Your anceſtors had ſo high an opinion of the excellence of Homer, as to make a law, that in every fifth year of the Panathenæa his poems, and his only, ſhould be recited by the rhapſodiſts."—S.

your

your profeſſion. For to be always well dreſſed[1], and to make the handſomeſt appearance poſſible, as becomes a man, no doubt, who ſpeaks in public; to be converſant, beſides, in the works of many excellent poets, eſpecially in thoſe of Homer, the beſt and moſt divine of them all; and to learn, not merely his verſes, but his meaning, as it is neceſſary you ſhould; theſe are advantages highly to be envied. For a man could never be a good rhapſodiſt unleſs he underſtood what he recited: becauſe it is the buſineſs of a rhapſodiſt to explain to his audience the ſenſe and meaning of the poet; but this it is impoſſible to perform well, without a [2] knowledge of thoſe things, concerning which the poet writes. Now all this certainly merits a high degree of admiration.

Io. You are in the right, Socrates. And the learning this I have made my principal buſineſs. It has given me indeed more trouble than any other branch of my profeſſion. I preſume therefore there is now no man living,

[1] The rhapſodiſts often uſed to recite in a theatrical manner, not only with proper geſtures, but in a garb alſo ſuitable to their ſubject: and when they thus acted the Odyſſey of Homer, were dreſſed in a purple-coloured robe, ἀλουργὶς, to repreſent the wanderings of Ulyſſes by ſea: but when they acted the Iliad, they wore one of a ſcarlet colour, to ſignify the bloody battles deſcribed in that poem. Upon their heads they bore a crown of gold; and held in their hands a wand made of the laurel-tree, which was ſuppoſed to have the virtue of heightening poetic raptures; being, we may preſume, found to have, like the laurel with us, though a different kind of tree, ſomewhat of an intoxicating quality. See Euſtathius on Homer's Iliad, b. i. and the ſcholiaſt on Heſiod's Theogony, v. 30. This little piece of information, we imagine, will not be diſagreeable to our readers: although in this paſſage, we muſt own, the common dreſs of the rhapſodiſts, when off the ſtage, ſeems rather to be intended; and the finery of Io, at that very time of his meeting with Socrates, reſembling probably that of our itinerant quack-doctors, to be here ridiculed.—S.

[2] This whole ſpeech of Socrates is ironical. For Xenophon, in whoſe writings Socrates is a graver character, with a leſs mixture of humour than in thoſe of Plato, introduceth his great maſter expreſsly declaring, that no ſort of people in the world were ſillier, μωρότεροι, than the rhapſodiſts: and Maximus Tyrius calls them a race of men utterly void of underſtanding, το των ῥαψῳδων γενος το ανοητοτατον. Diſſ. xxiii. We are to obſerve however, that notwithſtanding this, and our compariſon of their manners and way of life with thoſe of mountebanks and ſtrolling players, yet they held a much higher rank in common eſtimation, equal to that of the moſt judicious actors in the theatres of our metropolis, or the moſt ingenious profeſſors of any of the polite arts: were fit company for perſons even of the firſt rank, and gueſts not unbecoming their tables. We are not therefore to be ſurpriſed at ſeeing Socrates ſo highly compliment Io, and treat him wit ſo much outward reſpect, as he does through the whole Dialogue.—S.

who differs upon Homer so well as myself: nay, that none of those [1] celebrated persons, [2] Metrodorus of Lampsacus, [3] Stesimbrotus the Thasian, Glauco [4], nor any other, whether antient or modern, was ever able to show in the verses of that poet so many and so fine [5] sentiments as I can do.

Soc.

[1] The persons here mentioned were not rhapsodists, but critics, or as they were afterwards called grammarians; to whose profession antiently belonged the interpreting or explaining of their elder poets. See Dion. Chrys. Orat. liii. p. 553.—S.

[2] We are told by Diog. Laertius, in his life of Anaxagoras, that this Metrodorus was the first who applied himself to compose a work expressly concerning the physiology of Homer; meaning without doubt, as appears from Tatian, Λογ. προς Ἑλλην, that he explained Homer's theology from the various operations and phænomena of nature: and further, that he was intimate with Anaxagoras, and improved the moral explications of Homer, which had been given by that philosopher. If all this be true, Metrodorus must have been a great philosopher himself. For to have done this to the satisfaction of such a man as Anaxagoras, the master of Socrates, required certainly no mean degree of knowledge in the nature of man and of the universe. What is more probable is, that Metrodorus having been instructed by Anaxagoras in this knowledge, applied it to the giving a rational account of Homer's mythology, which was understood and received in a literal sense by the vulgar. The book which he composed on this subject, as we learn from Tatian, was entitled περι Ὁμηρου, "Concerning Homer."—S.

[3] Stesimbrotus is mentioned with honour by Socrates himself in Xenophon's Symposium, as a master in explaining Homer: and his abilities of this kind are there set in contrast with the ignorance of the rhapsodists. As to the time when he lived, we learn from Plutarch, in his Life of Cimon, that he was exactly of the same age with that general. The work, for which he seems here to be celebrated, was entitled περι της ποιησεως Ὁμηρου, "Concerning the poetry of Homer," as appears, we think, from Tatian, § 48.—S.

[4] We cannot find this Glauco mentioned by any of the antients, unless he be the same person cited as a grammarian, under the name of Glauco of Tarsus, by an old Greek scholiast upon Homer in the Medicean library, never published. See the passage to which we refer, in Luc. Holsten. de Vitâ et Scriptis Porphyrii, c. vii. But he appears, we think, from the specimen of his criticisms there given, to have been a grammarian of a much later age: we are inclined, therefore, to suspect a misnomer in this place, and instead of Γλαυκων would choose to read Γλαυκος, if any manuscript favoured us; believing that the person here mentioned is Glaucus of Rhegium, who flourished about this time, and wrote a treatise περι ποιητων, as we are informed by Plutarch, t. ii. ed. Par. p. 833. C. or as the title of it is elsewhere by the same author given us more at large, περι των αρχαιων ποιητων τε και μουσικων, t. ii. 1132. E. See Jonsius de Scriptor. Hist. Philos. l. ii. c. 4. § 4. But certainly much mistaken is J. Alb. Fabricius, Bibl. Gr. l. ii. c. 23. n. 37. in supposing the Glauco, here mentioned, to have been a rhapsodist. That very learned and worthy man was used to read too hastily; and did not therefore duly observe amongst what company Glauco is here introduced.—S.

[5] We learn from Plato, in this Dialogue, that the rhapsodists not only recited the poems of Homer, but professed to intrepret hem too. For the multitude every where, having heard that profound

secrets

Soc. I am glad, Io, to hear you ſay ſo: for I am perſuaded you will not be ſo ill-natured as to refuſe the exhibiting before me your abilities in this way.

Io. My illuſtrations of Homer are indeed, Socrates, well worth your attention. For they are ſuch as, I think, entitle me to receive from the admirers [1] of that poet the [2] crown of gold.

Soc. I ſhall find an opportunity of hearing you deſcant on this ſubject ſome other time. For the preſent, I deſire only to be informed of this; whether you are ſo great a maſter in explaining Homer alone, or whether you ſhine no leſs in illuſtrating [3] Heſiod and Archilochus.

Io.

ſecrets of wiſdom lay concealed there, thought there was no reaſon why they ſhould not be made as wiſe as their betters; and were eager to have thoſe hidden myſteries opened and revealed to them. The philoſophers, and thoſe who had ſtudied under them, knew the bulk of the people to be incapable of apprehending thoſe things rightly; or of receiving any real benefit from ſuch revelation; which they conſidered conſequently as a profanation of the truth. The Athenians, therefore, being in a ſtate of democracy, encouraged the rhapſodiſts to undertake the unfolding to them that ſecret wiſdom, reported to be wrapped up in the fables and allegories of Homer. The rhapſodiſts accordingly indulged their curioſity; collecting, as well as they were able, every meaning which had been attributed to that poet by grammarians, critics, or philoſophers. Thus the people became perplexed with a multiplicity of different opinions, infuſed into them by men who had never ſtudied the nature of things. See alſo Mr. Pope's firſt or introductory note on Homer's Iliad.—S.

[1] Ὑπὸ Ὁμηριδῶν. This word in its original ſenſe ſignified only thoſe who were ſuppoſed to be deſcended from Homer, or from ſome of his kindred, and were the fathers or founders of that rhapſodical way of life before deſcribed. The title was afterwards extended to all their ſucceſſors in that profeſſion. See the ſcholiaſt on Pindar's ſecond Nemæan Ode; and Athenæus, p. 620. H. Stephens ſeems to think theſe rhapſodiſts of Homer to be the perſons chiefly intended in this paſſage. If ſo, it ought to be tranſlated, or rather paraphraſed, thus; "For all the interpreters of that poet ought, I think, to yield me the preference and the prize, conſenting to crown me with the golden crown." But believing the word capable of being extended to that larger meaning given it by the old tranſlators, we have ventured to follow them in it, as being a more rational one; the other ſenſe making the arrogance of Io too extravagant and abſurd.—S.

[2] This means not the crown, before mentioned, to have been worn by the rhapſodiſts at the time of their rehearſal: for ſo his boaſt would amount to no more than the pronouncing himſelf worthy of his profeſſion; a ſpeech too little arrogant for the character of Io: but it means the prize, beſtowed on the moſt excellent performer on this occaſion. For that this was a crown of gold, may be ſeen in Meurſius's Panathenæa, c. xxv.—S.

[3] Theſe two poets are ſingled out from the reſt of the poetic tribe, becauſe their poetry, next to that of Homer, was the moſt frequently recited by the rhapſodiſts. This is fairly deducible from the words of Chamælion, cited by Athenæus. Not only, ſays he, were the poems of Homer

Io. By no means: for I own my powers confined to the illuſtrating Homer. To execute this well, is merit enough, I think, for one man.

Soc. But in the writings of Homer and of Heſiod are there no paſſages in which their ſentiments and thoughts agree?

Io. There are, I believe, many paſſages of that kind.

Soc. In theſe caſes now, are you better able to explain the words of Homer, than thoſe of Heſiod?

Io. Equally well to be ſure, Socrates, I can explain the words of both, where they agree.

Soc. But how is it with you, where, in writing on the ſame ſubject, they differ? For inſtance, Homer and Heſiod both write of things that relate to divination.

Io. True.

Soc. Well now; the paſſages in either of theſe poets, relating to divination; not only where he agrees with the other, but where he differs from him: who, think you, is capable of intrepreting with moſt ſkill and judgment, yourſelf, or ſome able diviner?

Io. An able diviner, I muſt own.

Soc. But ſuppoſe you were a diviner, and were able to interpret rightly the ſimilar places in both; would your abilities, do you imagine, fail you, when you came to interpret the places in either of them, where he differed from the other?

Io. I ſhould certainly in that caſe have equal ſkill to explain both of them.

Soc. How comes it to paſs then, that you interpret Homer in ſo maſterly

ſung by the rhapſodiſts, but thoſe of Heſiod too, and of Archilochus; and further, (that is, ſometimes,) the verſes of Mimnermus, and of Phochylides. Ου μονον τα Ὁμηρου, αλλα και τα Ἡσιοδου και Αρχιλοχου. ετι δε, Μιμνερμου και Φωκυλιδου. Deipnoſoph. l. xv. p. 620. The firſt of theſe two, Heſiod, is well known; and as he comes neareſt to Homer in point of time, of all the poets, any of whoſe works are yet remaining entire; ſo is he confeſſedly the next to him in point of merit, among thoſe who wrote in heroic meaſure. Archilochus was the firſt who compoſed poems of the Iambic kind, in which he is ſaid to have been ſuperior to all, who came after him. (See Athenæus's introduction to his Deipnoſoph.) Upon which account Paterculus joins him with Homer; mentioning theſe two poets, as the only inſtances of ſuch as advanced thoſe arts, which they invented themſelves, to the utmoſt pitch of perfection. Dion Chryſoſtom goes beyond this in the praiſes of Archilochus, putting him in the ſame rank with Homer, as a Poet; δυο γαρ ποιητων γε γονταν εξ απαντος του αιωνος, οις ουδενα των αλλων ξυμβαλειν αξιον, Ὁμηρου τε και Αρχιλοχουρ, κ. τ. λ. Dion Orat. xxiii. p. 397. "In all the courſe of time there have been but two poets, with whom no other is worthy of compariſon, Homer and Archilochus."—S.

a manner,

a manner, yet not Heſiod, or any other of the poets? Are the ſubjects of Homer's writings any thing different from the ſubjects of other poems, taken all together? Are they not, in the firſt place, war and military affairs; then, the ſpeeches and mutual diſcourſe of all ſorts of men, the good as well as the bad, whether they be private perſons or public; the converſe alſo of the gods one with another, and their intercourſe with men; the celeſtial bodies, with the various phænomena of the ſky and air; the ſtate of ſouls departed, with the affairs of that lower world; the generation of the gods, with the deſcent and race of the heroes? Are not theſe the [1] ſubjects of Homer's poetry?

Io. They are, Socrates, theſe very things.

Soc. Well; and do not the reſt of the Poets write of theſe very things?

Io. They do, Socrates: but their poetry upon theſe ſubjects is nothing like the poetry of Homer.

Soc. What then, is it worſe?

Io. Much worſe.

Soc. The poetry of Homer, you ſay then, is better and more excellent than that of other poets.

Io. Better indeed it is, and much more excellent, by Jupiter.

Soc. Suppoſe now, my friend Io, out of ſeveral perſons, all in their turns haranguing before an audience upon the nature of numbers, ſome one made a better ſpeech than the reſt; might not one of the auditors be capable of finding out that better ſpeaker, and of giving him the preference due to him?

Io. There might be ſuch a one.

Soc. Would not the ſame auditor, think you, be a judge of what was ſaid by the worſe ſpeakers? or muſt he be a different perſon, who was a proper judge of theſe?

Io. The ſame perſon, certainly.

Soc. And would not a good arithmetician be ſuch a perſon, thus equally able in both reſpects?

[1] As, in deſcribing the ſhield of Achilles, Homer has preſented us with a view of human life, and of the whole univerſe, in epitome; ſo Plato here finely ſums up, in the conciſeſt manner poſſible, thoſe very things, as the ſubjects of the Iliad and the Odyſſey; giving us to behold in them a picture of all human affairs, whether in peace or war; of all nature, whether viſible or inviſible; of the divine cauſes of things; of the heroic virtues among men, and the greatneſs of families in antient days from thence ariſing. S.

Io. Without doubt.

Soc. To put another caſe to you: ſuppoſe among many perſons, ſeverally differting upon food, what ſorts of it were wholeſome, there ſhould be one who ſpoke better than the reſt; would it belong, ſay you, to one of the hearers to diſtinguiſh accurately the better ſpeaker, while it was neceſſary to look amongſt the reſt of the audience for a fit judge of the meaner ſpeakers? or would the ſpeeches of them all be examined judiciouſly, and their different merits and demerits be eſtimated juſtly by the ſame perſon?

Io. By the ſame perſon, beyond all doubt.

Soc. Of what character muſt this perſon be, who is thus qualified? What do you call him?

Io. A phyſician.

Soc. And do not you agree with me, that this holds true univerſally; and that in every caſe, where ſeveral men made diſcourſes upon the ſame ſubject, the nature both of the good and of the bad diſcourſes would be diſcerned by the ſame perſon? For if a man was no proper judge of the defects in the meaner performance, is it not evident that he would be incapable of comprehending the beauties of the more excellent?

Io. You are in the right.

Soc. It belongs to the ſame perſon, therefore, to criticiſe with true judgment upon all of them.

Io. No doubt.

Soc. Did not you ſay that Homer, and the reſt of the poets, for inſtance, Heſiod and Archilochus, write concerning the ſame things, though not in the ſame manner? the compoſitions of the one being excellent, you ſay, while thoſe of the others are comparatively mean.

Io. I ſaid nothing more than what is true.

Soc. If hen you can diſtinguiſh and know the compoſitions which excel, muſt not you neceſſarily know thoſe which fall ſhort of that excellence?

Io. I own it appears probable, from your argument.

Soc. It follows therefore, my good friend, that in affirming Io to be equally capable of explaining Homer and every other poet, we ſhould not miſs the truth: ſince he acknowledges one and the ſame perſon to be an able judge of all ſuch as write concerning the ſame things; admitting at the ſame time the ſubjects of almoſt all poetical writings to be the ſame.

Io. What can poſſibly be then the reaſon, Socrates, that whenever I am preſent

preſent at an harangue upon any other poet, I pay not the leaſt regard to it; nor am able to contribute to the entertainment, or to advance any thing upon the ſubject in my turn, worth the regard of others; but grow downright dull, and fall aſleep: yet that as ſoon as any mention is made of Homer, immediately I am rouſed, am all attention, and with great facility find enough to ſay upon this ſubject?

Soc. It is not in the leaſt difficult, my friend to gueſs the reaſon. For to every man it muſt be evident, that you are not capable of explaining Homer on the [1] principles of art, or from real ſcience. For if your ability was of this kind, depending upon your knowledge of any art, you would be as well able to explain every other poet: ſince the whole, of what they all write, is poetry; is it not?

Io. It is.

Soc. Well now; when a man comprehends any other art, the whole of it, is not his way of conſidering and criticiſing all the [2] profeſſors of that art, one and the ſame? and does not his judgment in every caſe depend on the ſame principles? Would you have me explain myſelf upon this point, Io? do you deſire to know the meaning of my queſtion?

Io. By all means, Socrates. For I take great pleaſure in hearing you wiſe men talk.

Soc. I ſhould be glad, Io, could that appellation be juſtly applied to me; but you are the wiſe men, you rhapſodiſts and the [3] players, together with the poets, whoſe verſes you recite to us. For my part, I ſpeak nothing but the ſimple

[1] The Italian tranſlator has ſtrangely omitted this latter part of the ſentence, though very material to the ſenſe.

[2] In the Greek we read "περι ἁπασων των τεχνων." But if Socrates does indeed, as he undertakes to do, explain the meaning of this ſentence in what follows, his own explanation requires us to read "περι ἁπαντων των τεχνιτων, or rather τεχνικων, this being the word always uſed by Plato to ſignify *artiſts*. The argument however would bear the reading with leſs alteration, "περι ἁπασων των τεχνοσυνων," that is, all the performances in that art. Either way we are thus freed from the neceſſity, which Ficinus was under, from his retaining the common reading, to inſert many words of his own, in order to preſerve the juſtneſs of the reaſoning, and make this paſſage agreeable to the ſequel.—S.

[3] Plato in other places beſide this, as hereafter in this Dialogue, in the 3d book of the Republic, and in the 2d book of the Laws, joins together the arts of rhapſody and of acting plays, as being arts

ſimple truth, as it becomes a mere private man to do. For the queſtion, which I juſt now aſked you, ſee how mean a matter it concerns, how common, and within the compaſs of every man's reach to know, that which I called [1] one and the ſame way of criticiſing, when a man comprehends the whole of any art. To give an [2] inſtance of ſuch comprehenſive ſkill; painting is an art, to be comprehended as one kind of ſkill, whole and entire; is it not?

Io. It is.

Soc. Is there not a difference, in degree of merit, between the ſeveral profeſſors of that art, whether you conſider the ancients or the moderns?

Io. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Now then, do you know any man who is an able critic in the

arts of near affinity. That affinity between them was greater than one would be apt to imagine, and appears in a ſtrong light from what Euſtathius ſays of the rhapſodiſts, that "frequently they uſed to act in a manner ſomewhat dramatic." Hence in the feaſt of Bacchus, principally celebrated with dramatic entertainments, the rhapſodiſts had antiently a ſhare: and one of the feſtival days was called εορτη των ραψῳδων. See Athenæus, l. v. p. 275. Heſychius therefore with great propriety explains the word ραψῳδοι rhapſodiſts, by this deſcription ὑποκριται επων, actors of epic poems.—S.

[1] Socrates here, in the way of irony, after his uſual manner, inſinuates ſome very important doctrines of his philoſophy, leading us up even to the higheſt. For, obſerving that all the arts depend on certain uniform and ſtable principles, he would have us infer, in the firſt place, that every art, properly ſo called, or as it is diſtinguiſhed from ſcience on the one hand, on the other from mere habit and experience, is built on ſcience; and that no perſon can be juſtly called an artiſt, or a maſter of the art which he profeſſes, unleſs he has learnt the epiſtemonic or ſciential principles of it: in the next place, that ſcience is a thing ſtable, uniform, and general; guiding the judgment with unerring certainty, to know the rectitude and the pravity of every particular, cogniſable from the rules of any art depending thus on ſcience: further, that every ſcience hath certain principles, peculiar to it, uniform and indentical: and laſtly, that all the ſciences are branches of ſcience general, ariſing from one root, which in like manner is uniform, and always the ſame.—S.

[2] Λαβωμεν τω λογῳ. Serranus very abſurdly tranſlates it thus, "*adhibitâ ratione comprehendere.*" Ficinus imperfectly thus, "*exempli causâ,*" followed by the Italian, "*come per eſempio.*" So alſo Cornarius, "*verbi causâ.*" True it is, that λαβε τω λογῳ, frequently ſignifies *take an inſtance.* But in this place, λαβωμεν refers to the word λαβη, *comprehend,* in the preceding ſentence; and λογῳ is oppoſed to an actual comprehending of any art. Thus, to omit many paſſages in Plato's Republic; in the third book of his Laws, λογῳ κατοικιζειν την πολιν is oppoſed to the actual founding of a city: and again in his Theætetus, ἱνα μη στησωμεν αυτους τω λογῳ is in oppoſition to an actual ſettling, or fixing. Euripides with the ſame meaning oppoſes λογῳ to εργῳ in this verſe of his Cylops, Γευσαι νυν, ὡς αν μη λογῳ 'παινης μονον.—S.

works

works of [1] Polygnotus, the ſon of Aglaophon; and can ſhow, with great judgment, which of his pieces he executed well, and which with leſs ſucceſs; yet in the works of other painters hath no critical ſkill; and whenever their performances are brought upon the carpet to be examined and criticiſed, grows dull and falls aſleep, or is unable to contribute his quota to the converſation: but as ſoon as occaſion calls him to declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any other particular painter whatever, immediately is rouſed, is all attention, and finds enough to ſay upon this ſubject? Know you any ſuch man?

Io. Really I do not.

Soc. Well now; in the ſtatuary's art how is it? Did you ever ſee any man, who upon the works of [2] Dædalus, the ſon of Metion, or Epeius, ſon to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other ſingle ſtatuary, was able to diſplay great judgment in ſhowing the excellent performances of ſo great a maſter; yet with regard to the works of other ſtatuaries, was at a loſs, grew dull, and fell aſleep, becauſe he had nothing to ſay?

Io. I confeſs I never ſaw ſuch a man neither.

Soc. Nor is it otherwiſe, I imagine, with regard to [3] muſic, whether we

[1] This excellent artiſt was, in the days of Socrates, the Homer of the painters; and is here for this reaſon ſingled out from the reſt of his profeſſion, as the moſt proper for the compariſon; which was intended to ſhow, that the ſame circumſtance attended both the arts, of poetry and painting; this, that true critical ſkill, to judge of the performances of the beſt artiſt, inferred equal judgment with regard to all of inferior claſs. Polygnotus was the firſt painter, who gave an accurate and lively expreſſion of the manners and paſſions, by proper attitudes, and every variety of countenance. He diſtinguiſhed himſelf alſo by giving his portraits what we call a handſome likeneſs: and, beſides many other improvements which he made to his art, invented the way of ſhowing the ſkin through a tranſparent drapery. See Ariſtotle's Politics, b. viii. c. 5. and his Poetics, c. 2. and 6. Pliny's Nat. Hiſt. b. xxxv. c. 9. and Ælian's Var. Hiſt. b. iv. c. 3.—S.

[2] Plato here has purpoſely choſen for his inſtances three ſtatuaries, famous for their excellence in three very different ways, to make his reaſoning more juſt and leſs liable to exception; when he is proving, by induction, the fameneſs of the art of criticiſing upon all the poets, however different in their kinds. Dædalus then was particularly admirable for his wonderful automatons, or ſelf-moving machines, mentioned by Plato in his Meno. Epeius is well known to the readers of Homer's Odyſſey, and Virgil's Æneid, for that vaſt work of his, the Trojan horſe, of a ſize ſo ſtupendous. And the excellence of Theodorus conſiſted in the extreme minuteneſs and ſubtility of his works. See Pliny's Nat. Hiſt. b. xxxiv. c. 8.—S.

[3] In this word the antients comprehended all thoſe arts, which have any relation to the muſes,

Every

we conſider [1] wind-inſtruments, or thoſe of the ſtring-kind; and theſe laſt, whether alone, or [2] accompanied by the voice; ſo likewiſe in rhapſodical recitals; you never, I preſume, ſaw a man, who was a great maſter

Every ſpecies of poetry, known at that time, is included in what follows. For Αυλησις includes dithyrambic poety and ſatire. Κιθαρισις, joined with αυλησις, implies comedy and tragedy; becauſe in theſe the αυλος and the κιθαρα were the inſtruments principally uſed: thus Maximus Tyrius; αυληματα, ἡ κιθαρισματα, ἡ ει τις αλλη εν Διονυσου μουσα τραγικη τις και κωμωδικη. Diſſert. vii. Κιθαρῳδια means all Lyric poetry, or that, which the muſician ſung to his own inſtrument, the κιθαρα, or the λυρα. And Ῥαψῳδικ comprehends all poems, uſually recited, whether compoſed in heroic, elegiac, or other meaſure. We ſee here then, in what arts were thoſe αγωνες, or trials of ſkill, before mentioned, propoſed at the feaſts of Æſculapius. True it is, that Plato, in different parts of his writings, uſeth the word muſic in different ſenſes. In ſome places he means by it not only all harmony, whether inſtrumental or vocal, but all rhythm, whether in ſound or in motion. The following remarkable inſtance of this occurs in his Firſt Alcibiades: ΣΩΚ. Ειπε πρωτον, τις ἡ τεχνη, ἡς το κιθαριζειν, και το ᾀδειν, και το εμβαινειν ορθως, συναπασα τις καλειται; ουπω δυνασαι ειπειν; ΑΛΚ. Ου δητα. ΣΩΚ. Αλλ' ὡδε πειρω. τινες αι θεαι, ὡν ἡ τεχνη; ΑΛΚ. Τας Μουσας, ω Σωκρατες, λεγεις; ΣΩΚ. Εγωγε. ὁρα δη' τινα απ' αυτων επωνυμιαν ἡ τεχνη εχει; ΑΛΚ. Μουσικην μοι δοκεις λεγειν. ΣΩΚ. Λεγω γαρ. In other places, he confines it to melody alone. Thus, for inſtance, in his Gorgias, muſic is defined to be an art converſant περι την των μελων ποιησιν. Sometimes he enlarges it, ſo as to take in proſaic eloquence; and ſometimes ſo widely, as to comprehend all the liberal arts. There are paſſages where it is made to ſignify virtue; and a few, in which it is applied to the ſublimer parts of philoſophy. Theſe laſt metaphorical uſes of the word are ſufficiently accounted for by Plato himſelf on proper occaſions: the reſt we ſhall take notice of, and vindicate, in their due places. But in the ſentence now before us, that enumeration of the ſpecies of muſic fixes the meaning of the word, and limits it to the common acceptation. That Μουσικη has the ſame meaning in the beginning of this Dialogue, where we have tranſlated it, "the Muſe's art," is plain from the nature of the ſubject in that place. For every thing elſe, comprehended in the larger ſenſes of the word, would there be foreign to the purpoſe; as being, if we except medicine, nothing to Æſculapius.—S.

[1] The Greek is ουδε εν αυλησει γε, ουδε εν κιθαρισει. Αυλος is known to be a general term for all wind-inſtruments. Επιπνεομενα οργανα, το μεν συμπαν, αυλοι και συριγγες, ſays Jul. Pollux, Onomaſtic. l. iv. c. 9. And becauſe the Κιθαρα ſtood at the head of all ſtringed inſtruments, it is ſometimes taken for them all. Accordingly Maximus Tyrius expreſſes all inſtrumental muſic by theſe two kinds, αυληματα και κιθαρισματα. Diſſert. xxxii. See likewiſe Ariſtotle's Poetics, ch. i. and Plato's Leſſer Hippias, p. 375. ed. Steph. But theſe two being wholly diſtinct, the one from the other, we are not to imagine that ever they were either confounded together, and uſed promiſcuouſly, the one for the other; or that both of them were ſometimes ſignified by the word αυλος, as a common term for all inſtruments of either kind. We make this obſervation, to prevent the young ſcholar from being miſled by Heſychius, who explains the word Αυλος thus, κιθαρα ἡ συριγξ: for which egregious miſtake his late learned editor has but lamely apologized.—S.

in

in critiſing on [3] Olympus, or on Thamyris, or on Orpheus, or on Phemius the rhapſodiſt of Ithaca; but as to Io the Epheſian, was at a loſs what to ſay about him, and unable to give any account of Io's good or bad performances.

Io. I have nothing to oppoſe to what you ſay upon this point, Socrates: but of this I am conſcious to myſelf, that upon Homer I diſſert the beſt of all men, and do it with great eaſe. Nor is this my own opinion only; for all people agree, that my diſſertations of this kind are excellent. But if the ſubject be any other of the poets, it is quite otherwiſe with me. Conſider then what may be the meaning of this.

Soc. I do conſider, Io; and proceed to ſhow you how it appears to me. That you are able to diſcourſe well concerning Homer is not owing to any art of which you are maſter; nor do you explain or illuſtrate him, as I ſaid before, upon the principles or from the rules of art; but from a divine power, acting upon you, and impelling you: a power reſembling that which acts in the ſtone, called by Euripides the magnet, but known commonly by the name of [4] the loadſtone. For this ſtone does not only attract iron rings, but

[2] The Greek here is κιθαρωδια: which word Euſtathius, in his commentary on the Iliad, b. ii. v. 600. by a ſtrange blunder, confounds with κιθαριστις, and makes them both to have the ſame meaning.—S.

[3] Theſe four perſons ſeverally excelled in the four arts juſt before mentioned, each of them in one, according to the order in which they are there ranked. For we learn from Plutarch περι μουσικης, and from Maximus Tyrius, Diſſ. xxiv. that Olympus's inſtrument was the Αυλος. How excellent a maſter he was of muſic we are told by Plato in his Minos, and by Ariſtotle in his Politics, b. viii. c. 5. who both agree, that the muſical airs of his compoſing were moſt divine, and excited enthuſiaſtic raptures in every audience. Thamyris is celebrated by Homer himſelf, who calls him κιθαριστυς, Iliad. l. ii. v. 600. Agreeably to which we are informed by Pliny, that Thamyris was the firſt who played on the cithara, without accompanying it with his voice. Hiſt. Nat. l. vii. c. 56. The fame of Orpheus is well known: and among many paſſages in the writings of the antients, to prove that he was κιθαρωδος, or ſung and played on his inſtrument together, this of Ovid is moſt expreſs, "*Talia dicentem, nervoſque ad verba moventem.*" Metamorph. l. x. v. 40—and this other in l. xi. v. 4. "*Orphea percuſſis ſociantem carmina nervis.*" And as to Phemius, that he *recited* (or ſung in recitativo) poems of the epic kind, touching his lyre at the ſame time, appears from Homer's Odyſſey, b. i. v. 153, &c. and b. xvii. v. 262.—S.

[4] The Greek word here is ἡρακλεια, which Bembo tranſlates *di Hercole*. But we are taught by Heſychius, that this name was given to the loadſtone from the city Heraclea in Lydia, where probably they were found in greater number than elſewhere. Accordingly, the ſame ſtone was alſo called λιθος Λυδικος, *the Lydian ſtone*. The ſame Heſychius, however, ſays, that Plato is miſtaken

but impart to thoſe rings the power of doing that very thing which itſelf does, enabling them to attract other rings of iron. So that ſometimes may be ſeen a very long ſeries of iron rings, depending, as in a chain, one from another. But from that ſtone, at the head of them, is derived the virtue which operates in them all. In the ſame manner, the Muſe, inſpiring, moves men herſelf through her divine impulſe. From theſe men, thus inſpired, others [1], catching the ſacred power, form a chain of divine enthuſiaſts. For the beſt epic poets, and all ſuch as excel in the compoſing any kind of verſes to be recited, frame not thoſe their admirable poems from the rules

in ſuppoſing the magnet to be the ſame with this ſtone, referring, undoubtedly, to the paſſage now before us. But it is Heſychius who is miſtaken, not Plato. For that the μαγνητις of the antients was the ſame with our magnet, appears from theſe words of Alexander Aphrodiſienſis, an earlier writer than Heſychius, μαγνητις ἑλκει μονον τον σιδηρον. Com. in Ariſtot. Problem. fol. 1. and from theſe of Cicero long before, *Magnetem lapidem—qui ferrum ad ſe alliciat et attrahat.* Cic. de Divinat. lib. i. Yet Heſychius is ſo fond of his miſtake, as to repeat it in three different places; admitting the ἡρακλεια to attract iron, but denying that quality to the μαγνητις. See Heſych. in vocibus, ἡρακλεια, λιθος Λυδικος, and μαγνητις. Λιθος Λυδικος indeed frequently among the ancients ſignified the touchſtone: but ſo did ſometimes μαγνητις. Witneſs the following paſſage of Euripides himſelf, τας βροτων Γνωμας σκοπων, [σὺ] ὡστε μαγνητις λιθος. See alſo Theophraſtus περι λιθων. The truth ſeems to be, that the names of theſe two ſtones, the touchſtone and the loadſtone, were not well diſtinguiſhed, but vulgarly confounded, in the days of Plato. This accounts for that uncertainty and doubtfulneſs with which Plato here mentions the name of this ſtone; which in any other light would appear unneceſſary and inſipid. This, perhaps, alſo was the reaſon why no particular name of that ſtone was mentioned by Ariſtotle, ſpeaking of it in this paſſage, εοικε δε και Θαλης, εξ ὡν απομνημονευουσι, κινητικον τι την ψυχην ὑπολαμβανειν, ειπερ τον λιθον εφη ψυχην εχειν, ὁτι τον σιδηρον κινει. Ariſtot. de Animâ, lib. i. cap. 2.

[1] The contagion of this kind of enthuſiaſm is thus beautifully painted by a fine critic, who himſelf felt all the force of it: Πολλοι γαρ αλλοτριῳ θεοφορουνται πνευματι, τον αυτον τροπον, ὁν και την Πυθιαν λογος εχει, τριποδι πλησιαζουσαν, ειθα ῥηγμα εστι γης αναπνεον, ὡς φασιν, ατμον ενθεον αυτοθεν, και εγκυμονα της δαιμονιου καθισταμενην δυναμεως, παραυτικα χρησμῳδειν κατ' επιπνοιαν· ουτως απο της των αρχαιων μεγαλοφυιας, εις τας των ζηλουντων εκεινους ψυχας, ὡς απο ἱερων στομιων, απορροιαι τινες φερονται, ὑφ' ὡν επιπνεομενοι και οἱ μη λιαν Φοιβαστικοι τῳ ἑτερων συνενθουσιωσι μεγεθει. "Many are poſſeſſed and actuated by a divine ſpirit, derived to them through others: in the ſame manner as it is reported of the Delphian prieſteſs, that when ſhe approaches the ſacred tripod, where a chaſm in the earth, they ſay, reſpires ſome vapour, which fills her with enthuſiaſm, ſhe is immediately by that more than human power made pregnant; and is there upon the ſpot delivered of oracles, ſuch as the particular nature of the inſpiration generates. So, from the great genius reſiding in the antients, through them, as through ſome ſacred opening, certain effluxes, iſſuing forth, paſs into the ſouls of their admirers: by which many, who of themſelves but little feel the force of Phœbus, ſwell with the expanſive virtue of thoſe great and exalted ſpirits." Longin. de Sublim. § 11.—S.

of

of [1] art; but poſſeſſed by the Muſe, they write from divine inſpiration. Nor is it otherwiſe with the beſt lyric poets, and all other fine writers of verſes to be ſung. For as the prieſts of [2] Cybele perform not their dances, while they have the free uſe of their intellect; ſo theſe melody poets pen thoſe beautiful ſongs of theirs only when they are out of their ſober minds. But as ſoon as they proceed to give voice and motion to thoſe ſongs, adding to their words the harmony of muſic and the meaſure of dance, they are immediately tranſported; and, poſſeſſed by ſome divine power, are like the prieſteſſes of [3] Bacchus, who, full of the god, no longer draw water, but honey

[1] In the Greek it is ουκ εκ τεχνης. Bembo's tranſlation of which, *non con arte*, excludes art from having any ſhare in the beſt poetical compoſitions. But Plato's words admit of art, as an attendant upon the Muſe; though they make not her art, but her inſpiration, to be the miſtreſs and leading cauſe of all which is excellent in poetry. Serranus happily paraphraſes it, *non artis auſpiciis*. The following paſſage in the Phædrus puts the meaning of Plato, with regard to this point, out of diſpute. Ος δ' αν ανευ μανιας Μουσων επι ποιητικας θυρας αφικηται, πειθεις ως αρα εκ τεχνης ικανως ποιητης εσομενος, ατελης αυτος τε, και η ποιησις υπο της των μαινομενων η του σωφρονουντος ηφανισθη. "Whoever went, with a mind ſober and uninſpired, to the gates of the Muſes; and made his application to them, in order to be taught their art; perſuaded, that the learning that was alone ſufficient to qualify him for writing poetry; never attained to any perfection as a poet; and his poetry, as being that of a man cool and ſober, is now obliterated all, having been darkened by the ſplendour of that of the inſpired."—S.

[2] The rites of Cybele and of Bacchus, beyond thoſe of any other deities, were performed in a ſpirit of enthuſiaſm: which exerted itſelf in extraordinary agitations of body. Accordingly, theſe two religious rites are ſung of together, as equally enthuſiaſtical, by the chorus between the firſt and ſecond acts in the Bacchæ of Euripides.—S.

[3] The following account of enthuſiaſm, and the cauſes of divine mania, extracted from the third ſection of Jamblichus de Myſt., as it admirably illuſtrates this part of the Io, will, I doubt not, be gratefully received by every Platonic reader:

Enthuſiaſm is falſely believed to be an agitation of the dianoëtic part in conjunction with dæmoniacal inſpiration; for the inſpiration is from the gods. But neither is it ſimply an ecſtaſy, but a reduction and reſtitution of the ſoul to a more excellent nature; ſince inordinate motion and ecſtaſy indicate a regreſſion to that which is worſe. Further ſtill, the advocate for ecſtaſy adduces that which happens to thoſe that energize enthuſiaſtically, but does not teach us the leading cauſe, which is this, that the inſpired are wholly poſſeſſed by a divine power; which poſſeſſion is afterwards followed by ecſtaſy. No one, therefore, can juſtly apprehend, that enthuſiaſm depends on the ſoul, or any one of its powers, or on intellect, or energies, or corporeal infirmity, or that it cannot be produced without this. For the work of divine afflation is not human, nor does it derive all its authority from human parts and energies; but theſe have the relation of ſubjects, and divinity uſes them as inſtruments. Hence he accompliſhes the whole buſineſs of prophecy

[1] honey and milk out of the ſprings and fountains; though unable to do any thing like it when they are ſober. And in fact there paſſes in the ſouls of theſe poets that very thing which they pretend to do. For they aſſure us, that out of certain gardens and flowery vales belonging to the Muſes, from fountains

through himſelf, unmingled with and liberated from other things, and neither the ſoul nor body moving, energizes by himſelf. Hence too, prophecies, when they are conducted in this manner, are unattended with falſehood. But when the ſoul has been previouſly diſturbed, or is moved during the inſpiration, or is confounded by the body, and diſturbs the divine harmony, then the prophecies become confuſed and fallacious, and the enthuſiaſm is no longer true or genuine.

With reſpect to the cauſes of divine mania, they are as follow: Illuminations proceeding from the gods; ſpirits imparted by them; and an all-perfect dominion from them, which comprehends all that we poſſeſs, and entirely exterminates our proper obſequiency and motion. It alſo produces words which are not underſtood by thoſe that utter them, but are delivered, as it is ſaid, with an inſane mouth; the poſſeſſed being wholly ſubſervient and obedient to the energy alone of the inſpiring deity: ſuch, in ſhort, is enthuſiaſm, and from ſuch like cauſes does it derive its perfection.

Again, with reſpect to its proper cauſes, it muſt not be ſaid, that it ariſes from this, that nature leads every thing to its like: for the enthuſiaſtic energy is not the work of nature. Nor is it produced becauſe the temperature of the air, and of that which ſurrounds us, cauſes a difference of craſis in the body of the enthuſiaſtic. For the works of the gods are not changed by corporeal powers or temperaments. Nor is it that the inſpiration of the gods accords with paſſions and generated natures. For the gift to men of the proper energy of the gods is more excellent than all generation. But becauſe the power of the Corybantes is of a guardian nature, and adapted to ſacred myſteries, and becauſe that of Sabazius pertains to the purification of ſouls, and a diſſolution of antient anger, on this account the inſpirations of theſe divinities are in every reſpect different.

In ſhort, the ſpirits which from the divinities excite and agitate men with divine fury, expel all human and phyſical motion, nor are their operations to be compared with our accuſtomed energies; but it is requiſite to refer them to the gods, as their primary cauſes.

Thus we ſee that Jamblichus very properly ſuſpends enthuſiaſm and divination from the divinities, and aſcribes all the varieties of theſe to the different characteriſtic properties of the gods, as to their proper ſource.—T.

[1] This place receives great light from the two following paſſages in Euripides:

Ὅσαις δὲ λευκου πωματος ποθος παρη,
Ακροισι δακτυλοισι διαμωσαι χθονα,
Γαλακτος εσμους ειχον· εκ δε κισσινων
Θυρσων γλυκειαι μελιτος εσταζον ροαι. Bacch. v. 707.

Ῥει δε γαλακτι πεδον,
Ῥει δ' οινῳ, ῥει δε μελισσαν
Νεκταρι. Bacch. v. 142.

The

fountains flowing there with honey, gathering the [1] ſweetneſs of their ſongs, they bring it to us, like the bees; and in the ſame manner withal, flying. Nor do they tell us any untruth. For a poet is a thing light, and volatile, and [2] ſacred; nor is he able to write poetry, till the Muſe entering into him, he is tranſported out of himſelf, and has no longer the command of his intellect. But ſo long as a man continues in the poſſeſſion of intellect, he is

The firſt of theſe is in one of the dialogue ſcenes of the tragedy, and part of a narration; in Engliſh thus,

Some, longing for the milder milky draught,
Green herbs or bladed graſs of the bleſt ground
Cropp'd with light finger; and to them, behold,
Out guſh'd the milky liquid: trickling down
To others, from their ivy-twined wands
Dropp'd the ſweet honey.——

The other is ſung in chorus by the Bacchæ themſelves; which we have therefore thus paraphraſed,

Streams of milk along the plain
Gently flow in many a vein:
Flows ſweet nectar, ſuch as bee
Sips from flow'r and flow'ring tree:
Flow the richer purple rills;
Bacchus' ſelf their current fills.

From hence are to be explained the fabulous relations in Anton. Liberal. Met. lib. x. and Ælian. V. H. lib. iii. c. 42. There is likewiſe a paſſage, cited by Ariſtides the orator, from Æſchines, one of the diſciples of Socrates, ſo much like this of Plato, that the reader may, perhaps, have pleaſure in comparing them together. Αἱ Βακχαι, επειδαν ενθεοι γενωνται, ὁθεν οἱ αλλοι εκ των φρεατων ουδε ὑδωρ δυνανται ὑδρευεσθαι, εκειναι μελι και γαλα αρυονται. Ariſtid. Orat. vol. iii. p. 34. ed. Canter. "The prieſteſſes of Bacchus, when they are become full of the god, extract honey and milk from thoſe wells, out of which no common perſon is able ſo much as to draw water."—S.

[1] The Greek is only τα μελη, and is by the old tranſlators rendered ſimply *carmina*, and *i verſi*. We are in doubt whether the true reading is not το μελι: for the preceding word is δρεπομενοι, and the metaphor the ſame with this of Horace, *Ego apis matinæ more modoque, Grata carpentis thyma*, &c. If this alteration be not admitted, an alluſion, however, to the word μελι is certainly meant, in the ſimilarity of ſound, which μελη bears to it. And there is then a neceſſity, beſides, for inſerting the word μελι immediately afterwards, as Ficinus does in his tranſlation; which is making a ſtill greater change in the text of the original.—S.

[2] Bees were by the antients held ſacred, becauſe fabled to have yielded their honey for a nouriſhment to the Cretan Jupiter in his infancy; (ſee Virgil's fourth Georgic, v. 150.) and poets, becauſe ſuppoſed to be under the influence of the Muſe.—S.

unable

unable to ſing either odes or oracles; to write any kind of poetry, or utter any ſort of prophecy. Hence it is, that the poets ſay indeed many fine things, whatever their ſubject be; juſt as you do concerning Homer: but each is alone able to accompliſh this through a divine deſtiny, on that ſubject to which he is impelled by the Muſe; this poet in [1] dithyrambic; that in panegyric; one in chorus ſongs, another in epic verſe, another in iambic. In the other kinds every one of them is mean, and makes no figure: and this, becauſe they write not what is taught them by art, but what is ſuggeſted to them by ſome divine power, on whoſe influence they depend. For if it was their knowledge of the art which enabled them to write good poems upon one ſubject, they would be able to write poems equally good upon all other ſubjects. But for this reaſon it is, that the god, depriving them of the uſe of their intellect, employs them as his miniſters, his [2] oracle ſingers, and divine [3] prophets; that when we hear them, we may know, [4] it is not theſe men who deliver things ſo excellent; theſe, to whom intellect [5] is not preſent; but the god himſelf ſpeaking, and through theſe men publiſhing

[1] The uſual accuracy of Plato appears ſtrongly in this paſſage. For the five ſpecies of poetry, here enumerated, were the moſt of any full of enthuſiaſm, of the *vis poetica*, and the *os magna ſonans*; and appear ranked in their proper degrees of excellence in thoſe reſpects; beginning with that, which was deemed, and indeed by its effects proved, to be the moſt highly rapturous.—S.

[2] Near the ſeat of the oracle were certain poets employed, as the oracular reſponſe was delivered, to put it into metre. And becauſe, in order to execute their office well, they ought to enter into the ſenſe and ſpirit of thoſe reſponſes, they were piouſly preſumed to be themſelves inſpired by the oracle.—S.

[3] Plato in other places calleth the poets by this name; particularly in the ſecond book of his Republic, where his words are, οἱ θεῶν παιδες ποιηται, και προφηται των θεων γενομενοι, *poets, born the children of the gods, and made afterward their prophets.* And in the Second Alcibiades he calls Homer, by way of eminence, θεων προφητης, *the prophet of the gods.*—S.

[4] Thus Tully, who profeſſedly imitated Plato; *Deus incluſus corpore humano jam, non Caſſandra, loquitur.* Cic. de Divinat. lib. i.—S.

[5] The ſoul, when reſigning herſelf to the inſpiring influence of divinity, in conſequence of energizing divinely, is no longer governed by intellect; and it may therefore be ſaid, that intellect is then no longer preſent to her nature. Mr. Sydenham, from not having penetrated the depths of antient theology, has unhappily given, by his tranſlation, an air of ridicule to this paſſage; and I am ſorry to add, that this is not the only inſtance in which he has done the ſame, both in this and other dialogues. The original is οις νους μη παρεστιν. The tranſlation of Mr. Sydenham, *who are diveſted of common ſenſe.*—T.

his

his mind to us. The greateſt proof of that which I advance, is Tynnichus the Chalcidian; who never compoſed any other poem, worth the mention or remembrance, beſide that [1] Pæan, which every body ſings, of almoſt all [2] odes the moſt excellent, and as he himſelf tells us,

> [3] Wholly a preſent from the Muſe's hands,
> Some new invention of their own.

For in him does the god ſeem to give us a convincing evidence, ſo as to leave no room for doubt, that thoſe beautiful poems are not human, nor the compoſitions of men; but divine, and the work of gods: and that poets are only interpreters of the [4] gods, inſpired and poſſeſſed, each of them by that particular deity who correſponds to the peculiar nature of the poet. This, the better to demonſtrate to us, did the god purpoſely chooſe out a poet of the meaneſt kind, through whom to ſing a melody of the nobleſt. Do not you think, Io, that I ſay what is true?

Io. Indeed I do: for I [5] feel as it were in my very ſoul, Socrates, the truth of what you ſay. To me too ſuch poets, as write finely, appear in their

[1] This was an ode or hymn in honour of Apollo, ſo called from one of the names or titles of that god: in the ſame manner, as the word *Dithyrambic* is derived from Διθυραμβος, one of the names of Bacchus.—S.

[2] Μελων. In μελη are included all poems, made to be ſung; as επη, in the larger ſenſe of that word, comprehends all thoſe made for recital.—S.

[3] The Greek is ατεχνως ευρημα τι μουσαν. This is a verſe in the Alcmanian meaſure. Whence it appears, that this incomparable ode of Tynnichus, unhappily loſt, was of the lyric kind, and in the meaſure uſed by Alcman, approaching the neareſt of any to the heroic. It is evident, that Plato, in citing this verſe, as applicable to his preſent purpoſe, alludes to the other ſenſe of the word ατεχνως, in which it ſignifies *inartificially*, or *without art*. It was impoſſible to preſerve this double meaning in our language, unleſs the word ſimply may be thought tolerably expreſſive of it. Cornarius renders it in Latin, *ſine arte*: but the reſt of the tranſlators, as if it were a word of no force or even meaning at all, have entirely omitted it in their tranſlations. It is probable, however, that they were miſled by the falſe pointing in Aldus's edition, which refers the word ατεχνως to the preceding ſentence.—S.

[4] Hence probably was this title given to Orpheus, *ſacer, interpreſque deorum*, by Horace, Epiſt. ad Piſon. v. 391.—S.

[5] The words in the original are very ſtrong and ſignificant, απτη της ψυχης, *you touch my ſoul*. Whoever is well verſed in Plato's way of writing, and is no ſtranger to the Socratic way of thinking, will eaſily imagine, that Plato intends here to hint to us, by what means poetry operates ſo ſtrongly

their writings to be [1] interpreters of the gods, in proportion to the kind and degree of thoſe divine powers, allotted ſeverally to each poet.

Soc. Now you rhapſodiſts interpret in like manner the writings of the poets. Do you not?

Io. So far you ſtill ſay what is true.

Soc. Do you not then become the interpreters of interpreters?

Io. Very true.

Soc. Mind now, Io, and tell me this; and think not to conceal any part of the truth, in anſwering to what I am going to aſk. At thoſe times, when you perform your rehearſals in the beſt manner, and ſtrike your audience with uncommon force and efficacy; when you ſing, for inſtance, of Ulyſſes, haſtening to the entrance of his houſe, appearing in his own proper perſon to the wooers of his queen, and pouring out his arrows cloſe before him, ready for ſpreading round him inſtant death; or repreſent Achilles ruſhing upon Hector; or when you rehearſe, in a different ſtrain, any of the melancholy mournful circumſtances attending Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam; at ſuch times whether have you the free uſe of your intellect? or are you not rather [2] in a ſtate of mental alienation? Does not your ſoul, in an ecſtaſy, imagine herſelf preſent to thoſe very things and actions which you relate? as if you had been hurried away by ſome divine power to Ithaca, or Troy, or wherever elſe be laid the ſcene of action.

Io. How clear and convincing a proof, Socrates, of your argument is this which you have produced! For, without concealing any thing, I ſhall own the truth. When I am reciting any thing pitiable or mournful, my eyes

ſtrongly upon the ſoul; that is, by touching ſome inward ſtring the moſt ready to vibrate; awakening thoſe ſentiments, and ſtirring up thoſe paſſions, to which the ſoul is moſt prompt: inſinuating at the ſame time, that by means of the like aptitude and natural correſpondence, truth touches the mind. Thus Io, in the preſent ſituation of his ſoul, reminded of his own paſt feelings, and made ſenſible to what cauſe they were owing, exemplifies and illuſtrates the truth of that doctrine juſt before laid down by Socrates.—S.

[1] In this ſenſe it is, that the poets are a little before ſtyled the miniſters of the gods, as ſerving them in the conveying their mind and will to mortals. In the ſame ſenſe the rhapſodiſts are called, in the ſecond book of the Republic, ποιητων ὑπηρεται, *the miniſters of the poets*.—S.

[2] Agreeably to this, Cicero introduceth his brother Quintus, obſerving of him, and of Æſop the orator, *tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut eum vis quædam abſtraxiſſe à ſenſu mentis videretur*. Cic. de Divinat. lib. i.—S.

are

are filled with tears; when any thing dreadful or horrible is the ſubject, my hairs ſtand erect, and my heart beats quick, through terror and affright.

Soc. What ſhall we ſay then, Io? that a man has, at that time, the free uſe of his intellect, when, clad in a ſplendid garb, with a crown of gold upon his head, amidſt a feaſt, or at a feſtival, he falls into tears, without having loſt any part of his finery, or of the entertainment? or when he is affrighted and terrified, ſtanding in the midſt of twenty thouſand men, all well-diſpoſed and friendly to him, none offering to ſtrip him of his ornaments, or do him the leaſt injury?

Io. To confeſs the truth, Socrates, he is not, by Jupiter, entirely in the poſſeſſion of intellect.

Soc. Do you know that you produce this very ſame effect upon many of your auditors?

Io. I am, indeed, fully ſenſible of it. For at every ſtriking paſſage I look down from my [1] pulpit round me, and ſee the people ſuitably affected by it: now weeping, then looking as if horror ſeized them; ſuch emotion and ſuch aſtoniſhment are ſpread through all. And it is my buſineſs to obſerve them with ſtrict attention, that if I ſee I have ſet them a weeping, I may be ready to receive their money, and to laugh; but if I find them laughing, that I may prepare myſelf for a ſorrowful exit, diſappointed of my expected gain.

Soc. Know you not then, that this audience of yours is like the laſt of thoſe rings, which one to another, as I ſaid, impart their power, derived from that magnet at the top? The middle ring are [2] you the rhapſodiſt,

[1] This was a place, raiſed on high above the area, like thoſe two oppoſite gallery boxes in our magnificent theatre at Oxford; from whence orators, rhapſodiſts, and other declaimers, harangued the people.—S.

[2] Learned men are divided in their opinions concerning Io the rhapſodiſt, whether he is the ſame perſon or not with Io the Chian, a conſiderable poet, who flouriſhed in the ſame age. ſee Jonſius de Scriptor. Hiſt. Philoſ. l. ii. c. 13. n. 4. and Bentleii Epiſt. ad Millium, p. 50, &c. In the great want of good reaſoning on either ſide of the queſtion, it may be worth obſerving, that in this paſſage, as alſo in page 32, Io is contradiſtinguiſhed from the poets. A negative argument too may be of ſome weight, from the ſilence of Plato upon this point. Indeed it is ſtrange, had Io been a poet, and had won the prize of tragedy, which was the caſe of Io the Chian, that Plato ſhould have made him take none of thoſe many opportunities to glory in it, which offered themſelves in this converſation.—S.

and ſo too is the player: the firſt ring being the poet himſelf. By means of all theſe does the god draw, wherever it pleaſes him, the ſouls of men, ſuſpended each on other through attractive virtue. In the ſame manner too, as from that magnet, is formed a chain of many rows, where [1] chorus-singers and dancers, maſters and [2] under-maſters, hang, like the collateral rings, attracted and held together ſide ways, all depending from the Muſe. But upon one Muſe one of the poets, upon a different Muſe another is ſuſpended; [3] poſſeſſed we call him, that is held faſt; becauſe he is faſt held by the Muſe. From theſe firſt rings, the [4] poets hang their followers and admirers; ſome from one, others from another; inſpired by them, and faſtened on them, by means of the enthuſiaſtic ſpirit iſſuing from

[1] Or rather chorus-ſingers dancing; [χορευτων·] for they were not different perſons: the dance being nothing elſe than a meaſured motion, accompanied with certain geſtures of body, adapted to the tune, (which they called the harmony,) as that was to the words of the chorus-ſong, ſung by the ſame perſons who performed the dance.—S.

[2] The hindmoſt rows of the chorus ſang an under part, and had peculiar maſters of their own to teach it them, who were therefore called under-maſters. At the head of each row was placed the maſter of it, to give the muſical key, and to lead the dance to his proper row. The principal teacher of the whole choir, who alſo headed the whole, was called Χορηγος. See Jul. Pollux, Onomaſtic. l. iv. c. 15.—S.

[3] This paſſage in all the editions of Plato is read thus; ονομαζομεν δε αυτο κατεχεται. το δε εστι παραπλησιον· εχεται γαρ. Which, being nonſenſe, is thus nonſenſically rendered into Latin by Ficinus; "*Vocamus autem id nos occupari*, (altered by Grynæus into *mente capi*,) *quod quidem illi proximum eſt: tenetur enim.*" And by Cornarius thus; "*Hoc verò corripitur nominamus, quod conſimile eſt: hæret enim.*" In the ſteps of theſe tranſlators Bembo thought it ſafeſt here to tread, as being wholly in the dark himſelf. For he thus tranſlates it; *e cio chiamamo nei l'eſſer preſo, il che è ſimile:* and then quite omits the εχεται γαρ. Serranus, divining, as it ſeems, the true ſenſe of the paſſage, (for the words ſhow it not,) avoids the ſinking into nonſenſe; but hobbles along very lamely. The emendation of the pointing, with omiſſion only of the word γας, would make the paſſage plain and clear, thus read, ονομαζομεν δε αυτο κατεχεται, το δε εστι, παραπλησιον εχεται. But there is another way of amending this paſſage, that is, by a repetition of the word εχεται: and this way we prefer, and follow in our tranſlation, reading it thus; ομομαζομεν δε αυτο κατεχεται· το δε εστι, παραπλησιον εχεται· εχεται γαρ. The omiſſion of a word, where the ſame word immediately follows, is a common fault in manuſcripts.—S.

[4] The wrong pointing of this paſſage in the Greek has occaſioned Serranus to tranſlate it, as if it deſcribed the poets depending, that is, receiving their inſpiration, one from another. But though this fact be true, it is not the primary intention of Plato in this place to deſcribe it. To prevent the ſame miſtake in the readers of any future edition of the original, this ſentence ought to be printed with a comma after the word ποιητων, as well as with one before it. Ficinus however and the reſt tranſlate it rightly.—S.

them;

them; ſome to Orpheus, others to Muſæus; but the moſt numerous ſort is of ſuch, as are poſſeſſed by Homer, and held faſt by him. Of this number, Io, are you, inſpired as you are, and enthuſiaſtically poſſeſſed by Homer. Hence it is, that when the verſes of any other poet are ſung or recited, you grow dull and fall aſleep, for want of ſomething to ſay: but that, as ſoon as you hear a ſtrain of that poet poured forth, immediately you are rouſed, your ſoul recovers her ſprightlineſs, and much to ſay preſents itſelf to your mind: becauſe, when you harangue upon Homer, you do it not from art or ſcience, but from enthuſiaſm, of that particular kind which has poſſeſſed you by divine allotment. Juſt as thoſe, who join in the rites of Cybele, have an acute perception of ſuch muſic only as appertains to that deity by whom they are poſſeſſed; and are not wanting either in words or geſtures, adapted to a melody of that kind; but have no regard to any other muſic, nor any feeling of its power. In the ſame manner you, Io, when any mention is made of Homer, feel a readineſs and a facility of ſpeaking; yet with regard to other poets find yourſelf wanting. That therefore which your queſtion demands, whence you have within you ſuch an ample fund of diſcourſe, upon every thing relating to Homer; whilſt it is quite otherwiſe with you, when the ſubject brought upon the carpet is any other of the poets; the cauſe is this, that not ſcience, but enthuſiaſm, not art, but a divine deſtiny, has made you ſo mighty a panegyriſt on Homer.

Io. You ſpeak well, Socrates, I own. But I ſhould wonder if, with all your fine talk, you could perſuade me to think myſelf poſſeſſed, and inſane, when I make my panegyrics on Homer. Nor would you, as I imagine, think ſo yourſelf, were you but to hear from me a diſſertation upon that poet.

Soc. And willing am I indeed to hear you; but not till you have anſwered me this queſtion in the firſt place, [1] which of his ſubjects does Homer

[1] The Greek of this paſſage in all the editions runs thus; ὧν Ὅμηρος λεγει, περι τινος ευ λεγει; Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, very dogmatically alters the laſt word of this queſtion into λεγεις. Afterwards H. Stephens, into whoſe hands had fallen a copy of Plato with conjectural emendations in Ficinus's own hand-writing on the margin, tell us in his notes, that the ſame alteration was there propoſed by Ficinus. This, if admitted, will give a different turn, not only to this queſtion,

Homer handle beſt? for certainly you will not ſay, that he excels in all things.

Io. Be aſſured, Socrates, there is nothing in which he excels not.

Soc. You certainly do not mean to include thoſe things of which Homer writes, and of which you are ignorant.

Io. And what things may thoſe be which Homer writes of, and which I am ignorant of?

Soc. Does not Homer frequently, and copiouſly too, treat of the arts; for inſtance, the art of [1] chariot-driving? If I can remember the verſes, I will repeat them to you.

Io. I will recite them rather to you, for I well remember them.

Soc. Recite me then what Neſtor ſays to his ſon Antilochus, where he gives him a caution about the turning, in that chariot-race celebrated in honour of Patroclus.

Io. His words are theſe:

There to the left inclining, eaſy turn
The light-built chariot; mindful then to urge
With pungent whip, and animating voice,
The right-hand courſer, and with hand remiſs
The reins to yield him; hard upon the goal,
Mean time, his partner bearing; till the wheel
Skimming the ſtony lines of that old mark,
[2] Doubt if its nave with point projecting touch
Th' extremeſt margin: but of thoſe rough ſtones
Th' encounter rude be careful to decline.

Soc.

but to Io's anſwer, and to the obſervation of Socrates thence ariſing: but the philoſopher's drift, in aſking the queſtion, and the ſeries of the argument, will be very little affected by it. For the buſineſs is to ſhow, that neither poets write, nor rhapſodiſts interpret, when their ſubject happens to be ſome point belonging to any one of the arts, from their real ſkill in ſuch art. The only difference is, that in the common reading, the poets are concerned immediately; and according to the propoſed alteration, the queſtion is pointed at the rhapſodiſts, and reaches the poets but in conſequence. In either way, however, as the argument proceeds, the direct proof equally lies againſt the rhapſodiſts. Now in ſuch a caſe as this, we believe it to be an eſtabliſhed rule of ſound criticiſm to forbear altering the text.—S.

[1] What this art was in antient times, and in what high eſtimation it was held, ſuch of our readers, as are not converſant in the writings of the antients, may find in the entertaining notes to Mr. Pope's Homer.—S.

[2] It is great pity, that Mr. Pope, in his elegant verſion of Homer, has dropt this ſtrong poetical

Soc. Enough. Now in theſe verſes, Io whether Homer gives a right account of what ought to be done upon the occaſion or not, who muſt be the ableſt judge, a phyſician, or a charioteer?

Io. A charioteer, undoubtedly.

Soc. Whether is he thus able, from his having ſkill in his art, or by ſome other means?

Io. From his ſkill in his art only, and no other way.

Soc. [1] Has not thus every one of the arts an ability, given it by God himſelf, to judge of certain performances? for the ſame things, in which we have good judgment from our ſkill in the art of piloting, by no means ſhall we be able to judge of well from any ſkill in the art of medicine.

Io. By no means, undoubtedly.

Soc. Nor the ſame things, in which our ſkill in the art of medicine has given us good judgment would the greateſt ſkill in the art of building qualify us to judge of equally well.

Io. Certainly not.

Soc. [2] Does it not then hold true alike in all the arts, that of whatever things we are good judges by means of our being poſſeſſed of one art, we can never judge well of thoſe very things from our ſkill in any other art? But before you anſwer to this queſtion, anſwer me to this other: Do not you admit a diverſity between the arts, and call this ſome one art, and that ſome other?

Io. I admit ſuch a diverſity.

Soc. Do not you diſtinguiſh every art in the ſame way that I do, inferring

poetical ſtroke; by which not only the wheel is animated, but the exquiſite nicety of turning the goal, in keeping cloſe to the edge of it, without touching, is deſcribed by one word in the fineſt manner poſſible. This miſtake happened to him, from his miſunderſtanding the word δοχσσεται to mean, doubling the goal; in which ſenſe this part of the deſcription would be flat, lifeleſs, and proſaic, altogether unworthy Homer. Had Mr. Pope thought fit to conſult Euſtathius, he would have ſet him right. The verſes here cited are in the 23d book of the Iliad; where the word αν, in the fifth line, is evidently the right reading, inſtead of μη, which we meet with in the copies of Plato.—S.

[1] In the Greek, as it is printed, this is made an abſolute aſſertion of Socrates, contrary to his uſual manner of converſing, and to the genius of this Dialogue in particular, where Socrates is repreſented as proving the ignorance of Io out of his own mouth.—S.

[2] This ſentence in the original is likewiſe printed as if it was ſpoken poſitively; and is ſo tranſlated by Bembo: whereas immediately afterwards Socrates himſelf calls it a queſtion.—S.

a diverſity

a diverſity between them from the diverſity of their ſubjects? When one art is attended with knowledge of one ſort of things, another art by knowledge in things of a different nature, do you not from hence conclude, as I do, that this accordingly is one art, and that another?

Io. I do.

Soc. For if, in any two arts, there was the knowledge of the ſame things in both, why ſhould we make a diſtinction, and call this ſome one art, and that ſome other different, when both of them were attended by ſkill in the ſame ſort of things? as I know, for inſtance, theſe fingers of mine to be five in number; and you know it as well as I. Now were I to aſk you, whether it was by the ſame art that we know this one and the ſame thing, by the art of arithmetic, you as well as I, or each of us by a ſeveral art; you would certainly anſwer, it was by the ſame art.

Io. Undoubtedly.

Soc. The queſtion then, which I was about aſking you before, anſwer me now; whether in all the arts, you think it alike neceſſary that the ſame things ſhould be judged of by the ſame art; and that a different art muſt not pretend to judge of thoſe very things; but that if in reality it be a different art, different things muſt of courſe fall under its cognizance?

Io. I do think ſo, Socrates.

Soc. No man therefore will be able to judge well of any thing ſaid, or done, relating to any one of the arts in which he has no ſkill.

Io. You ſay right.

Soc. In thoſe verſes then, which you repeated, can you beſt tell whether Homer gives a right account of things or not; or is a charioteer the propereſt judge of this?

Io. A charioteer.

Soc. And that for this reaſon, becauſe you are a rhapſodiſt and not a charioteer.

Io. True.

Soc. And becauſe the art of a rhapſodiſt is different from that of a charioteer.

Io. Right.

Soc. If then it be a different art, it is attended by ſkill in a different ſort of things.

Io. Very right.

Soc.

Soc. Well then; when Homer relates how Hecamede, a damſel of Neſtor's, mingled a potion for machaon to drink, after he had been wounded, giving us this deſcription of it;

Into rough Pramnian carefully ſhe ſcrapes,
With brazen ſcraper, acrid-taſted cheeſe,
Made of thin milk drawn from ſallacious goat;
And ſets beſide the life-reviving bowl
[1] Strong ſtimulating onion.——

To form a true judgment in this caſe, whether Homer be in the right or not, does it belong to the art of medicine, or to that of rhapſody?

Io. To the art of medicine.

Soc. Well; and what, where Homer ſays thus;

Steep down to the low bottom of the main
Then plung'd the goddeſs; ruſhing, like the lead,
Pendant from horn of meadow-ranging bull,
Which falls impetuous, to devouring fiſh
[2] Bearing the deathful miſchief.——

Whether ſhall we ſay it belongs to the art of fiſhing, or to that of rhapſody, to judge beſt whether this deſcription be right or wrong?

Io. To the art of fiſhing, Socrates, without doubt.

[1] This latter circumſtance is mentioned by Homer at ſome diſtance from the former, eight lines intervening. Plato brings them together, ſelecting them out from the other particulars of that deſcription, as the two moſt ſingular and remarkable, the moſt blamed by the phyſicians, and ridiculed by the wits of thoſe days. But in the 3d book of his Republic, he anſwers all their criticiſms and cavils himſelf, in a juſt defence of the great poet, and of ſuch a method of treating wounded perſons, in the more ſimple, leſs luxuriant, and healthier ages. The verſes of Homer, here cited, are to be found in the eleventh book of the Iliad.—S.

[2] Had we been to have tranſlated this paſſage immediately from Homer, we ſhould have made the laſt line thus: "Bearing their fates deſtructive"—the Greek word being κηρα in the copies of Homer, inſtead of which we read πημα in thoſe of Plato. Upon this occaſion, we beg leave, once for all, to advertiſe our readers, that in many paſſages of Homer, as cited by Plato, there are variations, and thoſe ſometimes material, from the received reading of the text of that poet; and that this was one of the reaſons on which we grounded our undertaking to tranſlate all thoſe paſſages afreſh; when Mr. Pope's verſion, ſo excellent upon the whole, might otherwiſe have well excuſed us from that trouble. The paſſage of Homer, now before us, occurs in the laſt book of the Iliad.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Conſider now, ſuppoſe yourſelf had taken the part of queſtioner, and were to ſay to me thus; Since then, Socrates, you have found what paſſages in Homer it belongs to [1] each of thoſe arts before mentioned, ſeverally to diſcern and criticiſe with good judgment; come, find me out, upon the ſubject of divination, what paſſages it is the buſineſs of a diviner critically to examine, and to tell us whether the poetical account be right or wrong: conſider, how eaſily I ſhould be able to give you a ſatisfactory and a proper anſwer. For Homer has many paſſages relating to this ſubject in his Odyſſey, particularly one, where Theoclymenus the diviner, [2] one of the race of Melampus, addreſſes the wooers of Penelope in this manner;

Mark'd out by Heav'n for great events! What ill
Is this attends ye! what ſad omens point
Preſageful! round ye ſome dark vapour ſpreads
His duſky wings; head, face, and lower limbs
In ſhades involving: thick through burden'd air
Roll hollow ſounds lamenting: dropping tears
Stain of each mourning ſtatue the wet cheeks:
Crowded the porch, and crowded is the hall
With ſpectres; down to Pluto's ſhadowy reign
Ghoſts ſeem they gliding: the ſun's cheery light
Is loſt from heaven: a gloom foreboding falls,
O'erhanging all things, ſadd'ning every heart.

On the ſame ſubject he writes in many places of his Iliad; as, for inſtance, where he deſcribes that fight, which happened under the Grecian fortifications. For he there gives us this relation of it;

While eager they prepar'd to paſs the moat,
And force th' intrenchments; o'er them came a bird

[1] It is obſervable, that Plato here takes his four inſtances from four different ſorts of arts; the firſt from one of the arts military; the ſecond from one of the liberal arts; the third from one of the mechanical kind; and the fourth from one of thoſe arts relating to religion. His ends in thus multiplying and varying his inſtances are theſe; one is, to ſhow the univerſality of Homer's genius; and another is, to make it appear the more plainly, what a variety of arts the poet muſt have been maſter of, had he wrote, not from a divine genius, but from real ſkill humanly acquired. With the ſame view he inſtances again a little further in the arts imperatorial, liberal, ſervile, and mechanical.—S.

[2] See the Odyſſey of Homer, b. xv. v. 225, &c. But the fine deſcriptive ſpeech following is taken out of the twentieth book of that poet.—S.

Tow'ring

Tow'ring, an eagle, from the [1]left of heaven,
Their enterprife forbidding: on he came,
And in his talons bore a dragon, huge,
Enormous, gliſt'ning horrid with red ſcales.
Still liv'd the ſerpent; and though cloſe with death
He ſtrove, and gaſp'd, and panted; yet his rage
And venom he forgot not; for half round
Wreathing the pliant joints of his high creſt,
With backward ſtroke he pierc'd his griping foe:
His breaſt he pierc'd, where cloſe beneath the neck
Soft to the ſtroke it yielded. Stung with ſmart,
Looſen'd his gripe the foe, and to the ground
Down dropp'd him. Mid the martial throng the beaſt
Fell: while the bleeding bird with clangor ſhrill
Strain'd onward his weak flight, where bore the winds.

Theſe paſſages, and others of the ſame kind, ſhall I ſay, it belongs to the diviner to conſider, and to criticiſe?

Io. So will you ſay what is true, Socrates.

Soc. You ſpeak truth yourſelf, Io, in this. Come on then, and tell me, as I have ſelected out for you certain paſſages from the Odyſſey, and from the Iliad, appertaining ſome of them to the diviner, ſome to the phyſician, and others to the fiſherman; in return, do you pick out for me (ſince you are better verſed in Homer than I am) ſuch paſſages, Io, as appertain to the rhapſodiſt, and relate to the rhapſodical art: ſuch as it becomes the rhapſodiſt to examine and to criticiſe, with a judgment and ſkill ſuperior to that of other men.

Io. The whole of Homer I affirm it to be, Socrates.

[1] This circumſtance is very important. For upon the principles of augury, one kind of divination, had the flight of the eagle over their heads been, on the contrary, from the right ſide of the heavens, that is, from the eaſt, making toward the left, or weſt, it had been a preſage of good ſucceſs. Yet is this circumſtance careleſsly omitted by Mr. Pope. Now the paſſage being cited by Plato, expreſsly, as an inſtance to ſhow that Homer treats of the art of divination, we could not, without an abſurdity, paſs over that part of it, which is the moſt material with regard to the ſcope of our author in this place. And as this often is the caſe, that where Plato cites Homer for ſome particular purpoſe, Mr. Pope's verſion happens there to be defective, we found ourſelves obliged, for this further reaſon, to attempt ſetting thoſe paſſages in their proper light by a new tranſlation. This is cited from the τειχομαχια, or twelfth book of the Iliad.—S.

Soc. You denied it, Ion, but juſt now, to be the whole of Homer. [1] What, are you ſo forgetful? It ill becomes, however, a man, who is a rhapſodiſt, to be forgetful.

Ion. But what is it now that I have forgot?

Soc. Do you not remember, that you affirmed the art of rhapſody to be an art different from that of chariot-driving?

Ion. I do remember it.

Soc. Did not you allow too, that being a different art, it was accompanied by ſkill and judgment in a different ſort of things?

Ion. I did allow it.

Soc. The art of rhapſody therefore, according to your own account, is not accompanied by ſkill and judgment in things of every ſort: nor will the rhapſodiſt know all things.

Ion. With an exception, perhaps, Socrates, of ſuch ſort of things.

Soc. By ſuch ſort of things, which you are pleaſed to except, you mean ſuch things as belong to nearly all the other arts. But, ſince the rhapſodiſt knows not all things, pray what are thoſe things which he does know?

Ion. He knows, I preſume, what is proper for a man to ſpeak, and what for a woman; what for a ſlave, and what for a freeman; what for thoſe who are under government or command, and what for the governor and the commander.

Soc. For the commander, do you mean who has the command of a ſhip at ſea, amidſt a tempeſt, what is proper for him to ſpeak, that the rhapſodiſt will know better than the maſter of a ſhip?

Ion. Not ſo; for this indeed the maſter of a ſhip will know beſt.

Soc. For the governor then, who has the government of the ſick, what is proper for ſuch a one to ſpeak, will the rhapſodiſt know better than the phyſician?

Ion. Not this neither.

Soc. But that which is proper for a ſlave, you ſay.

Ion. I do.

[1] The Greek here is erroneouſly printed in all the editions, thus ἢ (inſtead of ἦ) ουτως επιλησμων ει; accordingly, Cornarius tranſlates it, "*Aut ita obliviosus es?*" This error of the preſs, we hope, will be corrected in the next edition of Plato.—S.

Soc.

Soc. For inſtance now, a ſlave, whoſe office it is to keep the cattle, what is proper for him to ſpeak, when the herd grows wild and madding, in order to pacify and tame them; do you ſay the rhapſodiſt will know this better than the cow-keeper?

Io. No, to be ſure.

Soc. That, however, which is proper for a woman to ſpeak; for a woman-weaver now, ſuppoſe, relating to the fabric of cloth.

Io. No, no.

Soc. But he will know what is proper for a man to ſpeak, who has the command of an army, in order to animate his men.

Io. You have it; ſuch ſort of things the rhapſodiſt will know.

Soc. What is the art of rhapſody then the art of commanding armies?

Io. Truly I [1] ſhould know what ſpeech is proper for the commander of an army.

Soc. Becauſe you have, perhaps, the art of generalſhip, Io. For ſuppoſe you were ſkilled in the arts of horſemanſhip and of muſic, both of them, you would be a good judge of what horſes were well-managed, and would be able to diſtinguiſh them from ſuch as were managed ill. Now, in that caſe, were I to aſk you this queſtion, by which of your arts, Io, do you know the well-managed horſes? do you know them through your ſkill in horſemanſhip, or through your ſkill in muſic? what anſwer would you make me?

Io. Through my ſkill in horſemanſhip, I ſhould anſwer.

Soc. Again; when you diſtinguiſhed rightly the good performers in muſic, would not you own, that you diſtinguiſhed them by your being ſkilled in muſic; and not ſay it was owing to your ſkill in horſemanſhip?

Io. Certainly.

Soc. But now that you underſtand what belongs to the [2] command of

[1] In the printed editions of the Greek we here read γνοιην γουν ἀρ' εγω, whereas certainly we ought to read γνοιην γουν αν (or elſe ἀρ') εγω.—S.

[2] This refers to an aſſertion of Io's a little before. It ſeems neceſſary, therefore, in this place to read στρατηγικα, (as the ſenſe alſo requires), and not στρατιωτικα, *military affairs*, as it is printed, and accordingly tranſlated by Cornarius and Serranus. Ficinus, however, Grynæus, and Bembo, agree with us.—S.

armies, whether do you underſtand this by means of your ſkill in the art of generalſhip, or as you are an excellent rhapſodiſt?

Io. There appears to me no difference.

Soc. What mean you by no difference? Do you mean, that the art of rhapſody and the art of generalſhip are one and the ſame art? or do you admit them to be two different arts?

Io. I think they are one art only.

Soc. Whoever then happens to be a good rhapſodiſt, the ſame man muſt alſo be a good general.

Io. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. [1] And whoever happens to be a good general, muſt he be a good rhapſodiſt too?

Io. This, I think, does not hold true.

Soc. [2] But that other conſequence, you think, will hold true, that whoever is a good rhapſodiſt is alſo a good general.

Io. Beyond all doubt.

Soc. Now are not you the moſt excellent of all the Grecian rhapſodiſts?

Io. Certainly ſo, Socrates.

Soc. Do you alſo then, Io, excel the reſt of the Grecians in knowing how to command armies?

Io. [3] Be aſſured, Socrates, that I do; for I have acquired that knowledge from the works of Homer.

Soc. In the name of the gods then, Io, what can be the meaning that, excellent as you are above the reſt of the Grecians, both as a general and as a rhapſodiſt, you chooſe to make your appearance only in this latter character; and travel about all over Greece, reciting and expounding, but take not the command of the Grecian armies? Is it becauſe you think the Grecians

[1] We chooſe, here, to tread in the ſteps of Ficinus, deviating from the printed original, where the ſentence is not interrogative, but affirmative.—S.

[2] By a ſtrange perverſeneſs in the editors or printers of the Greek text, this ſentence is changed into a queſtion; by which means the humorous turn of it is half loſt.—S.

[3] The words of Plato are *ευ ισθι*. This was an arrogant expreſſion, frequent in the mouths of the ſophiſts. See Plato's Sympoſium. In the ſame ſpirit he here very properly attributes it to Io. Yet Bembo renders it thus in Italian, *Tu il ſai bene*; following the ſenſe, or rather nonſenſe, given it by Cornarius and Serranus.—S.

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are in great need of a rhapſodiſt, or of a man to repeat verſes to them with a golden crown upon his head, but have no occaſion at all for a general?

Io. The city, which I belong to, Socrates, is under the government of yours, and her forces are commanded by the Athenians: therefore ſhe is in no want of a general. And as to your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, neither of you would appoint me her general, becauſe you have, both of you, a high opinion of your own ſufficiency.

Soc. What, my friend Io, do you not know Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Io. Which Apollodorus?

Soc. Him, whom the Athenians have often appointed to the command of their armies, though a foreigner. Then there is, beſides, Phanoſthenes the Andrian, and [1] Heraclides of Clazomenæ; upon whom the city, notwithſtanding that they are foreigners, yet becauſe they have [2] approved themſelves conſiderable and worthy men, confers the chief command of her army, with other poſts of power and government. And will not the city then beſtow her honours on Io the Epheſian, and appoint him her general, ſhould he

[1] This general is mentioned by Ælian in his Various Hiſtories, b. xiv. c. 5. together with Apollodorus of Cyzicum, and both of them with high commendations; but in ſuch a manner, it muſt be owned, as to induce a ſuſpicion, that he had all his knowledge of them from this paſſage of the Io.—S.

[2] Plato ſeems to take this opportunity of expreſſing the eſteem he had for theſe three commanders; under whom, it is probable, that Socrates had ſerved his country in ſome of thoſe compaigns which he had made with ſo much glory. See Plato's Banquet. This whole paſſage, however, is underſtood in a very different ſenſe by Athenæus, b. xi. p. 506 who takes this praiſe to be ironical: in conſequence of which miſtake he beſtows ill language on Plato, for having here, as he pretends, vilified theſe commanders, and thrown a reflection upon the city for promoting them. According to the ſuppoſition, therefore, of Athenæus, they are introduced here, on purpoſe to depreciate them, and put them on a level with an ignorant rhapſodiſt. A ſtrange interpretation! by which is weakened, if not entirely deſtroyed, as well the force of the argument here uſed by Socrates, as of that ridicule, with which he all along treats Io. For by ſetting him in compariſon with commanders of real merit only, could Socrates, conſiſtently with his own reaſoning, invalidate the account given by Io, why he was not promoted, in that he was a foreigner. Since the argument would be very inconcluſive, if this were ſuppoſed the meaning: "You ſee how the city chooſes to prefer a pack of fellows, who have no merit, and are foreigners as well as yourſelf; if you then are truly an expert and able general, though a foreigner, you may reaſonably expect a ſhare in ſo injudicious a promotion." And as to the irony, Socrates is thus made

he appear a man valuable, and worthy that regard? What, are not [r] you Epheſians originally of Athens? and then, beſides, does Epheſus yield the preference to any city in point of greatneſs? But the queſtion is about your own character, Io; What ſhall we think of you? For if you ſpeak truth, when you ſay that you are able to diſplay the excellencies of Homer through your ſkill in any art or ſcience, you are a man who does not act fairly. For after you had profeſſed to know many fine things, from which you could illuſtrate the works of Homer, and had undertaken to give me a ſpecimen of that knowledge of yours, you deceive and diſappoint me: whilſt you are ſo far from doing as you promiſed, and giving me ſuch a ſpecimen, that you will not ſo much as inform me what thoſe things are in which you have ſo profound a ſkill; and this, notwithſtanding I have long preſſed you to tell me: but abſolutely become, like Proteus, all various and multiform, changing backwards and forwards, till at laſt you eſcape me, by ſtarting up a general; for fear, I ſuppoſe, you ſhould be driven to diſcover how deep your wiſdom is in the works of Homer. If then you really are an artiſt, and when you had promiſed to give me a ſpecimen of your art and knowledge in Homer, wilfully diſappoint me; you act, as I juſt now ſaid, unfairly. If indeed you

made to go out of his way, and take off the ridicule from Io, whilſt he turns it upon others. But the reaſoning is juſt, and the ridicule on Io continued ſtrong, upon the contrary ſuppoſition, expreſſed in other words thus: "Your being a foreigner can be no bar to your preferment; let not that deter you from ſo laudable an ambition: you ſee what regard the city pays to men of great abilities, though born in other countries. Let the ſucceſs, therefore, of Apollodorus and the reſt encourage you to offer yourſelf a candidate: for you on other accounts have ſtill fairer pretenſions." Were the point, now in debate, a matter to be decided by authority, to that of Athenæus we might oppoſe that of Ælian, who commends the compliment, made by Plato in this paſſage, not only to the three foreign generals, but to the city of Athens at the ſame time, for giving her firſt honours to ſuperior virtue, wherever found, without regard to birth-place or to popular favour. See Ælian. Var. Hiſt. lib. xiv. c. 5.—S.

[r] Socrates, having now ſufficiently derided the perſonal arrogance and ignorance of Io, before he quits him, beſtows an ironical ſarcaſm or two upon the general vanity of Io's countrymen; who, while they were ſunk in Aſiatic luxury and effeminacy, valued themſelves highly, in the firſt place, upon their deſcent from the Athenians, ſo illuſtrious for wiſdom and valour, and next on account of their opulence and magnificence; circumſtances, in truth, redounding only to their ſhame; yet the uſual topics of boaſt, theſe two, high deſcent and outward greatneſs, whether in nations or private perſons, degenerated from their anceſtors, and void of thoſe virtues which raiſed them to that greatneſs.—S.

are

are not an artiſt, but an enthuſiaſt, one of thoſe who from divine allotment are inſpired by Homer; and thus, without any real knowledge, are able to utter abundance of fine words about the writings of that poet, agreeably to the opinion which I had of you before; in this caſe you are not guilty of any unfair dealing. Chooſe then, whether of theſe two opinions you would have me entertain of you; whether this, that you are a man, who acts unfairly; or this other, that you are a man under the influence of ſome divinity.

Io. Great is the difference, O Socrates: it is certainly much the better thing to be deemed under divine influence.

Soc. This better thing then, Io, is with you, to be deemed by us, in your encomiums upon Homer, an enthuſiaſt, and not an artiſt.

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

THE CRATYLUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

THE RECTITUDE OF NAMES.



INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CRATYLUS.

THE enſuing Dialogue, which diſputes whether names have been aſſigned to things from nature or poſition, and whether ſome at leaſt are not derived from a more divine origin than that of human invention, has been highly cenſured by modern critics for its etymologies, which they contend are for the moſt part falſe. This cenſure originated from not perceiving that the intention of Plato in this Dialogue is to inveſtigate names philoſophically, and not grammatically, and that he deſpiſes the matter, but is eſpecially attentive to the form of names; though this was obvious to the philologiſt Selden, as may be ſeen in his treatiſe on the Syrian gods:—and in the next place, Plato mingles, in his inveſtigation, the ſerious with the jocoſe: ſo that in the firſt part of the Dialogue, when he inveſtigates the names of the gods, he is perfectly in earneſt, as is highly proper on ſuch an occaſion; and in the middle part he facetiouſly ridicules the followers of Heraclitus, who conſidered all things as perpetually flowing, without admitting any periods of repoſe. Hence, in order to explode this opinion, which is erroneous in the extreme, when extended to intelligible as well as ſenſible natures, he proves that, by an abuſe of etymologies, all names may be ſhown to have been eſtabliſhed, as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.

With reſpect to the ſubject matter of this logical Dialogue, which is the invention, and as it were generation of names, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that there were two opinions of the antients on this particular; one of Heraclitus

and his followers, among whom Cratylus held a conſiderable rank; the other of certain Parmenidæans, among whom Hermogenes was no ignoble advocate. Of the former of theſe, Cratylus, it is reported that Plato was an auditor; and he is ſaid to have been under the tuition of the latter in theological concerns. And the Heraclitics indeed aſſerted that names conſiſt from nature alone, and that the conſent of men contributes nothing to their formation or invention. But the Parmenidæans affirmed, that names were not the productions of nature, but received their conformation from the arbitrary deciſion of men, by whom they were aſſigned and impoſed upon things. The more early Academics or diſciples of Plato embraced the opinion of the Heraclitics; and the more early Peripatetics that of Hermogenes: while in the mean time each ſect endeavoured to bring over its leader to the doctrine which it embraced; though, as we ſhall now ſhew from Ammonius [r], the ſentiments of Plato and Ariſtotle on this ſubject differed only in words, and not in reality.

In order therefore to be convinced of this, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that the dogma of thoſe who conſidered names as conſiſting from nature, and not from the will of men, received a two-fold diſtribution. Hence one part, as the Heraclitics, were of opinion that names were natural, becauſe they are the productions and works of nature. For (ſay they) proper and peculiar names are prepared and aſſigned from the nature of things, no otherwiſe than proper or ſecret ſenſes are attributed from the ſame cauſe to every thing. For that which is viſible is judged to be different from that which is tangible, becauſe it is perceived by a different ſenſe. But names are ſimilar to natural reſemblances; i. e. to ſuch as are beheld in mirrors, or in water, and not to ſuch as are the productions of art. And indeed thoſe are to be conſidered as denominating things, who produce true and ſolid names of this kind; but thoſe who act in a different manner, do not properly denominate, but only emit a ſound or voice. But it is the buſineſs of a prudent, learned, and truly philoſophic man, always to inveſtigate names, which are peculiarly conſtituted and aſſigned to each particular from the nature of things; juſt as it is the province of one who poſſeſſes an acute ſight, to know and judge rightly the proper ſimilitudes of every viſible object.

[r] In Ariſtot. de Interpretatione.

But

But the other claſs of thoſe who defended this opinion, aſſerted that names conſiſt from nature, becauſe they correſpond to the nature of the denominated particulars. For (ſay they) names ought to be illuſtrious and ſignificant, that they may expreſs things with perſpicuity and preciſion. As if (for inſtance) any one ſhould be born with a diſpoſition admirably adapted to imperial command, ſuch a one may with great propriety be called Ageſilaus or Archidamus. And that on this account ſuch names are natural, becauſe they ſignificantly accord with the things which ſuch names imply. For the perſon juſt adduced may be elegantly called Archidamus, becauſe he is able to rule over the people; and Ageſilaus, becauſe he is the leader of the people. They add beſides, that names are indeed ſimilar to images; but to thoſe only which do not conſiſt from nature, but which are the offspring of human art, ſuch as pictures and ſtatues, in which we evidently perceive that various ſimilitudes of reſemblances correſpond to the various exemplars of things; and that theſe render more, but thoſe leſs expreſs effigies of things, according as the ſkill of the artificer, by employing the dexterity of art, is able to faſhion them in a more or leſs convenient manner. But the truth of this (ſay they) may be clearly evinced from hence, that we often inveſtigate the natures of things by an analyſis of names; and, after a proceſs of this kind, demonſtrate that names are aſſigned adapted to the things which they expreſs.

In like manner, the dogma of thoſe who aſcribed names to the conſent of men received a two-fold diviſion. And one part indeed defended ſuch a poſition of names, as the Parmenidæan Hermogenes in the preſent Dialogue, viz. that names might be formed according to every one's arbitrary determination, though this ſhould take place without any rational cauſe: ſo that if a man ſhould call any thing by juſt whatever name he pleaſed, the name in this caſe would be proper, and accommodated to the things denominated. But the other part, ſuch as the more antient Peripatetics, aſſerted that names ought not to be formed and aſſigned by men raſhly, according to the opinion of Hermogenes, but with deliberation and deſign. And that the artificer of names ought to be a perſon endued with univerſal ſcience, in order that he may be able to fabricate proper and becoming names for all the variety of things. Hence they aſſert that names conſiſt from the determinations of men, and not from nature, becauſe they are the inventions of the reaſoning ſoul, and are properly accommodated from hence to things themſelves. For

thoſe

thoſe antient founders of names did not raſhly and without deſign denominate marſhes of the female genus, but rivers of the male (not to mention the various tribes of animals), but they characterized the former by the feminine genus, becauſe, like the ſoul, they are certain receptacles; and called the latter by a maſculine appellation, on account of their entering into and mingling themſelves with the former. In like manner they aſſigned the maſculine genus to intellect, and marked ſoul with a feminine appellation; becauſe intellect diffuſes its light upon ſoul, which, in conſequence of receiving it from thence in her inmoſt penetralia, is moſt truly ſaid to be filled and illuminated by intellect. They likewiſe very properly employed an equal analogy in the ſun and moon, on account of the abundant emanation of light from the former, and the reception of the prolific rays by the latter. But with reſpect to the neuter and common genus, as they judged that theſe were conſtituted and compoſed from the mixture or ſeparation of the maſculine and feminine genus, hence they ſignificantly aſſigned them to certain things in a congruous proportion of nature.

Hence it appears that Ariſtotle and the Peripatetics differ only in words from Plato and the Academics: ſince the latter aſſert that names conſiſt from nature, becauſe they ſignify particulars in a manner accommodated to the nature of things; but the former contend that names are the offspring of human invention, becauſe they have been ſagaciouſly aſſigned by a moſt ſkilful architect as it were of ſpeaking, and this according to the exigency of nature. But the preſent Dialogue ſufficiently proves that this is a true interpretation of Plato's opinion on this intereſting ſubject; ſince Socrates here eſtabliſhes himſelf as a medium between Hermogenes and Cratylus, and remarkably reprehends each by a multitude of very concluſive reaſons. For he plainly demonſtrates that names cannot alone conſiſt from the arbitrary determination of men, as Hermogenes ſeemed to aſſert, on account of the univerſal genera of things, and immutable and eternal natures to which a ſtable and right reaſon of names may be well aſcribed, both becauſe they are perpetual and conſtant, and known to all men from the beginning, and becauſe they are allotted a nature definite and immovable. And again, he ſhows that neither can names conſiſt from nature in the manner which the Heraclitics endeavour to ſupport, on account of the gliding and fluxible nature of individuals,

dividuals, to which names can neither be conveniently aſſigned nor well adapted for any conſiderable period of time.

But that the reader may ſee the progreſſion of names from their ſources, which are the gods, let him attend to the following beautiful paſſage from Proclus on the Theology of Plato [1]. "The firſt, moſt principal, and truly divine names muſt be conſidered as eſtabliſhed in the gods themſelves. But thoſe of the ſecond order, and which are the reſemblances of theſe, ſubſiſting in an intellectual manner, muſt be ſaid to be of a dæmoniacal condition. And thoſe in the third rank, emanating indeed from truth, but faſhioned logically, and receiving the laſt repreſentation of divine concerns, make their appearance from ſcientific men, who at one time energize according to a divine afflatus, and at another time intellectually, generating images in motion of the inward ſpectacles of their ſouls. For as the demiurgic intellect eſtabliſhes about matter repreſentations of the firſt forms ſubſiſting in his eſſence, temporal reſemblances of things eternal, diviſible of ſuch as are indiviſible, and produces as it were ſhadowy images of true beings; in the ſame manner, as it appears to me, the ſcience which we poſſeſs, faſhioning an intellectual production, fabricates reſemblances both of other things and of the gods themſelves. Hence it aſſimilates through compoſition that which in the gods is incompoſite; that which is ſimple in them through variety, and that which is united through multitude. And thus forming names, it manifeſts images of divine concerns, according to their laſt ſubſiſtence: for it generates each name as if it was a ſtatue of the gods. And as the Theurgic art, through certain ſymbols, calls forth the unenvying goodneſs of the gods, into an illumination of the artificial ſtatues; in the ſame manner, the intellectual ſcience of divine concerns, through compoſitions and diviſions of ſounds, exhibits the occult eſſence of the gods. With great propriety therefore does Socrates in the Philebus aſſert—that he proceeds with the greateſt dread in that which reſpects the names of the gods, on account of the caution which ſhould be employed in their inveſtigation. For it is neceſſary to venerate the laſt reſounding echoes as it were of the gods; and in conſequence of this reverence to eſtabliſh them in their firſt exemplars [2]."

Thus

[1] Lib. i. cap. 29.

[2] Agreeably to this, likewiſe, Proclus, in the fourth book of his Commentary on the Parmenides, which is juſtly called by Damaſcius, *υπεραιρουσα εξηγησις, a tranſcendent expoſition*, obſerves

Thus far the truly divine Proclus; from which admirable paſſage the Platonic reader will find all his doubts on this intricate ſubject fully ſolved, if he only beſtows on it that attention which it ſo well deſerves. I only add, that every ingenuous mind may be convinced, from the etymologies of divine names in this Dialogue, that the latter Platoniſts were not perverters of their maſter's theology, as is ignorantly aſſerted by verbal critics and modern theologiſts. This, indeed, will be ſo apparent from the enſuing notes, that no greater proof can be deſired of the dreadful mental darkneſs in which ſuch men are involved, notwithſtanding the great acumen of the former, and the much-boaſted but deluſive light of the latter.

as follows: πολλαι ταξεις εισι και των ονοματων, ωσπερ δη και των γνωσεων· και τα μεν αυτων θεια λεγεται, δι ων οι καταδεεστεροι θεοι τους προ αυτων ονομαζουσι· τα δε αγγελικα, δι ων οι αγγελοι εαυτους τε και τους θεους· τα δε δαιμονια, τα δε ανθρωπινα. και τα μεν εστι ρητα και ημιν, τα δε αρρητα. και ολως ωσπερ ημας ο Κρατυλος αναδιδασκει, και προ τουτου η ειθεος παραδοσις, και γνωσις, και ονομασια διαφορος εστι.—*i. e.* "There are many orders of names, as well as of cognitions; and ſome of theſe are called divine, through which ſubordinate gods denominate ſuch as are prior to them: but others are angelic, through which angels denominate themſelves and the gods; and others are dæmoniacal, and others again human. And ſome are effable by us, but others are ineffable. And univerſally, as the Cratylus informs us, and prior to this, the divine tradition (*i. e.* the Zoroaſtrian oracles), there is a difference in nomination as well as in knowledge."

THE

THE CRATYLUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES.

HERMOGENES.

ARE you willing, then, that we ſhould communicate this diſcourſe to Socrates?

CRAT. If you think proper.

HERM. Cratylus here, Socrates, ſays, that there is a rectitude of name naturally ſubſiſting in every thing; and that this is not a name which certain perſons pronounce from cuſtom, while they articulate a portion of their voice; but that there is a certain rectitude of names which is naturally the ſame both among Greeks and Barbarians. I aſk him, therefore, whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confeſſes it is. I then inquire of him, what is the appellation belonging to Socrates? He replies, Socrates. In all other particulars, therefore, I ſay, is not that the name by which we call each? Yet, ſays he, your name is not Hermogenes, though all men ſhould agree in calling you ſo. And upon my eagerly deſiring to know the meaning of what he ſays, he does not declare any thing, but uſes diſſimulation towards me, feigning as if he was thinking about ſomething on this ſubject, which if he ſhould be willing to relate clearly, he would oblige me to agree with him in opinion, and to ſay the ſame as he does. If, therefore, you can by any means conjecture this divination of Cratylus, I ſhall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I ſhould much more gladly hear your opinion concerning the rectitude of names.

Soc. O Hermogenes, ſon of Hipponicus, according to the antient proverb, beautiful things are difficult to be underſtood; and the diſcipline reſpecting names is no ſmall affair. If, therefore, I had heard that demonſtration of Prodicus, valued at fifty drachmas, which inſtructed the hearer in this very partilar, as he himſelf ſays, nothing would hinder but that you might immediately know the truth reſpecting the rectitude of names: but I never have heard it; and am acquainted with nothing more than the circumſtance about the drachmas. Hence I am unacquainted with the truth reſpecting theſe particulars; but am nevertheleſs prepared to inveſtigate this affair, along with you and Cratylus. But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I ſuſpect that in this he derides you: for he thinks, perhaps, that you are covetous of wealth, and at the ſame time have not obtained your deſire. But, as I juſt now ſaid, the knowledge of theſe matters is difficult. However, placing the arguments in common, it is proper to conſider, whether the truth is on your ſide, or on that of Cratylus.

Herm. But indeed, Socrates, though I have frequently diſputed with Cratylus and many others, yet I cannot perſuade myſelf, that there is any other rectitude of nomination, than what cuſtom and mutual conſent have eſtabliſhed. For to me it appears, that the name which any one aſſigns to a thing, is a proper name; and that, if he ſhould even change it for another, this name will be no leſs right than the firſt; juſt as we are accuſtomed to change the names of our ſervants. For I am of opinion, that no name is naturally inherent in any thing, but ſubſiſts only from the law and habit of thoſe by whom it is inſtituted and called. But, if the caſe is otherwiſe, I am prepared both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other perſon whatever.

Soc. Perhaps, Hermogenes, you ſay ſomething to the purpoſe. Let us conſider therefore. Is that by which any one calls any thing, the name of that thing?

Herm. To me it appears ſo.

Soc. And this, whether a private perſon calls it, or a city?

Herm. I think ſo.

Soc. What, then, if I ſhould call any thing in ſuch a manner, as to denominate that an horſe which we now call a man, and that a man which we now

now call a horſe; would not the name man remain the ſame publicly, but the name horſe privately; and again, privately the name man, and publicly the name horſe? Would you not ſpeak in this manner?

HERM. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. Tell me, then, do you call it any thing to ſpeak true and falſe?

HERM. I do.

SOC. Therefore, one thing will be a true ſentence, but another a falſe one. Will it not?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Will not that ſentence, then, which ſpeaks of things as they are, be a true ſentence; but that which ſpeaks of them different from what they are, a falſe one?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Is not this, therefore, to ſpeak of things which are, and which are not, by diſcourſe.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But with reſpect to a ſentence which is true, is the whole true, but the parts of it not true?

HERM. The parts, alſo, are no otherwiſe than true.

SOC. But whether are the large parts true, and the ſmall ones not? or, are all the parts true?

HERM. I think that all the parts are true.

SOC. Is there any part of what you ſay, ſmaller than a name?

HERM. There is not. But this is the ſmalleſt of all.

SOC. And does not this name belong to a true ſentence?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And this, you ſay, is true.

HERM. I do.

SOC. But is not the part of a falſe ſentence falſe?

HERM. I ſay it is.

SOC. It is permitted us, therefore, to call a name true and falſe, ſince we can call a ſentence ſo.

HERM. How ſhould it not be ſo?

SOC. Is that, therefore, which each perſon ſays the name of a thing is, the name of that thing?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Will there be as many names belonging to a thing, as any perſon aſſigns it; and at that time when he aſſigns them?

HERM. I have no other rectitude of name, Socrates, than this; that I may call a thing by one name, which I aſſign to it, and you by another, which you think proper to attribute to it. And after this manner, I ſee that in cities, the ſame things are aſſigned proper names, both among the Greeks with other Greeks, and among the Greeks with the Barbarians.

SOC. Let us ſee, Hermogenes, whether things appear to you to ſubſiſt in ſuch a manner, with reſpect to the peculiar eſſence of each, as they did to Protagoras, who ſaid that man was the meaſure of all things; ſo that things are, with reſpect to me, ſuch as they appear to me; and that they are ſuch to you, as they appear to you: or do ſome of theſe appear to you to poſſeſs a certain ſtability of eſſence?

HERM. Sometimes, Socrates, through doubting, I have been led to this, which Protagoras aſſerts; but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the caſe.

SOC. But what, was you never led to conclude that there is no ſuch thing as a man perfectly evil?

HERM. Never, by Jupiter! But I have often been diſpoſed to think, that there are ſome men profoundly wicked, and that the number of theſe is great.

SOC. But have you never yet ſeen men perfectly good?

HERM. Very few, indeed.

SOC. You have ſeen ſuch then?

HERM. I have.

SOC. How, then, do you eſtabliſh this? Is it thus: That thoſe who are completely good, are completely prudent; and that the completely bad, are completely imprudent?

HERM. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. If, therefore, Protagoras ſpeaks the truth, and this is the truth itſelf, for every thing to be ſuch as it appears to every one, can ſome of us be prudent, and ſome of us imprudent?

HERM. By no means.

SOC. And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, ſince there

there is ſuch a thing as prudence and imprudence, Protagoras does not entirely ſpeak the truth; for one perſon will not in reality be more prudent than another, if that which appears to every one, is to every one true.

HERM. It is ſo.

SOC. But neither do I think you will agree with Euthydemus, that all things ſubſiſt together with all, in a ſimilar manner, and always; for thus things would not be good, and others evil, if virtue and vice were always, and in a ſimilar manner, inherent in all things.

HERM. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. If, therefore, neither all things ſubſiſt together ſimilarly and always with all things, nor each thing is what it appears to each perſon, it is evident that there are certain things which poſſeſs a ſtability of eſſence, and this not from us, nor in conſequence of being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through the power of imagination, but which ſubſiſt from themſelves, according to the eſſence which naturally belongs to them.

HERM. This appears to me, Socrates, to be the caſe.

SOC. Will, therefore, the things themſelves naturally ſubſiſt in this manner, but their actions not ſo? or are their actions, in like manner, one certain ſpecies of things?

HERM. They are perfectly ſo.

SOC. Actions therefore, alſo, are performed according to the nature which they poſſeſs, and not according to our opinion. As, for inſtance, if we ſhould attempt to cut any thing, ſhall we ſay that each particular can be divided juſt as we pleaſe, and with what we pleaſe? or rather, ſhall we not ſay, that if we deſire to cut any thing according to its natural capacity of receiving ſection, and likewiſe with that inſtrument which is natural for the purpoſe, we ſhall divide properly, effect ſomething ſatisfactory, and act rightly? But that if we do this contrary to nature, we ſhall wander from the purpoſe, and perform nothing?

HERM. To me it appears ſo.

SOC. If therefore we ſhould attempt to burn any thing, we ought not to burn it according to every opinion, but according to that which is right; and this is no other, than after that manner in which any thing is naturally adapted to burn and be burnt, and with thoſe materals which are proper on the occaſion.

HERM. It is ſo.

SOC.

Soc. Muſt we not, therefore, proceed with other things after the ſame manner?

Herm. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Is not to ſpeak, therefore, one particular operation?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. Whether, therefore, does he ſpeak rightly, who ſpeaks juſt as he thinks fit; or he, who ſpeaks in ſuch a manner as the nature of things requires him to ſpeak, and themſelves to be ſpoken of; and who thinks, that if he ſpeaks of a thing with that which is accommodated to its nature, he ſhall effect ſomething by ſpeaking; but that, if he acts otherwiſe, he ſhall wander from the truth, and accompliſh nothing to the purpoſe?

Herm. It appears to me, it will be juſt as you ſay.

Soc. Is not, therefore, the nomination of a thing, a certain part of ſpeaking? For thoſe who denominate things, deliver after a manner ſentences.

Herm. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Is not the nomination of things, therefore, a certain action, ſince to ſpeak is a certain action about things?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. But it has appeared that actions do not ſubſiſt with reſpect to us, but that they have a certain proper nature of their own.

Herm. It has ſo.

Soc. It follows, therefore, that we muſt give names to things, in ſuch a manner as their nature requires us to denominate, and them to be denominated, and by ſuch means as are proper, and not juſt as we pleaſe, if we mean to aſſent to what we have before aſſerted. And thus we ſhall act and nominate in a ſatisfactory manner, but not by a contrary mode of conduct.

Herm. It appears ſo to me.

Soc. Come then, anſwer me. Muſt we not ſay, that a thing which ought to be cut, ought to be cut with ſomething?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. And that the thread, which ought to be ſeparated in weaving, ought to be ſeparated with ſomething? And that the thing which ought to be perforated, ought to perforated with ſomething?

Herm.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

Soc. And likewiſe that the thing which ought to be named, ought to be named with ſomething?

HERM. It ought.

Soc. But with what are the threads ſeparated in weaving?

HERM. With the ſhuttle.

Soc. And what is that with which a thing is denominated?

HERM. A name.

Soc. You ſpeak well. And hence a name is a certain organ.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

Soc. If, therefore, I ſhould inquire what ſort of an inſtrument a ſhuttle is, would you not anſwer, that it is an inſtrument with which we ſeparate the threads in weaving?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But what do we perform in weaving? Do we not ſeparate the woof and the threads, which are confuſed together?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Would you not anſwer in the ſame manner concerning perforating, and other particulars?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Can you in like manner declare concerning a name, what it is which we perform, whilſt we denominate any thing with a name which is a certain inſtrument?

HERM. I cannot.

Soc. Do we teach one another any thing, and diſtinguiſh things according to their mode of ſubſiſtence?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

Soc. A name, therefore, is an inſtrument endued with a power of teaching, and diſtinguiſhing the eſſence of a thing, in the ſame manner as a ſhuttle with reſpect to the web.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But is not the ſhuttle textorial?

HERM. How ſhould it not?

Soc. The weaver therefore uſes the ſhuttle in a proper manner, ſo far as concerns

concerns the art of weaving; but he who teaches employs a name beautifully, according to the proper method of teaching.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Through whoſe operation is it that the weaver acts properly when he uſes the ſhuttle?

HERM. The carpenter's.

SOC. But is every one a carpenter, or he only who poſſeſſes art?

HERM. He who poſſeſſes art.

SOC. And whoſe work does the piercer properly uſe, when he uſes the auger?

HERM. The blackſmith's.

SOC. Is every one therefore a blackſmith, or he only who poſſeſſes art?

HERM. He who poſſeſſes art.

SOC. But whoſe work does the teacher uſe when he employs a name?

HERM. I cannot tell.

SOC. Nor can you tell who delivered to us us the names which we uſe?

HERM. I cannot.

SOC. Does it not appear to you that the law delivered theſe?

HERM. It does.

SOC. He who teaches, therefore, uſes the work of the legiſlator when he uſes a name.

HERM. It appeas ſo to me.

SOC. But does every man appear to you to be a legiſlator, or he only who poſſeſſes art?

HERM. He who poſſeſſes art.

SOC. It is not the province, therefore, of every man, O Hermogenes, to eſtabliſh a name, but of a certain artificer of names; and this, as it appears, is a legiſlator, who is the moſt rare of artificers among men.

HERM. It appears ſo.

SOC. But come, conſider, what it is which the legiſlator beholds, when he eſtabliſhes names; and make your ſurvey from the inſtances above adduced. What is it which the carpenter looks to, when he makes a ſhuttle? Is it not to ſome ſuch thing as is naturally adapted to the purpoſes of weaving?

HERM.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But if the ſhuttle ſhould break during its fabrication, do you think the carpenter would make another, taking pattern by the broken one? or rather would he not look to that form, agreeably to which he endeavoured to make the broken ſhuttle?

HERM. It appears to me that he would look to this in his fabrication.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, moſt juſtly call this form, the ſhuttle itſelf?

HERM. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. When, therefore, it is requiſite to make ſhuttles, adapted for the purpoſe of weaving a ſlender garment, or one of a cloſer texture, or of thread or wool, or of any other kind whatever, it is neceſſary that all of them ſhould poſſeſs the form of the ſhuttle; but that each ſhould be applied to the work to which it is naturally accommodated, in the moſt becoming manner.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And the ſame reaſoning takes place with reſpect to other inſtruments. For an inſtrument muſt be found out which is naturally adapted to the nature of each particular, and a ſubſtance muſt be aſſigned to it, from which the artificer will not produce juſt what he pleaſes, but that which is natural to the inſtrument with which he operates. For it is neceſſary to know, as it appears, that an auger ought to be compoſed of iron, in order to operate in each particular naturally.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And that a ſhuttle ſhould for this purpoſe be made of wood.

HERM. It is ſo.

SOC. For every ſhuttle, as it appears, is naturally adapted to every ſpecies of weaving; and other things in a ſimilar manner.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It is neceſſary, therefore, excellent man, that the legiſlator ſhould know how to place a name naturally, with reſpect to ſounds and ſyllables; and that, looking towards that particular of which this is the name, he ſhould frame and eſtabliſh all names, if he is deſirous of becoming the proper founder of names. But if the founder of names does not compoſe every name from the ſame ſyllables, we ought to take notice, that neither does every blackſmith uſe the ſame iron, when he fabricates the ſame inſtrument for the ſake of the ſame thing; but that the inſtrument is properly compoſed, ſo long as they fabricate it according to the ſame idea, though from different ſorts of

iron, whether it is made here, or among the Barbarians. Is not this the caſe?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Will you not therefore be of opinion, that as long as a founder of names, both here and among the Barbarians, aſſigns a form of name accommodated to each, in any kind of ſyllables, that while this is the caſe, the founder of names here will not be worſe than the founder in any other place?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Who therefore is likely to know whether a convenient form of the ſhuttle is ſituated in every kind of wood? Does this belong to the artificer of the ſhuttle, or to the weaver by whom it is uſed?

HERM. It is probable, Socrates, that he is more likely to know this, by whom the ſhuttle is uſed.

SOC. Who is it, then, that uſes the work of the fabricator of the lyre? Is it not he who knows how to inſtruct the artificer of it in the beſt manner, and who is able to judge whether it is properly made or not?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But who is this?

HERM. The lyriſt.

SOC. And who is it that uſes the work of the ſhipwright?

HERM. The pilot.

SOC. And who is he that knows whether the work of the founder of names is beautiful, or not; and who is able to judge concerning it when finiſhed, both here and among the Barbarians? Muſt it not be the perſon who uſes this work?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And is not this perſon, one who knows how to interrogate?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And likewiſe to anſwer?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and anſwer any thing elſe, than one who is ſkilled in dialectic?

HERM. I ſhould not.

SOC. It is the buſineſs, therefore, of the ſhipwright to make a rudder, according to the directions of the pilot, if he means to produce a good rudder.

HERM.

HERM. It appears ſo.

SOC. And the legiſlator, as it ſeems, ought, in the eſtabliſhing of names, to conſult a man ſkilled in dialectic, if he means to found them in a beautiful manner.

HERM. He ought.

SOC. It appears, therefore, O Hermogenes, that the impoſition of names is no deſpicable affair, as you think it is, nor the buſineſs of depraved men, or of any that may occur. And Cratylus ſpeaks truly, when he ſays that names belong to things from nature, and that every one is not the artificer of names, but he alone who looks to that name which is naturally accommodated to any thing, and who is able to inſert this form of a name in letters and ſyllables.

HERM. I have nothing proper to urge, Socrates, in contradiction of what you ſay. And, perhaps, it is not eaſy to be thus ſuddenly perſuaded. But I think that I ſhould be more eaſily perſuaded by you, if you could ſhow me what that is which you call a certain rectitude of name according to nature.

SOC. As to myſelf, O bleſſed Hermogenes, I ſay nothing; but I even almoſt forget what I ſaid a ſhort time ſince, that I had no knowledge in this affair, but that I would inveſtigate it in conjunction with you. But now, in conſequence of our mutual ſurvey, thus much appears to us, in addition to our former conviction, that a name poſſeſſes ſome natural rectitude; and that every man does not know how to accommodate names to things, in a becoming manner. Is not this the caſe?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. After this, therefore, it is neceſſary to inquire, what the rectitude of name is, if you deſire to know this.

HERM. But I do deſire to know it.

SOC. Conſider then.

HERM. But in what manner is it proper to conſider?

SOC. The moſt proper mode of inquiry, my friend, muſt be obtained from thoſe endued with ſcience, offering them money for this purpoſe, and loading them with thanks: and theſe are the ſophiſts, through whom your brother Callias, in conſequence of having given them a great quantity of money, appears to be a wiſe man. But, ſince you have no authority in paternal matters, it is proper to ſupplicate your brother, and entreat him to ſhow you that rectitude about things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.

HERM. But this requeſt of mine, Socrates, would be abſurd, if, notwithſtanding my entirely rejecting the truth of Protagoras, I ſhould be pleaſed with aſſertions reſulting from this truth, as things of any worth.

SOC. But if this does not pleaſe you, it is proper to derive our information from Homer, and the other poets.

HERM. And what does Homer ſay, Socrates, concerning names; and where?

SOC. Every where. But thoſe are the greateſt and moſt beautiful paſſages, in which he diſtinguiſhes between the names which are aſſigned to the ſame things by men, and thoſe which are employed by the gods. Or do you not think that he ſpeaks ſomething in theſe, great and wonderful, concerning the rectitude of names? For it is evident that the gods call things according to that rectitude which names naturally poſſeſs. Or do you not think ſo?

HERM. I well know, that if the gods denominate any thing, they properly denominate it. But what are the paſſages you ſpeak of?

SOC. Do you not know, that ſpeaking of the Trojan river, which conteſted in a ſingular manner with Vulcan, he ſays,

> *Xanthus* its name with thoſe of heav'nly birth,
> But call'd *Scamander* by the ſons of earth[1]?

HERM. I do.

SOC. But what then, do you not think that this is ſomething venerable, to know in what reſpect it is more proper to call that river Xanthus, than Scamander? Likewiſe, if you are ſo diſpoſed, take notice that he ſays[2], the ſame bird is called Chalcis by the gods, but Cymindis by men. And do you think this is a deſpicable piece of learning, to know how much more proper it is to call the ſame bird Chalcis than Cymindis, or Myrines than Batica; and ſo in many other inſtances, which may be found both in this poet and others? But theſe things are, perhaps, beyond the ability of you and me to diſcover. But the names Scamandrius and Aſtyanax may, as it appears to me, be comprehended by human ſagacity; and it may eaſily be ſeen, what kind of rectitude there is in theſe names, which, according to Homer, were given to the ſon of Hector. For you doubtleſs know the verſes in which theſe names are contained.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Which therefore of theſe names do you think Homer conſidered as more properly adapted to the boy, Aſtyanax or Scamandrius?

[1] Iliad xx. v. 74. [2] Iliad xiv. v. 291.

HERM.

HERM. I cannot tell.

SOC. But conſider the affair in this manner: if any one ſhould aſk you, which you thought would denominate things in the moſt proper manner, the more wiſe or the more unwiſe?

HERM. It is manifeſt that I ſhould anſwer, the more wiſe.

SOC. Which therefore appears to you to be the more wiſe in cities, the women or the men, that I may ſpeak of the whole genus?

HERM. The men.

SOC. Do you not therefore know that, according to Homer, the ſon of Hector was called by the men of Troy, Aſtyanax, but by the women, Scamandrius?

HERM. It appears that it was ſo.

SOC. Do you not think that Homer conſidered the Trojan men as wiſer than the Trojan women?

HERM. I think he did.

SOC. He therefore thought that the name Aſtyanax was more proper for the boy than Scamandrius.

HERM. It appears ſo.

SOC. But let us conſider the reaſon which he aſſigns for this denomination: for, ſays he,

> Aſtyanax the Trojans call'd the boy,
> From his great father, the defence of Troy [1].

On this account, as it appears, it is proper to call the ſon of the ſaviour of his country Aſtyanax, that is, the king of that city, which, as Homer ſays, his father preſerved.

HERM. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. But why is this appellation more proper than that of Scamandrius? for I confeſs I am ignorant of the reaſon of this. Do you underſtand it?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not.

SOC. But, excellent man, Homer alſo gave to Hector his name.

HERM. But why?

SOC. Becauſe it appears to me that this name is ſomething ſimilar to Aſtyanax, and that theſe names were conſidered by the Greeks as having the

[1] Iliad vi. v. 402.

ſame

ſame meaning; for *king* and Hector nearly ſignify the ſame, ſince both theſe names are royal. For whoever is a *king*, is alſo doubtleſs *a Hector*; ſince ſuch a one evidently *rules over*, *poſſeſſes*, and *has*, that of which he is the king. Or do I appear to you to ſay nothing to the purpoſe, but deceive myſelf, in thinking, as through certain veſtiges, to touch upon the opinion of Homer reſpecting the rectitude of names?

HERM. By no means, by Jupiter, but perhaps you in ſome degree apprehend his meaning.

SOC. For it is juſt, as it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horſe, a horſe. I do not ſay, that this ought to be the caſe when ſomething monſtrous is produced from a horſe, and which is different from a horſe; but only when the offspring is a natural production. For if the natural progeny of an ox ſhould generate a horſe, the offspring ought not to be called a calf, but a colt. [And if a horſe, contrary to nature, ſhould generate a calf, the offspring ought not to be called a colt, but a calf[1].] And again, if from a man an offspring not human ſhould be produced, the progeny, I think, ought not to be called a man. And the ſame reaſoning muſt take place reſpecting trees, and all other producing natures. Or does it not appear ſo to you?

HERM. It does.

SOC. You ſpeak well: for take care that I do not fraudulently deceive you. For the ſame reaſon, therefore, the offspring of a king ought to be called a king. But it is of no conſequence, though the ſame thing ſhould be

[1] A great part of this ſentence within the crotchets is omitted in the Greek text of all the printed editions of Plato; and a great part likewiſe of the preceding ſentence is wanting: though Ficinus, as is evident from his verſion, found the whole complete in the manuſcript, from which he made his tranſlation. In the Greek, there is nothing more than, εαν βους εκγονον φυσει ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκη μοσχον, ου πωλον κλητεον, αλλα μοσχον. Inſtead of which we ought to read, εαν βους εκγονον φυσει ιππον τεκη ου μοσχον κλητεον, αλλα πωλον, και εαν ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκη μοσχον, ου πωλον κλητεον, αλλα μοσχον. But though, without this emendation, the paſſage is perfect nonſenſe, yet this has not been diſcovered by any of the verbaliſts; a plain proof this, that they never read this Dialogue with a view to underſtand it. Or perhaps, they conſidered an emendation of this kind beneath their notice; for doubtleſs it is not to be compared with the remarks with which their works abound. Such as, for inſtance, the following obſervation in Fiſcher's edition of this Dialogue, p. 2. in which we are informed that inſtead of ἀυτων, "the Baſil edition has ἀυτων, and this not badly:" "Ald. Baſ. 1. 2. ἀυτων, non male." And this author's edition is replete with remarks no leſs curious, acute, and important.

expreſſed

expreſſed in different ſyllables, or a letter ſhould be added or taken away, as long as the eſſence of the thing poſſeſſes dominion, and manifeſts itſelf in the name.

HERM. What is this which you ſay?

SOC. Nothing complex. But, as you well know, we pronounce the names of the elements, but not the elements themſelves, four alone excepted, viz. ε & υ, and ο & ω: and adding other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, we form names, which we afterwards enunciate. But, as long as we inſert the apparent power of the element, it is proper to call the name that which is manifeſted to us by the element. As is evident, for inſtance, in the letter βητα: for here you ſee that the addition of the η, and the τ, and the α, does not hinder the nature of that element from being evinced by the whole name, agreeably to the intention of its founder; ſo well did he know how to give names to letters.

HERM. You appear to me to ſpeak the truth.

SOC. Will not, therefore, the ſame reaſoning take place reſpecting a king? For a king will be produced from a king, *good* from *good*, and *beauty* from *beauty*; and in the ſame manner with relation to every thing elſe, from every genus a progeny of the ſame kind will be produced, unleſs ſomething monſtrous is generated; and will be called by the ſame name. But it is poſſible to vary theſe names in ſuch a manner by ſyllables, that, to ignorant men, the very ſame appellations will appear to be different from each other. Juſt as the medicines of phyſicians, when varied with colours or ſmells, appear to us to be different, though they are ſtill the ſame; but to the phyſician, as one who conſiders the power of the medicines, they appear to be the ſame, nor is he at all aſtoniſhed by the additions. In like manner, perhaps, he who is ſkilled in names ſpeculates their power, and is not aſtoniſhed, if at any time a letter ſhould be added, or changed, or taken away; or that in other all-various letters, the ſame power of name ſhould be found. As in the names Aſtyanax and Hector, which we have juſt ſpoken of, they do not poſſeſs any thing of the ſame letters, except the *t*, and yet, at the ſame time, they ſignify the ſame thing. So likewiſe with reſpect to the name αρχεπολις, or a *ruler of a city*, what communication has it in letters with the two preceding names? and yet it has the ſame ſignification. And there are many

other

other words which ſignify nothing elſe than a king; many which ſignify nothing elſe than the leader of an army, as αγις, πολεμαρχος, ευπολεμος; and likewiſe many which imply a profeſſor of medicine, as ιατροκλης and ακεσιμβροτος. And perhaps many other may be found, diſagreeing indeed in ſyllables, and letters, but in power vocally emitting the ſame ſignification. Does this appear to you to be the caſe, or not?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And that to things which ſubſiſt according to nature, the ſame names ſhould be aſſigned?

HERM. Perfectly ſo.

SOC. But that, as often as generations take place contrary to nature, and by this means produce things in the form of monſters, as when from a good and pious man an impious man is generated, then the offſpring ought not to be called by the name of his producer; juſt as we ſaid before, that if a horſe ſhould generate the progeny of an ox, the offſpring ought not to be called a horſe, but an ox?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. When an impious man, therefore, is generated from one who is pious, the name of the genus to which he belongs muſt be aſſigned him.

HERM. It muſt ſo.

SOC. Such a ſon, therefore, ought not to be called either one who is a friend to divinity, or mindful of divinity, or any thing of this kind: but he ſhould be called by that which ſignifies the contrary of all this, if names ought to poſſeſs any thing of rectitude.

HERM. This ought to be the caſe more than any thing, Socrates.

SOC. Juſt, Hermogenes, as the name Oreſtes appears to be properly invented; whether a certain fortune aſſigned him this name, or ſome poet, evincing by this appellation his ruſtic nature, correſpondent to an inhabitant of mountains.

HERM. So it appears, Socrates.

SOC. It appears alſo, that the name of his father ſubſiſts according to nature.

HERM. It does ſo.

SOC. For it ſeems that Agamemnon was one who conſidered that he ought to labour and patiently endure hardſhips, and obtain the end of his deſigns

deſigns through virtue. But his ſtay before Troy, with ſo great an army, evinces his patient endurance. That this man, therefore, was wonderful, with reſpect to perſeverance, is denoted by the name Agamemnon. Perhaps alſo Atreus is a proper denomination: for his ſlaughter of Chryſippus, and the cruelty which he exerciſed towards Thyeſtes, evince that he was *pernicious* and *noxious*. His ſurname, therefore, ſuffers a ſmall degree of declination, and conceals its meaning; ſo that the nature of the man is not evident to every one; but to thoſe who are ſkilful in names, the ſignification of Atreus is ſufficiently manifeſt. For his name properly ſubſiſts throughout, according to the *intrepid*, *inexorable*, and *noxious*. It appears alſo to me, that the name given to Pelops was very properly aſſigned: for this name ſignifies one who ſees things near at hand, and that he is worthy of ſuch a denomination.

HERM. But how?

SOC. Becauſe it is reported of this man, that in the ſlaughter of Myrtilus, he neither provided for any thing, nor could perceive afar off how great a calamity his whole race would be ſubject to from this circumſtance; but he only regarded that which was juſt before him, and which then ſubſiſted, that is, what was πελας, or *near*; and this when he deſired, by all poſſible means, to receive Hippodamia in marriage. So that his name was derived from πελας *near*, and οψις *ſight*. Every one alſo muſt think that the name given to Tantalus was properly and naturally aſſigned him, if what is related concerning him is true.

HERM. But what is that relation?

SOC. That, while he was yet living, many unfortunate and dire circumſtances happened to him, and at laſt the whole of his country was ſubverted; and that, when he was dead, a ſtone was ſuſpended over his head in Hades, theſe particulars, as it appears correſponding with his name in a wonderful and artleſs manner: for it is juſt as if any one ſhould be willing to call him ταλαντατος, i. e. *moſt miſerable*, but, at the ſame time, deſirous to conceal this circumſtance, ſhould call him Tantalus inſtead of Talantatus. And it ſeems that the fortune of rumour cauſed him to receive this appellation. But it appears that the name of him who was called his father, is compoſed in an all-beautiful manner, though it is by no means eaſy to be underſtood: for in reality the name of Jupiter is, as it were, a ſentence; but dividing it into

two parts, ſome of us uſe one part, and ſome another, for ſome call him ζηνα, and ſome δια. And theſe parts collected into one, evince the nature of the god; which, as we have ſaid, a name ought to effect: *For there is no one who is more the cauſe of living, both to us and every thing elſe, than he who is the ruler and king of all things*[1]. It happens, therefore, that this god is rightly denominated, through whom life is preſent with all living beings; but the name, though one, is diſtributed, as I have ſaid, into two parts, viz. into δια and ζηνα. But he who ſuddenly hears that this god is the ſon of Saturn, may perhaps think it a reproachful aſſertion: for it is rational to believe that Jupiter is the offspring of a certain great dianoëtic power; for, when Saturn is called κορος, it does not ſignify *a boy*, but the purity and incorruptible nature of his intellect[2]. But, according to report, Saturn is

[1] It is evident from hence, that Jupiter, according to Plato, is the demiurgus, or artificer of the univerſe; for no one can be more the cauſe of living to all things, than he by whom the world was produced. But if this be the caſe, the artificer of the world is not, as we have before obſerved according to the Platonic theology, the firſt cauſe: for there are other gods ſuperior to Jupiter, whoſe names Plato, as we ſhall ſhortly ſee, etymologizes agreeably to the Orphic theology. Indeed, his etymology of Jupiter is evidently derived from the following Orphic verſes, which are cited by Joannes Diac. Allegor. ad Heſiodi Theog. p. 278.

Εστιν δη παντων αρχη Ζευς. Ζευς γαρ εδωκε,
Ζωα τ' εγεννησεν· και Ζην αυτον καλεουσι,
Και Δια τ' ηδ', οτι δη δια τουτον απαντα τετυκται.
Εις δε πατηρ ουτος παντων, θηρων τε βροτων τε.

i. e. "Jupiter is the principle of all things. For Jupiter is the cauſe of the generation of animals: and they call him Ζην, and Δια alſo, becauſe all things were fabricated *through* him; and he is the one father of all things, of beaſts and men." Here too you may obſerve that he is called *fabricator* and *father*, which are the very epithets given to the demiurgus of the world by Plato in the Timæus. In ſhort, Jupiter, the artificer of the world, ſubſiſts at the extremity of that order of gods which is called νοερος, *intellectual*, as is copiouſly and beautifully proved by Proclus, in Plat. Theol. lib. v. And he is likewiſe celebrated by the Chaldaic theology, as we are informed by Damaſcius and Pſellus under two names, δις επεκεινα, *twice beyond*.

[2] Saturn, therefore, according to Plato, is *pure intellect*, viz. the firſt intellectual intellect: for the intellects of all the gods are pure in the moſt tranſcendent degree; and therefore purity here muſt be characteriſtic of ſupremacy. Hence Saturn ſubſiſts at the ſummit of the intellectual order of gods, from whence he is received into all the ſubſequent divine orders, and into every part of the world. But from this definition of Saturn we may ſee the extreme beauty of that divine fable, in which he is ſaid to devour his children: for this ſignifies nothing more than the nature of an intellectual god, ſince every intellect returns into itſelf: and conſequently its offſpring, which are intellectual conceptions, are, as it were, abſorbed in itſelf.

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the ſon of Heaven: and ſight directed to things above is called by this name, ὄψεσνια [1], from beholding things ſituated on high. From whence, O Hermogenes, thoſe who diſcourſe on ſublime affairs, ſay that a pure intellect is preſent with him, and that he is very properly denominated Heaven. Indeed, if I did but remember the genealogy of the gods, according to Heſiod, and the yet ſuperior progenitors of theſe which he ſpeaks of, I ſhould not deſiſt from ſhowing you the rectitude of their appellations, until I had made trial of this wiſdom, whether it produces any thing of conſequence, or not; and whether thoſe explanations which I have juſt now ſo ſuddenly delivered, though I know not from whence, are defective or true.

HERM. Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to pour forth oracles on a ſudden, like thoſe who are agitated by ſome inſpiring god.

SOC. And I think indeed, O Hermogenes, that this wiſdom happened to me through the means of Euthyphro, the ſon of Pantius: for I was with him in the morning, and liſtened to him with great attention. It ſeems therefore, that, being divinely inſpired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wiſdom, but that he has alſo arreſted my very ſoul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in ſuch a manner as to make uſe of this wiſdom to-day, and contemplate what yet remains concerning the rectitude of names. But to-morrow, if it is agreeable to you, we will lay it aſide, and purify ourſelves from it, finding out for this purpoſe one who is ſkilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he is ſome one of the prieſts, or the ſophiſts.

[1] Heaven, which is here characterized by ſight, is the heaven which Plato ſo much celebrates in the Phædrus, and compoſes that order of gods which is called by the Chaldean oracles νοητος και νοερος, i. e. *intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual.* This will be evident from conſidering that Plato, in what follows, admits with Heſiod, that there are gods ſuperior to heaven, ſuch as night, chaos, &c. But as ſight correſponds to intelligence, and this is the ſame with that which is both intelligible and intellectual, and as Saturn is the ſummit of the intellectual order, it is evident that heaven muſt compoſe the middle order of gods characterized by intelligence, and that the order above this muſt be entirely intelligible. In conſequence of all this, what muſt we think of their ſyſtem, who ſuppoſe Heaven, Saturn, and Jupiter, and indeed all the gods of the antients, to have been nothing more than dead men deified, notwithſtanding the above etymologies, and the expreſs teſtimony of Plato to the contrary in the Timæus, who repreſents the demiurgus commanding the ſubordinate gods, after he had produced them, to fabricate men and other animals? For my own part, I know not which to admire moſt, the ignorance, the impudence, or the impiety of ſuch aſſertions. All that can be ſaid is, that ſuch opinions are truly barbaric, modern and Galilæan.

HERM. I aſſent to this; for I ſhall hear, with great pleaſure, what remains of the diſcuſſion concerning names.

SOC. It is neceſſary to act in this manner. From whence then are you willing we ſhould begin our ſpeculation, ſince we have inſiſted upon a certain formula of operation; that we may know whether names themſelves will teſtify for us, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but contain a certain rectitude of conſtruction? The names, therefore, of heroes and men may perhaps deceive us: for many of theſe ſubſiſt according to the ſurnames of their anceſtors, and ſometimes have no correſpondence with the perſons, as we obſerved in the beginning of this diſputation. But many are added, as tokens of renown, ſuch as *the proſperous*, *the ſaviour*, *the friend of divinity*, and a variety of others of this kind. It appears to me, therefore, that we ought to neglect the diſcuſſion of theſe: but it is probable that we ſhall particularly find names properly fabricated, about eternal and natural beings; for it is moſt becoming to ſtudy the poſition of names in theſe. But, perhaps, ſome of theſe are eſtabliſhed by a power more divine than that of men.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to ſpeak excellently well.

SOC. Will it not therefore be juſt, to begin from the gods, conſidering the reaſon why they are properly denominated gods?

HERM. It will be proper.

SOC. I therefore conjecture as follows:—It appears to me that the moſt antient of the Greeks, or the firſt inhabitants of Greece, conſidered thoſe only as gods, which are eſteemed ſuch at preſent by many of the Barbarians; I mean, the ſun and the moon, the earth, the ſtars, and the heavens. As they therefore perceived all theſe *running* round in a perpetual courſe, from this nature of *running* they called them gods; but afterwards, underſtanding that there were others beſides theſe, they called all of them by the ſame name. Has what I ſay any ſimilitude to truth, or not?

HERM. It poſſeſſes a perfect ſimilitude.

SOC. What then ſhall we conſider after this?

HERM. It is evident that we ought to ſpeculate concerning dæmons, heroes, and men.

SOC. Concerning dæmons? And truly, Hermogenes, this is the proper method of proceeding. What then are we to underſtand by the name dæmon? See whether I ſay any thing to the purpoſe.

HERM.

HERM. Only relate what it is.

SOC. Do you not know who thoſe dæmons are which Heſiod ſpeaks of?

HERM. I do not.

SOC. And are you ignorant that he ſays, the golden race of men was firſt generated [1]?

HERM. This I know.

SOC. He ſays, therefore, concerning this, "that after this race was concealed by Fate, it produced dæmons [2] denominated holy, terreſtrial, good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men."

HERM. But what then?

SOC.

[1] The different ages of men which are celebrated by Heſiod, in his Works and Days, are not to be underſtand literally, as if they once really ſubſiſted, but only as ſignifying, in beautiful poetical images, the mutations of human lives from virtue to vice, and from vice to virtue. For earth was never peopled with men either wholly virtuous or vicious; ſince the good and the bad have always ſubſiſted together on its ſurface, and always will ſubſiſt. However, in conſequence of the different circulations of the heavens, there are periods of fertility and ſterility, not only with reſpect to men but likewiſe to brutes and plants. Hence places naturally adapted to the nurture of the philoſophical genius, ſuch as Athens and Egypt, will, in periods productive of a fertility of ſouls, ſuch as was formerly the caſe, abound with divine men: but in periods ſuch as the preſent, in which there is every where a dreadful ſterility of ſouls, through the general prevalence of a certain moſt irrational and gigantic impiety, αλογιστος και γιγαντικη αυθαδιουργια, as Proclus elegantly calls the eſtabliſhed religion of his time, in Plat. Polit. p. 369—at ſuch periods as theſe, Athens and Egypt will no longer be the ſeminaries of divine ſouls, but will be filled with degraded and barbarous inhabitants. And ſuch, according to the arcana of antient philoſopy, is the reaſon of the preſent general degradation of mankind. Not that formerly there were no ſuch characters as now abound, for this would be abſurd, ſince mankind always have been, and always will be, upon earth, a mixture of good and bad, in which the latter will predominate; but that during the fertile circulations of the heavens, in conſequence of their being a greater number of men than when a contrary circulation takes place, men will abound who adorn human nature, and who indeed deſcend for the benevolent purpoſe of leading back apoſtate ſouls to the principles from which they fell. As the different ages therefore of Heſiod ſignify nothing more than the different lives which each individual of the human ſpecies paſſes through, hence an intellectual life is implied by the golden age. For ſuch a life is pure, and free from ſorrow and paſſion; and of this impaſſivity gold is an image, through its never being ſubject to ruſt or putrefaction. Such a life, too, is with great propriety ſaid to be under Saturn, becauſe Saturn, as we have a little before obſerved, is pure intellect. But for a larger account of this intereſting particular, and of the allegorical meaning of the different ages celebrated by Heſiod, ſee Proclus upon Heſiod, p. 39, &c.

[2] By dæmons, here, muſt not be underſtood thoſe who are eſſentially ſuch, and perpetually ſubſiſt as mediums between gods and men, but thoſe only who are ſuch κατα σχεσιν, or *according*

Soc. I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as naturally compoſed from gold, but as being beautiful and good: but I infer this, from his denominating our race an iron one.

Herm. You ſpeak the truth.

Soc. Do you not therefore think, that if any one of the preſent times ſhould appear to be good, Heſiod would ſay he belonged to the golden race?

Herm. It is probable he would.

Soc. But are the good any other than ſuch as are prudent?

Herm. They are the prudent.

Soc. On this account therefore, as it appears to me, more than any other he calls them dæmons, becauſe they were *prudent* and *learned* (δαημονες). And, in our antient tongue, this very name is to be found. Hence both he, and many other poets, ſpeak in a becoming manner, when they ſay that a good man after death will receive a mighty deſtiny and renown, and will become a *dæmon*, according to the ſurname of prudence. I therefore aſſert the ſame, that every good man is *learned* and *ſkilful*; that he is dæmoniacal, both while living and when dead; and that he is properly denominated a dæmon.

Herm. And I alſo, Socrates, ſeem to myſelf to agree with you perfectly in this particular. But what does the name hero[1] ſignify?

Soc.

to habitude; or, in other words, the ſouls of truly worthy men, after their departure from the preſent life: for ſuch, till they deſcend again upon earth, are the benevolent guardians of mankind, in conjunction with thoſe who are eſſentially dæmons.

[1] Heroes form the laſt order of ſouls which are the perpetual attendants of the gods, and are characterized by a venerable and elevated magnanimity; and as they are wholly of an anagogic nature, they are the progeny of love, through whom they revolve about the firſt beauty in harmonic meaſures, and with ineffable delight. Men likewiſe, who in the preſent life knew the particular deity from whom they deſcended, and who lived in a manner conformable to the idiom of their preſiding and parent divinity, were called by the antients, *ſons of the gods, demigods*, and *heroes*: i. e. they were *eſſentially* men, but *according to habitude*, κατα σχεσιν, *heroes*. But ſuch as theſe were divided into two claſſes; into thoſe who lived according to *intellectual*, and thoſe who lived according to *practical* virtue: and the firſt ſort were ſaid to have a god for their father, and a woman for their mother; but the ſecond ſort, a goddeſs for their mother and a man for their father. Not that this was literally the caſe; but nothing more was meant by ſuch an aſſertion, than that thoſe who lived according to an intellectual life, deſcended from a deity of the male order, whoſe illuminations they copiouſly participated; and that thoſe who lived according to practical virtue, deſcended from a female divinity, ſuch a ſpecies of life being more imbecile and paſſive than

Soc. This is by no means difficult to underſtand; for this name is very little different from its original, evincing that its generation is derived from love.

Herm. How is this?

Soc. Do you not know that heroes are demigods?

Herm. What then?

Soc. All of them were doubtleſs generated either from the love of a god towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a goddeſs. If, therefore, you conſider this matter according to the antient Attic tongue, you will more clearly underſtand the truth of this derivation: for it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the ſake of the name: or you may ſay, that this name is deduced from their being wiſe and rhetoricians, ſagacious and ſkilled in dialectic, and ſufficiently ready in interrogating; for ειρειν is the ſame as to ſpeak. Hence, as we juſt now ſaid in the Attic tongue, thoſe who are called heroes will prove to be certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers: ſo that the genus of rhetoricians and ſophiſts is, in conſequence of this, an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to underſtand; but rather this reſpecting men is obſcure, I mean, why they were called ανθρωποι, *men*. Can you tell the reaſon?

Herm. From whence, my worthy friend, ſhould I be able? And, indeed, if I was by any means capable of making this diſcovery, I ſhould not exert myſelf for this purpoſe, becauſe I think you will more eaſily diſcover it than I ſhall.

than the former. But the maſculine genius in the gods, implies the cauſe of ſtable power, being, identity, and converſion; and the feminine, that which generates from itſelf all-various progreſſions, diviſions, meaſures of life, and prolific powers. I only add, that as the names of the gods were not only attributed by the antients to *eſſential* dæmons and heroes, but to men who were ſuch according to *habitude*, on account of their ſimilitude to a divine nature; we may from hence perceive the true origin of that moſt ſtupid and dire of all modern opinions, that the gods of the antients were nothing but dead men, ignorantly deified by the objects of their adoration. Such an opinion indeed, excluſive of its other pernicious qualities, is ſo great an outrage to the common ſenſe of the antients, that it would be diſgraceful even to mention the names of its authors. For,

O'er ſuch as theſe, a raſe of nameleſs *things*,
Oblivion ſcornful ſpreads her duſky wings.

Soc.

Soc. You appear to me to rely on the inſpiration of Euthyphro.

Herm. Evidently ſo.

Soc. And your confidence is proper: for I now ſeem to myſelf to underſtand in a knowing and an elegant manner; and I am afraid, if I do not take care, that I ſhall become to-day wiſer than I ought. But conſider what I ſay. For this, in the firſt place, ought to be underſtood concerning names, that we often add letters, and often take them away, while we compoſe names juſt as we pleaſe; and, beſides this, often change the acute ſyllables. As when we ſay Δια φιλος, *a friend to Jove:* for, in order that this name may become inſtead of a verb to us, we take away the other ιωτα, and, inſtead of an acute middle ſyllable, we pronounce a grave one. But, on the contrary, in others we inſert letters, and others again we enunciate with a graver accent.

Herm. You ſpeak the truth.

Soc. This, therefore, as it appears to me, takes place in the name *man*: for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, $\bar{\alpha}$, being taken away, and the end of the word becoming more grave.

Herm. How do you mean?

Soc. Thus. This name *man* ſignifies that other animals, endued with ſight, neither conſider, nor reaſon, nor contemplate; but man both ſees, and at the ſame time contemplates and reaſons upon that which he ſees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated ανθρωπος, viz. *contemplating what he beholds* [1]. But what ſhall we inveſtigate after this? Shall it be that, the inquiry into which will be very pleaſing to me?

Herm. By all means.

Soc. It appears then to me, that we ought, in the next place, to inveſtigate concerning ſoul and body; for we call the compoſition of ſoul and body, man.

Herm. Without doubt.

Soc. Let us, then, endeavour to divide theſe in the ſame manner as the former ſubjects of our ſpeculation. Will you not therefore ſay, that we ſhould firſt of all conſider the rectitude of this name *ſoul*, and afterwards of the name *body*?

[1] For every thing receives its definition from its *hyparxis*, or ſummit, which in man is *intellectual reaſon*; and this is entirely of a contemplative nature.

Herm.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. That I may ſpeak, then, what appears to me on a ſudden, I think that thoſe who aſſigned this name *ſoul*, underſtood ſome ſuch thing as this, that whenever this nature is preſent with the body, it is the cauſe of its life, extending to, and refrigerating it with, the power of reſpiration; but that when the refrigerating power ceaſes, the body at the ſame time is diſſolved and periſhes: and from hence, as it appears to me, they called it ſoul (ψυχη). But, if you pleaſe, ſtop a little; for I ſeem to myſelf to perceive ſomething more capable of producing perſuaſion than this, among the followers of Euthyphro: for, as it appears to me, they would deſpiſe this etymology, and conſider it as abſurd. But conſider whether the following explanation will pleaſe you.

HERM. Only ſay what it is.

SOC. What other nature, except the ſoul, do you think gives life to the whole body, contains, carries, and enables it to walk about?

HERM. No other.

SOC. But what, do you not believe in the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that intellect and ſoul diſtribute into order, and contain the nature of every thing elſe?

HERM. I do.

SOC. It will be highly proper, therefore, to denominate that power which *carries* and *contains* nature, φυσεχην: but it may more elegantly be called ψυχη.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.

HERM. For it certainly is ſo.

SOC. But it would truly appear to be ridiculous, if it was named according to its compoſition.

HERM. But what ſhall we next conſider after this?

SOC. Shall we ſpeak concerning body?

HERM. By all means.

SOC. But this name appears to me to deviate in a certain ſmall degree from its original: for, according to ſome, it is the *ſepulchre* of the ſoul, which they conſider as buried at preſent; and becauſe whatever the ſoul

ſignifies, it ſignifies by the body; ſo that on this account it is properly called σημα, *a ſepulchre*. And indeed the followers of Orpheus appear to me to have eſtabliſhed this name, principally becauſe the ſoul ſuffers in body the puniſhment of its guilt, and is ſurrounded with this encloſure that it may preſerve the image of a priſon [1]. They are of opinion, therefore, that the body ſhould retain this appellation, σωμα, till the ſoul has abſolved the puniſhment which is her due, and that no other letter ought to be added to the name.

[1] With this doctrine, that the body is the ſepulchre of the ſoul, and that the ſoul ſuffers the puniſhment of her guilt in body, as in a priſon, Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans perfectly agree. Thus Heraclitus, ſpeaking of unembodied ſouls: Ζωμεν τον εκεινων θανατον, τεθνηκαμεν δε τον εκεινων βιον, i. e. "We live their death, and we die their life." And Empedocles, blaming generation, beautifully ſays of her:

Εκ μεν γαρ ζωων ετιθει νεκρα, ειδε αμειβων.

"The ſpecies changing with deſtruction dread,
She makes the *living* paſs into the *dead*."

And again, lamenting his connection with this corporeal world, he pathetically exclaims:

Κλαυσα τε και κωκυσα, ιδων ασυνηθεα χωρον.

"For this I weep, for this indulge my woe,
That e'er my ſoul ſuch novel realms ſhould know."

Thus too the celebrated Pythagorean Philolaus, in the following remarkable paſſage in the Doric dialect, preſerved by Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromat. lib. iii. p. 403: Μαρτυρεονται δε και οι παλαιοι θεολογοι τε και μαντεις, ως δια τινας τεμωριας, α ψυχα τω σωματι συνεζευκται, και καθαπερ εν σωματι τουτω τεθαπται, i. e. "The antient theologiſts and prieſts alſo teſtify that the ſoul is united with body for the ſake of ſuffering puniſhment; and that it is buried in body, as in a ſepulchre." And laſtly, Pythagoras himſelf confirms the above doctrine, when he beautifully obſerves, according to Clemens in the ſame book: Θανατος εστιν οκοσα εγερθεντες ορεομεν οκοσα δε ευδοντες υπνος, i. e. "Whatever we ſee when awake is death, and when aſleep a dream." Hence, as I have ſhown in my Treatiſe on the Eleuſinian Myſteries, the antients by Hades ſignified nothing more than the profound union of the ſoul with the preſent body; and conſequently, that till the ſoul ſeparated herſelf by philoſophy from ſuch a ruinous conjunction, ſhe ſubſiſted in Hades even in the preſent life; her puniſhment hereafter being nothing more than a continuation of her ſtate upon earth, and a tranſmigration, as it were, from ſleep to ſleep, and from dream to dream: and this, too, was occultly ſignified by the ſhows of the leſſer myſteries. Indeed, any one, whoſe intellectual eye is not perfectly buried in the gloom of ſenſe, muſt be convinced of this from the paſſages already adduced. And if this be the caſe, as it moſt aſſuredly is, how barbarous and irrational is the doctrine, which aſſerts that the ſoul ſhall ſubſiſt hereafter in a ſtate of bliſs, connected with the preſent body.

HERM. But it appears to me, Socrates, that enough has been ſaid concerning theſe particulars. But do you think we can ſpeak about the names of the gods, in the ſame manner as we conſidered the name of Jupiter, and determine the rectitude of their denominations?

SOC. By Jupiter, Hermogenes, if we are endued with intellect, we ſhall confeſs that the moſt beautiful mode of conduct, on this occaſion, is to acknowledge that we know nothing either concerning the gods, or the names by which they denominate themſelves[1]: for it is evident that they call themſelves by true appellations. But the ſecond mode of rectitude conſiſts, I think, in calling the gods by thoſe names which the law ordains us to invoke them by in prayer, whatever the names may be which they rejoice to hear; and that we ſhould act thus, as knowing nothing more than this: for the method of invocation which the law appoints appears to me to be beautifully eſtabliſhed. If you are willing, therefore, let us enter on this ſpeculation, previouſly, as it were, declaring to the gods that we ſpeculate nothing concerning their divinities, as we do not think ourſelves equal to ſuch an undertaking; but that we direct our attention to the opinion entertained by thoſe men who firſt fabricated their names: for this will be the means of avoiding their indignation.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to ſpeak modeſtly: let us therefore act in this manner.

SOC. Ought we not, therefore, to begin from Veſta, according to law?

HERM. It is juſt that we ſhould.

[1] A modern reader will doubtleſs imagine, from this paſſage, that Plato denied in reality the poſſibility of knowing any thing concerning divine natures, and particularly if he ſhould recollect the celebrated ſaying of Socrates, "This one thing I know, that I know nothing." But as Proclus beautifully obſerves, in his book on Providence, Socrates, by ſuch an aſſertion, meant to inſinuate nothing more than the middle kind of condition of human knowledge, which ſubſiſts between intellect and ſenſe; the former poſſeſſing a total knowledge of things, becauſe it immediately knows the eſſence of things, and the reality of being; and the latter neither totally knowing truth, becauſe it is ignorant of eſſence, nor even the nature of ſenſible things, a knowledge of which is feigned to have a ſubſiſtence. So that the Oracle might well call Socrates the wiſeſt of men, becauſe he knew himſelf to be not truly wiſe. But who, except a wiſe man, can poſſeſs ſuch a knowledge? For a fool is ignorant that he is ignorant; and no one can truly know the imperfection of human knowledge, but he who has arrived at the ſummit of human wiſdom. And after this manner the preſent aſſertion of Plato muſt be underſtood.

Soc. What then ſhall we ſay is to be underſtood by this name Ἑστία?

Herm. By Jupiter, I do not think it is eaſy to diſcover this.

Soc. It appears, indeed, excellent Hermogenes, that thoſe who firſt eſtabliſhed names were no deſpicable perſons, but men who inveſtigated ſublime concerns, and were employed in continual meditation and ſtudy.

Herm. But what then?

Soc. It ſeems to me that the poſition of names was owing to ſome ſuch men as theſe. And, indeed, if any one conſiders foreign names, he will not leſs diſcover the meaning of each. As with reſpect to this which we call οὐσία, *eſſence*, there are ſome who call it ἐσία, and others again ὠσία. In the firſt place, therefore, it is rational to call the eſſence of things Ἑστία, according to one of theſe names, ἐσία: and becauſe we denominate that which participates of eſſence Ἑστία, *eſſence*, Veſta may, in conſequence of this, be properly called Ἑστία[1]: for our anceſtors were accuſtomed to call οὐσία, eſſence, ἐσία. Beſides, if any one conſiders the buſineſs of ſacrifice, he will be led to think that this was the opinion of thoſe by whom ſacrifices were ordained. For it was proper, that thoſe who denominated the eſſence of all things Ἑστία (Veſta), ſhould ſacrifice to Veſta, before all the gods. But thoſe who called *eſſence* ὠσία, theſe nearly, according to the opinion of Heraclitus, conſidered all things as perpetually flowing, and that nothing had any permanent ſubſiſtence. The cauſe, therefore, and leader of things, with them, is *impulſe*: and hence they very properly denominated this impelling cauſe ὠσία. And thus much concerning the opinion of thoſe who may be conſidered as knowing nothing. But, after Veſta, it is juſt to ſpeculate concerning Rhea

[1] The goddeſs Veſta has a manifeſt agreement with *eſſence*, becauſe ſhe preſerves the being of things in a ſtate of purity, and contains the ſummits of the wholes from which the univerſe conſiſts. For *being* is the moſt antient of all things, after the firſt cauſe, who is truly ſupereſſential; and Earth, which, among mundane divinities, is Veſta, is ſaid by Plato, in the Timæus, to be the moſt antient of all the gods in the heavens. This goddeſs firſt ſubſiſts among the *liberated* ἀπολυτοι, gods, of whom we have already given an account in our notes on the Phædrus, and from thence affords to the mundane gods an unpolluted eſtabliſhment in themſelves. Hence every thing which is ſtable, immutable, and which always ſubſiſts in the ſame manner, deſcends to all mundane natures from this ſuperceleſtial Veſta. So that, from the ſtable illuminations which ſhe perpetually imparts, the poles themſelves, and the axis about which the ſpheres revolve, obtain and preſerve their immoveable poſition; and the earth itſelf ſtably abides in the middle.

and Saturn, though we have diſcuſſed the name of Saturn already. But, perhaps, I ſay nothing to the purpoſe.

HERM. Why ſo, Socrates?

SOC. O excellent man, I perceive a certain hive of wiſdom.

HERM. But of what kind is it?

SOC. It is almoſt ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it is capable of producing a certain probability.

HERM. What probability is this?

SOC. I ſeem to myſelf to behold Heraclitus formerly aſſerting ſomething wiſely concerning Saturn and Rhea, and which Homer himſelf alſo aſſerts.

HERM. Explain your meaning.

SOC. Heraclitus then ſays, that all things ſubſiſt in a yielding condition, and that nothing abides; and aſſimilating things to the flowing of a river, he ſays, that you cannot merge yourſelf twice in the ſame ſtream.

HERM. He does ſo.

SOC. Does he, therefore, appear to you to conceive differently from Heraclitus, who places Rhea and Saturn among the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heraclitus aſſigned both of them by chance, the names of ſtreams of water? As, therefore, Homer[1] calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, ſo I think the ſame is aſſerted by Heſiod. Likewiſe Orpheus ſays,

> In beauteous-flowing marriage firſt combin'd
> Ocean, who mingling with his ſiſter Tethys join'd[2].

Behold,

[1] Iliad ix.

[2] Ocean, according to Proclus, in Tim. lib. iv. is the cauſe, to all ſecondary natures, of all motion, whether intellectual, pſychical (ψυχικη) or natural. But Tethys is the cauſe of all the diſtinction and ſeparation of the ſtreams proceeding from the Ocean; conferring on each its proper purity, in the exerciſe of its natural motion. Ocean therefore may with great propriety be called the generation of the gods, as it is the cauſe of their progreſſions into the univerſe, from their occult ſubſiſtence in the intelligible order. But it is neceſſary to obſerve, that this mutual communication of energies among the gods was called by antient theologiſts ιερος γαμος, *a ſacred marriage*; concerning which Proclus, in the ſecond book of his MS. Commentary on the Parmenides, admirably remarks as follows: Ταυτην δε την κοινωνιαν, ποτε μεν εν τοις συστοιχοις ορωσι θεοις (οι θεολογοι) και καλουσι γαμον Ηρας και Διος, Ουρανου και Γης, Κρονου και Ρεας· ποτε δε των καταδεεστερων προς τα κρειττω, και καλουσι γαμον Διος και Δημητρας· ποτε δε και εμπαλιν των κρειττωνων προς τα υφειμενα, και λεγουσι Διος και Κορης γαμον. Επειδη των θεων αλλαι μεν εισιν αι προς τα συστοιχα κοινωνιαι, αλλαι δε αι προς τα προ αυτων· αλλαι.

Behold, therefore, how all theſe conſent with each other in their doctrine, and how they all tend towards the opinion of Heraclitus!

HERM. You ſeem to me, Socrates, to ſay ſomething to the purpoſe, but I do not underſtand what the name Tethys implies.

SOC. But this nearly implies the ſame, and ſignifies that it is the occult name of a fountain; for *leaping forth*, and *ſtraining through*, repreſent the image of a fountain. But from both theſe names the name Tethys is compoſed.

HERM. This, Socrates, is an elegant explanation.

SOC. What then ſhall we next conſider? Jupiter we have already ſpoken of.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Let us, therefore, ſpeak of his brothers, Neptune and Pluto, and that other name by which Pluto is called.

HERM. By all means.

SOC. He, therefore, who firſt called Neptune ποσειδων, appears to me to have given him this name from the nature of the ſea, reſtraining his courſe when he walks, and not permitting him to proceed any further, as if it be-

αλλαι δε αι προς τα μετα ταυτα. Και δει την εκαστης ιδιοτητα κατανοειν και μεταγειν απο των θεων επι τα ειδη την τοιαυτην διαπλοκην: i. e. "Theologiſts at one time conſidered this communion of the gods, in divinities coordinate with each other; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Juno, of Heaven and Earth, of Saturn and Rhea. But at another time they conſidered it as ſubſiſting between ſubordinate and ſuperior divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Ceres. But at another time, on the contrary, they beheld it as ſubſiſting between ſuperior and ſubordinate divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Proſerpine. For, in the gods there is one kind of communion, between ſuch as are of a coordinate nature; another, between the ſubordinate and ſupreme; and another again, between the ſupreme and ſubordinate. And it is neceſſary to underſtand the idiom of each, and to transfer a conjunction of this kind from the gods, to the communion of ideas with each other." And in lib. i. in Tim. p. 16, he obſerves: Και το την αυτην (ſupple θεαν) ετεροις, ἡ τον αυτον θεον πλειοσι συζευγνυσθαι, λαθοις αν εκ των μυστικων λογων, και των εν απορρητοις λεγομενων Ιερων Γαμων: i. e. "And that the ſame goddeſs is conjoined with other gods, or the ſame god with many goddeſſes, may be collected from the *myſtic diſcourſes*, and thoſe marriages which are called, in *the myſteries*, *Sacred Marriages*." Thus far the divine Proclus; from the firſt of which admirable paſſages the reader may perceive how adultery and rapes are to be underſtood, when applied to the gods; and that they mean nothing more than a communication of divine energies, either between a ſuperior and ſubordinate, or a ſubordinate and ſuperior divinity. For none, but a perſon of the moſt ſimple underſtanding, would ever ſuppoſe that the antient theological poets believed there was any ſuch thing as marriage or adultery among the gods, according to the literal meaning of the words.

came

came a bond to his feet. He, therefore, denominated the ruler of this power ποσειδων, as ποσιδεσμον ονται, viz. *having a fettered foot*[1]. The ι perhaps was added for the ſake of elegance. But, perhaps, this was not the meaning of its founder, but two λλ were originally placed inſtead of σ; ſignifying that this god knows a multitude of things. And, perhaps, likewiſe he was denominated σειων, i. e. *ſhaking*, from σειειν, *to ſhake*, to which π and δ were added. But Pluto was ſo called from the donation of πλουτος, *wealth*, becauſe riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth. But by the appellation αιδης, the multiude appear to me to conceive the ſame as αειδες, i. e. *obſcure and dark*; and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.

HERM. But what is your opinion, Socrates, about this affair?

SOC. It appears to me, that men have abundantly erred concerning the power of this god, and that they are afraid of him without occaſion; for their fear ariſes from hence; becauſe, when any one of us dies, he abides for ever in Hades; and becauſe the ſoul departs to this god, diveſted of the body. But both the empire of this god, and his name, and every other particular reſpecting him, appear to me to tend to one and the ſame thing.

HERM. But how?

SOC. I will tell you how this affair appears to me. Anſwer me, therefore, Which of theſe is the ſtronger bond to an animal, ſo as to cauſe its detention, neceſſity, or deſire?

HERM. Deſire, Socrates, is by far the moſt prevalent.

SOC. Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unleſs it held thoſe who dwell there by the ſtrongeſt bond?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It binds them, therefore, as it appears, by a certain deſire; ſince it binds them with the greateſt bond, and not with neceſſity.

HERM. It appears ſo.

SOC. Are there not, therefore, many deſires?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It binds them, therefore, with the greateſt of all deſires, if it binds them with the greateſt of bonds.

[1] See the Additional Notes on this Dialogue.

HERM.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Is there then any greater deſire, than that which is produced when any one, by aſſociating with another, thinks that, through his means, he ſhall become a better man?

HERM. By Jupiter, Socrates, there is not any.

SOC. On this account, Hermogenes, we ſhould ſay, that no one is willing to return from thence hither, not even the Syrens themſelves; but that both they, and all others, are enchanted by the beautiful diſcourſes of Pluto. And hence it follows that this god is a perfect ſophiſt; that he greatly benefits thoſe who dwell with him; and that he poſſeſſes ſuch great affluence as enables him to ſupply us with thoſe mighty advantages which we enjoy; and from hence he is called Pluto. But does he not alſo appear to you to be a philoſopher, and one endued with excellent prudence and deſign, from his being unwilling to aſſociate with men inveſted with bodies, but then only admits them to familiar converſe with him, when their ſouls are purified from all the evils and deſires which ſubſiſt about the body? for this divinity conſidered, that he ſhould be able to detain ſouls, if he bound them with the deſire belonging to virtue; but that, while they poſſeſs the conſternation and furious inſanity of body, even his father Saturn would not be able to detain them with him, in thoſe bonds with which he is ſaid to be bound.

HERM. You ſeem, Socrates, to ſpeak ſomething to the purpoſe.

SOC. We ought then, O Hermogenes, by no means to denominate ἀιδὴς from ἀειδὲς, dark and inviſible, but much rather from a knowledge of all beautiful things [1]: and from hence this god was called by the fabricator of names ἀδὴς.

HERM.

[1] The firſt ſubſiſtence of Pluto, as well as that of Neptune, is among the ſupermundane gods, and in the demiurgic triad, of which he is the extremity. But his firſt allotment and diſtribution is according to the whole univerſe; in which diſtribution he perpetually adminiſters the diviſions of all mundane forms, and converts all things to himſelf. But his ſecond diſtribution is into the parts of the univerſe; and in this he governs the ſublunary region, and perfects intellectually the terreſtrial world. His third progreſſion is into that which is generated; and in this he adminiſters, by his providence, the earth, and all which it contains, and is on this account called terreſtrial Jupiter. But his fourth diſtribution is into places under the earth, which, together with the various ſtreams of water which they contain, Tartarus, and the places in which ſouls are judged, are ſubject to his providential command. Hence ſouls, which after generation are purified and puniſhed, and

HERM. Be it ſo. But what ſhall we ſay concerning the names Ceres, Juno, Apollo, Minerva, Vulcan, Mars, and thoſe of the other gods?

SOC. It appears that Ceres was ſo called from the donation of aliment, being, as it were, δίδουσα μήτηρ, or *a beſtowing mother*[1]. But Juno, from being *lovely*, on account of the love which Jupiter is ſaid to have entertained for her[2]. Perhaps alſo the founder of this name, ſpeculating things on high, denominated the air ἥρα; and, for the ſake of concealment, placed the beginning at the end. And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name of Juno. With reſpect to the names φερέφαττα, or Proſerpine, and Apollo, many are terrified at them, through unſkilfulneſs as it appears in the rectitude of names. And indeed, changing the firſt of theſe names, they conſider φερσεφόνη; and this appears to them as ſomething terrible and dire. But the other name, φερέφαττα, ſignifies that this goddeſs is wiſe: for that which is able to touch upon, handle, and purſue things which are borne along, will be wiſdom. This goddeſs therefore may, with great propriety, be named φερεπαφα, or ſomething of this kind, on account of her wiſdom, and contact of that which is borne along[3]: and hence the wiſe ἀιδής, or

and either wander under the earth for a thouſand years, or again return to their principle, are ſaid to live under Pluto. And laſtly, his fifth diſtribution is into the weſtern centre of the univerſe, ſince the weſt is allied to earth, on account of its being nocturnal, and the cauſe of obſcurity and darkneſs. Hence, from the preceding account of Pluto, ſince he bounds the ſupermundane demiurgic triad, and is therefore intellectual, the reaſon is obvious why Plato characterizes him according to *a knowledge of all beautiful things*; for the beautiful firſt ſubſiſts in intellect.

[1] See the Additional Notes on this Dialogue for an account of this goddeſs.

[2] Juno, ſo far as ſhe is filled with the whole of Venus, contains in herſelf a power of illuminating all intellectual life with the ſplendour of beauty. And hence, from her intimate communion with that goddeſs, ſhe is very properly characterized by Plato as lovely. But her agreement with Venus is ſufficiently evident, from her being celebrated as the goddeſs who preſides over marriage; which employment was likewiſe aſcribed by the antients to Venus.

[3] Proſerpine firſt ſubſiſts in the middle of the vivific ſupermundane triad, which conſiſts of Diana, Proſerpine, and Minerva. Hence, conſidered according to her ſupermundane eſtabliſhment, ſhe ſubſiſts together with Jupiter, and in conjunction with him produces Bacchus, the artificer of diviſible natures. But conſidered according to her mundane ſubſiſtence, ſhe is ſaid (on account of her proceſſion to the laſt of things) to be raviſhed by Pluto, and to animate the extremities of the univerſe, theſe being ſubject to the empire of Pluto. "But Proſerpine (ſays Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 371) is conjoined paternally with Jupiter prior to the world, and with Pluto in the world, according to the beneficent will of her father. And ſhe is at one time ſaid to have been

or Pluto, aſſociates with her, becauſe of theſe characteriſtics of her nature. But men of the preſent times neglect this name, valuing good pronunciation more than truth; and on this account they call her φερέφαττα. In like manner with reſpect to Apollo, many, as I ſaid before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it ſignified ſomething dire. Or are you ignorant that this is the caſe?

HERM. I am not; and you ſpeak the truth.

SOC. But this name, as it appears to me, is beautifully eſtabliſhed, with reſpect to the power of the god.

HERM. But how?

SOC. I will endeavour to tell you what appears to me in this affair: for there is no other one name which can more harmonize with the four powers of this god, becauſe it touches upon them all, and evinces, in a certain reſpect, his *harmonic*, *prophetic*, *medicinal*, and *arrow-darting ſkill* [1].

HERM.

inceſtuouſly violated by Jupiter, and at another to have been raviſhed by Pluto, that firſt and laſt fabrications may participate of vivific procreation." According to the ſame author too, in the ſame admirable work, p. 373, the epithet of wiſdom aſſigned to this goddeſs by Plato, in the preſent place, evinces her agreement with Minerva: and this correſpondence is likewiſe ſhown by her contact of things in progreſſion: ſince nothing but wiſdom can arreſt their flowing nature, and ſubject it to order and bound. But her name being terrible and dire to the multitude, is a ſymbol of the power which ſhe contains, exempt from the univerſality of things, and which, on this account, is to the many unapparent and unknown.

[1] For an accurate and beautiful account of theſe four powers of the ſun, and his nature in general, let the Platonic reader attend to the following obſervations, extracted from Proclus, on Plato's theology, and on the Timæus; and from the emperor Julian's oration to this glorious luminary of the world. To a truly modern reader, indeed, it will doubtleſs appear abſurd in the extreme, to call the ſun a god; for ſuch regard only his viſible orb, which is nothing more than the vehicle (deified as much as is poſſible to body) of an intellectual and divine nature. One ſhould think, however, that reaſoning from analogy might convince even a careleſs obſerver, that a body ſo tranſcendently glorious and beneficent, muſt be ſomething ſuperior to a mere inanimate maſs of matter. For if ſuch vile bodies, as are daily ſeen moving on the ſurface of the earth, are endued with life (bodies whoſe utility to the univerſe is ſo comparatively ſmall), what ought we to think of the body of the ſun! Surely, that its life is infinitely ſuperior, not only to that of brutes, but even to that of man: for unleſs we allow, that as body is to body, ſo is ſoul to ſoul, we deſtroy all the order of things, and muſt ſuppoſe that the artificer of the world acted unwiſely, and even abſurdly, in its fabrication. And from hence the reader may perceive how neceſſarily impiety is connected with unbelief in antient theology. But to begin with our account of the powers and properties of this mighty ruler of the world:

The

HERM. Tell me, then; for you ſeem to me to ſpeak of this name as ſomething prodigious.

Soc.

The ſontal ſun ſubſiſts in Jupiter, the perfect artificer of the world, who produced the hypoſtaſis of the ſun from his own eſſence. Through the ſolar fountain contained in his eſſence, the demiurgus generates ſolar powers in the principles of the univerſe, and a triad of ſolar gods, through which all things are unfolded into light, and are perfected and repleniſhed with intellectual goods; through the firſt of theſe ſolar monads participating unpolluted light and intelligible harmony; but from the other two, efficacious power, vigour, and demiurgic perfection. The ſun ſubſiſts in the moſt beautiful proportion to the good: for as the ſplendour proceeding from the good is the light of intelligible natures; ſo that proceeding from Apollo is the light of the intellectual world; and that which emanates from the apparent ſun is the light of the ſenſible world. And both the ſun and Apollo are analogous to the good; but ſenſible light and intellectual truth are analogous to ſupereſſential light. But though Apollo and the ſun ſubſiſt in wonderful union with each other, yet they likewiſe inherit a proper diſtinction and diverſity of nature. Hence, by poets inſpired by Phœbus, the different generative cauſes of the two are celebrated, and the fountains are diſtinguiſhed from which their hypoſtaſis is derived. At the ſame time they are deſcribed as cloſely united with each other, and are celebrated with each other's mutual appellations: for the ſun vehemently rejoices to be celebrated as Apollo; and Apollo, when he is invoked as the ſun, benignantly imparts the ſplendid light of truth. It is the illuſtrious property of Apollo to collect multitude into one, to comprehend number in one, and from one to produce many natures; to convolve in himſelf, through intellectual ſimplicity, all the variety of ſecondary natures; and, through one hyparxis, to collect into one, multiform eſſences and powers. This god, through a ſimplicity exempt from multitude, imparts to ſecondary natures prophetic truth; for that which is ſimple is the ſame with that which is true: but through his liberated eſſence he imparts a purifying, unpolluted, and preſerving power; and his emiſſion of arrows is the ſymbol of his deſtroying every thing inordinate, wandering, and immoderate in the world. But his revolution is the ſymbol of the harmonic motion of the univerſe, collecting all things into union and conſent. And theſe four powers of the god may be accommodated to the three ſolar monads, which he contains. The firſt monad *, therefore, of this god is enunciative of truth, and of the intellectual light which ſubſiſts occultly in the gods. The ſecond † is deſtructive of every thing wandering and confuſed: but the third ‡ cauſes all things to ſubſiſt in ſymmetry and familiarity with each other, through harmonic reaſons. And the unpolluted and moſt pure cauſe, which he comprehends in himſelf, obtains the principality, illuminating all things with perfection and power, according to nature, and baniſhing every thing contrary to theſe.

Hence, of the ſolar triad, the firſt monad unfolds intellectual light, enunciates it to all ſecondary natures, fills all things with univerſal truth, and converts them to the intellect of the gods; which employment is aſcribed to the prophetic power of Apollo, who produces into light the truth contained in divine natures, and perfects that which is unknown in the ſecondary orders of things. But

* i. e. Mercury. † Venus. ‡ Apollo.

Soc. This name then is well harmonized as to its compoſition, as belonging to an harmonical god: for, in the firſt place, do not purgations and purifi-

the ſecond and third monads are the cauſes of efficacious vigour, demiurgic effection in the univerſe, and perfect energy, according to which theſe monads adorn every ſenſible nature, and exterminate every thing indefinite and inordinate in the world.

And one monad is analogous to muſical fabrication, and to the harmonic providence of natures which are moved. But the ſecond is analogous to that which is deſtructive of all confuſion, and of that perturbation which is contrary to form, and the orderly diſpoſition of the univerſe. But the third monad, which ſupplies all things with an abundant communion of beauty, and extends true beatitude to all things, bounds the ſolar principles, and guards its triple progreſſion. In a ſimilar manner, likewiſe, it illuminates progreſſions with a perfect and intellectual meaſure of a bleſſed life, by thoſe purifying and pæonian powers of the king Apollo, which obtain an analogous principality in the ſun.—The ſun is allotted a ſupermundane order in the world, an unbegotten ſupremacy among generated forms, and an intellectual dignity among ſenſible natures. Hence he has a two-fold progreſſion, one in conjunction with other mundane gods, but the other exempt from them, ſupernatural and unknown. For the demiurgus, according to Plato in the Timæus, enkindled in the ſolar ſphere a light unlike the ſplendour of the other planets, producing it from his own eſſence, extending ſo mundane natures, as it were from certain ſecret receſſes, a ſymbol of intellectual eſſences, and exhibiting to the univerſe the arc anenature of the ſupermundane gods. Hence, when the ſun firſt aroſe, he aſtoniſhed the mundane gods, all of whom were deſirous of dancing round him, and being repleniſhed with his light. The ſun, too, governs the two-fold coordinations of the world, which coordinations are denominated hands, by thoſe who are ſkilled in divine concerns, becauſe they are effective, motive, and demiurgic of the univerſe. But they are conſidered as two-fold; one the right hand, but the other the left.

As the ſun, by his corporeal heat, draws all corporeal natures upwards from the earth, raiſing them, and cauſing them to vegetate by his admirable warmth; ſo by a ſecret, incorporeal, and divine nature reſident in his rays, he much more attracts and elevates fortunate ſouls to his divinity. He was called by the Chaldeans, the ſeven-rayed god: and light, of which he is the fountain, is nothing more than the ſincere energy of an intellect perfectly pure, illuminating in its proper habitation the middle region of the heavens: and from this exalted ſituation ſcattering its light, it fills all the celeſtial orbs with powerful vigour, and illuminates the univerſe with divine and incorruptible light.

The ſun is ſaid to be the progeny of Hyperion and Thea; ſignifying by this that he is the legitimate progeny of the ſupereminent god, and that he is of a nature truly divine. This god comprehends, in limited meaſures, the regions of generation, and confers perpetuity on its nature. Hence, exciting a nature of this kind with a ſure and meaſured motion, he raiſes and invigorates it as he approaches, and diminiſhes and deſtroys it as he recedes: or rather, he vivifies it by his progreſs, moving, and pouring into generation the rivers of life. The ſun is the unifying medium of the apparent and mundane gods, and of the intelligible gods who ſurround the good. So far as the ſun contains in himſelf the principles of the moſt beautiful intellectual temperament, he becomes Apollo,

the

purifications, both according to medicine and prophecy, and likewiſe the operations of pharmacy, and the luſtrations, waſhings and ſprinklings employed by

the leader of the Muſes; but ſo far as he accompliſhes the elegant order of the whole of life, he generates Eſculapius in the world, whom at the ſame time he comprehended in himſelf prior to the world: and he generates Bacchus, through his containing the cauſe of a partial eſſence and diviſible energy. The ſun, too, is the cauſe of that better condition of being belonging to angels, dæmons, heroes, and partial divine ſouls, who perpetually abide in the reaſon of their exemplar and idea, without merging themſelves in the darkneſs of body. As the ſun quadruply divides the three worlds, viz. the empyrean, the æthereal, and the material, on account of the communion of the zodiac with each; ſo he again divides the zodiac into twelve powers of gods, and each of theſe into three others: ſo that thirty-ſix are produced in the whole. Hence a triple benefit of the Graces is conferred on us from thoſe circles, which the god, quadruply dividing, produces, through this diviſion, a quadripartite beauty and elegance of ſeaſons and times. Monimus and Azizus, viz. Mercury and Mars, are the attendants of the ſun, in conjunction with whom they diffuſe a variety of goods on the earth. The ſun looſens ſouls from the bands of a corporeal nature, reduces them to the kindred eſſence of divinity, and aſſigns them the ſubtile and firm texture of divine ſplendour as a vehicle in which they may ſafely deſcend to the realms of generation. And laſty, the ſun being ſupermundane, emits the fountains of light; for, among ſupermundane natures, there is a ſolar world, and total light: and this light is a monad prior to the empyrean, æthereal, and material worlds.

I only add, that it appears, from the laſt chapter of the 4th book of Proclus on Plato's Theology, that the celebrated ſeven worlds of the Chaldeans are to be diſtributed as follows: One empyrean; three æthereal, ſituated above the inerratic ſphere; and three material, conſiſting of the inerratic ſphere, the ſeven planets, and the ſublunary region. For, after obſerving, that of the comprehending triad of gods, one is fiery or empyrean, another æthereal, and another material, he inquires why the gods called Teletarchs, or ſources of initiation, are diſtributed together with the comprehending gods? To which he replies, "Becauſe the firſt, on account of his poſſeſſing the extremities, governs, like a charioteer, the wing of fire. But the ſecond, comprehending the beginning, middle and end, perfects æther, which is itſelf triple. And the third, comprehending, according to one union, a round, right-lined and mixed figure, perfects unfigured and formleſs matter: by a round figure, forming that, which is inerratic, and the firſt matter: but by a mixed figure, that which is erratic, and the ſecond matter; for there (that is, among the planets) circumvolution ſubſiſts; and by a right-lined figure, a nature under the moon, and ultimate matter." From this paſſage, it is evident that both Patricius and Stanley were miſtaken, in conceiving the meaning of the account given by Pſellus (in his ſummary expoſition of the Aſſyrian Dogmata) of theſe ſeven worlds; which, when properly underſtood, perfectly correſponds with that of Proclus, as the following citation evinces: Επτα δε φασι κοσμους σωματικους. Εμπυρον ενα και πρωτον. και τρεις μετ' αυτον αιθεριους: επειτα τρεις υλαιους, το απλανες, το πλανωμενον, και το υπο σελην̃ην. "They aſſert that there are ſeven corporeal worlds; one empyrean,

by the divining art, all tend to this one point, viz. the rendering man pure, both in body and ſoul?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Will not then the purifying god, who waſhes and frees us from evils of this kind, be Apollo?

HERM. Perfectly ſo.

SOC. According, therefore, to the ſolutions and waſhings which he affords, as being the phyſician of ſuch-like things, he will be properly called απολυων or *the liberator*; but according to his prophetic power and truth, he may be moſt properly called ἁπλος, or ſimple, as he is denominated by the Theſſalians; ſince ſimplicity is the ſame with truth: for all the Theſſalians call this god the ſimple. But, on account of his perpetually prevailing might in the jaculation of arrows, he may be called αει βαλλων, that is, perpetually darting. But with reſpect to his harmonic power, it is proper to take notice, that ᾱ often ſignifies the ſame as together, as in the words ακολουθος, *a follower*, and ακοιτις, *a wife*. So likewiſe in the name of this god, ᾱ and πολησις ſignify the revolution ſubſiſting together with, and about the heavens, which they denominate the pole; and the harmony ſubſiſting in ſong, which they call ſymphony. Becauſe all theſe, according to the aſſertions of thoſe who are ſkilled in muſic and aſtronomy, revolve together with a certain harmony. But this god preſides over harmony, ομοπολων, i. e. converting all theſe together, both among gods and men. As, therefore, we call ομοκελευθος, and ομοκοιτις, i. e. going together, and lying together, ακολουθος and ακοιτις, changing ο into α, ſo likewiſe we denominate Apollo as ομοπολων, inſerting at the ſame time another λ; becauſe otherwiſe it would have been ſynonimous with a difficult name. And this many of the preſent time ſuſpecting, through not rightly perceiving the power of this name, they are terrified at it, as if it ſignified a certain corruption. But in reality this name, as we juſt now ob-

rean, and the firſt; after this, three æthereal worlds; and laſt of all, three material, the inerratic ſphere, the planetary ſyſtem, and the ſublunary region." But Patricius and Stanley conceived the paſſage, as if the three æthereal and three material worlds were diſtributed by the Aſſyrians into the inerratic ſphere, the planets, and the ſublunary world. It is likewiſe worthy of obſervation, that the Aſſyrians, as we are informed by Julian in his Hymn to the Sun, conſidered that luminary as moving beyond the inerratic ſphere, in the middle of theſe ſeven worlds; ſo that the ſun, in conſequence of this dogma, muſt revolve in the laſt of the æthereal worlds.

ſerved

ſerved, is ſo compoſed, that it touches upon all the powers of the god, viz. his ſimplicity, perpetual jaculation, purifying, and joint-revolving nature.— But the name of the Muſes, and univerſally that of Muſic, was derived, as it ſeems, from μωσθαι, *to inquire*, and from inveſtigation and philoſophy. But λητω, i. e. Latona, was derived from the mildneſs of this goddeſs, becauſe ſhe is εθελημων, viz. willing to comply with the requeſts of her ſuppliants. Perhaps, too, they denominate her as a ſtranger; for many call her ληθω: and this name ληθω they ſeem to have aſſigned her, becauſe her manners are not rough, but gentle and mild. But αρτεμις, i. e. Diana, appears to ſignify integrity and modeſty, through her deſire of virginity. Perhaps alſo the founder of her name ſo called her, as being ſkilful in virtue[1]. And it is not likewiſe improbable, that, from her hating the copulation of man and woman, or through ſome one, or all of theſe, the inſtitutor of her name thus denominated the goddeſs.

HERM. But what will you ſay concerning Dionyſius and Venus?

SOC. You inquire about great things, O ſon of Hipponicus. But the mode of nomination, belonging to theſe divinities, is both ſerious and jocoſe. Aſk therefore others about the ſerious mode; but nothing hinders us from relating the jocoſe: for theſe deities are lovers of jeſting and ſport. Dionyſius, therefore, is the giver of wine, and may be jocoſely called διδοινυσος. But οινος, wine, may be moſt juſtly denominated οιονους, becauſe it is accuſtomed to deprive thoſe of intellect who poſſeſſed it before[2]. But, with reſpect to Venus, it

[1] We have before obſerved, that Diana firſt ſubſiſts in the ſupermundane vivific triad: and her being characterized according to *virtue*, in this place, evidently ſhows her agreement with Minerva, the third monad of that triad, who is the firſt producing cauſe of all virtues. This goddeſs, according to her mundane ſubſiſtence, is, as is well known, the divinity of the moon; from whence, ſays Proclus (in Plat. Polit. p. 353), ſhe benignantly leads into light the reaſons of nature, and is on this account called *Phoſper*, or *light-bearer*. He adds, that the moon was called by the Thracians, *Bendis*.

[2] Dionyſius, or Bacchus, is the deity of the mundane intellect, and the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators of things. This deity is ſaid, in divine fables, to have been torn in pieces by the Titans, becauſe the mundane ſoul, which participates of this divinity, and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans, and through them diſtributed into every part of the univerſe. But the following beautiful account of this deity by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Commentary on the Phædo, will, I doubt not, be highly acceptable to the Platonic reader: Σπαραττεται δε το καθολον ειδος εν τῃ γενεσει, μοιας δε τιτανων ο Διονυσος. Κατ' επιβουλην δε της Ηρας, διοτι κινησεως εφορος ηνθεος

it is not proper to contradict Heſiod, but to allow that ſhe was called αφροδιτη, through her generation from αφρος, foam [1].

HERM. But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you ought not to neglect the inveſtigation of Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars.

SOC. For ſuch a neglect is, indeed, by no means becoming.

HERM. Certainly not.

η θεος και προοδον· διο και συνεχως εν τη Ιλιασι εξανιστησιν αυτη· και διεγορει τον Δια εις προνοιαν των δευτερων· και γενεσεως αλλως εφορος εστιν ὁ Διονυσος, διοτι και ζωης και τελευτης. ζωης μεν γαρ εφορος, επειδη και της γενεσεως, τελευτης δε διοτι ενθουσιαν ὁ οινος ποιει. και περι την τελευτην δε ενθουσιαστικωτεροι γιτομεθα, ως δηλοι ὁ παρ' Ομηρω Προκλος, μαντικος γεγονως περι την τελευτην. και την τραγωδιαν, και την κωμωδιαν ανεισθαι φασι τω Διονυσω. την μεν κωμωδιαν παιγνιον ουσαν του βιου· την δε τραγωδιαν δια τα παθη, και την τελευτην. ουκ αρα καλως οι κωμικοι τοις τραγικοις εγκαλουσιν, ως μη διονυσιακοις ουσιν, λεγοντες οτι ουδεν ταυτα προς τον Διονυσον. κεραννοι δε τουτοις ὁ Ζευς, του κεραννου δηλουντος την επιστροφην. πυρ γαρ επι τα ανω κινουμενα. επιστρεφει ουν αυτους προς εαυτον. i. e. "The form of that which is univerſal is plucked off, torn in pieces, and ſcattered into generation and Dionyſius is the monad of the Titans. But his laceration is ſaid to take place through the ſtratagems of Juno, becauſe this goddeſs is the inſpective guardian of motion and progreſſion: and, on this account, in the Iliad ſhe perpetually rouſes and excites Jupiter to providential energies about ſecondary concerns. And, in another reſpect, Dionyſius is the inſpective guardian of generation, becauſe he preſides over life and death: for he is the guardian of life, becauſe of generation; but of death, becauſe wine produces an enthuſiaſtic energy. And we become more enthuſiaſtic at the period of diſſolution, as Proclus evinces agreeably to Homer; for he became prophetic at the time of his death. They likewiſe aſſert, that tragedy and comedy are referred to Dionyſius; comedy, indeed, as being the play or jeſt of life; but tragedy, on account of the paſſions and death, which it repreſents. Comedians, therefore, do not properly denominate tragedians, as if they were not Dionyſiacal, aſſerting at the ſame time that nothing tragical belongs to Dionyſius. But Jupiter hurled his thunder at the Titans; the thunder ſignifying a converſion on high: for fire naturally aſcends. And hence Jupiter by this means converts the Titans to himſelf."—Thus far the excellent Olympiodorus; from which admirable paſſage the reader may ſee the reaſon of Plato's aſſerting, that *the mode of nomination belonging to this divinity is both ſerious and jocoſe.*

[1] As Venus firſt ſubſiſts in the anagogic triad of the ſuper-mundane gods, her production from the foam of the genitals of heaven may occultly ſignify her proceeding into apparent ſubſiſtence from that order of gods, which we have before mentioned, and which is called νοητος και νοερος, *intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual*; and likewiſe from the prolific and ſplendid power of this order, which the *foam* ſecretly implies. The nomination, too, of Venus, may be ſaid to be *ſerious*, conſidered according to her ſupermundane ſubſiſtence; and ſhe may be ſaid *to be a lover of jeſting and ſport*, conſidered according to her mundane eſtabliſhment; for to all ſenſible natures ſhe communicates an exuberant energy, and eminently contains in herſelf the cauſe of the gladneſs, and, as it were, mirth of all mundane concerns, through the illuminations of beauty which ſhe perpetually pours into every part of the univerſe.

SOC.

Soc. One of the names of Minerva, therefore, it is by no means difficult to explain.

Herm. Which do you mean?

Soc. Do we not call her Pallas?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. This name, therefore, we muſt conſider as derived from leaping in armour; and in ſo doing, we ſhall, as it appears to me, think properly: for to elevate oneſelf, or ſomething elſe, either from the earth or in the hands, is denominated by us to vibrate and be vibrated, and to dance and be made to dance.

Herm. Entirely ſo.

Soc. The goddeſs, therefore, is on this account called Pallas.

Herm. And very properly ſo. But how will you explain her other name?

Soc. Do you mean that of Athena?

Herm. I do.

Soc. This name, my friend, is of greater moment; for the antients appear to have conſidered Athena in the ſame manner as thoſe of the preſent day, who are ſkilled in the interpretation of Homer: for many of theſe explain the poet as ſignifying, by Athena, intellect and the dianoëtic power. And he who inſtituted names ſeems to have underſtood ſome ſuch thing as this about the goddeſs, or rather ſomething yet greater, expreſſing, by this means, the intelligence of the goddeſs, as if he had ſaid that ſhe is θεονοη, or deific intelligence, employing after a foreign mode ᾱ inſtead of η̄, and taking away ι and σ. Though perhaps this was not the caſe, but he called her θεονοη, as underſtanding divine concerns in a manner ſuperior to all others. Nor will it be foreign from the purpoſe to ſay that he was willing to call her ηθονοη, as being intelligence in manners[1]. But either the original founder of this name, or certain perſons who came after him, by producing it into ſomething which they thought more beautiful, denominated her Athena.

Herm.

[1] This whole account of Minerva is perfectly agreeable to the moſt myſtic theology concerning this goddeſs, as will be evident from the following obſervations. In the firſt place, one of her names, Pallas, ſignifying to *vibrate* and *dance*, evidently alludes to her agreement with the Curetes, of the progreſſions of which order ſhe is the monad, or proximately exempt producing cauſe. For the Curetes, as is well known, are repreſented as dancing in armour; the armour being a ſymbol of guardian power, through which, ſays Proclus, the Curetes contain the wholes

HERM. But what will you ſay concerning Vulcan?
Soc. Do you inquire concerning the noble arbiter of light?
HERM. So it appears.

Soc.

of the univerſe, guard them ſo as to be exempt from ſecondary natures, and defend them eſtabliſhed in themſelves; but the dancing, ſignifying their perpetually preſerving the whole progreſſions of a divine life according to one divine bound, and ſuſtaining them exempt from the incurſions of matter. But the firſt ſubſiſtence of Minerva, conſidered as the ſummit, or, as it were, flower of the Curetes, is in the intellectual order of gods, of which Jupiter, the artificer of the world, is the extremity: and, in this order, ſhe is celebrated as the divinely pure heptad. But as Proclus, in Tim. p. 51 and 52, beautifully unfolds the nature of this goddeſs, and this in perfect agreement with the preſent account of Plato, I ſhall preſent the following tranſlation of it to the reader.

"In the father and demiurgus of the world many orders of unical gods appear; ſuch as guardian, demiurgic, anagogic, connective, and perfective of works. But the one pure and untamed deity of the firſt intellectual unities in the demiurgus, according to which he abides in an uninclining and immutable ſtate, through which all things proceeding from him participate of immutable power, and by which he underſtands all things, and has a ſubſiſtence ſeparate and ſolitary from wholes;—this divinity all theologiſts have denominated Minerva: for ſhe was, indeed, produced from the ſummit of her father, and abiding in him, becomes a ſeparate and immaterial demiurgic intelligence. Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as θεονοη, or *deific intelligence*. But this goddeſs, when conſidered as elevating all things, in conjunction with other divinities, to one demiurgus, and ordering and diſpoſing the univerſe together with her father;—according to the former of theſe employments, ſhe is called the philoſophic goddeſs; but, according to the latter, philopolemic, or *a lover of contention*. For, conſidered as unifically connecting all paternal wiſdom, ſhe is philoſophic; but, conſidered as uniformly adminiſtering all contrariety, ſhe is very properly called philopolemic. Hence Orpheus, ſpeaking concerning her generation, ſays "that Jupiter produced her from his head, ſhining with armour ſimilar to a brazen flower." But, ſince it is requiſite that ſhe ſhould proceed into the ſecond and third orders, hence in the Coric order (that is, among the firſt Curetes) ſhe appears according to the unpolluted heptad; but ſhe generates from herſelf every virtue and all anagogic powers, and illuminates ſecondary natures with intellect and an unpolluted life: and hence ſhe is called κορη τριτογενης, or *a virgin born from the head of Jupiter*. But ſhe is allotted this virgin-like and pure nature from her Minerval idiom. Add too, that ſhe appears among the *liberated* gods with intellectual and demiurgic light, uniting the lunar order, and cauſing it to be pure with reſpect to generation. Beſides this, ſhe appears both in the heavens and in the ſublunary region, and every where extends this her two-fold power; or, rather, ſhe diſtributes a cauſe to both, according to the united benefit which ſhe imparts. For ſometimes the ſeverity of her nature is intellectual, and her ſeparate wiſdom pure and unmixed with reſpect to ſecondary natures; and the one idiom of her Minerval providence extends to the loweſt orders: for where there is a ſimilitude among partial ſouls to her divinity, ſhe imparts an admirable wiſdom and exhibits an invincible ſtrength.

But

Soc. This divinity, therefore, being φαιστος, luminous, and attracting to himſelf ἡ, is called ηφαιστος, or the arbiter of light [1].

Herm. It appears ſo, unleſs you think it requires ſome other explanation.

Soc. But, that it may not appear otherwiſe to me, inquire concerning Mars.

Herm. I inquire then.

Soc. If you pleaſe, then, the name of Mars ſhall be derived from το αρρεν *maſculine*, and το ανδρειον *bold*. But if you are willing that he ſhould be called Mars, from his hard and inconvertible nature [2], the whole of which is denominated αρρατον, this alſo will perfectly agree with the properties of the warlike god.

But why ſhould I ſpeak concerning her Curetic, dæmoniacal, or divine orders, together with ſuch as are mundane, liberated, and ruling? For all things receive the two-fold idioms of this goddeſs as from a fountain. And laſtly, this goddeſs extends to ſouls, Olympian and anagogic benefits, exterminates gigantic and generation-producing phantaſms, excites in us pure and unperverted conceptions concerning all the gods, and diffuſes a divine light from the receſſes of her nature."

[1] Light, according to Proclus, and I think according to truth, is an immaterial body, viz. a body conſiſting of matter ſo refined, that, when compared with terrene matter, it may be juſtly called immaterial: and Vulcan is the artificer of every thing ſenſible and corporeal. Hence this deity, when conſidered as the fabricator of light, may with great propriety be called *the arbiter of light*. For, ſince he is the producing cauſe of all body, and light is the firſt and moſt exalted body, the definition of his nature ought to take place from the moſt illuſtrious of his works. But this deity firſt ſubſiſts in the demiurgic triad of the liberated gods, and from thence proceeds to the extremity of things. He is fabled to be lame, becauſe (ſays Proclus, in Tim. p. 44) he is the artificer of things laſt in the progreſſions of being, for ſuch are bodies; and becauſe theſe are unable to proceed into any other order. He is likewiſe ſaid to have been hurled from heaven to earth, becauſe he extends his fabrication through the whole of a ſenſible eſſence. And he is repreſented as fabricating from braſs, becauſe he is the artificer of reſiſting ſolids. Hence he prepares for the gods their apparent receptacles, fills all his fabrications with corporeal life, and adorns and comprehends the reſiſting and ſluggiſh nature of matter with the ſupervening irradiations of forms; but, in order to accompliſh this, he requires the aſſiſtance of Venus, who illuminates all things with harmony and union.

[2] The character of *hard* and *reſiſting*, which is here given to Mars, is ſymbolical of his nature, which (ſays Proclus, in Plat. Repub. p. 388) perpetually ſeparates and nouriſhes, and conſtantly excites the contrarieties of the univerſe, that the world may exiſt perfect and entire from all its parts. But this deity requires the aſſiſtance of Venus, that he may infert order and harmony into things contrary and diſcordant. He firſt ſubſiſts in the *defenſive* triad of the *liberated gods*, and from thence proceeds into different parts of the world.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Let us therefore diſmiſs our inveſtigations concerning the names of the gods, as I am afraid to diſcourſe about them. But urge me to any thing elſe you pleaſe, that you may ſee the quality of the horſes of Euthyphro.

HERM. I will conſent to what you ſay, if you will only ſuffer me to aſk you concerning Hermes; for Cratylus ſays that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavour, then, to behold the meaning of the name Hermes, that we may know whether he ſays any thing to the purpoſe.

SOC. This name ſeems to pertain to diſcourſe, and to imply that this god is an interpreter and a meſſenger, one who ſteals, and is fraudulent in diſcourſe, and who meddles with merchandiſe[1]: and the whole of this ſubſiſts about the power of diſcourſe. As, therefore, we ſaid before, το ειρειν is the uſe of ſpeech: and of this Homer frequently ſays, ειρηκατο, i. e. he deliberated about it. This name, therefore, is compoſed both from to ſpeak and to deliberate; juſt as if the inſtitutor of the name had authoritatively addreſſed us as follows: "It is juſt, O men, that you ſhould call that divinity, who makes ſpeech the object of his care and deliberation, Ειρεμης." But we of the preſent times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him Ἑρμης, Hermes. But Iris[2] likewiſe is ſo called, from το ειρειν, *to ſpeak*, becauſe ſhe is a meſſenger.

HERM. By Jupiter, then, Cratylus appears to me to have ſpoken well, in denying that I am Hermogenes; becauſe I am by no means an excellent artiſt of diſcourſe.

SOC. It is likewiſe probable, my friend, that Pan[3] is the bipartite ſon of Hermes.

HERM. But why?

SOC. You know that ſpeech ſignifies *the all*; that it circulates and rolls perpetually; and that it is two-fold, true and falſe.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Is not, therefore, that which is true in ſpeech, ſmooth and divine,

[1] For an account of Hermes, ſee the Additional Notes to the Firſt Alcibiades, vol. i.

[2] "Iris," ſays Proclus in his MS Commentary on the Parmenides, book v. "is an archangelic deity, the peculiarity of whoſe eſſence is to conduct ſecondary natures to their proper principle, according to the demiurgic intellect, and eſpecially to lead them up to Juno, the ruler of all the mundane divinities of a feminine characteriſtic."

[3] See the laſt note on the Phædrus, in vol. iii.

and dwelling on high in the gods; but that which is falſe, a downward inhabitant, dwelling in the multitude of mankind, and, beſides this, rough and tragic? For in ſpeech of this kind, the greater part of fables, and the falſities about a tragic life, ſubſiſt.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. With great propriety, therefore, he who indicates every thing, and perpetually rolls, is παν αιπολος, the biform ſon of Hermes; who in his upper parts is ſmooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either ſpeech, or the brother of ſpeech, ſince he is the ſon of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother ſhould be ſimilar to brother. However, as I juſt now ſaid, O bleſſed man! let us leave theſe inveſtigations of the gods.

HERM. Gods of this kind, if you pleaſe, Socrates, we will omit; but what ſhould hinder you from diſcuſſing the names of ſuch divinities as the ſun and moon, ſtars and earth, æther and air, fire and water, the ſeaſons and the year?

SOC. You aſſign me an arduous taſk; yet at the ſame time, if it will oblige you, I am willing to comply.

HERM. It will ſo, indeed.

SOC. What therefore do you wiſh we ſhould firſt inveſtigate? Or ſhall we, agreeably to the order in which you mentioned theſe, begin with the ſun?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. It ſeems, then, that this would become more manifeſt, if any one ſhould uſe the Doric appellation: for the Dorians call the ſun αλιον. He will therefore be αλιος, from his collecting men into one, when he riſes; and likewiſe, from his always revolving about the earth. To which we may add, that this name belongs to him, becauſe he varies, in his circulation, the productions of the earth. But το ποικιλειν, and αιολειν, have one and the ſame meaning.

HERM. But what will you ſay of σεληνη, or the moon?

SOC. This name ſeems to preſs upon Anaxagoras.

HERM. Why?

SOC. Becauſe it ſeems to manifeſt ſomething of a more antient date, which

which he lately revived, when he ſaid that the moon derives her light from the ſun.

HERM. But how?

SOC. Σελας is the ſame with φως, *light.*

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But this light about the moon is perpetually νεον and εννον, *new* and *old*, if what the Anaxagorics ſay is true: for, perpetually revolving in a circle, it perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But many call the moon σελαναιας.

HERM. They do ſo.

SOC. But, becauſe it perpetually poſſeſſes new and old ſplendour, it may be more juſtly called σελασεννεοαεια; but is now conciſely denominated σελαναια.

HERM. This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But what will you ſay of month and the ſtars?

SOC. Μηνη, or month, may be properly ſo called, from μειουσθαι, *to be diminiſhed*; but the ſtars appear to derive their appellation from αστραπη, *corruſcation.* But αστραπη is denominated from ωπας ανασπερφει, i. e. converting to itſelf the ſight; but now, for the ſake of elegance, it is called αστραπη.

HERM. But what is your opinion concerning fire and water.

SOC. I am in doubt with reſpect to fire; and it appears, that either the Muſe of Euthyphro deſerts me, or that this word is moſt extremely difficult to explain. Behold then the artifice which I employ, in all ſuch things as cauſe me to doubt.

HERM. What is it?

SOC. I will tell you. Anſwer me, therefore: Do you know on what account πυρ, *fire*, is ſo called?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not.

SOC. But conſider what I ſuſpect concerning it: for I think that the Greeks, eſpecially ſuch as dwelt under the dominion of the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.

HERM. But what then?

SOC. If any one, therefore, ſhould inveſtigate the propriety of theſe names

names according to the Greek tongue, and not according to that language to which the name belongs, he would certainly be involved in doubt.

HERM. It is likely he would.

SOC. Conſider then, whether this name, πυρ, is not of Barbaric origin: for it is by no means eaſy to adapt this to the Greek tongue; and it is manifeſt that the Phrygians thus denominate fire, with a certain trifling deviation; as likewiſe that ὑδωρ *water*, κυνας *dogs*, and many other names, are indebted to them for their origin.

HERM. They are ſo.

SOC. It is not proper, therefore, to uſe violence with theſe words, ſince no one can ſay any thing to the purpoſe about them. On this account, therefore, I ſhall reject the explanation of πυρ *fire*, and ὑδωρ *water*. But air, O Hermogenes, is ſo called, becauſe it elevates things from the earth; or becauſe it always flows; or becauſe, from its flowing, ſpirit is produced: for the poets call ſpirits αηται, *winds*. Perhaps, therefore, it is called αηρ, as if implying *a flowing ſpirit*, or *a flowing blaſt of wind*. But I conſider æther as deriving its appellation from *always running in a flowing progreſſion, about the air*; and on this account it may be called αειθερ. But γη, or *earth*, will more plainly ſignify its meaning, if any one denominates it γαια. For γαια may be properly called γεννητειρα, *the producer*, as Homer ſays; for he calls γεγαασι, γεγενησθαι, or *that which is produced in itſelf*.

HERM. Let it be ſo.

SOC. What then remains for us to inveſtigate after this?

HERM. The hours, Socrates, and the year.

SOC. But ωραι, that is, *the hours*, muſt be pronounced in the Attic tongue, as that which is more antient, if you wiſh to know the probable meaning of this word. For they are ὡραι, on account of their bounding the winter and ſummer, as likewiſe winds and proper occaſions ſubſervient to the fruits of the earth. And hence, becauſe they *bound*, ὁριζουσαι, they are moſt juſtly called ὡραι. But ενιαυτος and ετος, *the year*, appear to be one and the ſame: for that which, at ſtated periods, educes into light the productions of the earth, and explores them in itſelf, is *the year*. And as in the foregoing part of our diſcourſe we gave a two-fold diſtribution to the name of Jupiter, and aſſerted that he was by ſome called ζηνα, and by others δια; ſo likewiſe, with reſpect to *the year*, it is called by ſome ενιαυτος, becauſe *it explores* IN ITSELF; but

ετος,

ετος, becauſe *it explores*. But the entire reaſon of its denomination is becauſe it explores things in itſelf; ſo that two names are generated, ενιαυτος and ετος, from one reaſon.

HERM. But now, Socrates, you have certainly proceeded to a great length.

SOC. I ſeem, indeed, to have purſued wiſdom to a conſiderable diſtance.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Perhaps you will urge me ſtill further.

HERM. But after this ſpecies of inquiry, I would moſt gladly contemplate the rectitude of thoſe beautiful names concerning virtue, ſuch as φρονησις *prudence*, συνεσις *conſciouſneſs*, δικαιοσυνη *equity*, and all the reſt of this kind.

SOC. You raiſe up, my friend, no deſpicable genus of names. But however, ſince I have put on the lion's ſkin, I ought not to fly through fear, but to inveſtigate prudence and intelligence, conſideration and ſcience, and all the other beautiful names which you ſpeak of.

HERM. We ought by no means to deſiſt till this is accompliſhed.

SOC. And indeed, by the dog, I ſeem to myſelf not to propheſy badly, about what I underſtand at preſent, that thoſe antient men who eſtabliſhed names, experienced that which happens to many wiſe men of the preſent times; for, by their intenſe inveſtigation concerning the manner in which things ſubſiſt, they became giddy, far beyond the reſt of mankind, and afterwards, things themſelves appeared to them to ſtagger and fluctuate. They did not however conſider their inward giddineſs as the cauſe of this opinion, but the outward natural fluctuation of things; for they imagined that nothing was ſtable and firm, but that all things flowed and were continually hurried along, and were full of all-various agitation and generation. I ſpeak this, as what I conceive reſpecting the names which we have juſt now mentioned.

HERM. How is this, Socrates?

SOC. Perhaps you have not perceived that theſe names were eſtabliſhed as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.

HERM. I do not entirely perceive this.

SOC. And, in the firſt place, the firſt name which we mentioned entirely pertains to ſomething of this kind.

HERM. Which is that?

SOC. *Prudence*, or φρονησις: for it is the intelligence of local motion and fluxion. It may alſo imply the advantage of local motion; ſo that it is plainly

plainly converſant with agitation. But if you will, γνωμη, or *conſideration*, perfectly ſignifies the inſpection and agitation of begetting: for το νωμαν is the ſame as το σκοπειν, *to ſpeculate*. Again, νοησις, or *intelligence*, if you pleaſe, is του νεου εσις, or *the deſire of that which is new:* but that things are new, ſignifies that they perpetually ſubſiſt in becoming to be. Hence, that the ſoul deſires things of this kind, is indicated by him who eſtabliſhed this name νεοεσις: for it was not at firſt called νοησις, but two ε ε ought to be ſubſtituted inſtead of η, ſo as to produce νεοεσις. But temperance ſignifies the ſafety of that prudence which we have juſt now conſidered: and ſcience, indeed, implies that the ſoul does not diſdain to follow things hurried along with local motion; and that ſhe neither leaves them behind, nor goes before them. On which, account, by inſerting ι, it ought to be called επιστημενης. But συνεσις appears to be, as it were, a ſyllogiſm. And when συνιεναι is ſaid to take place, the ſame things happens in every reſpect, as when any one is ſaid επισταασθαι, *to know:* for συνιεναι aſſerts that the ſoul follows along with things in their progreſſions; but wiſdom ſignifies the touching upon local motion. This, however, is more obſcure and foreign from us. But it is neceſſary to recollect from the poets, that when they wiſh to expreſs any thing which accedes on a ſudden, they ſay εσυθη, *it ruſhed forth:* and the name of a certain illuſtrious Lacedemonian was Σους, i. e. *one who ruſhes forward*; for thus the Lacedæmonians denominate *a ſwift impulſe*. Wiſdom, therefore, ſignifies the contact of this local motion, as if things were continually agitated and hurried along. But το ἀγαθον, *the good*, ſignifies *that which excites admiration*, in the nature of every thing: for, ſince all things ſubſiſt in continual progreſſion, in ſome ſwiftneſs, and in others ſlowneſs, prevails. Every thing, therefore, is not ſwift, but there is ſomething in every thing which is *admirable*. Hence the name τοαγαθον is the ſame with το ἀγαστον, *the admirable*. But, with reſpect to the name *equity*, we may eaſily conjecture that it is derived from the intelligence of that which is juſt: but the ſignification of the *juſt itſelf*, is difficult to determine: for it appears that the multitude agree thus far to what we have ſaid, but that what follows is a ſubject of doubt. For, indeed, ſuch as think that the univerſe ſubſiſts in progreſſion, conſider the greateſt part of it to be of ſuch a nature that it does nothing elſe than yield to impulſion; that, on this account, ſomething pervades through every thing, from which all generated natures are produced; and

that this pervading nature is the ſwifteſt and moſt attenuated of all things: for it would not be able to paſs through every thing, unleſs it was the moſt attenuated, ſo that nothing can ſtop its progreſſion; and the ſwifteſt, ſo that it may uſe other things as if in an abiding condition with reſpect to itſelf. Becauſe, therefore, it governs all other things διαϊὸν, i. e. by pervading through them, it is properly called δικαιον, receiving the power of the κ for the ſake of elegant enunciation. And thus far the multitude agree with us, concerning the meaning of το δικαιον, *the juſt*. But I, O Hermogenes, as being aſſiduous in my inquiries about this affair, have inveſtigated all theſe particulars, and have diſcovered in the απορρητα, or ſacred myſteries, that *the juſt* is the ſame with *cauſe*. For that through which a thing is generated, is the cauſe of that thing: and a certain perſon ſaid, that it was on this account properly denominated το δικαιον. But, notwithſtanding this information, I do not the leſs ceaſe to inquire, O beſt of men, what *the juſt* is, if it is the ſame with *cauſe*. I ſeem, therefore, now to inquire further than is becoming, and to paſs, as it is ſaid, beyond the trench; for they will ſay that I have ſufficiently interrogated and heard, and will endeavour, through being deſirous to ſatisfy me, to give different ſolutions of the difficulty, and will no longer harmonize in their opinions. For a certain perſon ſays that the ſun is *the juſt*, becauſe the ſun alone, by his pervading and heating power, governs all things. But when, rejoicing in this information, I related it to another perſon, as if I had heard ſomething beautiful and excellent, he laughed at me when I told it him, and aſked me if I thought that there was no longer any thing juſt in men after ſun-ſet? Upon my inquiring, therefore, what *the juſt* was, according to him, he ſaid it was fire. But this is by no means eaſy to underſtand. But another perſon ſaid, it was not fire, but the heat which ſubſiſted in fire. Another again ſaid, that all theſe opinions were ridiculous, but that *the juſt* was that intellect which Anaxagoras ſpeaks of; for he ſaid that this was an unreſtrained governor, and that it was mingled with nothing, but that it adorned all things, pervading through all things. But in theſe explanations, my friend, I find myſelf expoſed to greater doubts than before I endeavoured to learn what juſtice is. But, that we may return to that for the ſake of which we entered on this diſputation, this name appears to be attributed to *equity*, for the reaſons which we have aſſigned.

HERM.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard theſe particulars ſomewhere, and not to have fabricated them yourſelf.

SOC. But what do you ſay reſpecting my other explanations?

HERM. That this is not entirely the caſe with them.

SOC. Attentively hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, by ſpeaking as if I had not heard.—What then remains for us after equity? I think we have not yet diſcuſſed fortitude: for injuſtice is evidently a real hinderance to the pervading power; but fortitude ſignifies that it derived its appellation from contention, or battle. But contention in a thing, if it flows, is nothing elſe than a contrary fluxion. If any one, therefore, takes away the δ from this name ανδρια *fortitude*, the name ἀνρια, which remains, will interpret its employment. Hence it is evident that a fluxion, contrary to every fluxion, is not fortitude, but that only which flows contrary to *the juſt*; for otherwiſe fortitude would not be laudable. In like manner το αῤῥεν, that is, the male nature, and ἀνηρ *man*, are derived from a ſimilar origin, that is, from ανω ῥοη, or *a flowing upwards*. But the name woman appears to me to imply *begetting*; and the name for the female nature ſeems to be ſo called from the pap or breaſt. But the pap or breaſt, O Hermogenes, ſeems to derive its appellation from cauſing to germinate and ſhoot forth, like things which are irrigated.

HERM. It appears ſo, Socrates.

SOC. But the word θαλλειν, *to flouriſh*, appears to me to repreſent the increaſe of youth, becauſe it takes place ſwiftly and ſuddenly: and this is imitated by the founder of the name, who compoſed it from θειν *to run*, and αλλεσθαι *to leap*. But do you not perceive that I am borne, as it were, beyond my courſe, ſince I have met with words plain and eaſy? But many things yet remain, which appear to be worthy of inveſtigation.

HERM. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. And one of theſe is, that we ſhould conſider the meaning of the word *art*.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Does not the word τεχνη, then, ſignify εχονοη, or *the habit of intellect*, taking away for this purpoſe τ, and inſerting ο between χ and ν, and between ν and η?

HERM. And this in a very far-fetched manner, Socrates.

SOC. But do you not know, bleſſed man! that ſuch names as were firſt

eſtabliſhed, are now overwhelmed through the ſtudious of tragic diſcourſe; who, for the ſake of elegant enunciation, add and take away letters; and who entirely pervert them, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For in the word κατοπτρω, *a mirror*, does not the addition of the ρω appear to you abſurd? But ſuch alterations as theſe are, I think, made by thoſe who care nothing for truth, but are ſolicitous about the elegant conformation of the mouth: ſo that theſe men, having added many things to the firſt names, at length rendered it impoſſible for any one to apprehend the meaning of a name; as in the name Sphynx, which they call σφιγγξ inſtead of σφιγξ, and ſo in many others.

HERM. This is indeed the caſe, Socrates.

SOC. Indeed, if it ſhould be allowed for every one to add to, and take away from names, juſt as he pleaſed, this would certainly be a great licence; and any one might adapt every name to every thing.

HERM. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. The truth indeed. But I think that you who are a wiſe preſident, ought to preſerve and guard the moderate and the probable.

HERM. I wiſh I could.

SOC. And I alſo, O Hermogenes, wiſh the ſame in conjunction with you. But you ſhould not, O demoniacal man, demand a diſcuſſion very exact, leſt you perfectly exhauſt my force: for I ſhall aſcend to the ſummit of what I have ſaid, when, after *art*, I have conſidered *artifice or ſkill*. For μηχανη, or *artifice*, ſeems to me to ſignify the completion of a thing in a very high degree. It is compoſed therefore from μηκος, length, and ανειν, to finiſh a thing completely. But, as I juſt now ſaid, it is proper to aſcend to the ſummit of our diſcourſe, and to inquire the ſignification of the names virtue and vice.—One of theſe, therefore, I have not yet diſcovered; but the other appears to me to be manifeſt, for it harmonizes with all that has been ſaid before: for, in conſequence of every thing ſubſiſting in progreſſion, whatever paſſes on badly will be *depravity*; but this, when it ſubſiſts in the ſoul, badly acceding to her concerns, then moſt eminently poſſeſſes the appellation of the whole of depravity. But it appears to me, that the faulty mode of progreſſion is manifeſt in *timidity*, which we have not yet diſcuſſed; though it is proper to conſider it, after fortitude. And we likewiſe ſeem to have omitted many other names. *Timidity* therefore ſignifies, *that the bond of the ſoul is ſtrong:* for the word

vehement

vehement implies a certain ſtrength. And hence the moſt vehement and greateſt bond of the ſoul, will be timidity: juſt as *want* is *an evil*; and every thing as it appears, which is an impediment to paſſing on and progreſſion.—*Paſſing on badly*, therefore, ſeems, to evince a detention and hindrance of progreſſion: and when the ſoul is thus affected, ſhe then becomes full of evil. But if the name vice is applicable to ſuch things as theſe, the contrary of this will be virtue; ſignifying, in the firſt place, facility of progreſſion; and, in the next place, that the flowing of a good ſoul ought to be perpetually looſened and free. And hence, that which always flows unreſtrained and without impediment, may, as it appears, very properly receive this denomination, ἀειῤῥητη. Perhaps alſo, ſome one may call it ἀϕετη, becauſe this habit is the moſt eligible of all. Perhaps, too, you will ſay that I feign; but I aſſert, that if the preceding name *vice* is properly eſtabliſhed, the ſame may be ſaid of the name virtue.

HERM. But what is the meaning of το κακον, *evil*, through which you explained many things in the word *depravity*?

SOC. It appears to me, by Jupiter, to imply ſomething prodigious, and difficult to collect. I introduce therefore to this alſo the artifice mentioned above.

HERM. What is that?

SOC. To aſſert that this name is ſomething Barbaric.

HERM. And, in ſo doing, you appear to me to ſpeak properly. But, if you think fit, we will omit theſe, and endeavour to conſider the rectitude of compoſition in the names, *the beautiful*, and *the baſe*.

SOC. *The baſe*, then, ſeems to me to evince its ſignification plainly, and to correſpond with the preceding explanations: for he who eſtabliſhed names appears to me, throughout, to have reviled that which hinders and detains the flowing of things; and that he now aſſigned the name ἀεισχορρουν to that which always detains a flowing progreſſion. But, at preſent, they call it collectively αἰσχρον.

HERM. But what will you ſay concerning the *beautiful*?

SOC. This is more difficult to underſtand, though they ſay that the α in this word, is produced only for the ſake of harmony and length.

HERM. But how?

SOC.

Soc. It appears that this appellation is the ſurname of the dianoëtic energy.

Herm. How do you prove this?

Soc. What do you think is the cauſe of the denomination of every thing? Is it not that which eſtabliſhes names?

Herm. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Will not this cauſe, then, be the dianoëtic conception, either of gods, or men, or of both?

Herm. Certainly.

Soc. *To call things* therefore, and *the beautiful*, are the ſame with dianoëtic energy.

Herm. It appears ſo.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the operations of *intellect* and the dianoëtic power laudable; but ſuch things as are not the reſult of their energies blameable?

Herm. Entirely ſo.

Soc. That which belongs to medicine, therefore, produces medical works; and that which belongs to the carpenter's art, carpentry works: or what is your opinion on the ſubject?

Herm. The ſame as yours.

Soc. Does not therefore the *beautiful* produce things beautiful?

Herm. I is neceſſary that it ſhould.

Soc. But this as we have ſaid, is dianoëtic energy.

Herm. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Το καλον, therefore, or *the beautiful*, will be properly the ſurname of *prudence*, which produces ſuch things as, in conſequence of acknowledging to be beautiful, we are delighted with.

Herm. It appears to be ſo.

Soc. What then remains for us to inveſtigate, of ſuch like names?

Herm. Whatever belongs to *the good* and *the beautiful*; ſuch as the names ſignifying *things conducive*, *uſeful*, *profitable*, *lucrative*, and the contraries of theſe.

Soc. You may find then what το συμφερον, or *the conducive* is, from our foregoing ſpeculations; for it appears to be a certain brother of ſcience. For it evinces nothing elſe than the local motion of the ſoul, in conjunction with things; and that things reſulting from hence ſhould be called συμφεροντα and συμφορα, *i. e.* conducive, from συμπεριφερεσθαι, or *being borne along in conjunction.*

Herm.

HERM. It appears ſo.

SOC. But the name *lucrative* (κερδαλεον) is derived from κερδος, *gain*. And if any one inſerts a ι inſtead of a δ in this name, it will manifeſt its meaning: for it will thus, after another manner, become the name for *good*; ſince he who aſſigned it this name intended to expreſs that power which it poſſeſſes, of becoming mingled with, and pervading through all things, and thus, by placing δ inſtead of ι, he pronounced it κερδος.

HERM. But what will you ſay concerning λυσιτελουν, or *the uſeful*?

SOC. It appears, O Hermogenes! that this name was not eſtabliſhed according to the meaning in which it is employed by inn-keepers, *becauſe it frees from expenſe*; but becauſe it is the ſwifteſt of being, and, in conſequence of this, does not ſuffer things to ſtand ſtill, nor *lation*, by receiving an end of being borne along, to ſtop, and reſt from its progreſſion: but, on the contrary, it always departs from *lation*, as long as any end remains to be obtained, and renders it unceaſing and immortal. And, on this account, it appears to me λυσιτελουν was called *the good*; for that which *diſſolves the end* of lation was called λυσιτελουν. But ωφελιμον, or *the profitable*, is a foreign name; and Homer himſelf often uſes τῳ οφελλειν. But this is the ſurname of *increaſing* and *making*.

HERM. But what ſhall we ſay reſpecting the contraries of theſe?

SOC. There is no occaſion, as it appears to me, to evolve ſuch as are the negations of theſe.

HERM. But what are they?

SOC. The *non-conducive*, *uſeleſs*, *unprofitable*, and the *non-lucrative*.

HERM. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. But may we not inquire concerning βλαβερον and ζημιωδες, the *noxious* and *pernicious*.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And το βλαβερον, indeed, or *the noxious*, ſays that it is βλαπτον τον ῥουν. But βλαπτον ſignifies *that which wiſhes to bind*; and ἁπτειν, *to bind*, is the ſame as δεῖν: but this it blames in every reſpect. He, therefore, who wiſhes ἁπτειν ῥουν, i. e. *to bind that which flows*, will be moſt properly called βουλαπτερουν; but it appears to me, that, for the ſake of elegance, it was denominated βλαβερον.

HERM. A variety of names, Socrates, preſents itſelf for your conſideration; and you juſt now appeared to me to have founded a prelude on your pipe,

pipe, as it were, of the melody belonging to Minerva, while you pronounced this name Θουλαπτερουν.

Soc. I am not, Hermogenes, the cauſe of this, but he who founded the name.

Herm. You ſpeak the truth; but what will you ſay about ζημιωδες, *the pernicious?*

Soc. I will tell you, Hermogenes, the meaning of this word; and do you behold how truly I ſhall explain it, by aſſerting that men, through adding and taking away letters, very much vary the meaning of names, ſo that ſometimes a very ſmall alteration cauſes a word to imply the very contrary of what it did before. As, for inſtance, in the word το δεον, *the becoming*: for I underſtood, and called to mind juſt now, in conſequence of what I am about to ſay to you, that this beautiful word δεον is new to us, and induces us to enunciate το δεον and ζημιωδες contrary to their meaning, and by this means to obſcure their ſignification: but the antient name evinces the ſenſe of both theſe words.

Herm. How is this?

Soc. I will tell you. You know that our anceſtors very frequently uſed the ε and δ, and that this was not leſs the caſe with ſuch women as particularly preſerved the antient tongue. But now, inſtead of the ι, they perverſely uſe either ε or η, and ζ inſtead of δ, as being more magnificent.

Herm. But how?

Soc. Juſt as, for inſtance, the moſt antient men called day ἱμερα, and ſome of them ἑμερα; but thoſe of the preſent times ἡμερα.

Herm. This is indeed the caſe.

Soc. You know, therefore, that this antient name only manifeſts the conceptions of its founder; for, becauſe light emerges from darkneſs, and ſhines upon men rejoicing in and deſiring its beams, they called day ἱμερα.

Herm. It appears ſo

Soc. But as it is now celebrated in tragical performances, you can by no means underſtand what ἡμερα means; though ſome are of opinion that day is called ἡμερα, becauſe it renders things ἡμερα, placid and gentle.

Herm. So it appears to me.

Soc. And you likewiſe know that the antients called ζυγον, *a beam*, δυογον.

Herm.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And ζυγον, indeed, manifeſts nothing: but that which ſubſiſts for the ſake of bringing two things together, ſo that they may be bound, is very juſtly named δυογον. But it is now called ζυγον; and this is the caſe with a great variety of other particulars.

HERM. It appears ſo.

SOC. Hence then, the word δεον, when it is thus pronounced, ſignifies the contrary to all the names which belong to *the good*. For this name being a ſpecies of the good, appears to be a bond and impediment of local motion; as being the brother of βλαβερον, the noxious.

HERM. And indeed, Socrates, it appears to be very much ſo.

SOC. But this will not be the caſe if you uſe the antient name, which it is much more probable was properly founded than the preſent name. But you will agree with thoſe antient good men, if you ſubſtitute ῑ for ε̄; for διον, and not δεον, will ſignify that good which is celebrated by the inſtitutor of names. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himſelf, but the names δεον, ωφελιμον, λυσιτελουν, κερδαλεον, αγαθον, συμφερον, ευπορον, or *proceeding with facility*, will all of them appear to have the ſame meaning: for he meant to ſignify and celebrate, by different names, that which adorns and pervades through every part of the univerſe; and to reprobate that which detains and binds. And indeed, in the name ζημιωδες, if, according to the antient tongue, you ſubſtitute δ̄ for ζ̄, it will appear to you that this name was compoſed from δουντι το ιον, or binding that which is in progreſſion, and was called δημιωδες.

HERM. But what will you ſay concerning pleaſure, pain, deſire, and ſuch like names?

SOC. They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Hermogenes: for *pleaſure* ſeems to be an action tending towards emolument, and on this account to have derived its appellation; but the δ̄ was added, that it might be called ηδονη, inſtead of ηονη. But *pain* ſeems to have derived its appellation from the diſſolution of the body, which the body experiences in this paſſion: and the name *ſorrow* was ſo called from impeding the motion of progreſſion: but the name αλγηδων, i. e. *torment*, appears to me to be foreign, and to be ſo called from αλγεινος, *troubleſome*. Οδυνη, i. e. anxiety, was denominated from the ingreſs of pain.

HERM. It appears ſo.

Soc. But ἀχθηδων, grief, clearly ſignifies that it is a name aſſimilated to the ſlowneſs of lation: for ἀχθος is a burthen, and ιον, any thing in progreſſion. Joy ſeems to have received its appellation from the diffuſion and eaſy progreſſion of the flowing of the ſoul; but τερψις, delight, was derived from τερπνος, the pleaſant. But το τερπνον was ſo called, from being aſſimilated to the breathing of delight through the ſoul; it was therefore juſtly called ἕρπνον, i. e. inſpiring; but in the courſe of time, it came to be denominated τερπνον. But, with reſpect to ευφροσυνη, or hilarity, there is no occaſion to explain *the why* of its denomination; for it is obvious to every one, that it was ſo called from ευ and συμφερεσθαι, that is, from the ſoul's being well borne along in conjunction with things. Hence it ought, in juſtice, to be denominated ευφερωσυνη; but, notwithſtanding this, we call it ευφροσυνη. But neither is it difficult to diſcover the meaning of επιθυμια, *deſire*: for it evinces a power proceeding to θυμος, *anger*. But θυμος, *anger*, derives its appellation from θυσεως, and ζεσεως, *raging* and *ardour*. And again, ιμερος, *amatory deſire*, was ſo called from ῥω, or *a flowing which vehemently attracts the ſoul*; for becauſe it flows *excited*, and *deſiring the poſſeſſion of things*, it ſtrongly allures the ſoul through the incitement of its flowing. And hence, from the whole of this power, it is called ἱμερος. But ποθος, *deſire*, was ſo called, from ſignifying that it is not converſant with preſent amatorial deſire, and its effluxive ſtreams, like ἱμερος, but with that which is elſewhere ſituated, and is abſent. But, ἐρως, *love*, received its appellation from implying that it flows inwardly from an external ſource; and that this flowing is not the property of him by whom it is poſſeſſed, but that it is adventitious through the eyes. And hence love was called by our anceſtors εσρος, from εσρειν, to *flow inwardly*. But at preſent it is called ερως, through the inſertion of ω̄ inſtead of ο̄. But what ſhall we conſider after this?

Herm. What *opinion*, and ſuch-like names, appear to you to ſignify.

Soc. *Opinion*, δοξα, was denominated from the *purſuing* which the ſoul employs in her progreſſive inveſtigations concerning the nature of things, or elſe from *the darting of an arrow*; and this laſt appears to be the moſt likely derivation. Hence οιησις, *opinion*, harmonizes with δοξα; for it ſignifies the οισις, or ingreſs of the ſoul, in conſidering the οιον, or quality of a thing. Juſt as βουλη, counſel or deliberation, is ſo called from βολη, *hurling forth*: and βουλεσθαι, *to be willing*, ſignifies το εφισθαι, *to deſire*, and βουλευεσθαι, *to conſult*. For all theſe following δοξα, opinion, appear to be certain reſemblances

blances of βολη, *hurling forth*; juſt as the contrary of this αβουλια, or *a want of counſel*, appears to be a misfortune, as neither hurling forth, nor obtaining that which it wiſhes for, about which it deliberates, and which is the object of its deſire.

HERM. You ſeem to me, Socrates, to have introduced theſe particulars with great denſity of conception; let us therefore now, if it is pleaſing to divinity, end the diſcuſſion. Yet I ſhould wiſh you to explain the meaning of *neceſſity*, which is conſequent to what we have already unfolded, and *that which is voluntary*.

SOC. Το εκουσιον, therefore, or *the voluntary*, ſignifies that which yields and does not reſiſt, but as I may ſay εικον τω ιοντι, *yields to that which is in progreſſion*; and thus evinces that this name ſubſiſts according to βουλησις, *the will*. But το αναγκαιον and αντιτυπον, i. e. *the neceſſary* and *the reſiſting*, ſince they are contrary to the will, muſt ſubſiſt about *guilt* and *ignorance*. But they are aſſimilated to a progreſſion through a valley; becauſe, on account of their being paſſed through with difficulty, and their rough and denſe nature, like a place thick-planted with trees, they impede progreſſion. And hence, perhaps, *neceſſity* was denominated from an aſſimilation *to a progreſſion through a valley*. But as long as our ſtrength remains we ought not to deſert it; do not therefore deſiſt, but ſtill interrogate me.

HERM. I aſk you then about things the greateſt and moſt beautiful, viz. *truth*, *falſehood*, and *being*; and why *name*, which is the ſubject of our preſent diſputation, was ſo called?

SOC. What therefore do you call μαιεσθαι?

HERM. I call it ζητειν, *to inquire*.

SOC. It appears then that this word ονομα, *a name*, was compoſed from that diſcourſe which aſſerts that ον, *being*, is that about which name inquires. But this will be more evident to you, in that which we call ονομαστον, or *capable of being named*; for in this it clearly appears that *name* is *an inquiry about being*. With reſpect to αληθεια, *truth*, this name ſeems to have been mingled, as well as many others; for this name appears to have received its compoſition from the divine lation of being, and therefore implies that it is θεια αλη, *a divine wandering*. But ψευδος, *falſehood*, ſignifies the contrary to lation. For here again the inſtitutor of names blames that which detains and compels any

thing to reſt. This name, however, is aſſimilated to thoſe who are aſleep; but the addition of the δ conceals its meaning. But ον, *being*, and ουσια, *eſſence*, harmonize with truth, by receiving the addition of an ι; for then they will ſignify ιον, or that which is in progreſſion. And again, το ουκ ον, or *non-being*, is by ſome denominated ουκ ιον; that is, *not proceeding*.

Herm. You appear to me, Socrates, to have diſcuſſed theſe particulars in a very ſtrenuous manner. But if any one ſhould aſk you, what rectitude of nomination there is in the words ιον, *proceeding*, ῥεον, *flowing*, and δουν, *binding*, would you be able to anſwer him or not?

Soc. I ſhould perfectly ſo. And ſomething juſt now occurred to me, by the mentioning of which I may appear to ſay ſomething to the purpoſe.

Herm. What is it?

Soc. That, if we are ignorant of any thing, we ſhould ſay, it is of Barbaric origin: for, perhaps, this is really the caſe with ſome names; and others are, perhaps, inſcrutable on account of their antiquity. For, through names being every where wreſted from their proper conſtruction, it will be by no means wonderful, if the antient tongue, when compared with the preſent, is in no reſpect different from a Barbaric language.

Herm. And, indeed, you ſay nothing foreign from the purpoſe.

Soc. I ſay that, indeed, which is probable; but yet the conteſt does not appear to me to admit of an excuſe. Let us, however, endeavour to conſider this affair, and make our inquiry, as follows: If any one ſhould always inveſtigate thoſe words through which a name derives its ſubſiſtence, and again thoſe words through which words are enunciated, and ſhould do this without ceaſing, would not he who anſwers ſuch a one at length fail in his replies?

Herm. It appear ſo to me.

Soc. When, therefore, will he who fails to anſwer, juſtly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at thoſe names which are, as it were, the elements both of other diſcourſes and names? For theſe, if they have an elementary ſubſiſtence, can no longer be juſtly ſaid to be compoſed from other names. Juſt as we ſaid above, that το αγαθον was compoſed from αγαστος, *admirable*, and θοος, *ſwift*. But θοος, we may perhaps ſay, is compoſed from other words, and theſe laſt again from others: but if we ever apprehend that which

is no longer compoſed from other names, we may juſtly ſay, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.

HERM. You ſeem to me to ſpeak properly.

SOC. Are not the names, then, which are the ſubject of your preſent inquiry, elements? And is it not neceſſary that the rectitude of their formation ſhould be conſidered in a manner different from that of others?

HERM. It is probable.

SOC. It is probable certainly, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, muſt be reduced to theſe: and if this be the caſe, as it appears to me it is, conſider again along with me, leſt I ſhould act like one delirious, while I am explaining what the rectitude of the firſt names ought to be.

HERM. Only do but ſpeak; and I will endeavour to the utmoſt of my ability to ſpeculate in conjunction with you.

SOC. I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one certain rectitude of every name, as well of that which is firſt as of that which is laſt; and that none of theſe differ from one another, ſo far as they are names.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But the rectitude of thoſe names which we have juſt now diſcuſſed, conſiſts in evincing the quality of every thing.

HERM. How ſhould it be otherwiſe?

SOC. This property, then, ought no leſs to belong to prior than poſterior names, if they have the proper requiſites of names.

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. But poſterior names, as it appears, produce this through ſuch as are prior.

HERM. It appears ſo.

SOC. Be it ſo then. But after what manner can firſt names, which have no others preceding them, be able, as much as poſſible, to unfold to us the nature of things, if they have the properties of names? But anſwer me this queſtion: If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wiſhed to manifeſt things to one another, ſhould we not, like thoſe who are at preſent mute, endeavour to ſignify our meaning by the hands, head, and other parts of the body?

HERM. How could it be otherwiſe, Socrates?

SOC. I think, therefore, that if we wiſhed to ſignify that which is upwards and

and light, we ſhould raiſe our hands towards the heavens, imitating the nature of the thing itſelf; but that if we wiſhed to indicate things downwards and heavy, we ſhould point with our hands to the earth. And again. if we were deſirous of ſignifying a running horſe, or any other animal, you know, that we ſhould faſhion the geſtures and figures of our bodies, as near as poſſible, to a ſimilitude of theſe things.

HERM. It appears to me, that it would neceſſarily be as you ſay.

SOC. In this manner then, I think, the manifeſtations of the body would take place; the body imitating, as it ſeems, that which it wiſhes to render apparent.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But ſince we wiſh to manifeſt a thing by our voice, tongue, and mouth, will not a manifeſtation of every thing then take place through theſe, when an imitation of any thing ſubſiſts through theſe?

HERM. It appears to me, that it muſt be neceſſarily ſo.

SOC. A name then, as it ſeems, is an imitation of voice, by which every one who imitates any thing, imitates and nominates through voice.

HERM. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. But, by Jupiter, my friend, I do not think that I have yet ſpoken in a becoming manner.

HERM. Why?

SOC. Becauſe we muſt be compelled to confeſs, that thoſe who imitate ſheep and cocks, and other animals, give names to the things which they imitate.

HERM. You ſpeak the truth.

SOC. But do you think this is becoming?

HERM. I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will a name be?

SOC. In the firſt place, as it appears to me, it will not be ſuch an intimation as that which takes place through muſic, although this imitation ſhould be effected by the voice: nor, in the next place, though we ſhould imitate the ſame things as muſic imitates, yet we ſhould not appear to me to denominate things. But I reaſon thus: Is there not a certain voice, figure, and colour, in many things?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. It appears, therefore, that though any one ſhould imitate theſe, yet the

the denominating art would not be converſant with theſe imitations: for theſe are partly muſical, and partly the effects of painting. Is not this the caſe?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But what will you ſay to this? Do you not think that there is an eſſence belonging to every thing, as well as colour, and ſuch things as we juſt now mentioned? And, in the firſt place, is there not an eſſence belonging to colour, and voice, and to every thing elſe, which is conſidered as deſerving the appellation of being?

HERM. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. But what then? If any one is able to imitate the eſſence of every thing, by letters and ſyllables, muſt he not evince what every thing is?

HERM. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And how would you denominate him who is able to do this? For, with reſpect to the former characters, one you called muſical, and the other converſant with painting. But how will you call this character?

HERM. This perſon, Socrates, appears to me to be that inſtitutor of names which we formerly ſought after.

SOC. If this then is true, as it appears to be, let us conſider about thoſe names which are the ſubjects of your inquiry, i. e. ῥοη, *flowing*, ιεναι, *to go*, σχεσις, *habitude*, whether, in the letters and ſyllables from which they are compoſed, they really imitate eſſence, or not.

HERM. By all means.

SOC. Come then, let us ſee whether theſe alone belong to the firſt names, or many others beſides theſe.

HERM. I think that this is the caſe with many others beſides theſe.

SOC. And your opinion is probable. But what will the mode of diviſion be, from whence the imitator will begin to imitate? Since then the imitation of eſſence ſubſiſts through letters and ſyllables, will it not be moſt proper to diſtribute in the firſt place the elements? juſt as thoſe who are converſant with rhythms, in the firſt place, diſtribute the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the ſyllables; and thus at length begin to ſpeculate the rhythms themſelves, but never till this is accompliſhed.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. In like manner, therefore, ought not we firſt of all to divide the vowels,

vowels, and afterwards the reſt according to ſpecies, both mutes and ſemivowels? For this is the language of thoſe who are ſkilled in theſe matters. And again, ought we not after this to divide ſuch as are capable of being ſounded indeed, yet are not ſemivowels, and conſider the different ſpecies of vowels, with reference to one another? And after we have properly diſtributed all theſe, it is again requiſite to impoſe names, and to conſider, if there are certain things into which both theſe may be referred as elements; and from which both theſe may be known; and whether ſpecies are contained in them after the ſame manner as in the elements. But all theſe particulars being contemplated in a becoming manner, it is proper to know how to introduce each according to ſimilitude; whether one ought to be introduced to one, or many mingled together: juſt as painters, when they wiſh to produce a reſemblance, ſometimes only introduce a purple colour, and ſometimes any other paint: and ſometimes again they mingle many colours together, as when they make preparations for the purpoſe of producing the likeneſs of a man, or any thing elſe of this kind; and this in ſuch a manner, I think, as to give to every image the colours which it requires. In the ſame manner we ſhould accommodate the elements of words to things, and one to one, wherever it appears to be neceſſary, and ſhould fabricate ſymbols, which they call ſyllables. And again, combining theſe ſyllables together, from which nouns and verbs are compoſed, we ſhould again from theſe nouns and verbs compoſe ſomething beautiful and entire; that what the animal deſcribed by the painter's art was in the above inſtance, diſcourſe may be in this; whether conſtructed by the onomaſtic, or rhetorical, or any other art. Or rather this ought not to be *our* employment, ſince we have already ſurpaſſed the bounds of our diſcourſe; for, if this is the proper mode of compoſition, it was adopted by the antients. But if we mean to ſpeculate artificially, it is proper that, diſtinguiſhing all theſe, we ſhould conſider whether or not firſt and laſt names are eſtabliſhed in a proper manner; for to connect them without adopting ſuch a method would be erroneous, my dear Hermogenes, and improper.

HERM. Perhaps ſo, indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

SOC. What then? Do you believe that you can divide them in this manner? for I cannot.

HERM.

HERM. There is much greater reaſon, then, that I ſhould not be able to do this.

Soc. Let us give up the attempt then: or are you willing that we ſhould undertake it to the beſt of our ability, though we are able to know but very little concerning ſuch particulars? But as we ſaid before reſpecting the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth belonging to their names, we might conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them; ſo now, with regard to the preſent ſubject, we may proceed in its inveſtigation, declaring that, if theſe particulars have been properly diſtributed, either by us or by any other, they ought, doubtleſs, to have been ſo divided. Now, therefore, as it is ſaid, it is requiſite that we ſhould treat concerning them in the beſt manner we are able. Or, what is you opinion on the ſubject?

HERM. Perfectly agreeable to what you ſay.

Soc. It is ridiculous, I think, Hermogenes, that things ſhould become manifeſt through imitation produced by letters and ſyllables: and yet it is neceſſary; for we have not any thing better than this, by means of which we may judge concerning the truth of the firſt names; unleſs, perhaps, as the compoſers of tragedies, when they are involved in any difficulty, fly to their machinery, introducing the gods, in order to free them from their embarraſſment; ſo we ſhall be liberated from our perplexity, by aſſerting that the gods eſtabliſhed the firſt names, and that on this account they are properly inſtituted. Will not ſuch an aſſertion be our ſtrongeſt defence? or that which declares we received them from certain Barbarians? For the Barbarians are more antient than us. Or ſhall we ſay that, through antiquity, it is impoſſible to perceive their meaning, as is the caſe with Barbaric names? But all theſe ſolutions will only be ſo many plunderings, and very elegant evaſions of thoſe who are not willing to render a proper reaſon concerning the right impoſition of the firſt names; though, indeed, he who is ignorant of the proper eſtabliſhment of firſt names cannot poſſibly know ſuch as are poſterior; for the evidence of the latter muſt neceſſarily be derived from the former; and with theſe he is perfectly unacquainted. But it is evident, that he who profeſſes a ſkill in poſterior names ought to be able to explain ſuch as are firſt, in the moſt eminent and pure manner, or, if this is not the caſe, to be well convinced that he trifles in his explanation of poſterior names. Or does it appear otherwiſe to you?

HERM. No otherwiſe, Socrates.

SOC. My conceptions then, about the firſt names, appear to me very inſolent and ridiculous. If you are willing, therefore, I will communicate them to you; and do you, in your turn, if you have any thing better to offer, impart it to me.

HERM. I will do ſo; but ſpeak confidently.

SOC. In the firſt place, then, ρ appears to me to be as it were the organ of all motion, though we have not yet explained why motion is called κινησις. But it is evident that it implies ιεσις, *going*; for η was not formerly uſed, but ε. But its origin is from κιειν, *to go*, which is a foreign name, and ſignifies ιεναι. If, therefore, any one could find out its antient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called ιεσις. But now from the foreign name κιειν, and the change of the η, together with the interpoſition of the ν, it is called κινησις. It ought, however, to be called κιεινησις, or εισις. But στασις, or *abiding*, is the negation of ιεναι, *to go*; and for the ſake of ornament is called στασις. The element, therefore, ρ, as I ſaid, appeared to the inſtitutor of names to be a beautiful inſtrument of motion, for the purpoſe of expreſſing a ſimilitude to lation; and hence he every where employed it for this purpoſe. And in the firſt place, the words ῥειν and ῥοη, that is, *to flow*, and *flowing*, imitate lation, or local motion, by this letter; and this reſemblance is found, in the next place, in the words τρομος and τραχυς, i. e. *trembling*, and *rough*; alſo, in words of this kind, κρουειν, *to ſtrike*; θραυειν, *to wound*; ερυκειν, *to draw*; θρυπτειν, *to break*; κερματιζειν, *to cut into ſmall pieces*; and ῥεμβειν, *to roll round*. For all theſe very much repreſent motion through the ρ. Not to mention that the tongue, in pronouncing this letter, is detained for the leaſt ſpace of time poſſible, and is agitated in the moſt eminent degree; and on this account it appears to me that this letter was employed in theſe words. But the inſtitutor of names uſed the ι for the purpoſe of indicating all attenuated natures, and which eminently penetrate through all things. And hence this is imitated by the words ιεναι and ιεσθαι, *to go*, and *to proceed*, through the ι: juſt as through φ, ψ, σ, and ζ, becauſe theſe letters are more inflated, the author of names indicated all ſuch things as ψυχρον, *the cold*; ζεον, *the fervid*; σεισθαι, *to be ſhaken*; and univerſally σεισμον, *concuſſion*. And when he wiſhed to imitate any thing very much inflated, he every where, for the moſt part, appears to have introduced ſuch-like letters.

But

But he ſeems to have thought that the power of compreſſing δ and τ, and the tongue's action in adhering, were uſeful for the purpoſe of imitating the words δεσμος, *a bond*, and στασις, *abiding*. And becauſe the tongue remarkably ſlides in pronouncing λ, the inſtitutor of names perceiving this, and employing this letter in an aſſimilative way, he eſtabliſhed the names λεια, *ſmooth*; ολισθαινειν, *to ſlip*; λιπαρον, *unctuous*; κολλωδες, *liquid*; and all other ſuch-like words. But in conſequence of the tongue ſliding through λ, he employed the power of the ρ, and thus imitated γλισχρον, *the ſlippery*; γλυκυ, *the ſweet*; and γλοιωδες, *the viſcous*. Perceiving likewiſe that the ſound of the ι was inward, he denominated το ενδον, *the inward*, and τα εντος, *things inward*, that he might aſſimilate works to letters. But he aſſigned α to μεγαλον, *the great*, and η to μηκος, *length*, becauſe theſe letters are great. But in the conſtruction of στρογγυλον, *round*, which requires the letter ο, he mingled ο abundantly. And in the ſame manner the legiſlator appears to have accommodated other letters and ſyllables to every thing which exiſts, fabricating a ſignature and name; and from theſe, in an aſſimilative manner, to have compoſed the other ſpecies of names. This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the rectitude of names, unleſs Cratylus here aſſerts any thing elſe.

Herm. And, indeed, Socrates, Cratylus often finds me ſufficient employment, as I ſaid in the beginning, while he declares that there is a rectitude of names, but does not clearly inform me what it is; ſo that I cannot tell whether he is willingly or unwillingly thus obſcure in his aſſertions. Now, therefore, Cratylus, ſpeak before Socrates, and declare whether you are pleaſed with what Socrates has ſaid reſpecting names, or whether you have any thing to ſay on the ſubject more excellent; and if you have, diſcloſe it, that either you may learn from Socrates, or that you may teach both of us.

Crat. But what, Hermogenes! Does it appear to you to be an eaſy matter to perceive and teach any thing ſo ſuddenly, and much more that which ſeems to be the greateſt, among things which are the greateſt?

Herm. To me, by Jupiter, it does not; but that aſſertion of Heſiod[1] appears to me very beautiful, "that it is worth while to add a little to a little." If, therefore, you are able to accompliſh any thing, though but trifling, do not be weary, but extend your beneficence both to Socrates and me.

[1] Opera et Dies, lib. i.

Soc. And, indeed, Cratylus, I do not confidently vindicate any thing which I have above aſſerted; but I have conſidered with Hermogenes what appeared to me to be the truth: ſo that on this account ſpeak boldly, if you have any thing better to offer, as I am ready to receive it. Nor ſhall I be ſurpriſed if you produce ſomething more beautiful on this ſubject; for you appear to me to have employed yourſelf in ſpeculations of this kind, and to have been inſtructed in them by others. If, therefore, you ſhall aſſert any thing more excellent, you may ſet me down as one of your diſciples about the rectitude of names.

Crat. But, indeed, Socrates, as you ſay, I have made this the ſubject of my meditations, and perhaps I ſhall bring you over to be one of my diſciples: and yet I am afraid that the very contrary of all this will take place: for, in a certain reſpect, I ought to ſay to you what Achilles ſaid to Ajax[1] upon the occaſion of his embaſſy; but he thus ſpeaks: "O Jove-born Telamonian Ajax, prince of the people, you have ſpoken all things agreeably to my opinion." In like manner you, O Socrates, appear to have propheſied in conformity to my conceptions, whether you were inſpired by Euthyphro, or whether ſome muſe, who was latently inherent in you before, has now agitated you by her inſpiring influence.

Soc. O worthy Cratylus, I myſelf have ſome time ſince wondered at my wiſdom, and could not believe in its reality; and hence I think it is proper to examine what I have ſaid: for to be deceived by oneſelf is the moſt dangerous of all things; for ſince the deceiver is not for the leaſt moment of time abſent, but is always preſent, how can it be otherwiſe than a dreadful circumſtance? But it is neceſſary, as it ſeems, to turn ourſelves frequently to the conſideration of what we have before ſaid, and to endeavour, according to the poet[2], "to look at the ſame time both before and behind." And let us at preſent take a view of what we ſaid. We ſaid then, that rectitude of name was that which pointed out the quality of a thing. Shall we ſay that this definition is ſufficient for the purpoſe?

Crat. To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much ſo.

Soc. Names, then, are employed in diſcourſe for the ſake of teaching?

Crat. Entirely ſo.

[1] Iliad ix. ver. 640. [2] Iliad i. ver. 341; and Iliad iii. ver. 109.

Soc.

Soc. Shall we not therefore ſay, that this is an art, and that it has artificers?

Crat. Perfectly ſo.

Soc. But who are they?

Crat. Thoſe legiſlators, or authors of names, which you ſpoke of at firſt.

Soc. Shall we then ſay, that this art ſubſiſts in men, like other arts, or not? But what I mean is this: Are not ſome painters more excellent than others?

Crat. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Will not ſuch as are more excellent produce more beautiful works, i. e. the repreſentations of animals; but ſuch as are inferior, the contrary? And will not this alſo be the caſe with builders, that ſome will fabricate more beautiful, and others more deformed houſes?

Crat. It will.

Soc. And with reſpect to legiſlators, will not ſome produce works more beautiful than others?

Crat. It does not appear to me that they will.

Soc. It does not therefore appear to you, that ſome laws are better, and others worſe?

Crat. It certainly does not.

Soc. One name, therefore, does not ſeem to you to be better aſſigned than another?

Crat. It does not.

Soc. All names, therefore, are properly eſtabliſhed?

Crat. Such indeed as are names.

Soc. But what then ſhall we ſay to this name of Hermogenes, which we ſpoke of before? Shall we ſay that this name was not rightly aſſigned him, unleſs ſomething ἑρμου γενεσεως, of the generation of Mercury, belongs to him? Or that it was, indeed, aſſigned him, but improperly?

Crat. It does not ſeem to me, Socrates, to have been aſſigned him in reality, but only in appearance; and I think that it is the name of ſome other perſon, who is endued with a nature correſpondent to the name.

Soc. Will not he then be deceived, who ſays that he is Hermogenes? for

for he will no longer be the perſon whom he calls Hermogenes, if he is not Hermogenes.

CRAT. What is this which you ſay?

SOC. Is the efficacy of your aſſertion founded in the opinion, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak any thing which is falſe? for this has been ſaid, my dear Cratylus, by many formerly, and is the opinion of many at preſent.

CRAT. How is it poſſible, Socrates, that, when any one ſpeaks about any thing, he ſhould ſpeak about that which is not? Or is not to ſpeak of non-being, to ſpeak of things which are falſe?

SOC. This diſcourſe, my friend, is more elegant than my condition and age require. But at the ſame time inform me, whether it appears to you impoſſible to diſcourſe about that which is falſe, but poſſible to pronounce it?

CRAT. It appeats to me impoſſible even to pronounce it.

SOC. And are you of opinion likewiſe, that it is impoſſible to denominate it? As if, for inſtance, any one, on meeting you, ſhould in an hoſpitable manner take you by the hand, and ſay, I am glad to ſee you, O Athenian gueſt, Hermogenes, ſon of Smicrion, would he not ſome way or other, by means of voice, expreſs theſe words? And would it not be this Hermogenes, and not you, whom he thus denominated, or elſe no one?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that he would enunciate theſe words in vain.

SOC. Let it be ſo. But whether would he who pronounced theſe words, pronouncc that which is true or falſe? Or would ſome of theſe words be true, and ſome falſe? for this laſt ſuppoſition will be ſufficient.

CRAT. I ſhould ſay, that he ſounded theſe words, moving himſelf in vain, juſt as if any one ſhould move braſs by ſtriking on it.

SOC. Come then, ſee, Cratylus, whether we agree in any reſpect. Do you not ſay that a name is one thing, and that of which it is the name another?

CRAT. I do.

SOC. And do you not acknowledge, that a name is a certain imitation of a thing?

CRAT. I acknowledge this the moſt of all things.

SOC.

Soc. And will you not therefore confeſs that pictures are in a different manner imitations of certain things?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. But come, for perhaps I do not underſtand ſufficiently what you ſay, through you perhaps ſpeak properly. Can we diſtribute and introduce both theſe imitations, viz. the pictures and the names, to the things of which they are imitations? Or is this impoſſible?

Crat. It is poſſible.

Soc. But conſider this in the firſt place. Can any one attribute the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and ſo in other things?

Crat. Entirely ſo.

Soc. And is it poſſible, on the contrary, to attribute the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?

Crat. This alſo is poſſible.

Soc. Are both theſe diſtributions therefore proper; or only one of them?

Crat. Only one of them.

Soc. And this I think muſt be that which attributes to each, the peculiar and the ſimilar?

Crat. It appears ſo to me.

Soc. Leſt therefore you and I, who are friends, ſhould fall into verbal contention, take notice of what I ſay; for I, my friend, call ſuch a diſtribution in both imitations (i. e. in the pictures and names) right; and in names not only right, but true: but I call the other attribution and introduction of the diſſimilar, not right; and when it takes place in names, falſe.

Crat. But conſider, Socrates, whether it may not indeed happen in paintings, that an improper diſtribution may take place, but not in names; but that theſe muſt always be neceſſarily right.

Soc. What do you ſay? What does this differ from that? May not ſome one, on meeting a man, ſay to him, This is your picture, and ſhew him perhaps by chance his proper image, or by chance the image of a woman? But I mean by *ſhowing*, placing it before his eyes.

Crat. Entirely ſo.

Soc. But what, may he not again, meeting with the ſame perſon, ſay to him, This is your name? for a name is an imitation, as well as a painting.

But

But my meaning is this: May he not therefore ſay, This is your name? And after this, may he not preſent to his ſenſe of hearing, perhaps, an imitation of what he is, and which aſſerts that he is a man; and perhaps an imitation of a female of the human ſpecies, and which aſſerts that he is a woman? Does it not appear to you, that this may be ſome time or other poſſible?

CRAT. I am willing to allow you, Socrates, that this may be ſo.

SOC. You do well, my friend, if the thing ſubſiſts in this manner; for neither is it proper at preſent to conteſt much about it. If, therefore, there is a diſtribution of this kind in names, we muſt confeſs that one of theſe wiſhes to call a thing according to truth, but the other falſely. And if this is the caſe, and it is poſſible to diſtribute names erroneouſly, and not to attribute things adapted to each, it will alſo be poſſible to err in words. And if words and names may be thus eſtabliſhed, this muſt likewiſe neceſſarily be the caſe with ſentences; for ſentences are, I think, the compoſition of theſe. Or what is your opinion, Cratylus?

CRAT. The ſame as yours; for you appear to me to ſpeak beautifully.

SOC. If, therefore, we aſſimilate firſt names to letters, the ſame things will take place as in pictures, in which it is poſſible to attribute all convenient colours and figures; and again, not to attribute all, but to leave ſome and add others, and this according to the more and the leſs. Will not this be the caſe?

CRAT. It will.

SOC. He then who attributes every thing proper, will produce beautiful letters and images; but he who adds or takes away, will indeed produce letters and images, but ſuch as are defective?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But will not he who imitates the eſſence of things through ſyllables and letters, according to the ſame reaſoning, produce a beautiful image, when he attributes every thing in a convenient manner? And this beautiful image is a name. But if any one fails in the leaſt circumſtance, or ſometimes makes an addition, does it not follow that he will, indeed, produce an image, but not a beautiful one? And ſo that ſome of the names will be beautifully fabricated, and others badly?

CRAT. Perhaps ſo.

Soc. Perhaps therefore the one will be a good, and the other a bad artificer of names?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. But was not the name which we aſſigned to this character that of legiſlator?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. Perhaps therefore, by Jupiter, as in other arts, one legiſlator will be good and another bad, if we only agree in what has been before aſſerted?

Crat. It will be ſo. But do you perceive, Socrates, that when we attribute the letters ᾱ and β̄, and each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change any thing, a name indeed is deſcribed for us, yet not properly; or rather, it is by no means deſcribed, but becomes immediately ſomething elſe, if it ſuffers any thing of this kind?

Soc. Let us thus conſider this affair, Cratylus, leſt we ſhould not contemplate it in a becoming manner.

Crat. But how?

Soc. Perhaps ſuch things as ought neceſſarily either to be compoſed or not from a certain number, are ſubject to the property which you ſpeak of; as ten things, or if you will any other number, if you take away or add any thing, immediately become ſome other number. But perhaps there is not the ſame rectitude of any certain quality and of every image, but a contrary one: for neither is it neceſſary to attribute to an image every thing belonging to that which it repreſents, in order to its becoming an image. But conſider if I ſay any thing to the purpoſe. Would then theſe be two things, I mean Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if any one of the gods ſhould not only aſſimilate your colour and figure, after the manner of painters, but ſhould produce all ſuch inward parts as you contain, and attribute the ſame ſoftneſs and heat, the ſame motion, ſoul, and wiſdom, as you poſſeſs; and, in one word, ſhould faſhion every thing elſe ſimilar to the parts which you contain; whether in conſequence of ſuch a compoſition would one of theſe be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, or would there be two Cratyluſes?

Crat. It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.

Soc. Do you ſee then, my friend, that it is neceſſary to ſeek after another rectitude of an image than that which we juſt now ſpoke of; and that it does not neceſſarily follow, that if any thing is taken away or added, it will no longer be an image? Or do you not perceive how much images want, in order to poſſeſs the ſame things as their paradigms?

Crat. I do.

Soc. Thoſe particulars therefore of which names are names, would become ridiculous through names, if they were in every reſpect aſſimilated to them: for all things would become double; and the difference between a thing and its name could no longer be aſcertained.

Crat. You ſpeak the truth.

Soc. You may therefore, generous man, confidently own that ſome names are properly compoſed, and others not ſo; nor will you be obliged to attribute every letter to a name, that it may be perfectly ſuch as that of which it is the name: but you will ſometimes ſuffer a letter which is not convenient to be introduced; and if a letter, you will likewiſe permit an unadaptd name in a diſcourſe; and if a name, you will ſuffer a ſentence unadapted to things to be introduced in a diſcourſe; and will at the ſame time acknowledge, that a thing may nevertheleſs be denominated and ſpoken of, as long as the name or ſentence contains the effigies of the thing which is the ſubject of diſcourſe; juſt as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes juſt now diſcuſſed.

Crat. I do remember.

Soc. It is well, therefore; for when this effigies is inherent, though every thing properly adapted may not be preſent, yet the repreſentation may be ſaid to ſubſiſt as it ought. But let us now, bleſſed man! ceaſe our diſputation, that we may not be expoſed to danger, like thoſe who travel late by night in Ægina; and that we may not, in a ſimilar manner, appear to have arrived at the truth of things later than is becoming. Or at leaſt ſeek after ſome other rectitude of name, and do not confeſs that a manifeſtation produced by letters and ſyllables is the name of a thing: for, if you admit both theſe aſſertions, you cannot be conſiſtent with yourſelf.

Crat. But you appear to me, Socrates, to ſpeak in a very becoming manner, and I lay down the poſition which you mention.

Soc.

Soc. Since therefore we thus far agree, let us conſider what remains. We ſay then, that in order to the beautiful poſition of a name, it ought to poſſeſs convenient letters?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. But it is proper that it ſhould contain ſuch as are ſimilar to things?

Crat. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Such then as are beautifully compoſed will be compoſed in this manner. But if any name is not rightly compoſed, it will perhaps, for the moſt part, conſiſt of convenient and ſimilar letters, ſince it is an image; but it will poſſeſs ſomething unadapted, through which it is neither beautiful, nor beautifully eſtabliſhed. Shall we ſpeak in this manner, or otherwiſe?

Crat. There is no ſuch occaſion, I think, Socrates, of conteſting; though it does not pleaſe me to ſay, that a name has a ſubſiſtence, and yet is not beautifully compoſed.

Soc. Is this alſo unpleaſing to you, that a name is the manifeſtation of a thing?

Crat. It is not.

Soc. But do you think it is not beautifully ſaid, that ſome names are compoſed from ſuch as are firſt, and that others are themſelves firſt names?

Crat. I think, it is well ſaid.

Soc. But if firſt names ought to be manifeſtations of certain things, can you mention any better method of accompliſhing this, than their being ſo formed as to become, in the moſt eminent degree, ſuch as the things which they render manifeſt? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others ſpeak of, pleaſe you better, that names are ſignatures, that they manifeſt by ſignatures, and that they are preſcient of things? And, beſides this, that rectitude of name ſubſiſts by compact; and that it is of no conſequence whether any one compoſes them as they are at preſent compoſed, or the contrary; calling, for inſtance, that which is conſidered at preſent as ſmall ο, great, and ω, ο? Which of theſe modes is moſt agreeable to you?

Crat. It is wholly and univerſally, Socrates, better to evince by ſimilitude that which any one wiſhes to evince, than by any other method.

Soc. You ſpeak well. If, therefore, a name is ſimilar to a thing, is it not neceſſary that the elements from which firſt names are compoſed ſhould be naturally ſimilar to things themſelves? But my meaning is this: Could any one produce a picture, which we have juſt now ſaid is the ſimilitude of ſome

particular thing, unleſs the colours from which the picture is compoſed were naturally ſimilar to the things which the art of painting imitates? Is it not otherwiſe impoſſible?

CRAT. Impoſſible.

SOC. In a ſimilar manner, therefore, names can never become ſimilar to any thing, unleſs the things from which names are compoſed poſſeſs, in the firſt place, ſome ſimilitude to the particulars of which names are the imitations. But the component parts of names are elements.

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. You therefore now participate of the diſcourſe which Hermogenes a little before received. Tell me, then, whether we appear to you to have determined in a becoming manner, or not, that the letter ρ is ſimilar to local motion, to motion in general, and to hardneſs?

CRAT. In a becoming manner, in my opinion.

SOC. But the letter λ to the ſmooth and ſoft, and other things which we mentioned?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. Do you know therefore that the ſame word, i. e. *hardneſs*, is called by us σκληροτης, but by the Eretrienſians σκληροτηϱ?

CRAT. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do both the ρ and the σ appear ſimilar to the ſame thing; and does the termination of the ρ manifeſt the ſame thing to them, as the termination of the σ to us: or is nothing manifeſted by letters different from ours?

CRAT. The word evinces its meaning by both letters.

SOC. Is this accompliſhed, ſo far as ρ and σ are ſimilars, or ſo far as they are not?

CRAT. So far as they are ſimilars.

SOC. Are they, therefore, in every reſpect, ſimilars?

CRAT. Perhaps they are ſo, for the purpoſe of manifeſting lation.

SOC. But why does not the inſertion of λ ſignify the contrary of hardneſs?

CRAT. Perhaps, Socrates, it is not properly inſerted, juſt as in the names which you lately diſcuſſed with Hermogenes, taking away and adding letters where it was requiſite. And you then appeared to me to act properly. And now, perhaps, ρ ought to be inſerted inſtead of λ.

SOC.

Soc. You ſpeak well. Do we, therefore, according to our preſent manner of ſpeaking, mutually underſtand nothing when any one pronounces the word σκληρον? And do you not underſtand what I now ſay?

Crat. I do, my friend, through cuſtom.

Soc. But when you ſay through cuſtom, what elſe do you think you imply by this word, except *compact?* Or do you call cuſtom any thing elſe than this, that when I pronounce this word, and underſtand by it *hardneſs*, you alſo know that this is what I underſtand. Is not this what you mean?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. If, then, you know this, when I pronounce it, ſomething becomes manifeſt to you through me.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. But what I underſtand, I enunciate from that which is diſſimilar? ſince λ is diſſimilar to the σκληροτης, which you pronounce. But if this is the caſe, what elſe can be the conſequence, but that you accuſtom yourſelf to this, and that you derive rectitude of name through compact; ſince both ſimilar and diſſimilar letters manifeſt the ſame thing to you, through cuſtom and compact? But if cuſtom is very far from being compact, it will no longer be proper to ſay that ſimilitude is a manifeſtation, but this ought to be aſſerted of cuſtom: for this, as it appears, manifeſts both from the ſimilar and the diſſimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we allow the truth of theſe things (for I conſider your ſilence as a ſignal of aſſent), it is neceſſary that compact and cuſtom ſhould contribute to the manifeſtation of what we underſtand and enunciate. For if, O beſt of men! you are willing to paſs on to the conſideration of number, from whence do you think you can be able to attribute ſimilar names to each number, if you do not permit your conſent and compact to poſſeſs ſome authority about the rectitude of names? The opinion, indeed, pleaſes me, which aſſerts that names ſhould be as much as poſſible ſimilar to things. But yet I am afraid, leſt perhaps, as Hermogenes ſaid, the attraction of this ſimilitude ſhould be very precarious, and we ſhould be obliged, in this troubleſome affair, to make uſe of compact, in order to obtain rectitude of names: ſince, perhaps, we ſhall then ſpeak as much as poſſible in the moſt beautiful manner, when our ſpeech is compoſed either entirely, or for the moſt part, from ſimilars, that is, from things convenient; but

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in the moſt baſe manner, when the contrary takes place. But ſtill further inform me, what power names poſſeſs with reſpect to us, and what beautiful effect we muſt aſſert they are able to produce.

CRAT. Names, Socrates, appear to me to teach, and that it is ſimply true, that he who knows names, knows alſo things.

SOC. Perhaps, Cratylus, your meaning is this: that when any one knows the quality of a name (and it is of the ſame quality as a thing), he then alſo knows a thing, ſince it is ſimilar to a name. But there is one art of all things which are ſimilar to one another; and in conſequence of this you appear to me to aſſert, that he who knows names, knows alſo things.

CRAT. You ſpeak moſt truly.

SOC. But come, let us ſee what this mode of teaching things is, which you now ſpeak of, and whether there is any other method, this at the ſame time being the beſt; or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the caſe?

CRAT. That there is no other method than this, but that this is the only one, and the beſt.

SOC. But whether do you think that the invention of things is the ſame as the invention of names, and the ſame as the diſcovery of thoſe things, of which names are at preſent ſignificant? Or do you think that it is neceſſary to ſeek and find according to another method, and that this ſhould be learned?

CRAT. I think that we ought, above all things, to ſeek after and diſcover theſe things according to this method.

SOC. But let us conſider, Cratylus, if any one, while ſeeking after things, follows after names, ſpeculating the quality of each, do you perceive that there is no ſmall danger of his being deceived?

CRAT. How?

SOC. Becauſe, evidently, he who firſt eſtabliſhed names faſhioned them ſuch as he thought things themſelves were. Is it not ſo?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If, therefore, he did not think rightly, but faſhioned them agreeable to his conceptions, what muſt we think of thoſe who were perſuaded to follow him? Can it be any thing elſe, than that they muſt be deceived?

CRAT.

CRAT. But this is not the caſe, Socrates: but it is neceſſary that he who compoſed names muſt have known how to compoſe them; for otherwiſe, as I have before obſerved, names would never have exiſted. But you may derive the greateſt conviction, that the inventor of names did not wander from the truth, by conſidering that, if he had conceived erroneouſly, all things would not have thus correſponded with his conceptions. Or, did you not perceive this, when you were ſaying that all names were compoſed according to the ſame conceptions, and tended to the ſame thing?

SOC. But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight: for if the founder of names was deceived in the firſt inſtance, but compelled other things to this his firſt conception, and obliged them to harmonize with it; juſt as in diagrams, in which ſometimes a very trifling and unapparent error taking place, all the remaining parts, which are very numerous, conſent notwithſtanding with each other: if this be the caſe, every one ought in the beginning of a thing to employ much diſcuſſion and diligent conſideration, in order that he may know whether the principle is properly eſtabliſhed, or not; for this being ſufficiently examined, what remains will appear conſequent to the principle. And yet I ſhould wonder if names harmonized with each other. For let us again conſider what we diſcuſſed before; in the courſe of which we aſſerted, that, in conſequence of every thing *proceeding*, *hurrying along*, and *flowing*, names ſignified to us *eſſence*. Does this appear to you to be the caſe, or not?

CRAT. Very much ſo, and that they properly ſignify this.

SOC. Let us conſider, then, repeating ſome of theſe. In the firſt place, then, this name επιστημη, *ſcience*, is dubious, and ſeems rather to ſignify that it ſtops (ἱστησιν) our ſoul at certain things, than that it is borne along with them; and hence it is more proper to call its beginning as now, than by the ejection of ε, πιστημη, and to inſert an ι inſtead of ε. In the next place, το βεβαιον, *the firm*, is ſo called, becauſe it is the imitation of a certain *baſis* and *abiding*, but not of lation. Again, ἱστορια, *hiſtory*, ſignifies that it ſtops the flowing of things; and πιστον, *the credible*, implies that which produces *perfect ſtability*. Likewiſe μνημη, or *memory*, entirely indicates *a quiet abiding in the ſoul*, and not local motion. And, if you will, ἁμαρτια, *guilt*, and συμφορα, *calamity*, when theſe names are attentively conſidered, appear to be the ſame with συνεσις, *intelligence*, and επιστημη, *ſcience*, and all

all the other names belonging to things of an excellent nature. But ſtill further, αμαθια, and ακολασια, that is, *ignorance* and *intemperance*, will appear to be ſimilar to theſe: for *ignorance* will ſignify the progreſſion of one proceeding in conjunction with divinity; but *intemperance* will appear to be a perfect purſuit of things. And thus, thoſe names which we conſider as belonging to the baſeſt of things, will appear to be moſt ſimilar to the names of the moſt beautiful things. And I think that any one may diſcover many others of this kind, if he applies himſelf to the inveſtigation; from which he may be led to think, that the inſtitutor of names did not indicate things proceeding and borne along, but ſuch as ſtably abide.

CRAT. And yet you ſee, Socrates, that he ſignified many things according to the conception of agitation and flowing.

SOC. What then ſhall we do, Cratylus? Shall we number names like ſuffrages? And does their rectitude conſiſt in the ſame thing being ſignified by the moſt names?

CRAT. This is by no means proper.

SOC. Certainly not, my friend. But, omitting theſe particulars, let us conſider whether you will agree with us in this, or not. Have we not already acknowledged, that thoſe who inſtituted names in the ſeveral cities, both of Greeks and Barbarians, were legiſlators, and that the art, which is capable of accompliſhing this, is legiſlative?

CRAT. Entirely ſo.

SOC. Tell me now, then, whether thoſe who founded the firſt names knew the things to which they aſſigned names, or were ignorant of them?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that they were acquainted with them.

SOC. For, friend Cratylus, they could not accompliſh this, while ignorant of things.

CRAT. It does not appear to me that they could.

SOC. Let us then return again from whence we have digreſſed: for you lately ſaid, if you recollect, that he who eſtabliſhed names muſt have previouſly known the things to which he aſſigned names. Are you, therefore, of this opinion at preſent, or not?

CRAT. I am.

SOC. Will you ſay, that he who eſtabliſhed firſt names, eſtabliſhed them in conſequence of poſſeſſing knowledge?

CRAT.

CRAT. Yes.

SOC. From what names, then, did he either learn or find out things, ſince firſt names were not yet eſtabliſhed? But have we not ſaid, that it is impoſſible to learn and find out things any other way, than by learning or finding out ourſelves the quality of names?

CRAT. You appear to me, Socrates, to ſay ſomething to the purpoſe.

SOC. After what manner then, ſhall we ſay that they poſſeſſing knowledge eſtabliſhed names? Shall we ſay, that founders of names exiſted prior to the eſtabliſhment of names, and that they then poſſeſſed a knowledge of names, ſince it is impoſſible to learn things otherwiſe than by names?

CRAT. I think, Socrates, that the opinion about theſe particulars is moſt true, which aſſerts that a power greater than the human aſſigned the firſt names to things; in conſequence of which they muſt of neceſſity be rightly eſtabliſhed.

SOC. Do you think that he who eſtabliſhed names, whether he was a certain dæmon, or a god, would eſtabliſh things contrary to himſelf? Or do we appear to you, to have juſt now ſaid nothing to the purpoſe?

CRAT. But the other ſort of theſe were not names.

SOC. Which ſort do you mean, beſt of men! thoſe which lead to permanency, or thoſe which lead to lation? For, as we juſt now ſaid, this cannot be determined by their multitude.

CRAT. Your obſervation is indeed juſt, Socrates.

SOC. Since names then conteſt with each other, and, as well theſe as thoſe, aſſert that they are ſimilar to the truth, how ſhall we be able to determine in this affair? Or where ſhall we turn ourſelves? For we cannot have recourſe to other names different from theſe; for there are no others. But it is evident that certain other things, beſides names, muſt be ſought after, which may ſhow us, without names, which of theſe are true; pointing out for this purpoſe the truth of things.

CRAT. It appears ſo to me.

SOC. It is poſſible, therefore, Cratylus, as it ſeems, to learn things without names, if what we have juſt now aſſerted is true.

CRAT. It appears ſo.

SOC. Through what elſe, then, do you expect to learn things? Can it be

through any thing elſe than that which is proper and moſt juſt, and through their communion with each other, if they are in any reſpect mutually allied, and eſpecially through themſelves? For that which is different, and foreign from theſe, will ſignify ſomething elſe, and not theſe.

CRAT. You appear to me to ſpeak the truth.

SOC. But tell me, by Jupiter, have we not often confeſſed that names, which are properly eſtabliſhed, are ſimilar to the things of which they are the names, and are indeed the images of things?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If then it is poſſible, in the moſt eminent degree, to learn things through names, and likewiſe through themſelves, which will be the moſt excellent and the cleareſt diſcipline? Will it be poſſible to obtain this knowledge from an image, if it ſhould be beautifully aſſimilated, and to perceive the truth, of which this is the image? Or rather, ſhall we be able from truth to obtain truth itſelf, and its image, if the image is but properly fabricated?

CRAT. It appears to me, that this muſt neceſſarily be obtained from truth.

SOC. After what manner, therefore, it is neceſſary to learn, or to find out things, is perhaps a degree of knowledge beyond what you and I are able to obtain. It will be ſufficient, therefore, to acknowledge this, that things are not to be learned from names, but are much rather to be learned and diſcovered from themſelves.

CRAT. It appears ſo, Socrates.

SOC. But ſtill further, let us conſider, leſt this multitude of names tending to the ſame thing ſhould deceive us, if, in reality, thoſe by whom they were eſtabliſhed conſidered all things as proceeding and flowing; for they appear to me to have held this opinion. But ſhould this be the caſe, their opinion is however erroneous: for theſe men having fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, are themſelves confounded, and would willingly, by dragging us along, hurl us into the ſame whirlpool. For conſider, O wonderful Cratylus! that which I often dream about, whether or not we ſhould ſay that there is any ſuch thing as the beautiful itſelf, and the good, and ſo of every thing elſe.

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that there is.

SOC.

Soc. Let us therefore conſider this affair, not as if a certain countenance, or any thing of this kind, is beautiful; for all theſe appear to flow: but we aſk, whether the beautiful itſelf does not always remain ſuch as it is?

Crat. It is neceſſary that it ſhould.

Soc. Can it therefore be properly denominated, if it is always ſecretly flying away? And can it, in the firſt place, be ſaid that it is, and, in the next place, that it is of ſuch a particular nature? Or is it not neceſſary, in this caſe, that, while we are ſpeaking about it, it ſhould immediately become ſomething elſe, ſecretly withdraw itſelf, nor be any longer ſuch as it was?

Crat. It is neceſſary.

Soc. How, then, can that be any thing, which never ſubſiſts in a ſimilar manner? For if, at any time, it ſhould ſubſiſt in a ſimilar manner, in that time in which it is thus ſimilarly effected, it is evident that it would ſuffer no mutation: but, if it always ſubſiſts in a ſimilar manner, and is the ſame, how can it ſuffer mutation, or be moved, ſince it never departs from its idea?

Crat. By no means.

Soc. But neither can it be known by any one; for, as ſoon as that which is endued with knowledge accedes to it, it becomes ſomething different and various, ſo that it cannot be known what quality it poſſeſſes, or how it ſubſiſts: for no knowledge can know that which it knows, when the object of its knowledge has no manner of ſubſiſtence.

Crat. It is as you ſay.

Soc. But neither, Cratylus, can there be any ſuch thing as knowledge, if all things glide away, and nothing abides. For if knowledge itſelf does not fall from a ſubſiſtence, as knowledge, knowledge will perpetually abide, and will be always knowledge: but if the form itſelf of knowledge glides away, it will at the ſame time glide into ſomething different from the form of knowledge, and will no longer be knowledge; but if it always glides away, it will always be ſomething different from knowledge: and from hence it follows that neither knowledge, nor the object of knowledge, will have any ſubſiſtence. But if that which knows always is, then that which is known will always have a ſubſiſtence, together with the beautiful, the good, and every thing elſe which we are now ſpeaking of; and none of theſe, as it appears to me, will be ſimilar either to that which flows, or is borne along.

But whether things of this kind ſubſiſt in this manner, or whether as the followers of Heraclitus and many others aſſert, it is by no means eaſy to perceive: nor is it very much the province of a man endued with intellect, to give himſelf up, and his own ſoul, to the ſtudy of names, believing in their reality, and confiding in their author, as one endued with knowledge: and thus, in conſequence of poſſeſſing no ſound knowledge, either concerning the founder of names, or things themſelves, conſidering all things as flowing like earthen veſſels, and viewing them ſimilar to men diſeaſed with a rheum, as if every thing ſubſiſted according to flowing and diſtillation. Perhaps, therefore, Cratylus, this may be the caſe, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to conſider this affair in a very ſtrenuous and diligent manner, ſince it is by no means eaſy to apprehend the truth: for as yet you are but a young man, and in the vigour of your age; and if you ſhould diſcover any thing in the courſe of your inquiries, you ought to communicate it to me.

CRAT. I ſhall act in this manner. And I very well know, Socrates, that I am not at preſent without conſideration; but, in conſequence of ſpeculating this affair, the truth ſeems to me to be much more on your ſide, than on that of Heraclitus.

SOC. Afterwards therefore, my friend, when you come hither again, inſtruct me: but now, agreeably to your determination, proceed to the field; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.

CRAT. Be it ſo, Socrates: and do you alſo endeavour to think upon theſe things.

THE END OF THE CRATYLUS.

THE

THE EPISTLES

OF

PLATO.

THE

EPISTLES OF PLATO.

EPISTLE I.*

DION to DIONYSIUS—Proſperity.

WHILE I reſided ſo long with you, and managed the affairs of your kingdom with ſuch fidelity, that you might be benefited beyond others, I ſuſtained grievous calumnies. For I know you are convinced, that nothing inhuman was ever perpetrated with my conſent. And of the truth of this, all thoſe are my witneſſes, who governed in conjunction with you; many of whom, through ſtrenuous endeavours, I liberated from no trifling calamities. And when you poſſeſſed the ſole authority, I often preſerved your city; but at length I was diſmiſſed by you, and ordered to ſet ſail, in a more ignominious manner than it becomes you to expel a mendicant; and this, after I had ſo long reſided with you. As to what remains, therefore, I ſhall conſult reſpecting myſelf in a more inhuman manner. But you being ſo great a tyrant, will govern alone. As to the ſplendid gold, which you gave for my diſmiſſion, I return it you by Bacchius, the bearer of this Epiſtle: for it was neither ſufficient for a viaticum, nor uſeful for the reſt of life. It would likewiſe procure great diſgrace to you as the giver, and not much leſs to me as the receiver. But it evidently makes no difference to you, either to give or receive as much gold as this; and on its being returned to you, you may make the ſame preſent to ſome other of your aſſociates, as you made to me. For you have paid ſufficient attention to me. And now that ſentence of Euri-

* This and the fifth Epiſtle appear to have been written by Dion, the celebrated but unfortunate diſciple of Plato, though the Aldine edition aſcribes them to Plato.

pides

pides ſeaſonably occurs to my remembrance, " That when affairs happen to be different from what they are at preſent, you will pray for ſuch a man to be preſent with you." But I wiſh to remind you, that the greater part of other tragic poets, when they introduce a tyrant dying through the machinations of ſome one, make him vociferate as follows: " Miſerable that I am, I periſh deſtitute of friends." But no one repreſents a tyrant periſhing through the want of gold. The following poetical ſentences, likewiſe, will not be diſapproved by the intelligent: " Not ſplendid gold, in this miſerable life of mortals moſt rare, not diamonds, nor tables of ſilver, which are highly valued by men, are ſo glittering to the ſight; nor yet fertile, weighty acres of wide extended land, as the unanimous conceptions of good men." Farewell, and know thus much of us who are far diſtant, that you may conduct yourſelf better towards others.

EPISTLE

EPISTLE II.

PLATO to DIONYSIUS—Proſperity.

I HAVE heard from Archidemus, that you think reſpecting yourſelf, that not only I, but my familiars, Dion alone excepted, ought neither to do you any injury, nor ſpeak ill of you. But this aſſertion, that Dion is to be excepted ſignifies that I do not rule over my familiars. For if I had dominion, as well over others, as you and Dion, I think great good would be the reſult, both to all you and the reſt of the Greeks. But now I am great, in rendering myſelf obedient to the dictates of my reaſon. I ſpeak in this manner, becauſe Cratiſtolus and Polyxenus have not given you any genuine information: for they report, that one of theſe ſhould ſay, he had heard among the Olympians that many of my aſſociates reviled you. Perhaps he heard more accutely than I did. But it is proper, as it appears to me, that, whenever any thing of this kind reſpecting my aſſociates is mentioned to you, to write to me reſpecting the affair: for I ſhall neither be afraid nor aſhamed to ſpeak the truth. But to you and me things are thus mutually circumſtanced. Nor are we unknown to any one of the Greeks, as I may ſay, nor is our converſation paſſed over in ſilence; nor ſhould it be concealed from you, that neither will it be paſſed over in ſilence by poſterity: for thoſe by whom it is received are ſuch, that they are neither few nor obſcure. But why do I thus ſpeak? I will now tell you, aſſuming an elevated exordium.

Wiſdom and mighty power naturally tend to the ſame: and theſe two always purſue, ſeek, and unite with each other. In the next place, men are delighted with theſe, whether they make them the ſubject of their private converſations, or hear them celebrated in poetical compoſitions. Thus thoſe who diſcourſe about Hiero, and Pauſanias the Lacedæmonian, rejoice to mention the familiarity of Simonides with theſe men, and to relate what he

did and ſaid to them. In like manner they are accuſtomed to celebrate Periander the Corinthian in conjunction with Thales the Mileſian; Pericles and Anaxagoras, Crœſus and Solon, as powerful with wiſe men, and Cyrus as a powerful man. Poets too, in imitation of this, bring together Creon and Tireſias; Polydus and Minos; Agamemnon and Neſtor; Ulyſſes and Palamedes: and, as it appears to me, for the ſame reaſon, the firſt men joined Prometheus with Jupiter. But of theſe, they repreſent ſome as diſcordant, and others as friendly with each other; and again, ſome as at one time friendly, and at another diſcordant: and they celebrate as well their mutual agreements as their diſſenſions. But I mention all theſe particulars, becauſe I am willing to evince that men will not be ſilent reſpecting us when we are dead; ſo that we ought not to neglect the opinion of mankind. For it is neceſſary, as it ſeems, that we ſhould pay attention to futurity; ſince it comes to paſs, through a certain nature, that the moſt illiberal of mankind are not at all concerned about the opinion of poſterity: but the moſt worthy men do every thing that they may be juſtly celebrated hereafter. And this I conſider as an argument that the dead have a certain perception of what is tranſacted here. For the moſt excellent ſouls propheſy that this will be the caſe; but this is not aſſerted by the moſt depraved. And the prophecies of divine men are more powerful than of thoſe that are not divine. I alſo think, that if it were permitted thoſe deceaſed perſons, of whom I have ſpoken above, to correct their converſations, they would very earneſtly endeavour that better things might be ſaid of them than at preſent. This, therefore, it is yet permitted us to ſay, through the favour of divinity, that if we have done any thing unbecoming during our former acquaintance with you, either in word or deed, we may correct it; that a true opinion may be entertained of us by poſterity reſpecting philoſophy; viz. a better opinion if we are worthy, and the contrary if we are depraved. And indeed, if we pay attention to this, we cannot do any thing more pious, nor is any thing more impious than the neglect of it. But how this ought to take place, and what the juſtice is which it contains, I will tell you.

When I came into Sicily, I had the reputation of excelling very much in philoſophy. I was alſo willing on my arrival among the Syracuſians to have you a witneſs of my renown, that philoſophy might alſo be honoured for me by

by the multitude. But my wiſhes were not crowned with ſucceſs. I do not however aſſign as the cauſe of this, that which is aſſigned by many, but I attribute it to your not entirely believing in me. But you were willing to diſmiſs me and call others, and to inquire into the nature of my buſineſs, by this as it ſeems diſtruſting me. And thoſe that ſpoke loudly of theſe things were many, and who likewiſe affirmed that you indeed deſpiſed me, and ſeriouſly applied yourſelf to other things. Such indeed were the reports at that time.

Now hear however what after theſe things it is juſt to do, that I may reply to your queſtion, how you and I ought mutually to conduct ourſelves. If then you entirely deſpiſe philoſophy, you muſt bid farewell to it. But if you have either heard from another, or have yourſelf diſcovered things more excellent than thoſe you have received from me, then honour theſe. But if our doctrines pleaſe you, then you ought highly to honour me. Now, therefore, as from the beginning, do you lead and I will follow. For being honoured by, I will honour you; but not being honoured, I will remain ſilent. Further ſtill, if you honour me, and in doing this take the lead, you will appear to honour philoſophy: and this will procure you that which you ardently deſire, the reputation of being conſidered by the multitude as a philoſopher. But if I ſhould honour you, without being honoured by you, I ſhould ſeem to admire and purſue wealth: and we know that this is conſidered as diſgraceful by all men. In ſhort, if you honour me, an ornament to both of us will enſue; but if I honour you, diſgrace to both of us will be the conſequence. And thus much for theſe particulars.

But the little ſphere [1] is not properly made: and this Archidemus will ſhow you on his arrival. It is likewiſe requiſite to render apparent to him the particulars reſpecting that which is far more honourable and divine than this, and about which you interrogate me through him. For you ſay, according to his report, that I have not ſufficiently demonſtrated to you the particulars reſpecting the firſt nature. I muſt ſpeak to you therefore in enigmas, that in caſe the letter ſhould be intercepted either by land or ſea, he who reads it may not underſtand this part of its contents: *All things are ſituated about the*

[1] What this little ſphere was is uncertain. Perhaps it was a kind of orrery.

king[1] *of all things; and all things ſubſiſt for his ſake, and he is the cauſe of all beautiful things. But ſecond things are ſituated about that which is ſecond; and*

[1] The following obſervations, extracted from the ſecond book of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, form an excellent comment on the preſent paſſage, which is no leſs deeply myſtical than truly admirable:

Plato here evidently neither connumerates the ineffable principle of things with the other principles poſterior to him, nor does he coarrange it, as the leader of a triad, with the ſecond and third powers. For in a triadic diviſion, the firſt monad is the leader of the firſt orders, and which are coordinate with itſelf: but the ſecond is the leader of ſecond orders; and the third of thoſe that are third. And if ſome one ſhould apprehend that the firſt principle is the leader of all things, ſo as to comprehend at once both ſecond and third allotments, yet the cauſe which ſubſiſts according to comprehenſion, is different from that which ſimilarly pervades to all things. And all things indeed are ſubject to the king of all things, according to one reaſon and one order: but to the firſt of the triad, things firſt are ſubjected according to the ſame order; and it is neceſſary that things ſecond and third ſhould be ſubſervient according to their communion with the remaining kings. Is it not evident, therefore, that what is here ſaid in a remarkable manner celebrates the exempt nature of the firſt cauſe, and his uncoordination with the other kingdoms of the gods? For Plato ſays, that the king of all ſimilarly reigns over all things, that all things ſubſiſt about him, and that both eſſence and energy are preſent with all things for his ſake.

Obſerve too, that Plato calls the firſt god king, but he does not think proper to give this appellation to the reſt. He likewiſe calls him the king not only of things firſt, as the ſecond of things ſecond, and the third of things third, but as the cauſe at once of all being and of all beauty. Hence the higheſt god precedes the other cauſes in an exempt and uniform manner, and is neither celebrated by Plato as coordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad.

But when Plato a little after ſays, "This your inquiry concerning the cauſe of all beautiful things is as of a nature endued with *a certain quality*," he clearly indicates that neither language nor knowledge is adapted to that which is firſt: for, as being unknown, it cannot be apprehended by intelligence, and as being uncircumſcribed, it cannot be explained by words. But whatever you ſay of it, you will ſay, as of a *certain* thing; and you will ſpeak indeed *about* it, but you will not ſpeak *it*. For ſpeaking of the things of which it is the cauſe, we are unable to ſay, or to apprehend, through intelligence, what it is.

Here, therefore, the addition of quality and the buſy energy of the ſoul remove it from the goodneſs which is exempt from all things, by the redundancy of its conceptions about it. This likewiſe draws the ſoul down to kindred, connate, and multiform intelligibles, and prevents her from receiving that which is characterized by unity, and is occult in the participation of *the good*. And it is not only proper that the human ſoul ſhould be purified from things coordinate with itſelf in the union and communion with that which is firſt, and that for this purpoſe it ſhould leave all the multitude of itſelf behind, and, exciting its own hyparxis, approach with cloſed eyes, as it is ſaid, to the king of all things, and participate of his light as much as this is lawful for it to accompliſh; but intellect alſo, which is prior to us, and all divine natures, by their higheſt unions,

and ſuch as are third in gradation about that which is third. The human ſoul therefore extends itſelf in order to learn the quality of theſe things, and looks to ſuch

unions, ſupereſſential torches *, and firſt hyparxes, are united to that which is firſt, and always participate of its exuberant fulneſs; and this not ſo far as they are that which they are, but ſo far as they are exempt from things allied to themſelves, and converge to the one principle of all. For the cauſe of all diſſeminated in all things impreſſions of his own all-perfect tranſcendency, and through theſe eſtabliſhes all things about himſelf, and being exempt from wholes, is ineffably preſent to all things. Every thing, therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own nature, finds there the ſymbol of the father of all. All things too naturally venerate him, and are united to him, through an appropriate myſtic impreſſion, diveſting themſelves of their own nature, and haſtening to become his impreſſion alone, and to participate him alone, through the deſire of his unknown nature, and of the fountain of good. Hence, when they have run upwards as far as to this cauſe, they become tranquil, and are liberated from the parturitions and the deſire which all things naturally poſſeſs of goodneſs unknown, ineffable, imparticipable, and tranſcendently full. But that what is here ſaid is concerning the firſt god, and that Plato, in theſe conceptions, leaves him uncoordinated with and exempt from the other cauſes, has been, I think, ſufficiently evinced.

Let us then in the next place conſider each of the dogmas, and adapt them to our conceptions concerning cauſe, that from theſe we may comprehend, by a reaſoning proceſs, the ſcope of the whole of Plato's theology. Let then one truth concerning the firſt principle be eſpecially that which celebrates his ineffable, ſimple, and all-tranſcending nature; which eſtabliſhes all things about him, but does not aſſert that he generates or produces any thing, or that he preſubſiſts as the end of things poſterior to himſelf. For ſuch a form of words neither adds any thing to the unknown, who is exempt from all things, nor multiplies him who is eſtabliſhed above all union, nor refers the habitude and communion of things ſecondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in ſhort does it announce that it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the ſecond and third natures which ſubſiſt after him.

Such then being this indication of the firſt god, and ſuch the manner in which it venerates the ineffable, the ſecond to this is that which converts all the deſires of things to him, and celebrates him as the object of deſire to and common end of all things, according to one cauſe which precedes all other cauſes. For the laſt of things ſubſiſts only for the ſake of ſomething elſe, but the firſt is that only for the ſake of which all other things ſubſiſt: and all the natures that ſubſiſt between participate of theſe two idioms. Hence they genuinely adhere to the natures which ſurpaſs them, as objects of deſire, but impart the perfection of deſires to ſubordinate beings.

The third ſpeculation of the principle of things is far inferior to the preceding, conſidering him as giving ſubſiſtence to all beautiful things. For to celebrate him as the ſupplier of good, and as end preceding the two orders of things, is not very remote from the narration which ſays, that all cauſes are poſterior to him, and derive their ſubſiſtence from him, as well thoſe which are

* Ὑπερουσιους πυρσους. Proclus thus denominates the ſupereſſential unities conformably to what is ſaid of them by Plato in the 6th book of the Republic; for he there conſiders them as analogous to light.

paternal,

ſuch particulars as are allied to itſelf, none of which are ſufficient for the purpoſe. But about the king himſelf, and the natures of which I have ſpoken, there is

paternal, and the ſources of good, as thoſe that are the ſuppliers of prolific powers. But to aſcribe to him a producing and generative cauſe, is ſtill more remote from the all-perfect union of the firſt. For as it cannot be known or diſcuſſed by language, by ſecondary natures, it muſt not be ſaid that it is the cauſe, or that it is generative of beings, but we ſhould celebrate in ſilence this ineffable nature, and this perfectly cauſeleſs cauſe which is prior to all cauſes. If, however, as we endeavour to aſcribe to him *the good* and *the one*, we in like manner attribute to him *cauſe*, and that which is final or paternal, we muſt pardon the parturition of the ſoul about this ineffable principle, aſpiring to perceive him with the eye of intellect, and to ſpeak about him; but, at the ſame time, the exempt tranſcendency of *the one* which is immenſe muſt be conſidered as ſurpaſſing an indication of this kind.

From theſe things, therefore, we may receive the ſacred conceptions of Plato, and an order adapted to things themſelves. And we may ſay that the firſt part of this ſentence ſufficiently indicates the ſimplicity, tranſcendency, and in ſhort the uncoordination with all things of the king of all. For the aſſertion that all things ſubſiſt about him, unfolds the hyparxis of things ſecond, but leaves that which is beyond all things without any connexion with things poſterior to it. But the ſecond part celebrates the king of all things as prearranged in the order of *end*. For that which is the higheſt of all cauſes, is immediately conjoined with that which is prior to cauſe; but of this kind is the final cauſe, and that for the ſake of which all things ſubſiſt. This, therefore, is poſterior to the other, and is woven together with the order of things, and the progreſſion of the Platonic doctrine.

Again, the third part aſſerts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a ſpecies of cauſe inferior to the final. Whence alſo Plotinus, I think, does not heſitate to call the firſt god the fountain of the beautiful. It is neceſſary therefore to attribute that which is beſt to the beſt of all things, that he may be the cauſe of all, and in reality prior to cauſe. But this is *the good*. This too, which is an admirable circumſtance, may be ſeen in the words of Plato, that the firſt of theſe three divine dogmas, neither preſumes to ſay any thing about *the good*, and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any ſpecies of cauſe to it. But the ſecond dogma leaves indeed *the good* ineffable, as it is fit it ſhould, but, from the habitude of things poſterior to it, enables us to collect the final cauſe: for it does not refuſe to call it that for the ſake of which all things ſubſiſt. But when it aſſerts that all things are for the ſake of *the good*, it excites in us the conception of the communion and coordination of that which is the object of deſire with the deſiring natures. And the third dogma evinces that *the good* is the cauſe of all beautiful things. But this is to ſay ſomething concerning it, and to add to the ſimplicity of the firſt cauſe, and not to abide in the conception of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things ſecond. And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the firſt. For it is not poſſible to ſay any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from all things, and at another from the beſt of things: for it is the cauſe of hyparxis to all things, is firſt participated by the beſt of things, and unfolds its own ſeparate union through the idiom of theſe.

We

is nothing of this kind: but the ſoul ſpeaks of that which is poſterior to this. Indeed, O ſon of Dionyſius and Doris, this your inquiry concerning the cauſe of all beautiful[1] *things, is as of a nature endued with a certain quality. Or rather it is a parturition reſpecting this ingenerated in the ſoul; from which he who is not liberated will never in reality acquire truth.*

You have ſaid, that you thought of mentioning this to me, in the garden, when we were ſeated under the laurel trees, and that it was your invention. But I have ſaid, that if this appears to you to ſubſiſt in this manner, you have freed me from a long diſcuſſion. Nor ſhall we ever find any other inventor; but about this I ſhall be very buſily employed. Perhaps however you have heard this from ſome one, or perhaps you have been impelled to advance thus far by a *divine allotment*. You have not however apprehended what a ſtability the demonſtrations of this thing poſſeſs; but you ſpring forward at different times in a different manner, about that which is the object of phantaſy, while in the mean time the thing of which we are now ſpeaking is not any thing of this kind. Nor is this the caſe with you alone: but be well aſſured that no one, when he firſt hears me, is in the beginning otherwiſe affected. And one indeed, finding more difficulty, and another leſs, they are ſcarcely at length liberated from parturition. But nearly all of them labour not a little. As this therefore has been, and is the caſe, in my opinion, we have nearly found that about which you inquire in your letters, I mean, how we ought to be affected towards each other. For after you have diſcuſſed theſe particulars, with the aſſiſtance of other perſons, and

We aſcribe to it therefore *the one* and *the good*, from the donation from it which pervades to all things. For of thoſe things of which all participate, we ſay there is no other cauſe than that which is eſtabliſhed prior to all theſe. But *the about which* (το περι ο), *the through which* (το δι ου), *the from which* (το αφ' ου), particularly ſubſiſt in the intelligible gods: and from theſe they are aſcribed to the firſt god. For whence can we ſuppoſe the unical gods derive their idioms, except from that which is prior to them? To this ſummit of intelligibles therefore the term *about* is adapted, becauſe all the divine orders occultly proceed about this ſummit which is arranged prior to them. But the term *through which* pertains to the middle order of intelligibles: for all things ſubſiſt for the ſake of eternity and an hyparxis perfectly entire. And the term *from which* is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles: for this firſt produces all things, and adorns them uniformly.

[1] In all the editions of Plato that I have ſeen, κακων is here erroneouſly printed inſtead of καλων. I ſay erroneouſly, becauſe not only the authority of Proclus but the ſenſe of the paſſage proves it to be ſo.

have

have compared them with the opinions of others, and conſidered them by themſelves, then, if your inquiry has been properly conducted, you will accord both with them and us. How then is it poſſible that theſe things, and all of which we have ſpoken, ſhould not take place?

You have, therefore, acted rightly in now ſending Archidemus to us. And after he has returned to you and has related my opinion, other doubts will perhaps riſe in your mind. If, therefore, you conſult properly, you will ſend Archidemus to me again. But he, as if laden with merchandiſe, will again return to you. And if you do this, twice or thrice, and ſufficiently examine the things which I ſhall ſend, I ſhould wonder if you are not much better diſpoſed with reſpect to the particulars you are in doubt of than at preſent. You ſhould, therefore, boldly act in this manner: for neither you, nor Archidemus, can engage in any merchandiſe more becoming or more acceptable to divinity than this. Be careful, however, that theſe things do not fall among men void of diſcipline: *for, as it appears to me, there are ſcarcely any particulars which will appear more ridiculous to the multitude than theſe; nor again, any which will appear more wonderful and enthuſiaſtic to thoſe that are well born.* But when often repeated and continually heard, and this for many years, they are ſcarcely at length, with great labour, purified like gold.

But hear the wonderful circumſtance which takes place in this affair: for there are many men who have heard theſe things, who are able to learn and able to remember, who are ſagacious in examining and judging, who are now advanced in years, and who have heard theſe things for not leſs than thirty years; theſe men now ſay, that things which formerly appeared to them to be moſt incredible, now appear to them to be moſt credible and perſpicuous. And things which were formerly conſidered by them as moſt credible, now appear to them to be the very contrary. Looking therefore to this, be careful leſt you repent of what you have now unworthily uttered. But the greateſt means of defence in this caſe, conſiſts not in writing, but learning: for things which are written cannot be kept from the public view. On this account, I have never at any time written any thing about theſe particulars. Nor is there any book profeſſedly compoſed by Plato, nor will there be. But what has now been ſaid, is to be

aſcribed

aſcribed [1] to Socrates, who was a worthy character, even while a young man. Farewell, and be perſuaded by me; and when you have often read this Epiſtle, commit it to the flames. And thus much for theſe particulars.

With reſpect to Polyxenus, you wonder that I do not ſend him to you. But I ſay the ſame at preſent as I have formerly ſaid concerning Lycophron, and the others that are with you, viz. that, both naturally and from the method of your diſcourſe, you very much excel them in the art of ſpeaking. Nor is any one of them willingly confuted as ſome ſuppoſe, but unwillingly. And you appear indeed to have uſed and beſtowed gifts upon them ſufficiently well. Many other things may be ſaid about theſe particulars, as well as about others of the ſame kind. But if you uſe Philiſtion, do not ſpare him. And if you can, employ Speuſippus, and diſmiſs him. Speuſippus indeed ſtands in need of your aſſiſtance. But Philiſtion promiſed me that he would very willingly come to Athens, if you would diſmiſs him. You will likewiſe do well to diſmiſs him who belongs to the ſtone quarries. But the requeſt is trifling, both reſpecting his domeſtics, and Egeſippus the ſon of Ariſton: for in one of your letters to me you ſay, that if any one either injures him, or his domeſtics, and you perceive it, you will not ſuffer a continuance of the injury. Beſides, it is worth while to ſpeak the truth reſpecting Lyſiclides: for he alone, of thoſe who came from Sicily to Athens, has made no alteration reſpecting our intimacy with each other, but continually ſpeaks of our paſt conduct as laudable and good.

[1] Plato means nothing more by this, than that what has been above ſaid is conformable to the doctrine of Socrates.

EPISTLE III.

PLATO to DIONYSIUS—Health.

YOU inquire, by your letter, whether it is better in ſalutations to uſe the word *health*, or rather to write, as I am accuſtomed to do in letters to my friends, *proſperity*. For you, as thoſe who were then preſent relate, flattering the god who is worſhipped at Delphi, call him by this very appellation. And as they ſay, you write *hail*, and yet preſerve the voluptuous life of a tyrant. But I addreſs neither man nor divinity with this ſalutation. Not divinity, becauſe in ſo doing I ſhould place him in an order contrary to his nature; as he is far removed from pleaſure and pain. Nor man, becauſe pleaſure often produces detriment and pain, and generates in the ſoul, indocility, oblivion, ſtupidity, and inſolence. And thus much reſpecting ſalutation, which, after you have read, you may take as you pleaſe.

But not a few report, that you ſaid to certain ambaſſadors who were with you, that you intended to reeſtabliſh the Grecian cities in Sicily, to rectify the government of the Syracuſians, and give them a kingdom inſtead of a tyranny. You aſſert, however, that though you very much deſired, yet being impeded by me, you had not then an opportunity to put theſe intentions in execution; that I now teach Dion to do the very ſame things himſelf; and that, according to your conceptions of things, we ſhall ſubvert your government. You indeed know whether you derive any advantage from ſuch aſſertions; but you certainly injure me by ſpeaking contrary to the truth: for I am become ſufficiently odious both to the mercenary ſoldiers and the Syracuſian vulgar, through Philiſtides and many others, on account of my reſidence in the acropolis. For then thoſe that dwelt out of the tower blamed me as the author of every crime, and aſſerted that you did every

every thing through my perſuaſions. However, you moſt clearly know, that of my own accord I meddled very little with politics, and that this was only at firſt, when I thought I might in ſome degree be beneficial, while with a ſufficient degree of earneſtneſs I was compoſing my books of Laws; to which you, or ſome other perſon, have made additions contrary to my intention. For I hear that, afterwards, ſome of you acted in a fraudulent manner with reſpect to theſe writings: and theſe things indeed are manifeſt to thoſe that are able to diſtinguiſh the nature of my diſpoſition. But, as I juſt now ſaid, I do not ſtand in need of calumny from the Syracuſians, and certain others whom you may have perſuaded by theſe aſſertions; but I am much more in want of an apology againſt the former calumny, than that which has now ariſen after it, as being greater and more vehement.

Againſt theſe two calumnies, therefore, it is neceſſary I ſhould make a two-fold apology. In the firſt place aſſerting, that I very properly avoided engaging with you in political affairs: and in the ſecond place, that my advice was not that which you ſay it was, and that I did not impede you, when you deſigned to reeſtabliſh the Grecian cities. Hear then, in the firſt place, the particulars of my firſt apology. I came to Syracuſe, in conſequence of being called by you and Dion, who was already approved of by me, and who had formerly been my gueſt. He likewiſe had arrived at that period of life which we call a middle age, and in which thoſe that are endued with the ſmalleſt degree of intellect, will apply themſelves to ſuch affairs as were then the ſubject of your deliberations. But you were very young, and very ignorant of thoſe particulars in which you ought to have been ſkilled; and you were likewiſe perfectly unknown to me. After this, ſome man, or god, or a certain fortune in conjunction with you, expelled Dion, and you were left alone. Do you think therefore, that at that time I had any communion with you in political affairs; perceiving as I did, that a prudent counſellor was baniſhed by you, and that an imprudent perſon was left, with a multitude of baſe men; ſo that he did not govern in reality, but while he thought he had dominion, he was governed by men of this deſcription? In theſe circumſtances, what ought to have done? Does it not neceſſarily follow, that I ought to have done what I did do? I mean, to

bid farewell to politics, in order to avoid the calumnies of the malevolent, and to endeavour that you and Dion, who were far ſeparated from, and diſcordant with each other, might become in the higheſt degree mutual friends. You are my witneſs, that I never at any time remitted my endeavours to accompliſh this. At the ſame time, we could ſcarcely agree that I ſhould return home, and that when the war was finiſhed, in which you were then engaged, I and Dion ſhould come to Syracuſe; and that you would call us. Theſe were the tranſactions which happened when I firſt came among the Syracuſians, and on my returning home with ſafety.

After this, peace being made, you called me, not, however, according to the agreement, but you wrote to me that I ſhould come alone, and that you would ſend for Dion afterwards. On this account I did not come, which diſpleaſed Dion, who thought it would be better to comply with your requeſt. On the following year a three-banked galley and letters came from you, and in theſe epiſtles you ſay, that if I will come, the affairs of Dion ſhall be ſettled according to my mind; but that if I did not come, the very contrary ſhould take place. I am aſhamed to ſay how many letters then came, both from you, and others through you, from Italy and Sicily, to me, and to ſuch as were my kindred and familiars; all of them exhorting and requeſting me to comply by all means with your entreaties. It appeared, therefore, to all theſe, beginning from Dion, that I ought to ſet ſail, and not behave effeminately, though I excuſed myſelf on account of my age, and mentioned my doubts that you would not be ſufficient to reſiſt my calumniators, and thoſe who wiſhed to ſow diſſenſion between us. For I then ſaw, and now ſee, with reſpect to the great and ſurpaſſing poſſeſſions both of private perſons and monarchs, that in proportion to their magnitude, they nouriſh calumniators, and thoſe that deviſe noxious pleaſures; a greater evil than which neither wealth, nor the power of any other prerogative can produce. However, bidding farewell to all theſe conſiderations, I determined to come, that my friends might not accuſe me of ruining, through my negligence, the affairs of Dion, when they might have been ſafe.

You well know all that happened on my arrival. For I indeed thought, according to the compact made by you in your letters, that you would in the

firſt

firſt place recall Dion, and reſtore him to his former familiarity with you. If, as I perſuaded you, you had done ſo at that time, perhaps, as my opinion propheſies, things would have been better for you, and the Syracuſians, and the other Greeks. Afterwards, I thought that the property of Dion ought to be reſtored, and that it ought not to be given to thoſe among whom you thought proper it ſhould be divided. Beſides this, I thought that the uſual ſum of money ſhould be ſent to him every year, and that it ought rather to be increaſed than diminiſhed on account of my being preſent. But as none of theſe things took place, I determined to depart. After this, however, you perſuaded me to ſtay for a year, affirming that you would reſtore all the property of Dion, ſo that one half would be ſent to Corinth, and that the other half ſhould be left for his ſon. I could relate many other things which you promiſed to do, but have not performed; but I omit them, on account of their multitude: for as you ſold all the poſſeſſions of Dion without his conſent, though you affirmed you would not unleſs he conſented to it, you have placed a moſt glorious colophon, O wonderful man, on all your promiſes. For you deviſed a thing neither beautiful nor elegant, nor juſt, nor advantageous; I mean, you attempted to frighten me, as being ignorant of the tranſactions at that time, that I might ceaſe entreating you to ſend money to Dion. For when you baniſhed Heraclides, which did not appear juſt either to the Syracuſians, or to me, and I, together with Theodotus and Euribius, requeſted you to pardon him, making uſe of this as a ſufficient pretext, you ſaid that it had been for ſome time paſt evident to you, that I was not at all concerned about you, but only for Dion, and his friends and kindred. And now, as Theodotes and Heraclides are calumniated as being the familiars of Dion, you aſſert that I endeavour, by every poſſible device, that they may not ſuffer puniſhment. And thus much for the political tranſactions of you and me. And if you have ſeen any thing elſe diſcordant in me with reſpect to you, think it is reaſonable that all this ſhould have happened, and do not wonder that it has: for I ſhould deſervedly appear to be depraved to a man endued with any portion of intellect, if, perſuaded by the magnitude of your authority, I ſhould betray my antient friend and gueſt when acting evilly through you, and yet, as I may ſay, being in no reſpect a worſe character than you are; and if I ſhould prefer you though acting unjuſtly, and ſhould do every thing which you enjoin for the ſake of accumulating wealth. For if there

there had been any change in my conduct, no other cauſe than this would have been aſſigned of ſuch mutation. And thus much for this; you being the occaſion of the deceitful friendſhip and diſagreement between you and me.

But my diſcourſe now nearly brings me in connection to the ſecond part of my apology. Attend therefore diligently, and conſider whether I appear to you to aſſert that which is falſe, and not the truth: for I ſay, that when Archidemus and Ariſtocritus were with you in the garden, about twenty days before I returned home from Syracuſe, you reproached me with the very ſame thing as at preſent; I mean, that I was more concerned for Heraclides, and every other perſon, than for you. You likewiſe interrogated me before them, whether I remembered, on my firſt coming to Syracuſe, that I adviſed you to reeſtabliſh the Grecian cities. But I acknowledged that I did remember: and, even now, it appears to me that it were beſt to do ſo. I muſt likewiſe relate, O Dionyſius, what was ſaid after this: for I aſked you, whether I ſhould adviſe you to do this alone, or ſomething elſe beſides this. But you anſwered me in an angry and inſolent manner; and on this account the injurious reply which you then made me is now become a true viſion inſtead of a dream. But you aſked me, in a very undiſguiſed manner, and laughing at the ſame time if I remember, whether I exhorted you as one properly inſtructed to do all theſe things or not. I replied, that you very properly reminded me. You then aſked me whether I exhorted you as one learned in geometry, or how? But after thi I did not ſay what I might have ſaid, fearing leſt, for the ſake of a trifling word, the navigation which I expected ſhould be contracted, inſtead of being ample. That, therefore, for the ſake of which all this has been ſaid by me, is as follows: I am unwilling to be calumniated by you, as having hindered you from reeſtabliſhing the Grecian cities, which were ſubverted by the Barbarians, and aſſiſting the Syracuſians, by giving them a kingdom inſtead of a tyranny. For you cannot falſely aſſert any thing of me, which leſs becomes me than this.

Indeed, if there appeared to be any ſufficient judgment of this affair, I could adduce other arguments, ſtill clearer than theſe, to prove that I exhorted you to do theſe things, but that you were unwilling to do them: for it is by no means difficult to ſhow, in a perſpicuous manner, that by thus acting

acting you would have done the beſt for yourſelf, the Syracuſians, and all Sicily. If, therefore, you deny that you ſaid theſe things, when at the ſame time you did ſay them, this is ſufficient to condemn you. But if you acknowledge that you did, think after this, that Steſichorus was a wiſe man, and imitating his recantation[1], betake yourſelf from a falſe aſſertion to one that is true.

[1] See the Phædrus of Plato, where the circumſtance here alluded to is cited at length.

EPISTLE

EPISTLE IV.

PLATO to DION of SYRACUSE—Proſperity.

I THINK that my alacrity with reſpect to caſual actions is apparent at all times, and that I very ſeriouſly apply myſelf to accompliſh them, not more for the ſake of any thing elſe, than emulation in things beautiful. For I conſider it as juſt, that thoſe who are in reality worthy men, and who act in this manner, ſhould obtain that renown which is their due. At preſent, therefore, through the favour of divinity, things ſubſiſt in a proper manner: but with reſpect to future events there is the greateſt conteſt. For to excel in fortitude, ſwiftneſs, and ſtrength, may appear a thing poſſible to be accompliſhed by others; but to excel in truth, juſtice, magnificence, and graceful conduct reſpecting all theſe, pertains to thoſe, beyond all others, who aſpire after the honour attendant on ſuch things as theſe. Now, therefore, what I ſay is manifeſt. But at the ſame time, we ought to remind ourſelves, that it is proper, as you well know, that we ſhould differ more from other men than other men from boys. Hence it is evident that we ought to become ſuch characters as we aſſert ourſelves to be; eſpecially ſince, through the favour of divinity, we may ſay that this will be eaſy for us to accompliſh: for others, in order to effect this, muſt neceſſarily wander through many places. But the ſtate of your affairs is ſuch, that this muſt be accompliſhed by you in one particular part of the earth; and in this part the eyes of all men are eſpecially turned towards you. As you are therefore beheld by all men, prepare yourſelf to exhibit to the world a ſpecimen of the ancient Lycurgus and Cyrus, or any other, who appears to have ſurpaſſed in the moral and political virtues; eſpecially ſince many, and indeed nearly all, men ſay, there is great reaſon to expect that, when Dionyſius is taken away, things will be in a ruinous ſtate, through the emulation of you, Heraclides, Theodotus, and other illuſtrious perſons.

If

If, therefore, this ſhould happen to be the caſe, which we muſt hope will not, do you apply a remedy, that affairs may be brought to the beſt condition. It will perhaps ſeem to you ridiculous that I ſhould mention theſe things, becauſe you are not ignorant of them: but I ſee that in the theatres the combatants are incited by boys, and not by their friends, though it might be ſuppoſed that theſe would be induced earneſtly to exhort them, through benevolence. Now therefore do you begin the conteſt, and inform me by a letter if you require my aſſiſtance. Affairs here are juſt as when you were with us. Inform me, likewiſe, what you have done, or what you are now doing: for though we hear many things, we know nothing; and now letters from Theodotus and Heraclides are come to Lacedæmon and Ægina. But we, as I have ſaid, though we hear many things about theſe particulars, yet we know nothing with certainty. Think likewiſe, that you appear to certain perſons to be leſs affable than is proper. Do not therefore forget, that the power of acting ariſes from pleaſing mankind, but that moroſeneſs occaſions a deſertion of aſſociates. May proſperity attend you.

EPISTLE V.

DION to PERDICCAS.

I HAVE perſuaded Euphræus, as you requeſt me in your letter, to pay conſtant attention to your affairs. But it is juſt, hoſpitable, and holy, that I ſhould both adviſe you reſpecting other things, and how you ought to uſe Euphræus. I ought, however, moſtly to adviſe you in that of which you are now indigent through your age, and the ſcarcity of youthful monitors. For there is a particular ſound from the ſeveral polities, juſt as if it were emitted from certain animals, one from a democracy, another from an oligarchy, and another again from a monarchy. Many aſſert that they underſtand theſe voices, but, except a few, they are very far from underſtanding them. Whichever of theſe polities therefore emits a proper ſound, both towards the gods, and towards men, and produces actions correſpondent to its ſound, that polity always flouriſhes and is preſerved. But when it imitates another ſound, it is corrupted. For this Euphræus will be uſeful to you in no ſmall degree, though he will likewiſe poſſeſs fortitude in other things. for I hope that he will diſcover the reaſons of a monarchy, not leſs than your aſſociates. If you employ him therefore for this purpoſe, you will both derive advantage to yourſelf, and greatly benefit him.

But if any one, hearing theſe things, ſhould ſay, Plato profeſſed to know what is advantageous to a democracy, but though he had an opportunity, in his own city, of ſpeaking to the people, and giving them the beſt advice, yet he never was known to riſe and addreſs them; to this it may be anſwered, that Plato came late to his country, and that he became acquainted with the people when they were advanced in years, and after they had been accuſtomed by thoſe prior to him to do many things contrary to his

his advice: for he would moſt willingly have conſulted for its good, as for that of his father, if he had not thought he ſhould have expoſed himſelf to needleſs danger. But I think that the ſame thing will take place with reſpect to his advice to me: for if we ſhould appear to be incurable, he will bid a long farewell to us, and will abſtain from adviſing either me or mine. May you be proſperous.

EPISTLE VI.

PLATO to HERMIAS, ERASTUS, and CORISCUS—Proſperity.

IT appears to me, that ſome one of the gods has benevolently and abundantly procured for you good fortune, if you only receive it in a becoming manner: for you dwell near to, and are able to benefit each other in the greateſt degree. And to Hermias I ſay, that neither a multitude of horſes, nor any other warlike apparatus, nor even an abundance of gold, poſſeſſes greater power, than friends that are ſtable, and endued with ſound manners. But to Eraſtus and Coriſcus I ſay, though I am an old man, that beſides this beautiful wiſdom of ideas, that wiſdom is requiſite which poſſeſſes a guardian and defenſive power againſt the baſe and unjuſt: for they are unſkilled in fraud, through living for a long time with us, who are orderly, and not vicious men. On this account I have ſaid, that they ſtand in need of theſe two kinds of wiſdom, leſt they ſhould be compelled to neglect true wiſdom, and ſhould pay more attention than is proper to human and neceſſary wiſdom. But Hermias appears to me to have received this power from a nature which is not yet connate, and from art through experience. What then do I ſay? To you, Hermias, I, as being more ſkilled in the manners and diſpoſition of Eraſtus and Coriſcus than you are, aſſert, indicate, and teſtify, that you will not eaſily find men whoſe manners deſerve greater confidence than theſe your neighbours. I adviſe you, therefore, to cultivate an acquaintance with theſe men as much as poſſible. And again, I adviſe you, Eraſtus and Coriſcus, to cultivate in return an acquaintance with Hermias, and endeavour, by mutual offices of kindneſs, to be united in the bonds of friendſhip.

But

But if any one of you ſhall appear to diſſolve this union (for human affairs are not altogether ſtable), ſend hither to me and mine an epiſtle containing an accuſation of the delinquent. For I think that the reaſons which our anſwer to this letter will contain, unleſs there has been ſome great cauſe for this diſſolution, will again bind you in your former friendſhip and union, more than any incantation. Indeed, if all we and you philoſophize as much as we are able, and as far as is permitted to each of us, the things which have now been oracularly delivered will poſſeſs their proper authority. But if we do not act in this manner, I will not relate the conſequences: for I predict a good omen to you, and I ſay, that if divinity pleaſes, you will perform all theſe good actions. But it is requiſite that this Epiſtle ſhould be read by you three together; or at leaſt by two of you in common, as often as poſſible; and that you ſhould uſe it by compact, and an eſtabliſhed law; at the ſame time taking an oath, with an earneſtneſs by no means inelegant, and with diſcipline, the ſifter of this earneſtneſs, and ſwearing by that god, who is the leader[1] of all things preſent and future, and by the father and lord of this leader and cauſe: whom, if we truly philoſophize, we ſhall all clearly know, in as great a degree as is poſſible to happy men.

[1] By that god who is the leader of all things, Plato means Jupiter the artificer of the univerſe; and by the father and lord of this leader, the ineffable principle of things.

EPISTLE

EPISTLE VII.

PLATO to the Kindred and Aſſociates of DION—Proſperity.

YOU write to me, that it is requiſite to think that your ſentiments about politics are the ſame as thoſe of Dion; and that I ſhould be exhorted to join with you as much as poſſible, both in word and deed. Indeed, if you have the ſame opinion and deſire with him, I ſhall certainly join with you; but if you have not, it will be requiſite to deliberate frequently on the ſubject. But his thoughts and deſire were not ſuch as you conjecture. I, however, as knowing them, can clearly relate what they were.

When I firſt came to Syracuſe, I was nearly forty years old, and the age of Dion was then the ſame as that of Hipparinus is at preſent. He has likewiſe always perſevered in the opinion which he then entertained; I mean, that the Syracuſians ought to be free, and that they ſhould be governed by the beſt laws. So that it is by no means wonderful, if ſome god has cauſed Dion to accord with him in opinion reſpecting a polity. But the manner in which this was effected, is a thing which deſerves to be heard both by young and old. I will, however, endeavour to relate the affair to you from the beginning: for at preſent it will be opportune.

When I was a young man I was affected in the ſame manner as the many. For I determined, as ſoon as I became my own maſter, to betake myſelf immediately to the common affairs of the city. In the mean time, the following political circumſtances happened to me: The polity which exiſted at that time being reviled by many, a change took place. Then one and fifty men being choſen as governors, eleven of them preſided in the city, and ten in the Piræus; and each of theſe directed the affairs in the city. But the remaining thirty were inveſted with ſupreme authority. Some of theſe being my familiars, were well known to me, and immediately called on

on me to attend to politics, as a thing proper for me to ſtudy. But the manner in which I was affected was not at all wonderful, on account of my youth: for I thought that they ought to govern the city ſo as to bring it from an unjuſt life to juſt manners. And in conſequence of this, I very diligently attended to their conduct. But I perceived that theſe men, in a ſhort time, evinced that the former polity was golden in compariſon with theirs: for, beſides acting unjuſtly in other reſpects, they ſent Socrates, who was my friend, and older than I am, and who, I am not aſhamed to ſay, was the moſt juſt of any one then exiſting; they ſent him, I ſay, together with certain others, in order to bring back one of the citizens by force, that he might be puniſhed with death. They likewiſe endeavoured to make Socrates join with them in the management of affairs, whether he was willing or not. He refuſed however to comply, and determined to expoſe himſelf to every danger, rather than be a partaker of their impious deeds. All which when I perceived, together with other ſimilar particulars of no ſmall importance, I was indignant, and withdrew myſelf from the evil men of that time.

Not long after this, the thirty tyrants were cut off, and the whole of the then exiſting polity was ſubverted. Again, therefore, I was incited, though in a more moderate degree, to engage in common and political affairs. But many circumſtances then took place, at which any one might be indignant, owing to the diſordered ſtate of affairs at that time. Nor was it wonderful, that in ſuch mutations certain enemies ſhould be puniſhed in a more ſevere manner, although thoſe that returned were very equitable. However, through a certain fortune, it happened, that our aſſociate Socrates was brought into a court of juſtice, and was accuſed of the greateſt impiety, and which pertained to Socrates the leaſt of all men. For ſome led him along as an impious perſon, but others gave ſentence againſt him, and condemned *him* to death, who at that very time was unwilling to partake of the unholy deed reſpecting the removal of one of his exiled friends. On perceiving theſe things therefore, together with the men who had the management of political affairs, and their laws and manners, the more I conſidered them as I advanced in years, by ſo much the more difficult did the right adminiſtration of political concerns appear to me: *for this cannot be accompliſhed without friends and faithful aſſociates.* But at that time, it was not eaſy to find

find theſe: for our city was then no longer governed according to our fathers manners and purſuits; and it was not poſſible to obey ſuch as were new, with any degree of eaſe, in conſequence of the written laws and the manners being corrupted.

This likewiſe was wonderful in the affair, that I, who at firſt was ardently deſirous of engaging in political concerns, when I beheld the diſordered ſtate of things, was at length giddy with the view. However, I did not withdraw my attention from them, but determined to ſee whether ſomething better might not take place reſpecting theſe very things, and the whole polity, and always to wait a fit opportunity of acting. At laſt I perceived that all the cities exiſting at preſent were badly governed. For as to what relates to laws, they are nearly in an incurable ſtate, without the aſſiſtance of ſome wonderful apparatus in conjunction with fortune. I am therefore compelled to ſay, praiſing *genuine philoſophy*, that through this we are enabled to perceive ſuch political concerns as are juſt, and all the affairs of private individuals. *Hence, the human race will not be liberated from evils, till either the genus of thoſe that philoſophize with rectitude and truth obtains the government of political affairs, or thoſe that govern in cities, from a certain divine allotment, truly philoſophize.* With this conception, I firſt came to Italy and Sicily. But on my arriving thither, I was by no means pleaſed with the life which is called happy; a life full of the Italian and Syracuſian tables, and which conſiſts in repletion twice a day, in never lying alone by night, and ſuch other particulars as follow a life of this kind: for from theſe manners, no man under the heavens would ever become wiſe, if he is nouriſhed in them from his youth, however admirable his natural diſpoſition may be: nor will ſuch a one ever become temperate. And the ſame thing may be ſaid reſpecting the other virtues. But no city can acquieſce in its laws, while the citizens are of opinion, that it is proper to conſume all their poſſeſſions in ſuperfluous coſt; and that, neglecting every thing elſe, they ſhould give themſelves up to feaſting and venereal delight. For it is neceſſary that ſuch cities as theſe ſhould never ceaſe changing into tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies, and that the powerful among them ſhould not even endure the name of a juſt and equitable polity. With theſe, and the above-mentioned conceptions, I came to Syracuſe: perhaps through the interference of fortune. It appeared indeed, that the adminiſtration of the preſent

preſent affairs reſpecting Dion and the Syracuſians, was deviſed by *ſome one of the natures more excellent*[1] *than mankind.* And I am afraid, that you, on conſulting me a ſecond time, will be leſs perſuaded by me than before. However, I affirm that the beginning of all the tranſactions was my journey to Sicily. For I aſſociated with Dion who was then a young man; and in my diſcourſe, explained to him, and adviſed him to do, ſuch things as appeared to me to be beſt for mankind; not knowing that certain perſons were then ſecretly contriving a diſſolution of the tyranny. For Dion being very docile, both with reſpect to other things, and what was then ſaid by me, he ſo acutely apprehended, and readily embraced my doctrines, that he ſurpaſſed all the young men with whom I was ever acquainted. He was likewiſe determined to paſs the remainder of his life in a manner ſuperior to many of the Italians and Sicilians, viz. in purſuing virtue, rather than pleaſure and luxury. Hence he was hated by thoſe, who lived conformably to tyrannic inſtitutes, even till the death of Dionyſius.

After this he perceived that the very ſame conception, which he had framed through the aſſiſtance of right reaſon, did not ſubſiſt in him alone, but in certain other perſons, though they were not numerous, among whom he thought was Dionyſius the younger. He likewiſe hoped that if this were the caſe, both his own life, and that of the other Syracuſians, would be tranſcendently more bleſſed. On this account he thought that I ought by all means to come with the utmoſt celerity to Syracuſe, that I might aſſiſt them in their undertakings; remembering how eaſily, by my converſation, he was inflamed with the deſire of leading the moſt beautiful and beſt life. If he could but enkindle this deſire in Dionyſius, as he was attempting to do, he was in hopes that a happy and true life, without ſlaughter and death, and the evils which exiſt at preſent, would flouriſh through every part of Syracuſe.

Dion rightly conceiving that this would be the caſe, perſuaded Dionyſius to ſend for me, and himſelf requeſted that I would by all means come with the utmoſt celerity, before certain other perſons, aſſociating with Dionyſius, turned him to a life different from that which is beſt. But it is neceſſary to relate more fully what he ſaid. Why, ſays he, ſhould we expect a fitter

[1] Viz. by ſome one of thoſe who are eſſentially dæmons or heroes.

opportunity than that which now preſents itſelf to us through a certain divine fortune? He likewiſe mentioned the empire of Italy and Sicily, the power of Dionyſius in this empire, and his vehement deſire after philoſophy and erudition. He informed me how much inclined his own kindred and familiars were to the doctrines and mode of life which I inculcated, and that he himſelf was moſt ſufficient to incite Dionyſius to embrace them. He added, that in conſequence of this, if at any time, there was now every reaſon to hope that theſe perſons would become philoſophers and rulers of mighty cities. With theſe therefore, and many other ſuch reaſons, did he urge me to comply with his requeſt. But I was fearful of the event; as the deſires of young men are haſty, and are often borne along in a direction contrary to themſelves.

However, I knew that the diſpoſition of Dion was naturally grave, and that his age was ſufficiently mature. Hence, while I was conſidering and doubting whether I ſhould go and comply with his requeſt, or not, it at the ſame time occured to me that I ought to go; and that if ever any one thought of attempting to give perfection to laws and a polity, now was the time to make the attempt. For I conſidered, that if I could only perſuade one perſon, I ſhould ſufficiently produce every good. With this conception and this confidence, and not from the motives which ſome have thought, I left my home; feeling at the ſame time in myſelf the greateſt ſhame leſt I ſhould ever appear to myſelf to be nothing more than a man of words, and ſhould never voluntarily accompliſh any thing in deeds. I was likewiſe fearful, leſt the hoſpitality and friendſhip of Dion ſhould be expoſed to no ſmall dangers; who, if he ſhould fall into any calamity, or be baniſhed by Dionyſius, and his other enemies, would fly to us, and thus addreſs us: "I come to you, O Plato, an exile, but am neither indigent of horſes nor ſoldiers to oppoſe my enemies, but I am in want of words and perſuaſion, by which I know you are eſpecially able to convert young men to probity and juſtice, and unite them in friendſhip and fellowſhip with each other; through a defect of which on your part I have now left Syracuſe, and have betaken myſelf hither. As to what relates to myſelf indeed, this will bring you leſs diſgrace: but as to philoſophy, which you always praiſe, and which you ſay is diſhonoured by other men, is it not now betrayed by you together with

with me? If, indeed, we had been inhabitants of Megara, you would have come to my aſſiſtance when I had called you, or I ſhould have conſidered you as the moſt depraved of all men. But now, excuſing yourſelf through the length of the journey, and the magnitude of the voyage and the labour, you think you ſhall avoid infamy, though this is far from being the caſe."

If Dion had thus addreſſed me, I ſhould certainly have been at a loſs for a becoming anſwer. I, therefore, came to Syracuſe, with reaſon and juſtice, leaving my own purſuits, which were not unbecoming, under a tyranny, which was neither adapted to my diſcourſes nor myſelf. But when I came thither I liberated myſelf, and thus preſerved the allotment of hoſpitable Jupiter, and of a philoſopher, unblameable. This allotment indeed would have been diſgraceful, if, being in any reſpect effeminate and timid, I had been a partaker of vicious ſhame. On my arrival then (for there is no occaſion to be prolix) I found all things about Dionyſius full of ſedition, and calumnies reſpecting the tyranny of Dion. I defended Dion, therefore, to the utmoſt of my power, but I was able to effect but little. For, on the fourth month nearly after my arrival, Dionyſius accuſed Dion of endeavouring to obtain the tyranny by ſtratagem, and diſgracefully ſent him into exile in a ſmall ſhip. After this all of us that were the friends of Dion were fearful leſt Dionyſius ſhould accuſe and puniſh any one of us as cooperating with Dion in his ſtratagem. It was likewiſe reported in Syracuſe, that I was put to death by Dionyſius, as being the cauſe of every thing that then happened. But he perceiving that we were all thus affected, and dreading leſt ſomething of greater conſequence ſhould ariſe from our fear, received all of us benevolently, conſoled me, deſired me to confide in him, and requeſted that I would by all means ſtay; as he would derive no advantage from my flight, but from my continuing at Syracuſe. On this account, he pretended to requeſt me very much to ſtay. However, we know that the requeſts of tyrants are mingled with neceſſity.

Contriving, therefore, to prevent my departure, he obliged me to reſide in the acropolis, whence no ſailor could lead me away, not becauſe he would be hindered by Dionyſius, but becauſe he could not accompliſh this without his orders. Nor was there any merchant, or provincial magiſtrate, who, on ſeeing me leaving the country, would not immediately have brought me back again to Dionyſius; eſpecially ſince the report at that time was con-

trary to that which was circulated before; for now it was ſaid that Dionyſius again received Plato with wonderful kindneſs. And indeed this was the caſe: for it is neceſſary to ſpeak the truth. He behaved therefore to me with increaſing kindneſs every day, and was delighted with my manners and habits. But he wiſhed me to praiſe him more, and to conſider him as my friend in a far greater degree than Dion: and this he ſtrove to accompliſh in a wonderful manner. However, he neglected the moſt beautiful means of effecting his purpoſe, if it could have been effected, I mean aſſociating and becoming familiar with me, by hearing and learning diſcourſes on philoſophy. But this he was fearful of doing, leſt, as was aſſerted by my calumniators, he ſhould be impeded in his deſigns, and Dion ſhould have the entire management of affairs. However, I endured every thing, perſervering in the opinion which I entertained when I firſt came to Syracuſe, and trying if by any poſſible means Dionyſius could be brought to a deſire of a philoſophic life. But he rendered my endeavours ineffectual by his oppoſition. And ſuch are the particulars of my firſt voyage to Sicily.

However, in conſequence of the earneſt ſolicitations of Dionyſius, I made a ſecond voyage to Sicily. But on what account I came thither, and what I did there, I may reaſonably and juſtly relate to you, when I adviſe you how it is proper to act in the preſent ſtate of affairs. I ſay I may relate this to you, for the ſake of thoſe who aſk why I came a ſecond time to Sicily. I ſpeak in this manner, that ſuperfluous things may not be preferred by me to ſuch as are important.

I think, indeed, that he who gives his advice to a ſick man, and one who uſes bad diet, ſhould perſuade him in the firſt place to change his mode of living; and if the diſeaſed perſon is willing to comply with him in this, that he ſhould then perſuade him to other things; but if he is unwilling to comply, then I ſhould think that his adviſer, if he abandons him, acts like a man and a phyſician, but if he ſtill continues with him, that he acts like one effeminate and deſtitute of art. I aſſert the ſame thing likewiſe of a city, whether it has one governor, or many. For if the polity proceeds in a right way, it is the province of a man, endued with intellect, to give it uſeful advice; but if the very contrary of this happens to be the caſe, and the people do not by any means wiſh to tread in the veſtiges of an upright polity, but proclaim to their adviſer that he muſt relinquiſh his concern about the polity,

polity, and not diſturb it, for if he does he ſhall ſuffer death; and at the ſame time exhort him to be ſubſervient to their wills and deſires, and thus adviſe them how they may always procure pleaſures with celerity and eaſe; when this is the caſe, I ſhould conſider him who endures to give ſuch advice, as effeminate, but him who does not endure it, as a man.

In conſequence of this conception, when any one conſults me about one of the greateſt concerns of his life, ſuch as about the acquiſition of riches, or the attention pertaining to the body or ſoul, if he appears to me to live daily in an orderly manner, or is willing to be perſuaded when I give him my advice, then I readily join with him in conſultation, nor do I deſiſt till the affair is brought to a concluſion. But if either he does not at all conſult me, or, if he does, obviouſly neglects to follow my advice, in this caſe I ſhould not of my own accord give advice to ſuch a one, nor would I be compelled to give it, even if he were my ſon. But I would voluntarily give advice to a ſlave, and, if he were unwilling, force him to follow it. I ſhould not however think it holy to force my father, unleſs he was void of underſtanding through diſeaſe.

Again, if thoſe that conſult me live according to an eſtabliſhed mode which is pleaſing to themſelves, but not to me, I would not hate them, becauſe I had admoniſhed them in vain, nor yet flattering be ſubſervient to them, and afford them thoſe means of gratifying their deſires, which, if I were to embrace, I ſhould not wiſh to live. With the ſame conceptions reſpecting his country, a prudent man ought to live, expoſing its errors, if it appears to him not to be well governed, when this can be done, without ſpeaking in vain, or loſing his life. But he ſhould never by violence effect a change in the government of his country, when it cannot be brought to the beſt condition, without the expulſion and ſlaughter of the citizens, but in this caſe, leading a quiet life, he ſhould pray for the good both of himſelf and the city.

In the very ſame manner I adviſe you to act. And I adviſed Dionyſius to live daily in ſuch a manner with Dion, that he might both have the maſtery over himſelf, and acquire faithful friends and aſſociates, that the ſame thing might not befall him which happened to his father. For his father having obtained the poſſeſſion of and reeſtabliſhed many and great cities in Sicily, which had been ſubverted by the Barbarians, could not eſtabliſh in the poli-

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tics of theſe faithful men, neither from his own aſſociates, nor from among ſtrangers, nor from his younger brothers, whom he himſelf had educated. Nor yet could he find men worthy to be truſted, either among the private perſons whom he had made governors, or the poor, whom he had made very rich. But among theſe he could not procure one faithful aſſociate, either by perſuading or teaching, or the benefits which he conferred. But he was ſeven times worſe than Darius, who neither confiding in his brothers, nor in thoſe that were educated by him, but alone aſſociating with himſelf in the government of his kingdom a Mede and captive eunuch, he divided ſeven parts of his dominions between them, each of which was larger than all Sicily, and found them to be faithful adherents, and neither inſidious to him, nor to each other. He likewiſe gave an example how a good legiſlator and king ought to act. For he eſtabliſhed laws by which the Perſian government is preſerved even at preſent. To which we may add, that the Athenians, after they had taken poſſeſſion of many Grecian cities, which they had not founded themſelves, and which had been ſubverted by the Barbarians, preſerved their empire over them for ſeventy years, in conſequence of procuring to themſelves friends in each of the cities.

But Dionyſius having collected all Sicily into one city, and through his wiſdom confiding in no one, was with difficulty ſaved. For he was deſtitute of friends, and men in whom he could confide, than which there can be no greater ſign of vice, as on the contrary the poſſeſſion of theſe is the greateſt proof of virtue. I therefore and Dion adviſed Dionyſius to procure himſelf friends from his aſſociates, and ſuch as were his equals in age, and who unanimouſly cultivated virtue, ſince, through the ſituation of his father's affairs, he neither cultivated learning, nor had proper aſſociates. But we particularly adviſed him to accord with himſelf. For we aſſerted that he was in a wonderful manner deficient in this reſpect, not indeed in perſpicuous terms (for this was not ſafe), but in an obſcure manner, contending in our diſcourſe, that when this is the caſe, every man will become the ſaviour both of himſelf and thoſe whom he governs; but that when he does not accord with himſelf, he will cauſe the very contrary of this to take place. If therefore, as we ſaid, he was conſiſtent with himſelf, and acquired prudence and temperance, and if afterwards he reſtored the deſolated cities of Sicily, and bound them together with ſuch laws and polities, that they might

might be friendly both to him and to each other, in reſiſting the incurſions of the Barbarians, then he would not only double, but in reality multiply his paternal kingdom. For thus the Carthaginians would much more readily become ſubject to his power, than they were to that of Gelon; nor would he on the contrary, like his father, be compelled to pay a tribute to the Barbarians.

This was the ſubſtance of what we ſaid, and the advice which we gave to Dionyſius, at the very time when it was reported in many places that we were forming ſtratagems againſt him. Indeed, the men who raiſed theſe reports prevailed over Dionyſius, expelled Dion, and threw us into fear. But, in ſhort, Dion, departing from Peloponneſus and Athens, admoniſhed Dionyſius in reality. When therefore Dion had liberated and twice reſtored the city to its inhabitants, the Syracuſians were then affected in the ſame manner towards him, as Dionyſius had been before. For Dionyſius had endeavoured to educate Dion ſo as that he might become a king worthy of his kingdom, and be his aſſociate through the whole of life. But thoſe that calumniated Dion, reported that he endeavoured to gain the tyranny by ſtratagem, and did every thing at that time, that the mind of Dionyſius, which was allured by diſcipline, might neglect the affairs of government, and commit them entirely to Dion, who, by fraudulent uſurpation, would expel Dionyſius from the empire.

Theſe things being then reported a ſecond time among the Syracuſians, vanquiſhed by a very abſurd and baſe victory thoſe who were the cauſes of the victory. But it is proper that the particulars of this affair ſhould be heard by you, who now call upon me to ſettle the preſent affairs. I therefore being an Athenian, the aſſociate of Dion, and one who joined with him in oppoſing the tyrant, that he might make peace inſtead of war, was vanquiſhed in oppoſing the calumniators. But Dionyſius, by loading me with honours and riches, endeavoured to perſuade me to ſtay with him, and to make me his friend, that I might ſerve as a witneſs that he had not undeſervedly expelled Dion. However, he was entirely diſappointed in his expectations. But Dion afterwards returning home, brought with him two Athenian brothers, who had not become his friends from philoſophy, but from that caſual aſſociation of moſt friends, which ariſes from performing the

the rites of hoſpitality, and from being mutually initiated in ſacred myſteries. From theſe cauſes, and from offering to attend Dion in his return to Syracuſe, he had contracted a friendſhip with them. But theſe men, on their coming to Sicily, when they underſtood that Dion was calumniated as endeavouring by ſtratagem to obtain the tyranny, by thoſe very men whom he had liberated, not only betrayed their aſſociate and gueſt, but becoming as it were perpetrators of murder with their own hands, they aſſiſted the murderers with arms. However, I ſhall neither paſs by in ſilence, nor relate the particulars of this baſe and unholy deed: for it has been elegantly related by many others, and will be again in ſome future period of time.

But I will wipe away the infamy with which the Athenians are branded. For I ſay, that *he* was an Athenian, who could never be induced either by riches or honours to betray the city. For he was not made a friend through illiberal benevolence, but through the communion of liberal diſcipline; in which alone, he who is endued with intellect ought to confide, rather than in the alliance of ſouls and bodies. Theſe men, therefore, are not of conſequence ſufficient to bring diſgrace on the city for killing Dion: for they were men of no renown. But I have ſaid thus much for the ſake of giving advice to the friends and kindred of Dion.

I give you likewiſe the ſame advice as before, and addreſs you in the ſame words the third time, viz. that you ſhould neither ſubject Sicily, nor, in my opinion, any other city, to deſpotic men, but to the laws; for this is neither better for the governors nor the governed, nor for their children, nor their children's children, but the experiment is perfectly pernicious. But little and illiberal ſouls delight to ſeize gain of this kind, underſtanding nothing of things juſt and good, human and divine, whether pertaining to the preſent time, or to futurity. Of the truth of theſe things, I endeavoured firſt to perſuade Dion, and afterwards Dionyſius, and now, in the third place, you. Be perſuaded therefore by me, for the ſake of Jupiter the third ſaviour.

In the next place, look to Dionyſius and Dion, the former of whom, not following my advice, now lives in an unbecoming manner; but the latter, who acted conformably to my perſuaſions, died beautifully. For he who aſpires after the moſt excellent things, both for himſelf and his country, will endure whatever may befall him in an upright and beautiful manner: for no

one

one of us is naturally immortal[1], nor if this ſhould happen to be the caſe with any one of us, would he on that account become happy, as it appears he would to the multitude. For in things inanimate, there is nothing either of good or ill which deſerves to be regarded: but good or ill happens to every ſoul, either during its union with, or ſeparation from, body. But it is always proper thus to believe in antient and ſacred diſcourſes, which inform us that the ſoul is immortal, that it has judges of its conduct, and that it ſuffers the greateſt puniſhments when it is liberated from the body. On this account it is requiſite to think that it is a leſſer evil to ſuffer than to do the greateſt injuries. This, indeed, the man who is a lover of wealth, and who is poor in ſoul does not hear, and if he did hear, he would deride it, in conſequence of thinking that he ought impudently to ſeize on all ſides, like a wild beaſt, whatever he can eat or drink, and whatever can contribute to venereal delight, which is a thing ſervile and ungrateful, and is not properly denominated pleaſure. Such a one being blind, does not perceive that he can never ſatisfy inſatiable deſire, nor ſee what a mighty evil is unholy conduct, nor what the particulars are with which it is always attended in conjunction with every unjuſt deed. For he who acts unjuſtly, muſt neceſſarily attract to himſelf impiety, both while he rolls on the earth, and when he accompliſhes under the earth a journey, perfectly and in every reſpect diſhonourable and miſerable.

When I ſaid theſe, and other things of the like kind to Dion, I perſuaded him of their truth. But I was moſt juſtly enraged with his murderers, in the ſame manner nearly as with Dionyſius: for both of them injured me, and all the reſt, as I may ſay, in the higheſt degree. For they deſtroyed a man who was willing to uſe juſtice: but Dionyſius, who did not by any means wiſh to uſe juſtice, through the whole of his government, obtained the greateſt power. If, however, under his government, philoſophy and power had been united in reality, they would have preſented to all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, a true and ſufficiently luminous opinion, that neither any city nor any man can ever be happy, unleſs they paſs through life with prudence[2], and in ſubjection to juſtice; whether they poſſeſs theſe in themſelves, or are properly educated and inſtructed in the manners of holy governors.

The conduct, therefore, of Dionyſius in theſe things was noxious: but other

[1] Viz. the union of the ſoul with this terrene body is not an immortal union.

[2] See the General Introduction prefixed to this work for the accurate meaning of this word.

things in which I was injured are ſmall when compared to theſe. But he who ſlew Dion, did not know that he had done the ſame thing as Dionyſius. For I clearly know, as far as it is poſſible for one man to ſpeak confidently of another, that if Dion had retained his government, he would never have changed it into any other form than that which he firſt gave to his own country, Syracuſe, when he delivered it from ſlavery, cauſed it to aſſume a joyful and ſplendid appearance, and eſtabliſhed it in liberty. After this, he would have adorned the citizens, by every poſſible contrivance, with ſuch laws as are adapted to them, and are the moſt excellent. And beſides theſe things, he would have diligently endeavoured to make all Sicily inhabited, and free from the Barbarians, by expelling ſome and ſubjecting others, more eaſily than this was done by Hiero. But if theſe things had taken place, through a man juſt, brave, temperate, and who was a philoſopher, the ſame opinion of virtue would have been produced among the multitude, as would have flouriſhed among all men, if Dionyſius had followed my advice. But now either ſome dæmon, or ſome pernicious character, replete with iniquity and impiety, and, what is of the greateſt conſequence, with the audacity of ignorance, in which all evils are rooted, and from which they germinate and afterwards produce the moſt bitter fruit,—this dæmon, or this dire perſon, has a ſecond time ſubverted and deſtroyed every thing. However, for the ſake of augury, we now ominate good things the third time.

I adviſe therefore you, my friends, to imitate Dion, and acquire that patriotic benevolence which he poſſeſſed, and that temperate mode of living which he adopted. But you have clearly heard from me, what are the auſpices by which you ſhould endeavour to accompliſh his wiſh: and if there is any one among you, who is unable to live in a Doric manner, according to paternal inſtitutes, but follows the Sicilian mode of living, and that which was adopted by the murderers of Dion, neither call on him to join with you, nor believe that he will ever be ſincere and faithful in any undertaking. But you ſhould exhort the reſt to reeſtabliſh the whole of Sicily, and introduce both in Sicily and all Peloponneſus equitable laws, without dreading the Athenians: for men are to be found there who ſurpaſs all others in virtue, and who hate the audacity of thoſe that ſlaughter their gueſts.

But if theſe things ſhould take place afterwards, and the many and all various ſeditions and diſcords which ſpring up daily urge us to immediate exertion;

exertion; in this caſe, every man who, through a divine fortune, partakes, though in a ſmall degree, of right opinion, ought to know, that there will be no end to the evils reſulting from ſedition, till thoſe who vanquiſh in battle refrain from ſlaughtering and baniſhing their fellow-citizens, and from the remembrance of injuries, and giving reſpite to their deſire of vengeance, become reconciled to their enemies; and till obtaining the empire over themſelves, they eſtabliſh common laws, which no leſs pertain to themſelves, than to thoſe they have vanquiſhed, at the ſame time compelling them to uſe theſe laws. But they ſhould compel them by a two-fold neceſſity, viz. of fear and ſhame. By the neceſſity of fear, evincing their power; in conſequence of being ſuperior to them: but by the neceſſity of ſhame, through their appearing to ſurpaſs them, both in vanquiſhing pleaſures, and in ſubjection to the laws. For there is no other way by which a city labouring under ſedition can find a period to its evils. But ſeditions, enmities, hatred, perfidy, will always ariſe in cities, which are thus affected towards themſelves. Thoſe, therefore, that have the greateſt power in cities, if they deſire the welfare of their country, ſhould chooſe among themſelves, in preference to others, ſuch men as they have heard to be the moſt excellent characters: and, in the firſt place, they ſhould chooſe old men, who poſſeſs children, wives, and eſtates, together with ſuch of their progenitors as are moſt worthy and renowned, and poſſeſs ſufficient property. But ten thouſand and fifty inhabitants will be ſufficient for a city of this kind. Theſe ſhould be ſent from their places of abode with prayers and the greateſt honours: but after they are called from home, they ſhould be bound by an oath, and exhorted to eſtabliſh laws, that they may not attribute more to the victors than the vanquiſhed, but impart the equal and that which is common to the whole city. All things, however, conſiſt in the eſtabliſhment of laws. For when the victors are more willing to be ſubject to the laws than thoſe that are vanquiſhed, all things will be well, and full of felicity, and every evil will be exiled. But if this is not the caſe, there is no occaſion to call me, or any other, to join with him in the adminiſtration of affairs, who is not perſuaded by the precepts I have now enjoined. For theſe are the ſiſters of the things which I and Dion very wiſely attempted to accompliſh among the Syracuſians. They were, however, ſecond attempts: for the firſt were thoſe common goods, which we attempted to effect in conjunction with Dionyſius. But a certain fortune ſuperior to man-

kind fruſtrated our attempt. Do you therefore now endeavour to accompliſh theſe things more proſperouſly, through a good deſtiny, and a certain divine fortune. And thus much concerning my advice and epiſtle, and my firſt viſit to Dionyſius.

But my ſecond voyage to Sicily was both becoming and proper, of which he may now hear an account who is ſo inclined. For the firſt time of my reſidence in Sicily paſſed away as I have already ſaid, before I could adviſe the kindred and aſſociates of Dion; but after this I perſuaded Dionyſius, to the utmoſt of my power, to ſuffer me to depart: but we mutually agreed, that when a peace took place (for there was then a war in Sicily), Dionyſius ſhould recall Dion and me, as ſoon as his government was more ſecurely eſtabliſhed. He likewiſe thought it proper that Dion ſhould underſtand that I was not then baniſhed by him, but was to return to him at a certain time. And I agreed to theſe conditions.

A peace therefore taking place, Dionyſius ſent for me, but required that Dion ſhould abſent himſelf, for another year: bu the requeſted me by all means to come. Dion therefore exhorted and entreated me to ſet ſail; for it was very much reported from Sicily, that Dionyſius was again wonderfully inflamed with a deſire of philoſophy: and on this account Dion earneſtly requeſted me to ſet ſail for Sicily. But I, though I knew that many ſuch things happened to young men reſpecting philoſophy, at the ſame time thought it more ſafe not to comply with the requeſt of Dionyſius and Dion. I therefore anſwered both of them, that I was an old man, and that nothing which was done at preſent was according to the agreement. But it ſeems that after this Archytas[1] had betaken himſelf to Dionyſius: for, before I ſet ſail from Sicily, I had made Archytas, and certain other Tarentines, the gueſts and friends of Dionyſius. There were likewiſe certain others among the Syracuſians who were the auditors of Dion, and among theſe ſome wh were full of depraved doctrines reſpecting philoſophy, and who appeared to me to endeavour to diſcourſe with Dionyſius about things of this kind, as if Dionyſius had heard all ſuch particulars as were the ſubject of my thoughts. But he was not naturally unapt with reſpect to learning, and was ambitious in a wonderful degree. Perhaps, therefore, he was pleaſed with the diſcourſe of theſe men; and he was ma-

[1] A famous Pythagorean philoſopher.

nifeſtly

nifeſtly aſhamed that he heard nothing from me when I went to ſee him. Hence he was at the ſame time inflamed with a deſire of hearing me more clearly, and ſtimulated by ambition. But on what account he did not hear me diſcourſe, when I firſt came to Sicily, I have related above.

After therefore I had returned home ſafe, and refuſed to comply with his ſecond invitation, Dionyſius appeared to be perfectly ambitious, and through his deſire of renown to be afraid leſt I ſhould ſeem to certain perſons to deſpiſe him, and that my diſlike of his diſpoſition, habits, and mode of living, had induced me to refuſe complying with his requeſt. But it is juſt that I ſhould ſpeak the truth, and endure with equanimity, if any one on hearing the paſt tranſactions ſhould deſpiſe my philoſophy, and think that the tyrant was endued with intellect: for Dionyſius ſent to me, the third time, a three-ranked galley, for the ſake of procuring me an eaſy paſſage. He ſent alſo Archidemus, whom he thought I moſt eſteemed of all the familiars of Archytas that were then in his dominions, together with other illuſtrious perſons in Sicily. But all theſe announced to us the ſame thing, viz. that Dionyſius was wonderfully given to philoſophy. Beſides this, he ſent me a long epiſtle, knowing how I was affected towards Dion, and that Dion was deſirous I ſhould ſet ſail and come to Syracuſe. The letter, therefore, was compoſed with a view to all theſe particulars, and the beginning of it was as follows:

Dionyſius to Plato: after which followed ſuch things as are uſual, and he ſaid nothing after this, except that complying with his requeſt I ſhould now come to Sicily. He then proceeded: "In the firſt place the particulars reſpecting Dion ſhall be accompliſhed according to your wiſh; but I know you wiſh for moderate meaſures, and that I would accede to them. However, unleſs you come, your deſires reſpecting Dion will not be gratified, nor yet reſpecting other things pertaining to yourſelf." This is what he wrote. But the other parts of his letter were prolix, and foreign to the purpoſe. Other letters likewiſe came to me from Archytas, and other Tarentines, praiſing the philoſophic diſpoſition of Dionyſius, and adding, that unleſs I now came their friendſhip with Dionyſius, which had been effected through me, and which was of no ſmall conſequence with reſpect to political affairs, would be entirely deſtroyed.

As therefore, at that time, I was thus incited to comply with the requeſt of Dionyſius,

Dionyſius, ſome drawing me from Sicily and Italy, and others at Athens impelling me, as it were, by their prayers; and again reaſon proclaiming, that I ought not to betray Dion, together with the gueſts and others belonging to Tarentum:—when I likewiſe conſidered, that it was nothing wonderful, if a young man who was formerly unwilling to hear reſpecting things of great moment ſhould become docile, and be inflamed with a deſire of the beſt life, and that it was proper to prove clearly, in what manner he was affected, and not by any means betray him, nor become myſelf the cauſe of a diſgrace ſo truly great, if the caſe with reſpect to Dionyſius was in reality ſuch as it was reported to be;—ſcreened by this reaſoning as with a veil, I commenced my journey, fearing many things, and propheſying as it ſeems not altogether well. I came therefore to Sicily the third time under the protection of the ſaviour Jupiter. And this voyage I actually accompliſhed, being again fortunately ſaved. But for theſe things I return thanks to Dionyſius, after divinity; becauſe when many were willing to ſlay me, he prevented them, and conducted himſelf with ſome degree of moderation in my affairs.

When therefore I came to Sicily, I thought it was proper, in the firſt place, to try whether Dionyſius was in reality enkindled by philoſophy as by a fire, or whether the report concerning him at Athens was entirely vain. But there is a certain method of making an experiment about things of this kind, by no means ignoble, but truly adapted to tyrants, and eſpecially to thoſe that are full of depraved doctrines, which, as ſoon as I arrived, I perceived was very much the caſe with Dionyſius. But to ſuch as theſe, it is requiſite to ſhow that philoſophy is a thing of the greateſt conſequence, and that it it only to be obtained by great ſtudy and mighty labour. For he who hears that this is the caſe, if he is truly a lover of wiſdom, and is adapted to and worthy of its acquiſition, being a divine perſon, will think that he hears of an admirable way, that he ought immediately to betake himſelf to this path, and make it the great buſineſs of his life. After this, he will not ceaſe exciting both himſelf, and the leader of this way, till he either obtains the conſummation of his wiſhes, or receives a power by which he may be able to conduct himſelf without a guide.

Such a one, therefore, will ſo live, that all his actions may accord with theſe conceptions. But before all things he will be perpetually intent on philoſophy,

philoſophy, and will daily procure for himſelf ſuch nutriment, as may eſpecially render him docile, of a good memory, and able to reaſon; living ſoberly, and hating intoxication.

But thoſe that are not lovers of wiſdom in reality, but are coloured over with opinions, like thoſe whoſe bodies are burnt by the ſun, when they perceive what a multitude of diſciplines, what mighty labour, and what temperate food are requiſite, to the acquiſition of philoſophy, ſuch as theſe, thinking that philoſophy is a thing difficult and impoſſible for them to obtain, cannot be brought to make it the object of their purſuit. But ſome of theſe perſuade themſelves, that they have ſufficiently heard the whole of philoſophy, and that they require nothing further. This mode of experiment is perſpicuous and moſt ſafe, when employed upon the effeminate, and ſuch as are incapable of enduring labour: for thus they can never accuſe him who points out to them the arduouſneſs of the undertaking, but muſt blame themſelves as unable to engage in all that is requiſite to the acquiſition of philoſophy.

This method of examination I employed upon Dionyſius; but I neither enumerated all the requiſites, nor did Dionyſius require that I ſhould. For there were many things, and thoſe of the greateſt conſequence, in which he pretended to be ſufficiently knowing, through the depraved doctrines which he had heard from others. But I am informed that he afterwards wrote about the things which he then heard, as if the compoſition was the reſult of his own art, when at the ſame time it contained nothing of his own. However, I am entirely ignorant as to the truth of this report. But I know that certain others have written about the ſame things, though without underſtanding what they wrote.

Thus much however I ſhall ſay reſpecting all thoſe who either have written, or ſhall write, affirming that they know thoſe things which are the objects of my ſtudy, (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they have diſcovered them themſelves,) that they have not heard any thing about theſe particulars conformable to my opinion: for I never have written, nor ever ſhall write, about them. For a thing of this kind[1] cannot be expreſſed by words like other diſciplines, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itſelf, a light as it were leaping from

[1] Plato here means by *a thing of this kind*, true being, the proper object of intellect.

a fire

a fire will on a ſudden be enkindled in the ſoul, and there itſelf nouriſh itſelf. Indeed, thus much I know, that things which have been written or ſaid by me, have been ſaid in the beſt manner; and I do not feel the ſmalleſt degree of pain from things being aſcribed to me that are badly written.

But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am ſpeaking could be ſufficiently communicated to the multitude by writing or ſpeech, what could we accompliſh more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, ſo as to be obvious to all men? I think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from ſome ſmall veſtiges previouſly demonſtrated are themſelves able to diſcover theſe abſtruſe particulars. But with reſpect to the reſt of mankind, ſome it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they ſhould now learn certain excellent things. I intend, therefore, to ſpeak further about theſe particulars: for thus perhaps I ſhall ſay ſomething clearer reſpecting them than I have yet ſaid. For there is a certain true diſcourſe which is adverſe to him, who dares to write about things of this kind, and which has often been delivered by me before, and as it ſeems muſt be delivered by me at preſent.

There are three things belonging to each of thoſe particulars through which ſcience is neceſſarily produced. But the fourth is ſcience itſelf. And it is requiſite to eſtabliſh as the fifth that which is known and true. One of theſe is the name of a thing; the ſecond its definition; the third the reſemblance; the fourth ſcience. Now take each of theſe, deſiring to learn what we have lately aſſerted, and think as follows concerning them all. A circle is called ſomething, whoſe name we have juſt expreſſed. After this follows its definition, compoſed from nouns and verbs. For that which every where is equally diſtant from the extremes to the middle, is the definition of that which we ſignify by the name of a round, and a circumference, and a circle. But the third is the circle which may be painted, or blotted out, which may be made by a wheel, or deſtroyed. None of which affections, the circle itſelf, which each of theſe reſpects, ſuffers, as being of a different nature. But the fourth is ſcience and intellect, and true opinion about theſe. And the whole of this again muſt be eſtabliſhed as one thing which neither ſub-

ſiſts

ſiſts in voice, nor in corporeal figures, but is inherent in ſoul[1]. It is therefore manifeſt, that this fourth is different from the nature itſelf[2] of the circle, and again different from the three we have previouſly mentioned. But among the number of theſe, intellect, by its relation and ſimilitude, proximately adheres to the fifth, while the reſt are more remote from its nature. The ſame may likewiſe be affirmed of a ſtraight and crooked figure, of colour, and of the good, the beautiful, and the juſt. And again of every body, whether faſhioned by the hand, or the work of nature, whether fire or water, and the reſt of this kind; likewiſe of every animal, and the manners of ſouls; and of all actions and paſſions. For unleſs among theſe ſome one after a manner receives that fourth, he will never perfectly participate the ſcience about the fifth. For, in addition to what has been ſaid, theſe four no leſs endeavour to evince about every thing the quality which it poſſeſſes; but likewiſe its being, through the imbecility of reaſons. On this account, no one endued with intellect will ever dare to conſider as equally immutable, things which are the objects of intellectual viſion, and ſuch as have a ſubſiſtence in corporeal figures.

But again, it is requiſite to attend to what we have juſt now ſaid. Every circle, which by the hands of men is either painted, or faſhioned by a wheel, is plainly contrary to our fifth: for it every where participates of the right line. But we muſt affirm that the circle itſelf has neither more nor leſs of any thing whatever; that is, it poſſeſſes in itſelf nothing of a contrary nature. Beſides, none of theſe is endued with any ſtability of name: for nothing hinders our applying the appellation of ſtraight to that which we now denominate round, and calling the ſtraight by the denomination of the round; nor will there be any leſs ſtability in theſe, when their names are changed into the contrary. The ſame reaſoning is likewiſe true of definition, ſince it is compoſed from nouns and verbs which poſſeſs no ſtability. And in a variety of ways it may be proved, that no one of theſe four is certain and firm. But the greateſt thing of all, as I juſt before obſerved, is

[1] Viz. in the dianoëtic part of the ſoul: for the forms, or eſſential reaſons ſubſiſting in this part, are the objects of ſcience.

[2] For the circle itſelf is an *intellectual form*, and is not to be apprehended by the diſcurſive energies of the dianoëtic part, but by the ſimple projections of intellect.

this, that ſince there are two things, eſſence and quality, when the ſoul ſeeks to know not the quality of a thing, but what it is, unleſs it firſt inveſtigates each of theſe four, and ſufficiently diſcuſſes them by a reaſoning proceſs and ſenſible inſpection, and this continually through every thing which is aſſerted and ſhown, it will be filled, as I may ſay, with all poſſible ambiguity and obſcurity.

In ſuch things therefore, as through a depraved education we are not accuſtomed to inveſtigate the truth, but are contented with an image exhibited to our view, we do not become ridiculous to each other, when being interrogated, we are able to diſcuſs and argue about thoſe four. But in ſuch particulars as we are compelled to ſeparate that fifth from other things, and evince its nature, he who wiſhes to ſubvert what we have evinced, vanquiſhes, and cauſes him who explains this fifth, either by ſpeech, or writing, or anſwers, to appear to the multitude of his hearers entirely ignorant of the things about which he attempts either to write or ſpeak; men ſometimes being ignorant, that it is not the ſoul of the writer or ſpeaker that is confuted, but the nature of each of the above-mentioned four particulars, when it is badly affected. But the proceſſion through all theſe, and the tranſition to each upwards and downwards, ſcarcely at length produces the ſcience of that which naturally ſubſiſts in an excellent condition, in the ſoul of one naturally well affected. But when any one is naturally ill affected, as is the caſe with the habit of ſoul poſſeſſed by the multitude, who are badly diſpoſed, with reſpect to learning, and whoſe manners are depraved, not even Lynceus himſelf can enable ſuch as theſe to ſee. But in one word, neither docility nor memory will confer on any one the power of perceiving things of this kind, who is not allied to them: for they are not inherent from the firſt in foreign habits. So that thoſe who are not naturally adapted and allied to what is juſt, and other things that are beautiful, though they may be docile, and of a good memory with reſpect to other particulars; and again, thoſe that are allied to the juſt and beautiful, but are indocile and of a bad memory, will never learn, as far as it is poſſible to learn, the truth pertaining to virtue and vice. For it is neceſſary to learn this, and at the ſame time the falſehood and truth of the whole of eſſence, with all poſſible exerciſe, and a great length of time, as I ſaid in the beginning. But after agitating together the ſeveral names and reaſons, and ſenſible perceptions of theſe things, confuting

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in a benevolent manner, and employing queſtions and anſwers without envy, then ſtriving as much as is poſſible to human power, prudence and intellect about each of theſe will ſcarcely at length ſhine forth.

On this account, every worthy man will be very far from writing[1] about things truly worthy, as he will thus ſubject himſelf to envy and ambiguity. But, in one word, it is requiſite to know from theſe things, that when any one ſees the writings of another, whether of a legiſlator on the laws, or on certain other ſubjects, he will ſee that theſe are not ſuch writings as are conſidered by him to be the moſt worthy of all others, if he is himſelf a worthy character: but the objects of his purſuit are ſituated in a moſt beautiful region. And if he ſhould find in writings ſuch things as truly deſerve the higheſt regard, it might then be ſaid, that not the gods indeed, but men deſtroy the intellects of men. And thus much for this fable and digreſſion, which he who acutely follows will well underſtand.

Whether therefore Dionyſius has written any thing about the higheſt and firſt natures, or any other perſon inferior or ſuperior to him, according to my deciſion, he has neither heard nor learnt any thing ſound reſpecting theſe natures; for otherwiſe he would have venerated them in the ſame manner as I do, and would not have dared to hurl them into incongruity and indecency. For he could not write about them, for the ſake of recalling them to his memory; as there is no occaſion to fear that any one will ever forget them, when they are once comprehended by the ſoul: for they lie in the ſhorteſt ſpace of all things. But perhaps he did this for the ſake of baſe ambition, either aſſerting that theſe doctrines were his own, or as partaking of diſcipline of which he was unworthy to partake, loving the renown which ariſes from ſuch participation.

Perhaps, however, we may allow that Dionyſius has written about theſe things, if what he has aſſerted was produced by one converſation. But, O Jupiter, ſays the Theban, how was it produced! For I diſcuſſed theſe things with him as I have ſaid, and only once; but never afterwards. In the next place, he who is anxious to find out the cauſe of what then happened reſpecting theſe things, ought to know why we did not diſcuſs them a ſecond and a third time, and often: whether it was that Dionyſius, having only heard them

[1] Viz. he will be unwilling to write perſpicuouſly about the moſt ſublime truths, unleſs the age in which he lives renders it neceſſary ſo to do, in order to preſerve them to poſterity.

once, thought that he knew them, and knew them ſufficiently, or that he diſcovered them himſelf, or had formerly learnt them from others. Or was it that he thought the things that were ſaid were trifling? Or did a certain third thing happen to be the caſe, viz. that they were in reality too great for him, who was ſolicitous to lead a life of prudence and virtue? For if it is ſaid that he conſidered the things about which he wrote as trifling, this will be oppoſed by many witneſſes who aſſert the contrary, and who are much better judges about things of this kind than Dionyſius. But if he invented them, or learnt them, and they deſerve to be made ſubſervient to the diſcipline of a liberal ſoul, is it not wonderful that he ſhould ſo readily deſpiſe the leader and maſter of theſe things?

But how he deſpiſed him I will now relate. Not long after this he would not permit the procurators of Dion to ſend that portion of his wealth to Peloponneſus, which ſome time before he had ſuffered him to poſſeſs and enjoy, as if he had entirely forgotten the letter which he wrote to me. For he aſſerted that this property did not belong to Dion, but to Dion's ſon, who, as he was his own grandſon, was according to law underr his protection. And ſuch were the tranſactions of that time.

From hence, however, we may accurately ſee how Dionyſius was affected towards philoſophy; and it is lawful for me to be indignant whether I am willing or not: for it was then ſummer, and the time for ſhips to ſail. But it ſeemed that I ought not to be more offended with Dionyſius than myſelf, and with thoſe who compelled me to come the third time to the ſtrait about Scylla, and

"Dire Charybdis meaſure o'er again[1]."

I was therefore forced to tell Dionyſius, that it was impoſſible for me to ſtay with him while Dion was uſed ſo ignominiouſly. But he conſoled me, and requeſted me to ſtay; thinking it would not be well for him that I ſhould be ſo ſwift a meſſenger of ſuch tranſactions as theſe: and when he could not perſuade me, he ſaid he would prepare my diſmiſſion. However, being enraged, I was determined to depart in a fleet of ſhips, thinking that I ought to ſuffer every thing, if he ſhould attempt to ſtop me; as I was manifeſtly injured, though I had done no injury. But when he found that I could not by any

[1] Odyſſ. lib. xii. v. 428.

means

means be induced to ſtay, he deviſed the following mean to retard my depar-ture. On the day after theſe things had taken place, he thus plauſibly addreſſed me: Dion, ſays he, and the affairs of Dion, about which we have often diſagreed, ſhall be entirely removed from you and me; for on your account I will act as follows towards Dion. I think it fit that he ſhall take up his reſidence in Peloponneſus, not as an exile, but as one who may come hither, when it ſhall ſeem good to him, to me, and to you who are his friend. This ſhall take place, if he forms no ſtratagems againſt me; and you, your familiars, and the familiars of Dion, that are here, ſhall be bound for his fulfilling this agreement. But the money which he may receive ſhall be depoſited n Peloponneſus and Athens, with thoſe you ſhall think fit: Dion too ſhall enjoy the benefit of this money, but ſhall not be authorized to take it away without your conſent; for I ſhould not very much believe that juſtice would be done to me, if he had the entire poſſeſſion of this wealth, which is not inconſiderable. But I have greater confidence in you and your familiars. See, therefore, whether theſe things are agreeable to you, and ſtay for the ſake of them this year, at the expiration of which you ſhall receive this money and depart. I well know, indeed, that Dion will be greatly indebted to you for acting in this manner on his account.

When I heard theſe things, I was perfectly indignant, but at the ſame time I ſaid that I would conſider the affair, and give him my opinion on the following day. This was our compact at that time. I therefore conſulted with myſelf after this, but in a very confuſed manner; but the following conſideration firſt preſented itſelf to me, as the leader of my conſultation: What if Dionyſius intends to do nothing of what he promiſes to do, but on my departure both he and many others ſhould write in a plauſible manner to Dion, what he has now ſaid to me, that he indeed was willing, but that I was unwilling he ſhould act in this manner, and that I entirely neglected his concerns; and beſides this, if Dionyſius, being unwilling I ſhould depart, ſhould give no orders to any pilot, but ſhould eaſily ſignify to all men, that he did not conſent to my ſetting ſail, what ſailor would be willing to take me on board, from the palace of Dionyſius? For, in addition to other evils, I dwelt in the garden which ſurrounded the palace; from whence the porter would not be willing to diſmiſs me, without an order from Dionyſius. But if I ſtay another year, I can indeed ſend an account of theſe tranſactions to Dion, and acquaint him with my

my ſituation and conduct. And if indeed Dionyſius ſhould do any thing of what he promiſes to do, my conduct will be not entirely ridiculous: for perhaps the property of Dion, when rightly eſtimated, does not amount to leſs than a hundred talents[1]. But if the iſſue of affairs ſhould be ſuch as it is likely to be, I ſhall be at a loſs how to act. At the ſame time, it is perhaps neceſſary that I ſhould ſtay a year longer, and endeavour in reality to fruſtrate the machinations of Dionyſius.

Thus thinking with myſelf, I told Dionyſius, on the following day, that I thought it beſt to ſtay; but I ſaid he ought not to conſider me as poſſeſſing abſolute authority over Dion. I added, that he ſhould write to Dion in conjunction with me, acquainting him with the compact we had made, and aſking him whether he was ſatisfied with theſe things, and with me, and whether he wiſhed for any thing further. Laſtly, that he ſhould write to him as ſoon as poſſible, and ſhould not make any innovation in his affairs. This is what was ſaid, and theſe are nearly the things in which we agreed.

But after this the ſhips ſailed, and therefore it was no longer poſſible for me to depart. Dionyſius, therefore, as if recollecting ſomething he had omitted, ſaid that the half of Dion's property ought to remain with his ſon, and that the other half ſhould be ſent to Dion. This property, he ſaid, he would ſell, and when he had ſold it, deliver one half to me to be ſent to Dion, and keep the other half for his ſon; for he added, it will be moſt juſt to act in this manner. I therefore, being ſtruck with what he ſaid, thought it would be entirely ridiculous to ſay any thing further. At the ſame time, however, I obſerved to him, that we ought to wait for an anſwer from Dion, and again ſend him an account of theſe particulars. But Dionyſius, after this, in a very juvenile manner, ſold the whole of Dion's property to whom and for what he pleaſed, without making any mention of it whatever to me: and again I in like manner ſaid nothing to him reſpecting the affairs of Dion; for I thought I ſhould be able to do nothing further in them. And thus far I gave aſſiſtance both to philoſophy and my friends.

But after this, I and Dionyſius ſo lived together, that I like a bird was always looking out, and longing to fly away, but he was deviſing after what manner he might prevent my flight, and gave up no part of the property of

[1] i. e. upwards of 13,300l.

Dion.

Dion. At the ſame time, however, we were ſaid to be ſociable through the whole of Sicily. But at that period, Dionyſius endeavoured to diminiſh the pay of the mercenaries, contrary to the cuſtom of his father; and the ſoldiers being enraged, aſſembled in a body, and declared this ſhould not take place. Dionyſius therefore endeavoured to force them to ſubmiſſion, and for this purpoſe ſhut the gates of the acropolis: but the ſoldiers immediately marched to the walls, vociferating a certain barbarous and warlike pæon; at which Dionyſius being terrified, granted the ſoldiers all they deſired, and thoſe that carried creſcent ſhields more than their uſual pay. But a report was rapidly ſpread that Heraclides was the cauſe of this diſturbance; upon hearing which, Heraclides immediately diſappeared. Dionyſius therefore endeavoured to take him; but not being able to diſcover his place of retreat, he ordered Theodotes to attend him in the gardens, in which at that time I happened to be walking. Other parts, therefore, of their diſcourſe I neither known or heard; but what Theodotes ſaid to Dionyſius before me I both know and remember. For he ſaid, Plato, I am perſuading Dionyſius, that if I were able to bring Heraclides hither, he would anſwer to the crimes which are now laid to his charge: and if it does not appear fit to Dionyſius that he ſhould dwell in Sicily, yet I think it is proper that, receiving his wife and ſon, he ſhould be permitted to ſet ſail for Peloponneſus, and there reſide, not injuring Dionyſius in any reſpect, and enjoying his own property. I have therefore, prior to this, ſent, and ſhall again ſend for him. But whether he complies with my firſt or ſecond citation, I think it proper that he ſhould receive no injury, either here or in the ſuburbs, but that he ſhall be ſent out of the kingdom, till Dionyſius ſhall think fit to recall him; and I requeſt Dionyſius to accede to theſe terms. Do you accede or not? ſays he, ſpeaking to Dionyſius. He anſwered, I do accede; nor ſhall he ſuffer any thing worſe than what has now been mentioned, though he ſhould make his appearance in your houſe.

However, on the evening of the following day, Eurybius and Theodotes came to me in great haſte and wonderfully alarmed: and Theodotes ſaid to me, Plato, was you not a witneſs yeſterday to the compact which Dionyſius made with me and you reſpecting Heraclides? To which I replied, Undoubtedly I was. But now, ſays he, the ſoldiers with creſcent ſhields are running every where in order to take Heraclides, and there is reaſon to fear that

that he is concealed at no great diſtance. Attend us therefore to Dionyſius with every poſſible artifice. In conſequence of this, we followed and came to him; and they indeed ſtood ſilent and weeping; but I ſaid, Theſe men, Dionyſius, are afraid leſt you ſhould make ſome alteration reſpecting Heraclides, contrary to your compact yeſterday: for it appears to me that he is evidently at no great diſtance from hence. But Dionyſius on hearing this was violently enraged, and his countenance exhibited all various colours, ſuch as anger produces: but Theodotes falling at his feet, and taking his hand, wept, and ſuppliantly implored him not to do any ſuch thing. Then I, reſuming the diſcourſe, conſoled him and ſaid, Take courage, Theodotes, for Dionyſius dares not to act contrary to the compact which he made yeſterday. But he looking at me, and in a very tyrannic manner, With you, ſays he, I made no compact, neither great nor ſmall. To which I replied, By the gods, you promiſed me, that you would not do the very things, which this man now requeſts you not to do. Having thus ſaid, I turned from him and left the place.

After this Dionyſius endeavoured to find Heraclides: however, Theodotes ſent meſſengers to him, and exhorted him to fly. But Dionyſius ſent Tiſias and the ſoldiers with the creſcent ſhields, and ordered them to purſue him. Heraclides, however, as it is ſaid, eſcaped their purſuit, and in the ſmall part of a day fled into the dominions of the Carthaginians. But now, from the enmity towards me which this occaſioned, Dionyſius appeared to have a pretext for doing that which, for a long time, he had been attempting to accompliſh by ſtratagem, I mean, withholding the property of Dion. And in the firſt place he ſent me from the acropolis, pretending it was requiſite that the women ſhould perform a ſacrifice, which laſts for ten days, in the gardens in which I reſided. He therefore ordered me at that time to take up my reſidence, out of the acropolis, with Archidemus: but when I was there, Theodotes ſending for me, was indignant at many of the then tranſactions, and complained of Dionyſius. But Dionyſius hearing that I had been with Theodotes, made this another pretext of enmity towards me, ſimilar to the former, and ſent a certain perſon to aſk me, whether I had really been with Theodotes at his requeſt. To which I readily replied, I had. The meſſenger therefore ſaid, Dionyſius ordered me to tell you, that you by no means do well, in always preferring to him Dion and the friends of Dion. This is

what

what was ſaid; and after this Dionyſius never again ſent for me to his palace, as it was now clear that I was the friend of Theodotes and Heraclides, and an enemy to him; and he no longer conſidered me as well affected towards him, becauſe the property of Dion was entirely conſumed.

After this I dwelt out of the acropolis among the mercenary ſoldiers: but as well others as certain Athenian citizens, who acted as ſervants to Dionyſius, came to me and informed me that I was calumniated by the ſoldiers. And beſides this, certain perſons threatened to kill me, if they could apprehend me. I deviſed therefore the following means of preſervation: I ſent to Archytas, and other friends at Tarentum, and informed them of my ſituation: but they, under the pretext of a certain embaſſy from the city, ſent Lamiſcus, who was one of my friends, with a galley of thirty ranks; and he, on his arrival, informed Dionyſius that I wiſhed to depart, and deſired him by all means to grant my requeſt. To this Dionyſius aſſented, and diſmiſſed me with a paſſport. However, I neither aſked for the money belonging to Dion, nor did any one give it me.

But when I came to Peloponneſus to the Olympic games, I there met with Dion, who was beholding the celebration of them, and informed him of the paſt tranſactions; but he, calling Jupiter to witneſs, immediately declared to me, and my domeſtics and friends, that he would prepare to puniſh Dionyſius, both on account of his deceiving me, while I was his gueſt (for thus he ſaid and thought), and expelling and baniſhing him unjuſtly. On hearing this, I perſuaded him to call his friends if he were willing. But I ſaid, as to myſelf, ſince you have forced me after a manner, together with others, to become the companion and gueſt of Dionyſius, and a partaker with him of ſacred rites, he will doubtleſs think that I ought to conduct myſelf as an equitable medium between both parties, eſpecially ſince, when I was accuſed by many of forming ſtratagems in conjunction with you againſt him and his tyranny, he did not put me to death, though he was not prevented from doing ſo by fear. To this I added, that my age rendered me unfit to engage in the concerns of war; and that I ſhould act as a mediator between them, if at any time their friendſhip would require the aſſiſtance of a conciliator. But I informed them, that as long as they were averſe to each other, they muſt call others to their aſſiſtance. I ſaid theſe things, in conſequence of hating my wandering and adverſe fortune about Sicily.

However, as they were not perſuaded by the arguments which I adduced, they have been the cauſes of all the evils that exiſt at preſent. Indeed, if Dionyſius had given to Dion the property which was his due, or if he had been perfectly reconciled to him, we may ſay, as far as the condition of human affairs permits us to judge, that nothing adverſe would have happened: for I could eaſily have kept Dion from hoſtile meaſures, both by my will and power. But now, being impelled againſt each other, they fill all things with evils; though indeed Dion had the ſame wiſh, which I ſhould ſay both I and every other moderate perſon ought to have, reſpecting his own power, and that of his friends, and reſpecting his own city, I mean the wiſh to benefit when in authority, and when in the greateſt power to impart the greateſt benefits. But this will not be effected by him who endeavours to enrich himſelf and his friends, who forms ſtratagems againſt the city, and being poor collects together conſpirators, and having no dominion over himſelf is through timidity vanquiſhed by pleaſure: who beſides this flays thoſe that are wealthy, calling them enemies, ſeizes their wealth, and at the ſame time proclaims to his adjutants and aſſociates, that no one ought to accuſe him, as he is poor. After the ſame manner, he who benefits his city will be honoured by it, in conſequence of diſtributing by decrees the property of a few among the many. And this will likewiſe be the caſe, when any one governing a great city, and at the ſame time many leſſer cities, unjuſtly diſtributes to his own city the wealth of the leſſer. For after this manner, neither Dion, nor any other perſon, would ever voluntarily take upon them an authority, which would always be pernicious to himſelf and poſterity; but he will endeavour to eſtabliſh ſuch a polity, and ſuch laws, as are the moſt juſt, and the beſt, and which can be affected by the feweſt deaths and baniſhments.

This conduct indeed was now adopted by Dion, who preferred ſuffering things impious to the commiſſion of them; but who, at the ſame time that he was cautious leſt he ſhould ſuffer them, fell, after he had arrived at the ſummit of advantage over his enemies. Nor did he in this ſuffer any thing wonderful: for the ſoul of a pious man will never be wholly deceived reſpecting things impious, temperate, and prudent. But neither perhaps is it wonderful, if the ſame thing has happened to him as to a good pilot, from whom the future ſtorm is not entirely concealed, but who may be ignorant of a ſudden tempeſt, which is of an unexpected magnitude, and by which he may be violently overwhelmed.

overwhelmed. After the ſame manner, through the feweſt circumſtances, was Dion deceived: for he was not entirely ignorant that his enemies were bad men, though he was unacquainted with the profundity of their ignorance, and of the reſt of their depravity and voracity. Through being deceived in this he fell, and by his fall involved Sicily in infinite grief. What therefore I adviſe you to do, after the preſent relation of theſe particulars, I have already nearly mentioned. But it appeared to me neceſſary to ſhow on what account I came a ſecond time to Sicily, through the abſurdity and irrationality with which this circumſtance ſeems to be attended. If, therefore, what has been now ſaid ſhall appear to any one to be reaſonable, and if he ſhould think that I had a ſufficient pretext for undertaking this voyage, the contents of this Epiſtle will alſo be ſufficient.

EPISTLE VIII.

PLATO to the Kindred and Familiars of DION—Proſperity.

AS I perceive that affairs are in a very proſperous condition, I will endeavour, as far as I am able, to ſend you a true account of them. But I hope I ſhall not only, in the firſt place, give you ſalutary advice, but, in the ſecond place, all thoſe that are in Syracuſe; and, in the third place, your enemies and adverſaries, except ſome one of them ſhall have been guilty of an impious deed. For theſe things are incurable, and can never be expiated. But conſider what I now ſay.

The tyranny being diſſolved, all Sicily is at ſtrife about theſe very things. And ſome wiſh to reſtore again the former government, but others to bring the tyranny entirely to an end, while in the mean time the ſeveral plans about things of this kind appear to the multitude to be right, ſo long as they tend to injure their enemies, and benefit their friends, in the higheſt degree. It is however by no means eaſy for him who inflicts many evils on others not to ſuffer many himſelf. Nor is it neceſſary, in order to ſee this clearly, to ſearch for examples at a great diſtance, ſince the circumſtances which have now taken place about Sicily are ſufficient for this purpoſe: for ſome attempt to injure, and others to take vengeance on the injurers. But you are ſufficiently acquainted with theſe particulars, to be able to teach them to others. In theſe things, therefore, there is nearly no difficulty. But what is advantageous to all enemies and friends, or what is the leaſt noxious to both, this it is neither eaſy to perceive, nor, when ſeen, to accompliſh. Indeed this conſultation and inquiry appears to reſemble prayer. Let it therefore be in every reſpect a certain prayer. For *it is requiſite to begin every thing from the gods, both in ſpeaking and underſtanding.* But when brought to a concluſion, it will ſignify to us the following diſcourſe.

From the time that the war began to the end of it, one alliance nearly ruled over both you and your enemies; an alliance which your fathers once eſtabliſhed,

eſtabliſhed, in conſequence of being involved in the greateſt difficulties, at that time when the Sicily of the Greeks was expoſed to the extreme danger of becoming the prey of Barbarians, through being entirely ſubverted by the Carthaginians. For then they choſe Dionyſius, as being a young man, and ſtrenuous in ſuch warlike affairs as were properly adapted to him. But they gave him as an adviſer Hipparinus, who was his ſenior: and for the ſafety of Sicily, inveſting theſe two with abſolute power, they denominated them, as they ſay, tyrants. And whether any one is willing to think that a divine fortune and a god, or the virtue of the governors, or both, together with the citizens of that time, were the cauſe of the ſafety of Sicily, let this be juſt as he pleaſes. Safety, however, to the men of that time, was thus obtained. As therefore they conducted themſelves in this manner, it is juſt that thoſe who were ſaved ſhould return them thanks. But if the tyranny afterwards improperly uſed any gift of the city, for this it has partly been accuſed, and partly has ſuffered puniſhment. Certain puniſhments, therefore, have neceſſarily been properly inflicted on them for their conduct. For if you could either avoid them, without great danger and labour, or they could eaſily recover the antient government, we ſhould not adviſe you to do ſuch things as we ſhall perſuade you to do hereafter. But now it is proper that both of you ſhould underſtand and call to mind, how often you have been in hope of obtaining your deſire, and have thought that but little was wanting to the accompliſhment of all things according to your intention. However, this little that was wanting became every where the cauſe of great and infinite evils, and has not yet arrived at any end. But the antient evils always adhere together, and though the end preſents itſelf to the view, yet a new beginning continually ſprings forth. The whole too of the tyrannic and popular genus appears to have periſhed under this circle. But if that which it ſeems reaſonable to expect, though of an execrable nature, ſhould take place, all Sicily nearly will become deſtitute of the Greek tongue, in conſequence of being transferred to a certain Phœnician or Opic[1] dynaſty and power. All the Greeks, therefore, with all poſſible diligence and earneſtneſs, ought to bring a remedy for theſe things. If indeed any one can give better adviſe than that which I ſhall give, he may with the greateſt rectitude be called a lover of Greece.

[1] The Opici were the antient inhabitants of Campania.

But

But I will now endeavour, with all poſſible freedom of ſpeech, and making uſe of a certain common and juſt mode of diſcourſe, to evince to you what appears to me to be the truth. I ſhall however for this purpoſe ſpeak in the character of an arbitrator, and according to my antient cuſtom give advice both to him who tyrannizes and him who is ſubject to tyranny. And now, in the firſt place, I adviſe every tyrant to fly from the appellation, and the thing itſelf, and change his tyranny, if poſſible, into a kingdom. But it is poſſible, as the wiſe and good Lycurgus evinced in reality: for he, when he ſaw that the race of his kindred in Argos and Meſſene had arrived from the power of kings to that of tyrants, and that they were deſtroying both themſelves and the city,—he, I ſay, fearing both for his country and race, applied a remedy, by introducing the government of elderly men, and the diviſion of the Ephori, as the means of preſerving the royal government. And it is owing to this that it has been preſerved for ſo many generations with glory; ſince here law became the proper king of men, and men did not tyrannize over the laws. To effect this indeed my preſent diſcourſe perſuades all men, exhorting thoſe that aſpire after tyranny to turn and fly, with an unwearied celerity, from the felicity of hungry and ſtupid men, and endeavour to transfer themſelves to a royal form of government, become ſubſervient to royal laws, and thus obtain the greateſt honours with the conſent both of men and the laws.

But I adviſe thoſe that purſue free manners, and avoid a ſervile yoke as an evil, to be cautious leſt, through an inſatiable avidity of a certain unſeaſonable liberty, they fall into the diſeaſe of their anceſtors, who, through an unmeaſured love of freedom, ſuffered all the evils of extreme anarchy. For thoſe that governed in Sicily before Dionyſius and Hipparinus, lived as they thought happily, becauſe they lived luxuriouſly, and governed even governors themſelves. They likewiſe diſſolved the authority of the twelve military chiefs prior to Dionyſius, and judged no one according to law, that they might not be ſubject to any one who governed either with juſtice or law. But they were in every reſpect entirely free, and on this account they became ſubject to tyrannic governments. For both ſlavery and freedom when they are tranſcendent, are attended with every evil. But when they ſubſiſt according to meaſure, they are attended with every good. And the ſervice of divinity is attended with meaſure, but that of men is without meaſure.

Divinity

Divinity too is the law to temperate men, but pleaſure to the intemperate.

Since theſe things, therefore, naturally ſubſiſt in this manner, I exhort that the advice which I give to the friends of Dion be given to all the Syracuſians, as the common advice of Dion and myſelf. But I will unfold what he while living and able ſaid. Though perhaps ſome one may inquire what the advice of Dion has to do with the preſent affairs. Hear:—"O Syracuſians, receive before all things ſuch laws as appear to you to be neither conducive to gain, nor the gratification of your deſires; but as there are three things, viz. ſoul, body, and riches, it is requiſite that the care of the ſoul ſhould rank in the firſt place; that of the body in the ſecond place, ſituated under the care belonging to the ſoul; and, in the third place, the honour pertaining to riches, as in a ſtate of ſervitude to both body and ſoul. The divine inſtitution effecting theſe things, will be a law rightly eſtabliſhed for you, and rendering thoſe by whom it is uſed truly happy. But the diſcourſe which calls the rich happy, is itſelf miſerable and ſtupid, is the diſcourſe of women and children, and renders thoſe that are perſuaded by it like itſelf. Indeed, that theſe things to which I exhort you are true, you will know in reality, if you have taſted of what has now been ſaid by me reſpecting laws. But a moſt true examination appears to have taken place reſpecting all things. However, ſuch laws being received, ſince Sicily is in danger, and you neither ſufficiently vanquiſh, nor are remarkably vanquiſhed, it will perhaps be juſt and advantageous to all of you to purſue the middle path, as well for thoſe of you that avoid the ſeverity of government, as for thoſe of you that deſire its reſtoration. For your anceſtors formerly, which is a thing of the greateſt conſequence, preſerved the Greeks from the Barbarians; ſo that it is now lawful to diſcourſe concerning the preſent polity. For if at that time the Greeks had periſhed, we could neither have diſcourſed in any reſpect concerning them, nor would any hope whatever have remained. Now therefore to ſome let there be liberty in conjunction with a royal government; but to others in ſubjection to it; the laws at the ſame time having dominion not only over the other citizens, but over kings themſelves, whenever they are found to act contrary to law. But in all theſe affairs, eſtabliſh kings in conjunction with the gods, with a mind ſound and free from guile.

And,

And, in the firſt place, eſtabliſh my ſon [1] on a two-fold account, viz. for my ſake, andfor the ſake of my father. For he at that time freed the city from the Barbarians: but I freed it twice from tyrants, as you yourſelves can teſtify. But, in the ſecond place, make him a king, who has the ſame name [2] with my father, I mean the ſon of Dionyſius: and this do for the ſake of the aſſiſtance which he now affords, and on account of his pious manners; for though he is the ſon of a tyrant, yet he has voluntarily liberated the city; and has thus procured for himſelf and his race ever-living honour, inſtead of the tranſient and unjuſt renown of a tyranny. In the third place, it is proper to invite willingly to the kingdom of the Syracuſians, the city alſo being willing, Dionyſius the ſon [3] of Dionyſius, who is now the general of the enemy's army, if he aſſents to the kingly form of government, fearing the changes of fortune, commiſerating his country, and paying due reverence to temples and ſepulchres; leſt through a love of contention he ſhould involve all things in ruin, and thus gratify the Barbarians by the deſtruction of his country.

Theſe three kings, therefore, whether you give or deprive them of a Lacedæmonian power, you ſhould by common conſent eſtabliſh after the manner which I have before mentioned to you, and which now again hear: If the offspring of Dionyſius and Hipparinus are willing, for the ſafety of Sicily, that the preſent calamities ſhould ceaſe, and are thus deſirous to procure honours for themſelves and their race, both for the future and preſent time, on this condition, as I have before ſaid, call them to the government, inveſting with the power of making a reconciliation, ſuch ambaſſadors as they ſhall think fit for the purpoſe, whether they are choſen from among yourſelves, or from other cities, or from both; and beſides this, as many as they ſhall chooſe to allow.

Theſe, in the firſt place, ſhould eſtabliſh laws and a polity, in which it will be requiſite that the kings ſhould be lords of the ſacred, and ſuch other concerns as ought to be entruſted to the benefactors of their country. Guardians of the laws too ſhould be created, thirty-five in number, and

[1] Dion, who is here ſuppoſed to be ſpeaking, means his ſon Hipparinus.

[2] Viz. Hipparinus, the ſon of Hipparinus.

[3] Viz. the ſon of the ſecond Dionyſius.

theſe,

theſe, together with the people and ſenate, ſhould be the governors of war and peace. There ſhould likewiſe be different courts of juſtice: and the thirty-five guardians of the laws ſhould be the judges of death and baniſhment. And beſides theſe, judges ſhould be choſen from thoſe that acted laſt in the capacity of governors; ſo that one who appears to be the beſt and the moſt juſt ſhould be choſen from each government. Theſe too, on the following year, muſt judge ſuch of the citizens as deſerve death, or impriſonment, or exile. But the king ſhall not be permitted to be a judge of theſe deciſions, as being a prieſt, and conſequently purified from murder, bonds, and exile. While living, I conceived that theſe things ſhould take place, and I think ſo at preſent. And then indeed, in conjunction with you, I ſhould have vanquiſhed my enemies, if foreigners and the furies had not prevented me from effecting what I intended to effect.

In the next place, if the event of things had anſwered my expectations, I ſhould have cauſed the reſt of Sicily to be inhabited, after having expelled the Barbarians from the places which they now occupy, ſuch of them however being excepted as fought for the common liberty againſt the tyranny. I ſhould likewiſe have reſtored the former inhabitants of Grecian places to their antient and paternal abodes. I therefore adviſe and call upon all of you to conceive and act in the very ſame manner at preſent: and let him who is unwilling to do ſo, be conſidered in common as an enemy. But neither are theſe things ſuch as it is impoſſible to accompliſh: for he who judges thoſe things to be impoſſible, which ſubſiſt in the ſouls of two perſons, and which from reaſoning will readily be found to be the beſt of things, is by no means wiſe. But by the two, I mean the ſoul of Hipparinus the ſon of Dionyſius, and the ſoul of my ſon. For I think if theſe two agree, the other Syracuſians, and all thoſe who are lovers of their country, will likewiſe be unanimous. But paying due honours, and praying to all the gods, and to thoſe other natures whom it is proper to reverence in conjunction with the gods, and beſides this perſuading and inciting both your friends and enemies, benignantly, and in every poſſible way, do not deſiſt, till by what we have now ſaid, urging you in the ſame manner as divine dreams urge thoſe that are awake, you obtain clear evidence and proſperous fortune in perfection."

EPISTLE IX.

PLATO to ARCHYTAS the Tarentine—Proſperity.

THE familiars of Archippus and Philonides came to us, bringing with them the letter which you gave them, and relating the ſtate of your affairs. Such things therefore as pertain to the city, they accompliſhed without difficulty; for they were not in every reſpect laborious. But as to what relates to yourſelf, they ſaid that you are indignant becauſe you cannot be freed from an attention to public concerns. That it is indeed the moſt pleaſant thing in life, for a man to attend to his own affairs, eſpecially if he chooſes to act in the ſame manner as you do, is nearly obvious to every one; but you ought alſo to conſider this, that each of us is not born for himſelf alone; but that our country claims one part of our birth, our parents another part, and our friends the remaining part. Much too muſt be given to the occaſions which occupy our life. As your country, therefore, calls upon you to attend to public affairs, it would perhaps be abſurd not to obey its call: for at the ſame time too, it happens that a place is left for depraved men, who apply themſelves to politics, not from the beſt motives. But of theſe things enough.

At preſent we take care of Echecrates[1], and ſhall do ſo in future; and this for your ſake, and that of his father Phrynion, and for the ſake of the young man himſelf.

[1] This is the perſon to whom the laſt diſcourſe of Socrates was related by Phædo. See the Dialogue of that name.

EPISTLE

EPISTLE X.

PLATO to ARISTODORUS—Proſperity.

I HEAR that you are now in the moſt eminent degree the aſſociate of Dion, and that you are at all times moſt wiſe with reſpect to thoſe manners that are ſubſervient to philoſophy. For I ſay that firmneſs, faith, and integrity, conſtitute true philoſophy. But I think that other wiſdom and ſkill, which tend to other things, when denominated elegant ſubtilties, will be rightly named. But now farewell; and continue to abide in the manners in which you now abide.

EPISTLE XI.

PLATO to LAODAMAS—Proſperity.

WE have before written to you, that your coming to Athens is of great conſequence with reſpect to all you ſay. But as you declare you cannot come, if either I ſhould be able to come, or Socrates, as you mention in your letter, this will be the ſecond plan to be adopted. Socrates however, at preſent, labours under the infirmity of the ſtrangury; and it would be diſgraceful for me to go thither, if the particulars, for the ſake of which you incite me to make this journey, are not accompliſhed: but I have not much hope that they will be accompliſhed. However, to diſcuſs every particular would require a long epiſtle. And at the ſame time my body, through age, is not able to bear the fatigue of wandering, and to encounter all thoſe dangers with which the land and ſea are ſurrounded; eſpecially at the preſent time, when travelling is full of danger. But I give you as advice, that which Heſiod, through me as the relator, ſays, "that to opine is vile, but to underſtand is difficult." For if there are any who think that a city can be well eſtabliſhed by the mere promulgation of laws, without ſome one endued with authority preſiding in the city, and attending to the conduct of its inhabitants, in order that both ſlaves and the free born may be temperate and brave,—thoſe who entertain this opinion do not think rightly.

But again, if there are men among you who deſerve this authority, let them obtain it. But if there is occaſion for ſome one to inſtruct them, I think that neither he who can teach, nor thoſe who are capable of being inſtructed, are with you. All that remains, therefore, is to pray to the gods: for cities, prior to the preſent time, have been nearly conſtituted

in

in this manner. And after they have been well peopled, through the intervention of great concerns, which have taken place through war and other tranſactions, then at ſuch like ſeaſons an illuſtrious and good man has obtained a mighty power. But prior to this, it is proper and neceſſary to beſtow great attention on theſe things. Conſider what I ſay, and do not act imprudently, in conſequence of thinking that ſomething ought to be done with expedition. May proſperity attend you.

EPISTLE XII.

PLATO to ARCHYTAS the Tarentine—Proſperity.

IT is wonderful with what pleaſure we received the commentaries which came from you, and how very much we were delighted with the genius of their author. To us indeed, he appeared to be a man worthy of his antient progenitors. For thoſe men are ſaid to have been ten thouſand in number; and according to the fable, they were the beſt of all thoſe Trojans that were excited by Laomedon.

With reſpect to the commentaries by me, about which you write, they are not yet finiſhed. However, ſuch as they are, I have ſent them to you. With reſpect to guardianſhip, we both accord in our ſentiments, ſo that in this particular there is no need of exhortation[1].

[1] There is another epiſtle after this which is aſcribed to Plato, but which I have not tranſlated, becauſe it is obviouſly ſpurious. That it is ſo, will be at once evident to the intelligent reader from the following ſentence in it, της μεν γαρ σπουδαιας επιστολης θεος αρχει, θεοι δε της ηττονος, viz. "The word *god* is the beginning of a ſerious epiſtle, the word *gods* of one that is not ſo." Very properly therefore in all the early editions of Plato is the reader admoniſhed that this epiſtle is ſpurious by the word νοθευεται; and it is ſingular that Fabricius ſhould doubt whether it might not be genuine, becauſe Diogenes Laertius enumerates thirteen epiſtles of Plato, and this with the preceding makes thirteen. For of the thirteen which are extant, two, as the reader will perceive, are written by Dion.

THE END OF THE EPISTLES.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE CRATYLUS,

EXTRACTED FROM THE MS. SCHOLIA OF PROCLUS ON THAT DIALOGUE.



ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE CRATYLUS.

THE ſcope of the Cratylus* is to exhibit in things laſt the prolific energy of ſouls, and the aſſimilative power, which, eſſentially receiving, they evince through the rectitude of names. But ſince the partial energy of ſouls frequently fails of its proper ends, juſt in the ſame manner as a partial nature, hence names indefinite, and which are caſually circulated, naturally take place, and all of them are not the offſpring of intellectual ſcience, nor do they all regard an alliance with things themſelves. Again, the Cratylus is logical and dialectical, not, however, according to the mere dialectic methods of the Peripatetics, but according to the ſcientific† dialectic of the great Plato, which is only adapted to thoſe whoſe dianoëtic power is perfectly purified, who have been inſtructed from their youth in diſciplines, have purified the juvenile condition of their manners through the virtues; and, in ſhort, have genuinely philoſophized. This dialectic alſo is the defenſive encloſure of diſciplines, leads us up to *the good*, the one

* The extracts with which the reader is here presented, comprehend nearly the whole of the Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus. They may be justly called an incomparable treasury of theological information, since they are replete with the most mystic wisdom, and many of the most abstruse dogmas of antient theology are here most satisfactorily and perspicuously unfolded. To him also who is desirous of penetrating the depths of Grecian mythology, they will be inestimable; and genuine elucidations of many parts of Homer, of the Hymns of Orpheus, and of the Theogony of Hesiod, can alone be obtained from these Scholia. And in addition to all this, these Scholia are no less rare than valuable, since a copy of them is not to be found either in the university of Oxford or Cambridge, or in the British Museum, or in any of the universities of Scotland or Ireland; and it is seldom to be met with in the universities on the continent. My copy is a transcript of the manuscript now in the possession of Mr. Heber, of Brazen-nose college, Oxford.

† For an account of this dialectic, see the Parmenides, and particularly the introduction to it.

cauſe of all things, and was imparted to men through Prometheus, together with a moſt ſplendid fire * from the gods. For the analytics of the Peripatetics, and demonſtration, which is the ſummit of this, may be comprehended by all who are not entirely involved in mental darkneſs, and who have not drank abundantly of the water of oblivion.

Again, intellect is the producer (προβολευς) of dialectic, from the whole of itſelf generating the whole of it; according to the progreſſion of all things from *the one*, giving ſubſiſtence to the diviſive method; but according to the collective comprehenſion of every thing in one idiom, to the definitive method; and according to the preſence of forms with each other, though which each is what it is, and participates of other forms, the demonſtrative method; and generating the analytic method, according to the converſion of all things to *the one*, and their proper principles.

Again, according to Ariſtotle, there is one rhetoric, and one dialectic, which are able to perſuade or confute on both ſides; but Plato ſays it is better to give a two-fold diſtribution to each. For one ſpecies of rhetoric is flattery, and without art, which he reprobates in the Gorgias; but the other is the ſcience of things good and juſt, which he celebrates in the Phædrus. And again, he diſmiſſes the dialectic of Ariſtotle as contentious, but embraces the dialectic, which ſurveys the principles of things, as a part of philoſophy.

The preſent dialogue makes us to be ſcientifically knowing in the rectitude of names; and it is neceſſary that he who intends to be ſkilled in dialectic ſhould begin from this theory.

As Plato, in the Parmenides, delivers the whole of dialectic, but not merely ſo, but together with the theory of beings, ſo now he delivers the rectitude of names, together with the ſcience of things.

Plato now wiſhes to deliver the principles of things and of dialectic, ſince he delivers names in conjunction with the things of which they are names.

Why is it that Plato ſays, that by deſpiſing names we ſhall become, in old age, more rich in prudence, and yet now makes the inveſtigation of them the leading object? May we not ſay, that he conſiders them, not ſo far as they are appellations, but ſo far as they are images of things? For the definitive art is triple; ſince either beginning from the higheſt genus, it proceeds through all the media, to the laſt differences, which the

* See the notes on the Philebus.

Elean

Elean gueſt does*, when defining a ſophiſt and politician; or receiving the genus which is near and known, it proceeds through the following differences, ſuch as in this inſtance, man is an animal pedeſtrian, biped, and the like; or it uſes name alone, ſuch as the becoming is beautiful, and ſoul is φυσιοχη ουσια, and the like. For if he who at firſt eſtabliſhed names poſſeſſed ſcience, he who uſes an eſtabliſhed name muſt neceſſarily fall upon definition. Hence Plato now makes the inveſtigation about ſuch like names his principal deſign, and through theſe as media is extended to things themſelves. This inquiry alſo contributes to demonſtration. Thus, in the Phædrus, Plato endeavours to ſhow, that the divining art is better than that pertaining to augury, from the name. It likewiſe contributes to analyſis. Thus, in the Phædrus, Plato calls the love which is participated by mortals *flying*, but that which is imparticipable and divine *winged*, through the eſſence and the energy of the god conſpiring into one; and thus he appears to aſcend and analyze. Frequently alſo, this is neceſſary to diviſion. Thus Socrates ſhows, by diviſion, that the pleaſant is one thing, and the good another, becauſe the names alſo are two.

That† the perſons of the dialogue are Cratylus the Heraclitean, of whom Plato was an auditor, who ſaid that all names are from nature, and that ſuch as are not from nature are not names, juſt as we ſay, that he who falſely denominates things ſays nothing; and Hermogenes, the Socratic, who on the contrary ſaid that there was no name from nature, but that all names are from poſition; and the third is Socrates, who diſtinguiſhing ſays, that ſome names are from nature, and others from poſition; ſuch as are thoſe which are caſually made. For the names which belong to things perpetual, rather participate of a ſubſiſtence from nature, but thoſe which belong to things corruptible, rather partake of the caſual. For he who calls his ſon Athanaſius‡, manifeſts the confuſion of names about things of this kind.

Further ſtill, ſince names have both form and matter, according to form they rather participate of a ſubſiſtence from nature, but according to matter of a ſubſiſtence from poſition. And Socrates indeed, addreſſing himſelf to Hermogenes, ſeparates names firmly eſtabliſhed in the gods, ſuch as μυρινη, and the like, from thoſe which ſubſiſt in

* In the Sophista and Politicus.

† Almoſt all the paragraphs of theſe Scholia begin with the word οτι, *that*.

‡ That is, *Immortal*.

ſouls, ſuch as ἕξεις. But, addreſſing himſelf to Cratylus, he admits, indeed, the relation of names to things, but ſhows that there is much of the caſual in names, and at the ſame time that all things are not moved.

That the heavens, which partake more of motion, have alſo permanency after a certain manner, as in the poles, and things of this kind. But the earth, which partakes more of permanency, has alſo motion through its internal change.

That names which ſubſiſt from nature partake alſo of a ſubſiſtence from poſition, and thoſe which ſubſiſt from poſition partake of a ſubſiſtence from nature.

That Cratylus being ſcientific, and employing the greateſt brevity of diction, which was the peculiarity of the Heraclitics, in conſequence of enunciations not being able to keep pace with the flowing nature of things, appears to anſwer, through the whole of the dialogue, from the feweſt ſyllables and words. Hence the moſt imitative Plato, in the very beginning, repreſents him as ſaying βουλει. But Hermogenes being doxaſtic, and venerating the opinions of the many, conformably to his doctrine, that names ſubſiſt from poſition, ſays, ει σοι δοκει, &c. For δοκησις frequently belongs to things ineligible, and alſo to ſuch as are eligible, juſt as will is of things good alone.

That the whole Apolloniacal ſeries is ſuſpended from the government of Jupiter.

That Pythagoras and Epicurus were of the opinion of Cratylus; but Democritus and Ariſtotle of Hermogenes. Pythagoras therefore being aſked what was the wiſeſt of things, ſaid it was number; and being aſked what was the next in wiſdom ſaid, he who gave names to things. But by number, he obſcurely ſignified the intelligible order, which comprehends the multitude of intellectual forms: for there that which is the firſt and properly number* ſubſiſts after the ſupereſſential one. This likewiſe ſupplies the meaſures of eſſence to all beings, in which alſo true wiſdom, and knowledge which is of itſelf, and which is converted to and perfects itſelf, ſubſiſt. And as there the intelligible, intellect, and intelligence are the ſame, ſo there alſo number and wiſdom are the ſame. But by the founder of names, he obſcurely ſignified the ſoul, which indeed ſubſiſts from intellect, and is not things themſelves like the firſt intellect, but poſſeſſes the images, and eſſential tranſitive reaſons of them, as ſtatues of beings. Being therefore is imparted to all things from intellect, which knows itſelf and is replete with

* That is, number according to cauſe, which ſubſiſts at the extremity of the intelligible order. For number, according to hyparxis, ſubſiſts at the ſummit of the intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual order.

wiſdom;

wiſdom; but that they are denominated is from ſoul, which imitates intellect. Pythagoras therefore ſaid, that it was not the buſineſs of any caſual perſon to fabricate names, but of one looking to intellect and the nature of things. Names therefore are from nature.

But Democritus, who ſaid that names ſubſiſt from poſition, inferred this from four arguments: Firſt, From ſameneſs of appellation; for different things are called by the ſame name. Names therefore are not from nature. 2d, From the variety of names, for if different names are adapted to one and the ſame thing, they are alſo adapted to each other, which is impoſſible. 3d, From the change of names: for why was Ariſtocles called Plato, but Turtamus Theophraſtus. 4th, If names are from nature, but yet from a defect of ſimilars, why do we ſay φρονειν from φρονησις, but from δικαιοσυνη (ουκ εστι παρονομαζειν) we do not derive a word which alludes to this? Names therefore are caſual and not from nature. But he calls the firſt argument πολυσημος, (i. e. *having a manifold ſignification*); the ſecond, ισορροπος, (i. e. *equivalent*, or *equiponderant*); and the fourth, ναυυμνος, (i. e. *nameleſs*). In anſwer to the firſt of theſe arguments, ſome ſay, that it is nothing wonderful, if one name ſhadows forth many things, as ερως, *love*, both from ρωμη, *ſtrength*, and from πτερον, *a wing*, manifeſts different things. In anſwer to the ſecond, it is ſaid, nothing hinders that different names, in a different reſpect, may manifeſt the ſame thing. Thus, for inſtance, in the words *merops* and *man*, the ſame thing may be called by the former of theſe words, according to the poſſeſſion of a diſtributed life, and by the latter according to ανοεθρειν α οπωπεν, *conſidering what he has ſeen*. In anſwer to the third, it is ſaid, that this very thing ſignifies that names are by nature, viz. that we transfer thoſe that are not properly eſtabliſhed, and which are contrary to nature, to a poſition according to nature. And in anſwer to the fourth, that it is nothing wonderful, if names which were eſtabliſhed at firſt ſhould fail through a great length of time.

That a ſubſiſtence according to nature is four-fold. For it is either as the eſſences of plants and animals, as well the wholes as the parts; or it is as the energies and powers of theſe, ſuch as the levity and heat of fire; or it is as ſhadows and appearances in mirrors; or as artificial images are aſſimilated to their archetypes. Epicurus therefore thought that names had a ſubſiſtence from nature according to the firſt ſignification, as works precedaneous by nature, ſuch as voice and ſight. And as to ſee and to hear

hear are according to nature, ſo alſo to denominate; ſo that a name is from nature, as being the work of nature. But Cratylus was of this opinion according to the ſecond ſignification; and hence he ſays that the peculiarity of every thing is a name, as being appropriately aſſigned by the founders of names, artificially and ſcientifically. For Epicurus ſaid, that the founders of names did not eſtabliſh them ſcientifically, but in effecting this were moved phyſically, like thoſe that ſnore, howl, roar, and ſigh. But Socrates ſaid, that names are from nature, according to the fourth ſignification, as being the progeny of ſcientific conceptions, and not of phyſical appetite (orexis), but of the ſoul energizing according to imagination, and at the ſame time eſtabliſhing names from the firſt, as much as poſſible, appropriately to things. He likewiſe ſaid, that, according to form, all names are the ſame, have one power, and are from nature. For, according to form, they are ſimilar to things, but differ from each other according to matter.

That the name Cratylus appears to have been aſſigned παρα τω περικρατησαι αραροτως των ηρακλειτου δογματων, from *firmly obtaining the dogmas of Heraclitus*, and that on this account he deſpiſed flowing things, as not properly having a ſubſiſtence. But the name Socrates is παρα τω σωτηρα ειναι του κρατους της Ψυχης, from *being the ſaviour of the ſtrength of his ſoul*, that is of his reaſon, and from not being drawn down under the ſenſes.

That things eternal receive their denomination from powers or energies, but things generated from uſe and communion.

That he who wiſhes to imitate any thing, ought to be ſcientifically knowing in two things, viz. the archetype, and demiurgic art.

That the Heraclitics are accuſed as arrogant, as diſſemblers, and as deſpiſers, by Theodorus in the Theætetus, and now by Hermogenes. It muſt be obſerved, however, that theſe two are not philoſophers; for the former was a geometrician, and the latter a youth. And a true philoſopher has not leiſure to conſume his time in things of this kind.

That Socrates did not think that the ſpeculation about the rectitude of names was to be deſpiſed, but according to the proverb he conſidered fine things to be difficult.

That inveſtigation is imparted to ſouls from Maia the mother of Hermes; but invention is from the Hermaic ſeries. For the more total genera of the gods energize prior to, together with, and poſterior to, ſuch as are more partial. Hence we ſee that inveſtigation

is

is imperfect, and is as matter previouſly prepared, from the donation of more elevated cauſes to their participants, ſuch as form ſupervening from things inferior.

That ſophiſts rejoice in indicative aſſertions, but philoſophers in ſuch as are dialectic. And again, the ſophiſts, as framers of images, aſſume the perſon of one ſkilled in dialectic; and thus their contentious moleſtation is produced.

That of the Hermaic gift, ſome things are intellectual and firſt goods; but others are ſecondary, and perfective of the dianoëtic power; and others rank in the third degree, purify the irrational nature, and in a particular manner meaſure the phantaſtic motions. Others again give ſubſiſtence to the reaſons of nature; and others are the ſuppliers of externally proceeding powers, and of gain. For theſe are the laſt and the material gifts of the god, which, as aſtrologers ſay, the god imparts in ignoble diſpoſitions (αδοξοις διαθεσεσιν).

That it very little belongs to a philoſopher, ſays Plato, to ſpeak about particulars; for it is his buſineſs to aſcend to the ſpeculation of wholes, and things common.

The reaſoning of Hermogenes is as follows: If there is a tranſpoſition of names, names are from poſition, and are the ſymbols of things. But the firſt is true, and therefore the ſecond. But the reaſoning of Proclus is this: If names are ſymbols of things, and are from poſition, we have no longer any occaſion for the tranſpoſition of names. The firſt is true, and therefore the ſecond. The followers of Hermogenes therefore ſpeak erroneouſly; for they look to particulars only, and not alſo to things eternal. For the names of things eternal are divine and venerable, as being ſacred to the gods, whoſe powers and energies they expreſs. Theſe Socrates, in the Philebus, venerates, and ſays, that his caution about them is attended with the greateſt dread.

That the truth of an enunciative ſentence (του αποφαντικου λογου), means one thing with Ariſtotle, and another with Plato in the preſent place, in which he ſays, that names eſſentially predicated (καθ αυτα λεγομενα) are true. For that of Ariſtotle ſpeaks of the compoſition and diviſion of that which is predicated, and has for its ſubject both the falſe and the true. But the great Plato knew how to uſe the ſignificant of truth and falſehood in a fourfold reſpect. For he uſes it either according to the hyparxes themſelves of things, as when he ſays that real beings truly are, but that unreal beings have a falſe ſubſiſtence. Or he uſes it according to the paſſions which are conſequent

to

to preceding motions, as when Socrates, in the Philebus, divides pleaſure into the true and falſe. Or according to knowledge, as when he defines falſe opinions according to the true. Or according to the inſtruments of the gnoſtic life, as, for inſtance, aſſertions, names, and elements. For in theſe the true and the falſe are ſeen, according to their adaptation and ſymphony with things. Rhetoricians alſo have a certain form of diction which they call truth.

That Antiſthenes ſaid, that nothing could be contradicted; for according to him every aſſertion is true. For he who ſpeaks ſays ſomething. He who ſays ſomething, ſpeaks of that which has a being. And he who ſpeaks of that which has a being, ſpeaks the truth. In anſwer to this we muſt ſay, that there is alſo that which is falſe, and that nothing hinders but that the man who ſpeaks of being may ſpeak falſely. For he who ſpeaks, ſpeaks *about* ſomething, and does not ſpeak *ſomething*.

That bad are more known by good men, than the virtue of good men is by the bad. For vice is blind; and in the firſt place is ignorant of itſelf, and in the next place of others.

That the dogma of Protagoras is different from that of Euthydemus. For the former ſays, that though the ſubject has no exiſtence, yet it appears to beholders to poſſeſs a particular quality, through the commixture of the agent and patient. But the dogma of Euthydemus makes every thing to be all things, and aſſerts that all things are at the ſame time always true. As he that ſays, that a piece of wood is white and black, ſmall and great, moiſt and dry, and likewiſe, that all the negations of theſe are true. Hence beginning from different principles, thoſe ſophiſts end in the ſame thing.

That the power of the firſt *infinity* imparts from itſelf progreſſion to all things whatever which are capable of ſubſiſtence; but *bound*, limits and circumſcribes every thing, and eſtabliſhes it in its proper boundaries. Thus in numbers form pervades to all things from the monad and bound; but the never-failing according to progreſſion from the prolific duad; ſo that every being has a certain nature, bound, idiom, and proper order, through the firſt bound. There is therefore contradiction in words, which definitely exhibits the falſe and the true.

That the word πραττειν, *to act*, is aſſerted of thoſe only who energize according to the dianoëtic power, but the word ποιειν, *to do*, is aſſerted of thoſe who energize in a different

different manner from this. *Actions* therefore and *makings* have their proper boundaries, inſtruments, and times; nor does any caſual thing do or act any caſual thing.

That ſpeech is under action, may be ſhown from the following diviſion: Every energy of the ſoul is either effected without body, and this energy is phantaſy, opinion, intelligence; or it is effected with body, and this is two-fold. For it is either unattended with free will, and this is ſenſe and involuntary motion, or it is attended with free will, and this is action, under which is diſcourſe.

That Plato coarranges Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars, through that which is common with reſpect to warlike concerns; through Minerva poſſeſſing a kindred art with each of the others; through each of the others being the lover of Venus; and becauſe each was produced from Juno and Jupiter.

That the ſoul of the world imparts life to altermotive natures: for to theſe it is the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato ſays in the Phædrus and in the Laws. But the demiurgus imparts life ſimply to all things, life, divine, intellectual, pſychical, and that which is diviſible about bodies.

If names, according to Ariſtotle *, are from poſition, and are ſymbols of things and conceptions, it is neceſſary that the ſentences compoſed from them, being enunciative from poſition, ſhould not be ſaid, from this very circumſtance, to be aſſimilated to compoſite conceptions, nor that they are of themſelves the recipients of truth or falſehood. But indeed enunciative ſentences (οι αποφαντικοι λογοι), poſſeſſing eſſentially the ſpeaking falſely or truly, do not poſſeſs this from poſition. Names therefore are not from poſition.

If every one who gives a name performs a certain action, but he who performs a certain action, performs it through an inſtrument; hence he who gives a name, ſince he gives it through an inſtrument, uſes a name as an inſtrument. But of inſtruments ſome are from nature, as the hand and foot; others from poſition, as a bridle and a name. And of theſe artificial inſtruments, ſome effect ſomething which is ſubſervient to ſubſiſtence, as an ax; but others effect that which contributes to ſignifying and teaching. A name therefore is a thing of this kind: for it is an inſtrument which *teaches* and *unfolds into light* the eſſence of things; the teaching being aſſumed from him who uſes the inſtrument, but the unfolding into light from the paradigm. But a

* See the Introduction to this Dialogue.

name requires, as an inſtrument, him who uſes it, but as an image it requires a reference to its paradigm. So that it is evident from theſe things, that a name is not a ſymbol, nor the work of any caſual poſition, but is allied to things, and adapted to them by nature. For every inſtrument is coordinated to a proper work, and cannot be adapted to any thing elſe than to that for which it was made. A name therefore, as being an inſtrument, has a certain connate power, and which coharmonizes with the things ſignified. As likewiſe, it is that which teaches, it poſſeſſes an order which unfolds conceptions into light; and as giving diſtinction to eſſence, it produces in us a knowledge of things.

Again, a name is not the effect of phyſical inſtruments: for every name, ſo far as a name, is ſignificant of ſomethimg; ſince *voice* is not the ſame with name. Phyſical inſtruments therefore, ſuch as the tongue, the arteries, and the lungs, give perfection to voice; and though theſe cooperate in producing a name, through matter, yet the conception of the founder of names, eſpecically gives completion to it, which conception coharmonizes, in a becoming manner, matter to form and paradigm. But he who diſcourſes, uſes a name when eſtabliſhed: for every inſtrument has both one who uſes it, and one who makes it. Every thing too which is uſed has a producing cauſe; and every thing having a producing cauſe, is miniſtrant to ſomething with reſpect to energy.

A name is ſaid to be from nature, both as an effect, and as an inſtrument; for it becomes by its formation an image of things, and announces them through conceptions as media. Very properly therefore is a name ſaid to be *a doctrinal inſtrument*, οργανον διδασκαλικον; but ſhortly after it is called the *effect* of the legiſlator. And this is for the ſake of him who diſcourſes: for it is both an end and good to unfold things. Hence Socrates ſays, it is rather an inſtrument, conſidering it according to its more excellent ſubſiſtence. Hence too this inſtrument is a medium between the teacher and the learner.

That a ſhuttle and an augur are paradigms adapted to a name. For a name ſeparates things from each other, and enters into the learner, through the depth of his conceptions.

That as Socrates, in the Gorgias, demonſtrates to Callicles, who divides that which is juſt by law, oppoſitely to that which is juſt by nature, that law and nature in that which is juſt concur with each other, in like manner it is neceſſary to conceive that names

names ſubſiſt both from law and nature; not however from caſual law, but from that which is eternal, and which conſiſts according to eternal reaſons. A name therefore, through its producing cauſe, which is ſcientific, is both from law and poſition; but through its paradigmatic cauſe is from nature.

But if this be the caſe, how does Socrates afterwards ſhow to Cratylus, that it is not only neceſſary to call that a name which is rightly framed, but that alſo which is erroneouſly eſtabliſhed. In anſwer to this, we muſt ſay, that law is contemplative of that which is univerſal. Such names therefore as are given to things perpetual, are founded by law. But ſince there are alſo names of things corruptible, it is by no means wonderful if law, which regards univerſal, has not dominion over theſe, and that there ſhould be much of the caſual in them, as in the names *Ambroſius*, *Athanaſius*, *Polychronius* *, and the like. But what the art is which produces names we will conciſely relate; for not every thing in it is a ſpecies of the legiſlative art. That there is then in the ſoul an aſſimilative power is evident; for painting and things of this kind are ſuſpended from this power, which aſſimilates ſubordinate to ſuperior natures, and things which ſubſiſt in compoſition to ſuch as are more ſimple. And again, according to the ſame power, the ſoul is able to aſſimilate herſelf to natures ſuperior to her own eſſence, viz. to gods, angels, and dæmons. She alſo, through the ſame power, aſſimilates to herſelf things ſubordinate to her own nature; and alſo aſſimilates them to things ſuperior to herſelf. Hence ſhe fabricates ſtatues of gods and dæmons. But wiſhing to give ſubſiſtence after a manner to immaterial ſimilitudes of things, and which are alone the progeny of the rational eſſence, employing from herſelf the cooperation of phantaſy adapted to ſpeech (λεκτικης φαντασιας), ſhe produces the eſſence of names. And as the teleſtic art, through certain ſymbols, and arcane ſignatures, aſſimilates ſtatues of the gods, and makes them adapted to the reception of divine illuminations, ſo the legiſlative art, according to the ſame aſſimilative power, gives ſubſiſtence to names, the ſtatues of things; through ſuch and ſuch ſounds ſhadowing forth the nature of things, and having given ſubſiſtence to them, delivers them to the uſe of mankind. Hence the legiſlator is ſaid to be the lord of the generation of names. And as it is not holy to behave in a diſorderly manner towards the ſtatues of the gods, ſo neither is it becoming to err

* The firſt and ſecond of theſe words ſignify *immortal*; the third, *having an extended duration*.

about names. For a legiſlative intellect is the artificer of theſe, inſerting in them images of paradigms; and it is proper to venerate them, through their alliance to the gods.

It alſo appears to me that Plato eſtabliſhes the legiſlator analogous to the demiurgus of the univerſe: for he it is, according to the Timæus, who eſtabliſhes the laws of fate, and who governs all things conformably to law. According to Plato too, he is the firſt fabricator of names: for as we learn from the Timæus, he denominated one of the circulations of the univerſe *ſame*, and the other *different*. If therefore the legiſlator is analogous to the demiurgus, muſt he not neceſſarily be the lord of the poſition of names? Hence in this Dialogue Plato calls the legiſlator, *demiurgus*, and the moſt rare of demiurgi. Thus alſo Socrates, in the Phædrus, ſays, that the name ἵμερος was given by Jupiter. Of names therefore, ſome are the progeny of the gods, extending alſo as far as to the ſoul; but others are the offspring of partial ſouls, who are able to frame them through intellect and ſcience; and others again ſubſiſt through the middle genera. For ſome meeting with dæmons and angels, have been taught by them names better adapted to things than ſuch as men have eſtabliſhed. It is requiſite likewiſe to know the differences of names ariſing from their producing cauſes, and to refer all of them to the one demiurgus, a divinity of an intellectual characteriſtic. Whence alſo a name has two-fold powers, the one, that which teaches conceptions, and is the cauſe of communion; but the other, that which gives diſtinction to eſſence; ſince the demiurgus likewiſe poſſeſſes two-fold powers, the one productive of ſameneſs, the other of difference.

That the aſſimilative energy of the demiurgic intellect is two-fold; the one, that according to which he gives ſubſiſtence to the whole world, looking to an intelligible paradigm; the other, that according to which he promulgates names adapted to things; concerning which Timæus briefly indicates, but theurgiſts teach more clearly, and oracles * from the gods themſelves: "There is a venerable name with a ſleepleſs revolution, leaping into the worlds through the rapid reproofs of the father." And another oracle ſays, "The paternal intellect diſſeminated ſymbols through the world." Thus therefore the legiſlator alſo, looking to the whole world, delivers the moſt excellent polity, and impoſes names aſſimilated to things.

* See my collection of these Oracles in the third volume of the Monthly Magazine.

That

That of things artificial there are no definite cauſes and paradigms, becauſe the effects of ſuch cauſes and paradigms are eſſences, and proper meaſures, have a reference to the univerſe, and proceed through nature. But every thing artificial is uneſſential, and is all-variouſly changed in accommodation to our uſes and circumſtances, and is ſeparated from things which have a natural ſubſiſtence. If, however, ſome one ſhould call the producing and prolific powers of the gods, which proceed into the univerſe, demiurgic, intellectual, generative, and perfective arts, we ſhall not reject a nomination of this kind; ſince we alſo find theologiſts indicating through theſe divine productions. Hence they call the Cyclops the cauſes of all artificial production, who alſo taught Jupiter, Minerva, and Vulcan. But they celebrate Minerva as preſiding over other arts, and particularly that of weaving, and Vulcan as the inſpective guardian of another art. According to Orpheus, however, the weaving art originates from Minerva, but proceeds into the vivific ſeries of Proſerpine: for this goddeſs and all her choir, abiding on high, are ſaid to weave the order of life, which is participated by all the mundane gods. For the one demiurgus excites all the junior demiurgi to weave together the mortal with the immortal form of life *. But the order of life thus woven ends in the gods who preſide over generation, among whom is the Homeric Circe, who weaves all the life in the four elements, and at the ſame time with her ſong harmonizes the ſublunary realms. Circe therefore is ranked by theologiſts among theſe weaving powers. Her ſhuttle too, as they ſay, is golden, by this indicating her eſſence to be intellectual and pure, immaterial and unmingled with generation, and that her employment conſiſts in ſeparating things ſtable from ſuch as are in motion, according to divine diverſity. If therefore, as I have ſaid, ſome one recurring to theſe analogies, calls the powers of the gods the cauſes of theſe arts, but their effects the illuminations of theſe powers pervading through the whole world, he will ſpeak with rectitude. For it is neceſſary not only to ſuſpend from Minerva the weaving art which is with us, but prior to this, that which energizes through nature, and connects generated with eternal, mortal with immortal, corporeal with incorporeal, and ſenſible with intellectual natures. In like manner we muſt ſurvey the whole of the tectonic, and each of the other arts, as firſt ſubſiſting in nature. So that the ſhuttle will every where have an analogous ſubſiſtence, ſeparating the genera which con-

* This is asserted in the Timæus.

ſtitute

ſtitute beings, that, together with the connection of them, diviſion may remain, and genuinely preſerve their hyparxis. Hence the artiſts that are with us act under preſiding and inſpecting gods. They do not however in conſequence of this contemplate intelligibles; for they do not operate looking to theſe, but to the forms which are with themſelves, and the reaſons of things artificial which they contain; and this by either inventing theſe, or receiving them from others. For the firſt artificer of a ſhuttle conceived in his own mind what kind of a thing a ſhuttle ought to be, looking to its uſe, and being led by this, produced in himſelf that form of a ſhuttle according to which others are made. But others learning from him, have acquired a knowledge of the form, and conformably to it make the reſemblance of the ſhuttle.

And here we may ſee how theſe things are imitations of the demiurgic art, and of intellectual forms: for theſe forms being always eſtabliſhed according to invariable permanency, things corruptible in the world are preſerved, and are again renovated through their ſtable fameneſs. And the corruption indeed is derived from matter, but the ſtable fameneſs from an eternal form. Juſt as in the ſhuttles which are here, the corruption is from the matter, but the regeneration from the reaſon or productive principle in the artiſt. What the ſhuttle, therefore, is to the artificer by whom it is made, that are names to the legiſlator, and all mundane natures to the demiurgus. Hence as forms have a three-fold ſubſiſtence, viz. intellectual, ſcientific, doxaſtic; all ſenſible natures are derived from intellectual, names from ſcientific, and ſhuttles from doxaſtic forms.

That the fabrication of the univerſe is two-fold: for the one gives ſubſiſtence to reaſons which extend to all things, and to forms which have an invariable ſubſiſtence, and ſuſtain no mutation; but the other inſerts diviſible differences in generated natures. Thus, for inſtance, the human form pervades ſupernally from the one and whole intellectual fabrication, through the ſtars as media. Hence this form has a perpetual ſubſiſtence, as originating from an immovable cauſe. But ſince men differ from each other in magnitude and colour, and things of this kind, theſe differences ariſe from the ſecondary fabrication of the junior gods, and are converſant with much mutability, through being the production of moveable cauſes. This however takes place, in order that the variety of things may ſubſiſt, and that the perpetual generation of particulars may be multiplied. For different celeſtial periods give completion to, and at different times generate different

things,

things, and produce one connection from all things which contributes to the completion of the univerſe.

That the ſhuttle* is an image of the ſeparating power of the gods, both of thoſe that preſide over wholes, and thoſe that preſide over parts; for its operation in woofs repreſents the energy of this power, and exhibits a ſymbol of the order of the ſeparating gods. Hence when theologiſts ſpeak of ſhuttles as belonging to theſe gods, they do not ſpeak of the idea of a ſhuttle, but only ſymbolically uſe the name. For why do they rather ſpeak of the ſhuttle, and not of ſomething elſe? And is it not abſurd that ſcience ſhould caſually uſe names, and theſe when applied to the gods? But they appear to me to aſſume things of this kind according to analogy. For what a ſhuttle is in the weaving art, that ſeparation is in the fabrication of forms. But analogy is not the habitude of idea to an image, nor is it from poſition alone. Thus Plato† calls certain powers of the ſoul horſes; neither thus denominating them caſually, nor meaning that theſe powers are the ideas of ſenſible horſes, but merely employing analogy. *Hence initiators into the myſteries through an alliance of this kind, cauſing ſenſibles to ſympathize with the gods, uſe theſe inſtruments as ſignatures of divine powers; the ſhuttle as a ſignature of ſeparating, a cup of vivific, a ſceptre of ruling, and a key of guardian power.* And thus they denominate other powers of the gods, uſing analogy in a ſimilar manner.

That as things are to each other, ſo alſo are their names analogouſly to each other, according to honour and power. Hence the names of the gods are honourable and venerable, and worthy of the greateſt fear to the wiſe. On this account they ſay it is not proper that the Greeks ſhould uſe the Egyptian, Scythian, or Perſian names of the gods, but ſuch as are Grecian. For the gods who preſide over climates rejoice when they are denominated in the dialects of their proper regions.

If he who uſes an inſtrument is better than him who fabricates it as being more architectonic, how does a partial ſoul uſe the irrational nature, and the ſhelly body, which were fabricated by the junior gods? Or does not the ſoul alſo contribute to the fabrication of theſe? And do not the junior gods uſe theſe as inſtruments? And it is neceſſary to conſider theſe with reference to each other; the whole fabrication, as they ſay, to the uſe of the whole, but the diviſible to the diviſible.

* See p. 495. † See the Phædrus.

If

If he who is ſkilled in dialectic uſes the work of the legiſlator as a more excellent character, but the judge as one ſubordinate, it appears to be abſurd. May we not ſay that the one uſes it as an inſtrument, the other as a principle? for a partial ſoul uſes a dæmon as a governor and an inſpective guardian, but the body as an inſtrument. For in the paradigms of theſe, the father of Jupiter is Saturn, but the daughter is Juſtice. Hence the legiſlator is analogous to the demiurgus Jupiter, inſerting the laws of fate in ſouls, and promulgating names to the whole circulations. But he who is ſkilled in dialectic, is analogous to the Saturnian monad. For the mighty Saturn ſupernally imparted the principles of intelligence to the demiurgus, and preſides over the whole fabrication of the univerſe. Whence alſo Jupiter in Orpheus calls him a dæmon:

Ορθου δ' ημετερην γενεην αριδεικετε δαιμον.

i. e. O illuſtrious dæmon, direct our offſpring.

And Saturn it ſeems poſſeſſes with himſelf the higheſt cauſes of things collected and ſeparated; through the celeſtial ſections* producing into parts the intellectual wholeneſs, and becoming the cauſe of generative progreſſions and multiplications, and, in ſhort, being the leader of the Titannic race, from which the diviſion of things originates. Through abſorptions too, he again collects his own progeny, unites them to himſelf, and reſolves them into his own uniform and impartible cauſe; ſince alſo the demiurgus Jupiter receives proximately from him the truth of things, and primarily underſtands the ideas which he contains: for Night alſo delivers oracles to Jupiter. But the father Saturn proximately imparts to him all the meaſures of the whole fabrication of things.

That with reſpect to intellect, the eſſential contains in itſelf the whole true knowledge of things at once in energy; but the intellect of the philoſopher not being eſſential, but an illumination, and, in ſhort, an image of intellect, underſtands diviſibly, and ſometimes only touches on the truth.

That there are five habits of men with reſpect to knowledge, viz. two-fold ignorance, ſimple ignorance, deſire, inveſtigation, invention.

* i. e. Through the ſections of that order of gods which is denominated intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual.

That

That he who has a ſcientific knowledge of the methods of invention interprets to the learner, imitating the leading Hermes.

That Socrates is analogous to intellect; but Hermogenes to irrational opinion, aſpiring after good; and Cratylus is analogous to the corporeal and material phantaſy, on which account he is deceived by the ſophiſts as a ſlave. But opinion and the phantaſy are nearly ſiſters, as being neighbours (αγχι θυροι).

Why does Plato eject from his Republic the poets about Homer, as imitators, but now* introduces them as divine leaders of the rectitude of names? May we not ſay, that there the variety of imitation is unadapted to ſimple and unperverted manners; but that here and every where he admires and embraces their divinely-inſpired conceptions? Since however the preſent diſcourſe is about divine names, it is neceſſary to ſpeak a little concerning them. And in the firſt place, let us ſpeak concerning the names which are occultly eſtabliſhed in the gods themſelves; ſince ſome of the antients ſaid that theſe originated from the more excellent genera†, but that the gods are eſtabliſhed beyond a ſignification of this kind; but others admitted that names are in the gods themſelves, and in thoſe gods that are allotted the higheſt order.

The gods therefore poſſeſs an hyparxis uniform and ineffable, a power generative of wholes, and an intellect perfect and full of conceptions; and they give ſubſiſtence to all things according to this triad. Hence it is neceſſary that the participations of thoſe divinities who are of a more elevated order, and who are arranged nearer to *the good*, ſhould proceed triadically through all things to which they give ſubſiſtence. It is alſo neceſſary that among theſe, thoſe participations ſhould be more ineffable, which are defined according to the *hyparxes* of the firſt gods; but that thoſe ſhould be more apparent, and more divided, which are illuminated according to the *intellect* of exempt cauſes; and that thoſe participations which are between theſe, ſhould be ſuch as are the effluxions of *prolific powers*. For the fathers of wholes giving ſubſiſtence to all things, have diſſeminated in all things veſtiges, and impreſſions, of their own triadic hypoſtaſis; ſince nature alſo inſerts in bodies an exciting principle (ενουσμα) derived from her proper idiom, through which ſhe moves bodies, and governs them as by a rudder. And the demiurgus has eſtabliſhed in the univerſe an image of his own monadic tranſcendency, through which

* See p. 500,

† Viz. angels, dæmons, and heroes.

he governs the world, holding a rudder, as Plato ſays, like a pilot. It is proper to think therefore, that theſe rudders, and this helm of the univerſe, in which the demiurgus being ſeated orderly diſpoſes the world, are nothing elſe than a ſymbol of the whole fabrication of things, to us indeed difficult of comprehenſion, but to the gods themſelves known and manifeſt. And why is it requiſite to ſpeak concerning theſe things, ſince, of the ineffable cauſe of all, who is beyond intelligibles, there is an impreſſion in every being, and even as far as to the laſt of things, through which all things are ſuſpended from him, ſome more remotely, and others more near, according to the clearneſs and obſcurity of the impreſſion which they contain? This it is which moves all things to the deſire of good, and imparts to beings this inextinguiſhable love. And this impreſſion is indeed unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of knowledge. It is alſo more excellent than life; for it is preſent with things inanimate; and has not an intellectual power; ſince it lies in things deſtitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the demiurgic monad, and the father himſelf who is exempt from all things, have diſſeminated in things poſterior, impreſſions of their reſpective idioms, and through theſe convert all things to themſelves, in like manner all the gods impart to their progeny ſymbols of their cauſe, and through theſe eſtabliſh all things in themſelves. The impreſſions therefore of the hyparxis of the higher order of gods, which are diſſeminated in ſecondary natures, are ineffable and unknown, and their efficacious and motive energy ſurpaſſes all intelligence. And of this kind are the characters of light, through which the gods unfold themſelves to their progeny; theſe characters ſubſiſting unically in the gods themſelves, but ſhining forth to the view in the genera more excellent than man, and preſenting themſelves to us diviſibly, and accompanied with form. Hence the gods* exhort "To underſtand the forerunning form of light." For ſubſiſting on high without form, it becomes inveſted with form through its progreſſion; and there being eſtabliſhed occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through motion, from the gods themſelves; poſſeſſing indeed an efficacious energy, through a divine cauſe, but becoming figured, through the eſſence by which it is received.

Again, the impreſſions which are illuminated from powers, are in a certain reſpect

* Proclus here alludes to one of the Chaldæan oracles.

media

media between things ineffable and effable, and pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not poſſible for the primary gifts of the gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent genera (i. e. angels, dæmons, and heroes,) previouſly participating the illuminations which thence proceed. But theſe illuminations ſubſiſting appropriately in each of their participants, and coordinately in all things, unfold the powers that give them ſubſiſtence. Of this kind are the ſymbols of the gods, which are indeed uniform in the more elevated orders, but multiform in thoſe that are ſubordinate; and which the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations (αδιαρθρωτων εκφωνησεων).

The impreſſions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from intellectual eſſences to all idioms, and proceed as far as to us, are divine names, through which the gods are invoked, and by which they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the gods themſelves, and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of the gods as is apparent. For through theſe we are able to ſignify ſomething to each other, and to converſe with ourſelves about the gods. Different nations however participate differently of theſe, as, for inſtance, the Egyptians, according to their native tongue, receiving names of this kind from the gods; but the Chaldæans and Indians in a different manner, according to their proper tongue; and in a ſimilar manner the Greeks, according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the Chaldæans, we muſt nevertheleſs admit, that each of theſe names is the progeny of the gods, and that it ſignifies the ſame eſſence. But if ſome names are more and others leſs efficacious, it is not wonderful; ſince of things which are known to us, ſuch as are dæmoniacal and angelic are more efficacious; and, in ſhort, of things denominated, the names of ſuch as are nearer are more perfect than the names of thoſe that are more remote.

Not every genus of the gods however can be denominated: for Parmenides evinces that the god who is beyond all things is ineffable. "For," ſays he, "he can neither be denominated, nor ſpoken of." And of the intelligible gods, the firſt genera, which are conjoined with *the one itſelf*, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requiſite that the progreſſion of intelligibles ſhould be terminated* in this order; in which there is the firſt effable, and that which is called by

* The firſt effable ſubſists in the god Phanes, or the extremity of the intelligible order.

proper names. For the firſt forms are there, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles there ſhines forth to the view. But all the natures prior to this being ſilent and occult, are only known by intelligence *. Hence the whole of the teleſtic art energizing theurgically aſcends as far as to this order. Orpheus alſo ſays, that this is firſt called by a name by the other gods: for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual orders. But he thus ſpeaks,

Μητιν σπερμα φεροντα θεων κλυτον ουτε φανητα,
Πρωτογονον μακαρες καλεον κατα μακρον ολυμπον.

i. e. "Metis bearing the ſeed of the gods, whom the gods about lofty Olympus call the illuſtrious Phanes Protogonus." In the gods however nomination is united with intellectual conception, and both are preſent with them through the participation of the light which the mighty Phanes emits to all things. But in our ſoul theſe two are divided from each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and name another: and the one has the order of an image, but the other of a paradigm. In the middle genera there is indeed a ſeparation, but there is alſo a union of the intellective and onomaſtic energy. The tranſportive name (διαπορθμιον ονομα) of *Iynxes* † (ιυγγων), which is ſaid to ſuſtain all the fountains, appears to me to ſignify a thing of this kind. Such alſo is the appellation *teletarchic* (το τελεταρχικον), which ſome one of the gods ‡ ſays, "leaps into the worlds, through the radid reproof of the father," κοσμοις ενθρωσκειν κραιπνην δια πατρος ενιπην. For all theſe things are occultly with the gods, but are unfolded according to ſecond and third progreſſions, and to men that are allied to the gods.

There is therefore a certain abiding name in the gods, through which the ſubordinate invoke the ſuperior, as Orpheus ſays of Phanes, or through which the ſuperior denominate the ſubordinate, as Jupiter, in Plato, gives names to the unapparent periods of ſouls §. For fathers define the energies of their offſpring, and the offſpring know their

* See this explained in the notes on the Parmenides.

† The *Iynx*, *Synoches*, and *Teletarchæ* of the Chaldæans, compoſe that divine order, which is called by the Platonists *intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual.* This order is celebrated by Plato in the Phædrus under the names of the *ſupercelestial place*, *Heaven*, and the *ſubcelestial arch.*

‡ This is one of the Chaldæan oracles.

§ See the Timæus.

producing

producing cauſes, through the intellectual impreſſions which they bear. Such then are the firſt names which are unfolded from the gods, and which through the middle genera end in the rational eſſence.

There are however other names of a ſecond and third rank; and theſe are ſuch as partial ſouls have produced, at one time energizing enthuſiaſtically about the gods, and at another time energizing according to ſcience; either conjoining their own intelligence with divine light, and thence deriving perfection; or committing the fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artiſts, ſuch as geometricians, phyſicians, and rhetoricians, give names to the things the idioms of which they underſtand. Thus too poets inſpired by Phœbus (των ποιητων οι φοιβολημποι) aſcribe many names to the gods, and to human names give a diviſion oppoſite to theſe; receiving the former from enthuſiaſtic energy, and the latter from ſenſe and opinion; concerning which Socrates now ſays Homer indicates, referring ſome names to the gods, and others to men.

That the names which are aſſigned to things by the gods are ſmooth, well-ſounding, and of fewer ſyllables, than thoſe which are aſſigned by men, as, for inſtance, Xanthus* than Scamander, Chalcis than Cymindis, and Myrine than Batieia. And it ſeems that the firſt of theſe names manifeſts how the gods comprehend and denominate according to a definite cauſe the whole of a flowing eſſence; but the ſecond, how the gods bound in intellectual meaſures a life converſant with generation; and the third, how they divide and permit in a ſeparate manner a life ſeparate from generation. And with reſpect to Xanthus, Ariſtotle relates, that the ſkin of the cattle that drank out of it was yellower than before; and on this account perhaps the gods, who both produce and know the cauſes of all things, thus denominate it. But the apparent cauſe of its appellation perhaps was this, that its water paſſes through a drain made by the hand (οτι δια τινος χειροποιητου σκαφης διερχεται το υδωρ αυτου); and thus by men of ſuperficial conceptions was called Scamander. Chalcis, perhaps, was ſo called from the ſhrill and canorous, like ſharp ſounding braſs; for thus certainly the Chaldæans call it, having heard this name from the gods. But Cymindis is from the leaping of the bird (παρα την σκιρτοτητα του ορνεου); and Myrine, from the ſoul allotted that place from the gods. Laſtly, Batieia perhaps was thus called, through the plant which abounds in it. In theſe too, we have the three-fold differences of divine and human knowledge; the effi-

* See p. 500.

cacious

cacious and paſſive, in Xanthus and Scamander; the logical and phyſical, in Myrine and Batieia; and the enharmonic and unharmonic, in Chalcis and Cymindis.

That if the nature of the gods is unfigured, uncoloured, and unapparent, the dialectic work is not in them, but a thing of this kind is converſant with things that ſubſiſt in theſe inferior realms and about generation.

That of the gods, ſome are incorporeal, but others uſe bodies, and theſe ſuch as are ſpherical: for the ſpherical figure is peculiarly adapted to things which are converted to themſelves. But of dæmons ſome are good and divine, and have ſpheric vehicles; and others are material, and their vehicles are rectilinear.

With reſpect to our prayers, they are heard both by gods and dæmons, not externally; but both theſe comprehend in themſelves cauſally our deliberative tendency to things in our power, and have a cauſal knowledge of our energies.

That there are Pans * with the feet of goats, ſuch as was that which appeared to the courier Philippides, as he was paſſing over the mountain Parthenion; and alſo Minerval ſouls uſing various forms, and proximately ruling above men; ſuch as was the Minerva which appeared to Ulyſſes and Telemachus. But Panic and Minerval dæmons, and much more the gods themſelves, are exempt from all ſuch variety.

That it is not becauſe dæmons are allotted certain forms, that the men who are under their guardian protection are allotted, both in common and peculiarly, different characteriſtic properties, as, for inſtance, the Scythians properties different from the Æthiopians, and one individual from another. But dæmons that preſide over men comprehend all the variety of manners in ſimplicity, the mutation of figures in ſameneſs, and the difference of motions in ſtable power.

That the names delivered by theologiſts by which the gods call things, are from the gods, and not from dæmons only. For *the things performed in the myſteries, are performed to the gods themſelves, and not to the dæmons ſuſpended from them.*

That the gods ſignify things to men, not requiring for this purpoſe corporeal organs, but faſhioning the air according to their will: for the air being far more plaſtic than wax, receives the impreſſions of divine intelligence; which proceeds indeed from the gods with-

* After eſſential heroes, there is an order of ſouls who proximately govern the affairs of men, and are dæmoniacal κατα σχεσιν, *according to habitude, or alliance,* but not eſſentially. Of this kind are the nymphs that ſympathize with water, and the Pans now mentioned by Proclus.

out

out motion, but arrives to us through ſound and mutation. For thus we ſay, that oracles are given by the gods, they not ſpeaking, but uſing us as inſtruments, and filling the auditory ſenſe with appropriate knowledge, without percuſſion and without contact. For they aſſociate with each other through intellectual conceptions, and know what pertains to each other intellectively, but not ſenſibly.

That, as Homer ſays, the ſun ſees and hears all things, and the apparent gods have both a viſive and auditory ſenſe, but not externally: for they contain in themſelves, prior to wholes, the roots and the cauſes of all things.

That knowledge does not deſcend from on high without a medium, but through certain media. For, as in Homer *, the knowledge of the converſation between Jupiter and the Sun, deſcended to Ulyſſes through the archangelic Hermes and Calypſo as media, ſo Helenus the prophet perceived the will of Apollo and Minerva, not indeed of the divinites who ſtand at the head of the Apolloniacal and Minerval ſeries, but of thoſe powers of this ſeries that were proximate to him, and of a dæmoniacal characteriſtic.

That with reſpect to the names Aſtyanax† and Hector, the philoſopher, looking to the form and the thing ſignified, calls them ſimilar; but grammarians, directing their attention to the matter and the ſyllables, will ſay that they are diſſimilar.

That it is neceſſary the founder of names ſhould eſtabliſh names looking to the forms of the things denominated. But this will become evident to him who looks to the univerſe. For as there are many pſychical deſcents to this terreſtrial abode, and different ſouls are diſſeminated according to different allotments, and engaged in different lives, and ſince among theſe ſome chooſe lives correſponding to thoſe of their preſiding and leading gods; hence ſouls of this kind eſpecially appear to venerate the names of their leaders. My meaning is this: ſouls that proceed from the Minerval ſeries, and preſerve unchanged the form of life adapted to this order, at the ſame time exhibit themſelves by an energy and appellation correſponding to the idiom of the goddeſs. But ſouls that deſcend indeed from this order, and yet chooſe a life by no means adapted to it, employ likewiſe foreign and caſual names. Hence, as it appears to me, Bacchuſes, Eſculapiuſes, Mercuries, and Herculeſes, having the ſame names with their preſiding gods, have pro-

* See the twelfth book of the Odyſſey. † See p. 501.

ceeded

ceeded into theſe terreſtrial places, accompanied with the inſpiring influence of the gods, neither changing the form of the life, nor the appellation of their proper leaders. They ſay then, that Hercules, who was called Alcides by his mortal parents, was called Hercules by the Pythian deity, through his alliance to the Herculean order and divinity. For deity gives an appropriate name to man, looking to his whole ſeries and life, which he produces into energy.

That it is requiſite to conſider the names of things borne along in generation, either by looking to all cauſes, as well ſuch as are total, as thoſe that are partial, as well thoſe that are remote, as thoſe that are proximate to generated natures; as, for inſtance, horſe conſidered as a whole, and that which is proximate and corruptible; or it is neceſſary to conſider them looking only to more excellent and perfect natures, which poſſeſs invariable rectitude, and which entirely rule over matter; and of this kind are univerſals. For when an ox is generated from an horſe, the partial nature is ſubdued, and on this account a horſe is not generated; but whole nature vanquiſhes, and on this account an ox is generated. For whence is the form of the ox derived, unleſs nature ſimply conſidered ſubdues. Hence Plato does not now ſimply call things of this kind, τερατα, but as it were τιρατα, as not being entirely contrary to nature.

That he who intends to etymologize ought to know, in the firſt place, the differences of dialects; and, in the ſecond place, the uſe of the poets. In the third place, he muſt diſtinguiſh ſimple from compoſite names. In the fourth place, he muſt unfold names in a manner accommodated to things themſelves. In the fifth place, it is neceſſary that he ſhould obſerve the different uſe of names. In the ſixth place, he ought to know the properties of words, ſuch as apocopies, ſyncopies, ellipſes, pleonaſms, and the like. In the ſeventh place, he ought to know the idioms of the elements; for from theſe, as extremes, the rectitude of names and their alliance to things is demonſtrated. In the eighth place, it is neceſſary that he ſhould diſtinguiſh ambiguities, and ſuch names as are homonymous; for the truth of names is retained through theſe. Further ſtill, it is neceſſary to know names which deviate from their origin. And ſuch is the critical knowledge which he who etymologizes ought to poſſeſs.

That Socrates now appropriately introduces the words θεοφιλον* and μνησιθεον, i. e. dear

* See p. 504.

to

to divinity, and mindful of divinity; for the alliance of ſouls to divinity is effected through the love of a divine nature, and the recollection of the hyparxis of deity; and to ſouls of this kind only does it belong to have paternal and intellectual names. But names, which are the offſpring of generation, belong to thoſe who embrace an indefinite and material life.

That names being two-fold, one kind belonging to things perpetual, which are eſtabliſhed according to ſcience, and another to things corruptible, and which are the ſubjects of doubt, it is not likely that fathers ſhould have given their ſons inauſpicious names, ſuch as Oreſtes, Atreus, Tantalus, nor is it probable that they foreknew what would be the life of their children in future: for the phyſiognomic art is attended with great obſcurity, and eſpecially when exerciſed on thoſe that are juſt born. Of all theſe doubts, therefore, Socrates delivers to us moſt clear rules of ſolution: for men are unacquainted with the unapparent periods of ſouls, and the appetites (ορεξεις) which they poſſeſſed prior to generation, in which nearly the whole of actions is comprehended. Hence they are not judges of the rectitude of names coordinate to every form of life. Gods therefore and dæmons, who cauſally comprehend the powers and energies of ſouls, clearly know how to impoſe names adapted to the reſpective lives of ſouls. And as they diſtribute every other allotment to them according to their deſert, ſo alſo their names. But ſince we every where conſider fortune as the cauſe of the coordination of things which appear to be diſordered, here alſo this is to be conſidered as the moſt proper principle. For fathers, looking to memory or hope, or ſomething of this kind, give names to their children; but fortune gives them names after another manner, through a ſymphony with their lives. Agamemnon therefore called his ſon Oreſtes, not through ruſticity of manners, but through impulſe (δια την ορμην) and facility of motion (ευκινησιαν), παρα το ορουειν from *ruſhing*, or rather from *ſeeing* (ορων) in him ſuch-like marks or tokens of nature; or from wiſhing that he might become a character of this kind. Fortune, however, after another manner, and more truly, allotted him this name: for it unfolds his whole life. Hence Socrates, from this cauſe, thinks fit to etymologize his name, but not from a mere human cauſe; for he ſaw that this accorded better with the thing. Much more therefore is fortune productive of the proximate cauſe of the rectitude of names; and when this proximate cauſe errs, nothing hinders the whole cauſe, which belongs to fortune, from acting rightly; ſince the ſame thing

takes place in nature. For when a partial nature acts rightly, whole nature much more acts with rectitude; but when a partial nature wanders from the mark, whole nature is nevertheleſs able to act with rectitude. Nor let any one think that this fortune is an irrational and indefinite cauſe: for its work looks to intellect. And a divine, or dæmoniacal power, leaves nothing deſtitute of its proper ſuperintendence, but directs all, and the very laſt of our energies, to a good purpoſe, and to the order of the univerſe. For we are ſupernally moved from more excellent cauſes, who are able, from our eſſence, as if from the ſtern of a ſhip, to pilot all our concerns. Plato therefore introduces this as one cauſe of the right poſition of names; but he conſiders as another cauſe poets acting under the influence of divine inſpiration, looking to the accidental actions of men, and through theſe as it were ſagaciouſly analyzing and diſcovering their proper names. What then hinders but that poets, looking to the bold deed of Oreſtes towards his mother, may have called him Oreſtes, as ορειον, *mountainous*, and *ſavage* (αγριον), and without fruit (ακαρπον), as having cut off the principle of his proper generation; and that they ſhould have delivered this name to the Greeks?

That Plato, in etymologizing, always firſt indicates by itſelf the thing ſignified; and afterwards that which is aſſimilated to the thing, and which ſubſiſts as a veſtige of it in the ſyllables of the name. Thus in the name of Oreſtes* he firſt ſays, that it ſignifies *the ſavage* and *the ruſtic* (το θηριωδες, και το αγριον), and afterwards he adds, το ορειον, *the mountainous*, which ſubſiſts in the ſyllables. And in the name of Agamemnon, having firſt ſaid that it ſignifies to labour and endure, he adds, he was therefore a good man, δια την επιμονην. And this he does in all the other names.

That Plato, in his etymologies, deſpiſing the matter, but being eſpecially attentive to the form of names, ſays that the name Agamemnon† was compoſed from the admirable (παρα το αγαστον), and not from the *too much* (ου παρα το αγαν). But grammarians, as paying attention moſtly to the matter, and not ſeeing the form of life, very properly etymologize this name from the contrary.

That Plato indicates that our very being is in ſoul, and not in body, by looking to names from pſychical idioms, and not from ſuch as are corporeal.

That the divine Plato in what is here ſaid aſſiſts us with reſpect to our morals, ſince

* See p. 504. † See p. 505.

he

he delivers to us Oreſtes, Agamemnon, and Atreus, as men vehement, irraſcible, and avengers. But ſince the firſt of theſe ſinned againſt his mother, and the laſt towards his children, hence they are very properly blamed. But Agamemnon is called by him admirable and praiſe-worthy, becauſe he exerted his vehemence on the naturally hoſtile race of the Barbarians.

That the particulars reſpecting Pelops teach us, firſt, to deſpiſe appearances, and to look to the whole periods of ſouls; and to be remiſs with reſpect to human affairs, but ſtrenuous with reſpect to virtue and things divine. And, in the ſecond place, they teach us that children partake of the puniſhment belonging to the crimes of their anceſtors. For ſouls, through their coordination * with the unjuſt, become partakers of injuſtice; their bodies alſo conſiſt from baſe ſeed; and their external concerns receive their beginning from crimes. Socrates in the Phædrus ſays, that the teleſtic art is able to purify theſe, liberating them from their preſent evils through the worſhip of divinity.

That the narration concerning Tantalus † obſcurely ſignifies a ſoul elevated through contemplation to the intelligible (for the intelligible is the nutriment of the gods); but falling from the intelligible place to earth, and communicating his intellectual life which remains recently perfected (νεοτελη) with the multitude of the irrational nature. Hence he is ſaid to be the ſon of Jupiter. For every recently-perfected ſoul falls from the court of Jupiter into generation; and on this account, Jupiter is the father of gods and men. Such a ſoul too, being enfolded with the evils which are here, and aſſociating with images inſtead of realities, is ſaid to ſuffer puniſhment in Hades; having much of the terreſtrial, ſtony, and material ſuſpended from its nature, through which its intellectual part is buried. It is likewiſe in want of all divine fruits, poſſeſſing the mere imaginations of them, and falling from the true and clear apprehenſion of them.

That the allotment of a certain name to a certain life is the work of the ſoul, but the general adoption of this name is from Fame. For Fame, according to Homer, is the angel of Jupiter.

That Socrates from divine names, which are ſtatues of the gods, recurs analytically to

* The ſouls of ſuch children, therefore, as are puniſhed for the crimes of their parents, are, from their coordination, naturally allied to the diſpoſition of their parents; and through this alliance become juſt objects of puniſhment.

† See p. 505.

the powers and energies of the gods: for he leaves their eſſences, as being ineffable and unknown, to be alone ſurveyed by the flower of intellect*.

That Jupiter is not *ſaid to be*, but *is* the father of thoſe who genuinely preſerve the proper form of life, ſuch as Hercules and the Dioſcuri; but of thoſe who are never at any time able to convert themſelves to a divine nature, he never *is* nor is *ſaid to be* the father. Such therefore as having been partakers of a certain energy above human nature, have again fallen into *the ſea of diſſimilitude*†, and for honour among men have embraced error towards the gods,—of theſe Jupiter is *ſaid to be* the father.

That the paternal cauſe originates ſupernally from the intelligible and occult gods; for there the firſt fathers of wholes ſubſiſt; but it proceeds through all the intellectual gods into the demiurgic order. For Timæus celebrates this order, as at the ſame time *fabricative* and *paternal*; ſince he calls Jupiter the *demiurgus* and *father*. The fathers however who are ſuperior to the one fabrication are called gods of gods, but the demiurgus is the father of gods and men. Further ſtill, Jupiter is ſaid to be *peculiarly* the father of ſome, as of Hercules, who immutably preſerve a Jovian and ruling life during their converſe with the realms of generation. Jupiter therefore is triply father, of gods, partial ſouls, and of ſouls that embrace an intellectual and Jovian life. The intellectual order of the gods, therefore, is ſupernally bounded by the king ‡ of the total divine genera, and who has a paternal tranſcendency with reſpect to all the intellectual gods. This king, according to Orpheus, is called by the bleſſed immortals that dwell on lofty Olympius, Phanes Protogonus. But this order proceeds through the three Nights, and the celeſtial orders into the Titannic or Saturnian ſeries, where it firſt ſeparates itſelf from the fathers, and changes the kingdom of the *Synoches* §, for a diſtributive goverment of wholes, and unfolds every demiurgic genus of the gods, from all the above-mentioned ruling and royal cauſes, but proximately from Saturn the leader of the Titannic orders. Prior however to other fabricators (δημιουργοι) it unfolds Jupiter, who is allotted the unical ſtrength of the whole demuirgic ſeries, and who produces and gives ſubſiſtence to

* That is, by the ſummit, or *one* of our nature, through which we become united with divinity.

† Plato, in the Politicus, thus calls the realms of generation, i. e. the whole of a viſible nature.

‡ That is, intelligible intellect, the extremity of the intelligible order.

§ That is, the divinities who compose the middle of that order of gods, which is denominated intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual.

all

all unapparent and apparent natures. And he is indeed intellectual according to the order in which he ranks, but he produces the ſpecies and the genera of beings into the order of ſenſibles. He is likewiſe filled with the gods above himſelf, but imparts from himſelf a progreſſion into being to all mundane natures. Hence Orpheus* repreſents him fabricating every celeſtial race, making the ſun and moon, and the other ſtarry gods, together with the ſublunary elements, and diverſifying the latter with forms, which before had a diſordered ſubſiſtence. He likewiſe repreſents him preſiding over the gods who are diſtributed about the whole world, and who are ſuſpended from him; and in the character of a legiſlator aſſigning diſtributions of providence in the univerſe, according to deſert, to all the mundane gods. Homer too, following Orpheus, celebrates him as the common father of gods and men, as leader and king, and as the ſupreme of rulers. He alſo ſays that all the multitude of mundane gods is collected about him, abides in and is perfected by him. For all the mundane gods are converted to Jupiter through Themis,

Ζευς δε θεμιστα κελευσε θεους, αγορην δε καλεσσαι
—— εδ' αρα παντη
Φοιτησασα κελευσε Διος προς δωμα νεεσθαι·

i. e. "But Jupiter orders Themis to call the gods to council; and ſhe directing her courſe every where, commands them to go to the houſe of Jupiter†." All of them therefore are excited according to the one will of Jupiter, and become διος ενδον ‡, *within Jupiter*, as the poet ſays. Jupiter too, again ſeparates them within himſelf, according to two coordinations, and excites them to providental energies about ſecondary natures; he at the ſame time, as Timæus ſays, abiding after his accuſtomed manner,

Ως εφατο κρονιδης πολεμον δ' αλιαστον εγειρεν §·

i. e. "Thus ſpoke Saturnian Jupiter, and excited inevitable war." Jupiter however is

* As what is here ſaid from Orpheus concerning Jupiter is very remarkable, and is no where elſe to be found, I give the original for the ſake of the learned reader. Διο και Ορφευς δημιουργουντα μεν αυτον την ουρανιαν πασαν γενεαν παραδιδωσι, και ηλιον ποιουντα και σεληνην, και τους αλλους αστρους θεους· δημιουργουντα δε τα υποσεληνην στοιχεια, και διακρινοντα τοις ειδεσιν ατακτως εχοντα προτερον· σειρας δ' εφισταντα θεων περι ολον τον κοσμον εις αυτον ανηρτημενας, και διαθεσμοθετουντα πασι τοις εγκοσμιοις θεοις κατ' αξιαν διανομας της εν τω παντι προνοιας.

† Iliad. xx. v. 4. ‡ See the 14th line. § Ibid. v. 32.

ſeparate

ſeparate and exempt from all mundane natures; whence alſo the moſt total and leading of the other gods, though they appear to have in a certain reſpect equal authority with Jupiter, through a progreſſion from the ſame cauſes, yet call him father. For both Neptune and Juno celebrate him by this appellation. And though Juno ſpeaks to him as one who is of the ſame order,

Και γαρ εγο θεος ειμι· γενος δε μοι ενθεν οθεν σοι
Και με πρεσβυτατην τεκετο κρονος αγκυλομητις*·

i. e. "For I alſo am a divinity, and Saturn of inflected council endowed me with the greateſt dignity, when he begat me." And though Neptune ſays,

Τρεις γαρ τ' εκ κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι, ους τεκε Ρεια,
Ζευς και εγω, τριτατος δ' Αϊδης ενεροισιν ανασσων†·

i. e. "For we are three brothers from Saturn, whom Rhea bore, Jupiter and I, and the third is Pluto, who governs the infernal realms." Yet Jupiter is called father by both theſe divinities; and this becauſe he comprehends in himſelf the one and impartible cauſe of all fabrication; is prior to the Saturnian triad‡; connectedly contains the three fathers; and comprehends on all ſides the vivification of Juno. Hence, at the ſame time that this goddeſs gives animation to the univerſe, he alſo together with other gods gives ſubſiſtence to ſouls. Very properly therefore do we ſay that the demiurgus in the Timæus is the mighty Jupiter. For he it is who produces mundane intellects and ſouls, who adorns all bodies with figures and numbers, and inſerts in them one union, and an indiſſoluble friendſhip and bond. For Night alſo in Orpheus adviſes Jupiter to employ things of this kind in the fabrication of the univerſe,

Αυταρ επην δεσμον κρατερον περι πασι τανυσσης·

i. e. But when your power around the whole has ſpread
A ſtrong coercive bond.———

The proximate bond indeed of mundane natures, is that which ſubſiſts through analogy;

* Iliad. iv. 58. † Iliad. xv. v. 187.

‡ For the Saturnian triad belongs to that order of gods which is called ſupermundane, and which immediately ſubſiſts after the intellectual order; ſo that the Jupiter who ranks at the ſummit of this triad is different from and inferior to the demiurgus.

but

but the more perfect bond is derived from intellect and ſoul. Hence Timæus calls the communion of the elements through analogy, and the indiſſoluble union from life, a bond: for he ſays animals were generated bound with animated bonds. But a more venerable bond than theſe ſubſiſts from the demiurgic will. "For my will," ſays Jupiter in the Timæus, "is a greater and more principle bond," &c.

Firmly adhering, therefore, to this conception reſpecting the mighty Jupiter, viz. that he is the demiurgus and father of the univerſe, that he is an all-perfect imparticipable* intellect, and that he fills all things both with other goods, and with life, let us ſurvey how from names Socrates unfolds the myſtic truth concerning this divinity. Timæus then ſays that it is difficult to know the eſſence of the demiurgus, and Socrates now ſays, that it is not eaſy to underſtand his name, which manifeſts his power and energy.

That our ſoul knows partibly, the impartible nature of the energy of the gods, and that which is characterized by unity in this energy, in a multiplied manner: and this eſpecially takes place about the demiurgus, who expands intellectual forms, and calls forth intelligible cauſes, and evolves them to the fabrication of the univerſe. For Parmenides characterizes him by fameneſs and difference. According to Homer two tubs are placed near him; and the moſt myſtic tradition, and the oracles of the gods, ſay that the duad is ſeated with him. For thus they ſpeak: "He poſſeſſes both; containing intelligibles in intellect, but introducing ſenſe to the worlds." Theſe oracles likewiſe call him *twice beyond*, and *twice there* (δις επεκεινα, και δις εκει), and, in ſhort, they celebrate him through the duad. For the demiurgus comprehends in himſelf unitedly every thing *prolific*†, and which gives ſubſiſtence to mundane natures. Very properly therefore is his name two-fold, of which δια manifeſts *the cauſe through which*, and this is paternal goodneſs; but ζηνα ſignifies *vivification*, the firſt cauſes of which in the univerſe the demiurgus unically comprehends. The former, too, is a ſymbol of the Saturnian and paternal ſeries; but the latter of the vivific and maternal Rhea. So far likewiſe as Jupiter receives the whole of Saturn, he gives ſubſiſtence to a triple eſſence, the impartible, the partible, and that which ſubſiſts between theſe; but according to the Rhea which he contains in himſelf, he ſcatters, as from a fountain, intellectual, pſychical, and corporeal life. But by his demiurgic powers and energies, he

* That is, he is not an intellect conſubſiſtent with ſoul.

† And the duad, conſidered as a divine form or idea, is the ſourſe of fecundity.

gives

gives a formal ſubſiſtence to theſe and ſeparates them from forms of a prior order, and from each other. He is alſo the ruler and king of all things; and is exempt from the three demiurgi. For they, as Socrates ſays in the Gorgias, divide the kingdom of their father; but Jupiter, the demiurgus, at once without diviſion reigns over the three, and unically governs them.

He is therefore the cauſe of the paternal triad, and of all fabrication; but he connectedly contains the three demiurgi. And he is a *king* indeed, as being coordinated with the fathers; but a *ruler*, as being proximately eſtabliſhed above the demiurgic triad, and comprehending the uniform cauſe of it. Plato, therefore, by conſidering his name in two ways, evinces that images receive partibly the unical cauſes of paradigms, and that this is adapted to him who eſtabliſhes the intellectual duad in himſelf. For he gives ſubſiſtence to two-fold orders, the celeſtial and the ſuperceleſtial; whence alſo the theologiſt Orpheus ſays, that his ſceptre conſiſts of four and twenty meaſures, as ruling over a two-fold twelve *.

That the ſoul of the world gives life to altermotive natures; for to theſe it becomes the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato ſays in the Phædrus and Laws. But the demiurgus ſimply imparts to all things life divine, intellectual, pſychical, and that which is diviſible about bodies. No one however ſhould think that the gods in their generations of ſecondary natures are diminiſhed; or that they ſuſtain a diviſion of their proper eſſence in giving ſubſiſtence to things ſubordinate; or that they expoſe their progeny to the view, externally to themſelves in the ſame manner as the cauſes of mortal offſpring. Nor, in ſhort, muſt we ſuppoſe that they generate with motion or mutation, but that, abiding in themſelves, they produce by their very eſſence poſterior natures, comprehend on all ſides their progeny, and ſupernally perfect the productions and energies of their offſpring. Nor again, when it is ſaid that gods are the ſons of more total gods, muſt it be ſuppoſed that they are disjoined from more antient cauſes, and are cut off from a union with them; or that they receive the idiom of their hyparxis through motion, and an indefiniteneſs converting itſelf to bound. For there is nothing irrational and without

* The twelve gods who firſt ſubſiſt in the *liberated* or ſupercelestial order, and who are divided into four triads, are Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; Veſta, Minerva, Mars; Ceres, Juno, Diana; and Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The firſt of theſe triads is *fabricative*; the ſecond, *defenſive*; the third, *vivific*; and the fourth, *anagogic*.

meaſure

meaſure, in the natures ſuperior to us. But we muſt conceive that their progreſſions are effected through ſimilitude; and that there is one communion of eſſence, and an indiviſible continuity of powers and energies between the ſons of gods and their fathers; all thoſe gods that rank in the ſecond order being eſtabliſhed in ſuch as are more antient; and the more antient imparting much of perfection, vigour, and efficacious production to the ſubordinate. And after this manner we muſt underſtand that Jupiter is ſaid to be the ſon of Saturn. For Jupiter being the demiurgic intellect, proceeds from another intellect, ſuperior and more uniform, which increaſes indeed its proper intellections, but converts the multitude of them to union; and multiplies its intellectual powers, but elevates their all-various evolutions to impartible ſameneſs. Jupiter, therefore, proximately eſtabliſhing a communion with this divinity, and being filled from him with total intellectual good, is very properly ſaid to be the ſon of Saturn, both in hymns and invocations, as unfolding into light that which is occult, expanding that which is contracted, and dividing that which is impartible in the Saturnian monad; and as emitting a ſecond more partial kingdom, inſtead of that which is more total, a demiurgic inſtead of a paternal dominion, and an empire which proceeds every where inſtead of that which ſtably abides in itſelf.

Why does Socrates apprehend the name of king Saturn* to be ὑβριστικον, *inſolent*, and looking to what does he aſſert this? We reply, that according to the poets *ſatiety* (κορος) is the cauſe of *inſolence*; for they thus denominate immoderation and repletion; and they ſay that *Satiety* brought forth *Inſolence* (ὑβριν φασιν τικτει κορος). He, therefore, who looks without attention to the name of Saturn, will conſider it as ſignifying *inſolence*. For to him who ſuddenly hears it, it manifeſts ſatiety and repletion. Why, therefore, ſince a name of this kind is expreſſive of inſolence, do we not paſs it over in ſilence, as not being auſpicious and adapted to the gods? May we not ſay that the royal ſeries† of

* See p. 506.

† This royal ſeries conſiſts of Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus. "Antient theologists," ſays Syrianus (in his Commentary on the 14th book of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics), "aſſert that Night and Heaven reigned, and prior to theſe the mighty father of Night and Heaven, who diſtributed the world to gods and mortals, and who firſt poſſeſſed royal authority, the illuſtrious Ericapæus:

Τοιον ελων διενειμε θεοις, θνητοισι δε κοσμον
Ου πρωτος βασιλευε περικλυτος ηρικεπαιος.

of the gods, beginning from Phanes, and ending in Bacchus, and producing the ſame ſceptre ſupernally, as far as to the laſt kingdom; Saturn being allotted the fourth royal order, appears, according to the fabulous pretext, differently from the other kings, to have received the ſceptre inſolently from Heaven, and to have given it to Jupiter? For Night receives the ſceptre from Phanes; Heaven derives from Night the dominion over wholes; and Bacchus, who is the laſt king of the gods, receives the kingdom from Jupiter. For the father (Jupiter) eſtabliſhes him in the royal throne, puts into his hand the ſceptre, and makes him the king of all the mundane gods. "Hear me, ye gods, I place over you a king."

Κλυτε θεοι τον δ' υμμιν βασιλεα τιθημι

ſays Jupiter to the junior gods. But Saturn alone, perfectly deprives Heaven of the kingdom, and concedes dominion to Jupiter, cutting and being cut off as the fable ſays. Plato, therefore, ſeeing this ſucceſſion, which in Saturn is called by theologiſts *inſolent* (υβριστικη), thought it worth while to mention the appearance of inſolence in the name; that from this he might evince the name is adapted to the god, and that it bears an image of the inſolence which is aſcribed to him in fables. At the ſame time he teaches us to refer mythical devices to the truth concerning the gods, and the apparent abſurdity which they contain, to ſcientific conceptions.

That *the great*, when aſcribed to the gods, muſt not be conſidered as belonging to

Night ſucceeded Ericapæus, in the hands of whom she has a septre:

Σκεπτρον εχουσ' εν χερσιν ηρικεπαιου.

To Night, Heaven ſucceeded, who first reigned over the gods after mother Night:

Ος πρωτος βασιλευε θεων μετα μητερα νυκτα.

Chaos transcends the habitude of ſovereign dominion: and, with reſpect to Jupiter, the Oracles given to him by Night manifeſtly call him not the first, but the fifth immortal king of the gods:

Αθανατον βασιλεα θεων πεμπτον γενεσθαι.

According to these theologiſts, therefore, that principle which is moſt eminently the first, is *the one* or *the good*, after which, according to Pythagoras, are those two principles Æther and Chaos, which are ſuperior to the poſſeſſion of ſovereign dominion. In the next place ſucceed the first and occult genera of the gods, in which first ſhines forth the father and king of all wholes, and whom, on this account, they call *Phanes*."

interval,

interval, but as ſubſiſting intellectually, and according to the power of cauſe, but not according to partible tranſcedency. But why does Plato now call Saturn διανοια, the dianoëtic part of the ſoul? May we not ſay, that it is becauſe he looks to the multitude of intellectual conceptions in him, the orders of intelligibles, and the evolution of forms which he contains; ſince alſo in the Timæus he repreſents the demiurgic intellect as reaſoning, and making the world, dianoëtically energizing; and this in conſequence of looking to his partible and divided intellections, according to which he fabricates not only wholes but parts? When Saturn however is called intellect, Jupiter has the order of the dianoëtic part: and when again, Saturn is called the dianoëtic part, we muſt ſay that he is ſo called according to analogy with reference to a certain other intellect of a higher order. Whether therefore you are willing to ſpeak of intelligible and occult intellect, or of that which unfolds into light (εκφαντορικος νους), or of that which connectedly contains (συνεκτικος νους), or of that which imparts perfection* (τελεσιουργος νους), Saturn will be as the dianoëtic part to all theſe: for he produces united intellection into multitude, and fills himſelf wholly with excited intelligibles. Whence alſo he is ſaid to be the leader of the Titannic race, and the ſource of all-various ſeparation and diverſifying power. And perhaps Plato here primarily delivers two-fold interpretations of the name of the Titans, which Jamblichus and Amelius afterwards adopted. For the one interprets this name from the Titans extending their powers to all things; but the other from *ſomething inſectile* (πειρα το τι ατομον), becauſe the diviſion and ſeparation of wholes into parts receives its beginning from the Titans. Socrates, therefore, now indicates both theſe interpretations, by aſſerting of the king of the Titans, that he is a *certain great dianoëtic power*. For the term *great* is a ſymbol of power pervading to all things; but the term *a certain*, of power proceeding to the moſt partial natures.

That the name Saturn is now triply analyzed, of which the firſt aſſerting this god to be the plenitude of intellectual good, and to be the ſatiety of a divine intellect, from its conveying an image of the ſatiety and repletion which are reprobated by the many, is ejected as inſolent. The ſecond alſo, which exhibits the imperfect and the puerile, is in

* Of theſe intellects, the firſt is Phanes, the ſecond Heaven, the third Earth, and the fourth the Subcelestial Arch, which is celebrated in the Phædrus, viz. νους νοητος ο φανης, εκφαντορικος νους ο ουρανος, συνεκτικος νους η γη, τελεσιουργος δε νους η υπ' ουρανιος αψις.

like manner rejected. But the third, which celebrates this god as full of purity, and as the leader of undefiled intelligence, and an undeviating life, is approved. For king Saturn is intellect, and the ſupplier of all intellectual life; but he is an intellect exempt from coordination with ſenſibles, immaterial and ſeparate, and converted to himſelf. He likewiſe converts his progeny, and after producing them into light, again emboſoms and firmly eſtabliſhes them in himſelf. For the demiurgus of the univerſe, though he is a divine intellect, yet he orderly arranges ſenſibles, and provides for ſubordinate natures. But the mighty Saturn is eſſentialized in ſeparate intellection, and which tranſcend wholes. "For the fire which is beyond the firſt," ſays the Oracle, "does not incline its power downwards." But the demiurgus is ſuſpended and proceeds from Saturn, being himſelf an intellect ſubſiſting about an immaterial intellect, energizing about it as the intelligible, and producing that which is occult in it, into the apparent. For the maker of the world is an intellect of intellect. And it appears to me, that as Saturn is the ſummit of thoſe gods that are properly called intellectual, he is intellect as with reference to the intelligible genus of gods. For all the intellectual adhere to the intelligible genus of gods, and are conjoined with them through intellections. "Ye who underſtand the ſupermundane paternal profundity," ſays the Hymn to them. But Saturn is intelligible, with reference to all the intellectual gods. *Purity*, therefore, indicates this impartible and imparticipable tranſcendency of Saturn. For the not coming into contact with matter, the impartible, and an exemption from habitude, are ſignified by purity. Such indeed is the tranſcendency of this god with reſpect to all coordination with things ſubordinate, and ſuch his undefiled union with the intelligible, that he does not require a Curetic guard, like Rhea, Jupiter, and Proſerpine. For all theſe, through their progreſſions into ſecondary natures, require the immutable defence of the Curetes. But Saturn being firmly eſtabliſhed in himſelf, and haſtily withdrawing himſelf from all ſubordinate natures, is eſtabliſhed above the guardianſhip of the Curetes. He contains however the cauſe of theſe uniformly in himſelf: for this purity, and the undefiled which he poſſeſſes, give ſubſiſtence to all the progreſſions of the Curetes. Hence, in the Oracles, he is ſaid to comprehend the firſt fountain of the Amilicti, and to ride on all the others. "The intellect of the father riding on attenuated rulers, they become refulgent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire."

Νους πατρος αρραιοις εποχουμενος ιθυντηρσιν
Ακναμπτου αστραπτουσιν αμειλικτου πυρος ολκοις.

He is therefore *pure intellect*, as giving ſubſiſtence to the undefiled order, and as being the leader of the whole intellectual ſeries.

Αυτου γαρ εκθρωσκουσιν αμειλικτοι τε κεραυνοι,
Και πρηστηροδοχοι κολποι παμφεγγεος αλκης
Πατρογενους Εκατης, και υπεζωκος πυρος ανθος,
Ηδε κραταιον πνευμα πολων πυριων επεκεινα.

i. e. "From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the preſter-capacious boſoms of the all-ſplendid ſtrength of the father-begotten Hecate, together with the environed flower of fire, and the ſtrong ſpirit which is beyond the fiery poles."

For he convolves all the hebdomad of the fountains*, and gives ſubſiſtence to it, from his unical and intelligible ſummit. For he is, as the Oracle ſays, αμιστυλλευτος, uncut into fragments, uniform, and undiſtributed, and connectedly contains all the fountains, converting and uniting all of them to himſelf, and being ſeparate from all things with immaculate purity. Hence he is κορονευς, as an immaterial and pure intellect, and as eſtabliſhing himſelf in the paternal ſilence. He is alſo celebrated as the father of fathers. Saturn therefore is a father, and intelligible, as with reference to the intellectual gods.

That every intellect either abides, and is then intelligible, as being better than motion; or it is moved, and is then intellectual; or it is both, and is then intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual. The firſt of theſe is Phanes; the ſecond, which is alone moved, is Saturn; and the third, which is both moved and permanent, is Heaven.

That Saturn, from his impartible, unical, paternal, and beneficent ſubſiſtence in the intellectual orders, has been conſidered by ſome as the ſame with the one cauſe of all things. He is however only analogous to this cauſe, juſt as Orpheus calls the firſt cauſe *Time* (χρονος), nearly homonymouſly with Saturn (κρονος). But the oracles of the gods

* That is, of the whole intellectual order, which conſists of Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, the three Curetes, and the separating monad Ocean.

characterize

characterize this deity by the epithet of *the once* (τῳ απαξ); calling him *once beyond* (απαξ επεκεινα). For *the once* is allied to *the one*.

That *Heaven**, the father of Saturn, is an intellect, underſtanding himſelf indeed, but united to the firſt intelligibles; in which he is alſo firmly eſtabliſhed; and connectedly contains all the intellectual orders, by abiding in intelligible union. This god too is *connective*, juſt as Saturn is of a *ſeparating* idiom; and on this account he is *father*. For connecting precede ſeparating cauſes; and the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual, ſuch as are intellectual only. Whence alſo *Heaven* being the *Synocheys* (συνοχεις) of wholes, according to one union, gives ſubſiſtence to the Titannic ſeries, and prior to this, to other orders of the gods; ſome of which abide only in him, which he retains in himſelf, but others both abide and proceed, which he is ſaid to have concealed, after they were unfolded into light. And after all theſe, he gives ſubſiſtence to thoſe divine orders, which proceed into the univerſe, and are ſeparated from their father. For he produces two-fold monads, and triads, and hebdomads, equal in number to the monads. Theſe things however will be inveſtigated more fully elſewhere. But this deity is denominated according to the ſimilitude of the apparent Heaven. For each of them compreſſes and connects all the multitude which it contains, and cauſes the ſympathy and connection of the whole world to be one. For connection is ſecond to unifying power, and proceeds from it. In the Phædrus therefore Plato delivers to us the production of all ſecondary natures by Heaven, and ſhows us how this divinity leads upwards and convolves all things to the intelligible. He likewiſe teaches us what its ſummit is, what the profundity of its whole order, and what the boundary of the whole of its progreſſion. Here therefore, inveſtigating the truth of things from names, he declares its energy with reſpect to things more elevated and ſimple, and which are arranged nearer to *the one*. He alſo clearly appears here to conſider the order of Heaven as intelligible, and at the ſame time intellectual. For if it ſees things on high, it energizes intellectually, and there is prior to it the intelligible genus of gods, to which looking it is intellectual; juſt as it is intelligible to the natures which proceed from it. What then are the things on high which it beholds? Is it not evident that they are the ſuperceleſtial place, an eſſence without colour, without figure, and without

* See p. 507.

the

the touch, and all the intelligible extent? An extent comprehending, as Plato would ſay, intelligible animals, the one cauſe of all eternal natures, and the occult principles of theſe; but as the followers of Orpheus would ſay, bounded by Æther upwards, and by Phanes downward. For all between theſe two gives completion to the intelligible order. But Plato now calls this both ſingularly and plurally; ſince all things are there united, and at the ſame time each is ſeparated peculiarly; and this according to the higheſt union and ſeparation.

With reſpect to the term μετεωρολογοι, i. e. *thoſe who diſcourſe on ſublime affairs* *, we muſt now conſider it in a manner adapted to thoſe who chooſe an anagogic life, who live intellectually, and who do not gravitate to earth, but ſublimely tend to a theoretic life. For that which is called Earth there, maternally gives ſubſiſtence to ſuch things as Heaven, which is coordinate to that Earth, produces paternally. And he who energizes there, may be properly called μετεωρολογος, or, *one who diſcourſes about things on high*. Heaven therefore being of a *connective* nature, is expanded above the Saturnian orders, and all the intellectual ſeries; and produces from himſelf all the Titannic race; and prior to this, the perfective and defenſive orders; and, in ſhort, is the leader of every good to the intellectual gods. Plato therefore having celebrated Saturn for his intelligence, which is without habitude to mundane natures, and for his life which is converted to his own exalted place of ſurvey, now celebrates Heaven for another more perfect energy: for to be conjoined to more elevated natures, is a greater good than to be converted to oneſelf. Let no one, however, think that, on this account, the above-mentioned energies are diſtributed in the gods; as, for inſtance, that there is providence alone in Jupiter, a converſion alone to himſelf in Saturn, and an elevation alone to the intelligible in Heaven. For Jupiter no otherwiſe provides for mundane natures than by looking to the intelligible; ſince, as Plato ſays in the Timæus, intellect underſtanding ideas in animal itſelf, thought it requiſite that as many, and ſuch as it there perceived, ſhould be contained in the univerſe; but, as Orpheus† ſays, with a divinely inſpired mouth, "Jupiter ſwallows his progenitor Phanes, emboſoms all his powers, and becomes

* See p. 507.

† Ως δ' Ορφευς ενθεῳ στοματι λεγει, και καταπινει τον προγονον αυτου τον φανητα, και εγκολπιζεται πασας αυτου τας δυναμεις ο ζευς, και γινεται παντα νοερως, οσαπερ ην εκεινος νοητως.

all

all things intellectually which Phanes is intelligibly." Saturn alſo imparts to Jupiter the principles of fabrication, and of providential attention to ſenſibles, and underſtanding himſelf, he becomes united to firſt intelligibles, and is filled with the goods which are thence derived. Hence alſo the theologiſt (Orpheus) ſays, "that he was nurſed by Night *." If therefore the intelligible is nutriment, Saturn is replete not only with the intelligibles coordinated with him, but alſo with the higheſt and occult intellections. Heaven himſelf alſo fills all ſecondary natures with his proper goods, but guards all things by his own moſt vigorous powers; and the father ſupernally committed to him the connecting and guarding the cauſes of eternal animal. But he intellectually perceives himſelf, and is converted to the intelligibles which he contains; and this his intelligence, Plato, in the Phædrus, calls *circulation*. For as that which is moved in a circle is moved about its own centre, ſo Heaven energizes about its own intelligible, according to intellectual circulation. But all the gods ſubſiſting in all, and each poſſeſſing all energizes, one tranſcends more in this, and another in a different energy, and each is particularly characterized according to that in which it tranſcends. Thus Jupiter is characterized by providence, and hence his name is now thus analyzed; but Saturn, by a converſion to himſelf, whence alſo he is *inflected counſel*, αγκυλομητις; and Heaven by habitude to things more excellent, from which alſo he receives his appellation. For his giving ſubſiſtence to a pure and the Saturnian intellect, repreſents his energy to the other part. But as there are many powers in Heaven, ſuch as the connective, guardian, and convertive, you will find that this name is appropriately adapted to all theſe. For the connective is ſignified through bounding the intellectual gods; ſince the connective bounds the multitude which he contains. The power which guards wholes ſubſiſts through the termination and ſecurity of an intellectual eſſence. And the convertive power ſubſiſts through converting, ſeeing, and intellectually energizing natures, to things on high. But all theſe are adapted to Heaven. For there is no fear that the gods will be diſſipated, and that on this account they require connective cauſes, or that they will ſuſtain mutation, and that on this account they ſtand in need of the ſaving aid of guardian cauſes; but now Socrates at once manifeſts all the powers of Heaven, through convertive energy. For this is to behold things on high, to be con-

* Διο και τρεφεσθαι φησιν αυτον ο θιολογος υπο της νυκτος· "εκ παντων δε κρονον νυξ ετρεφεν ηδ' ατιταλλεν·"

verted

verted to them, and through this to be connected and defended. And it appears to me that Heaven poſſeſſes this idiom according to analogy to the intelligible eternity, and the intelligible wholeneſs. For Timæus particularly characterizes eternity by this, viz. by abiding in the one prior to it, and by being eſtabliſhed in the ſummit of intelligibles; and Socrates ſays, that Heaven ſurveys things on high, viz. the ſuperceleſtial place, and ſuch things as are comprehended in the god-nouriſhed ſilence of the fathers (*και οσα τη θεοθρεμμονι σιγη περιειλημπται των πατερων*). As therefore Parmenides ſignifies each of theſe orders through *wholeneſs*, the one through intelligible, and the other through intellectual wholeneſs; in like manner both Timæus and Socrates characterize them by a converſion to more excellent natures. But the converſion as well as the wholeneſs is different. For that of eternity is intelligible, on which account Timæus does not ſay that it looks to its intelligible, but only that it ſtably abides. But the converſion of Heaven is intellectual, and on this account Socrates ſays, that it ſees things on high, and through this converts, guards, and connects all things poſterior to itſelf. Whence alſo, in the Phædrus, it is ſaid, by the circulation of itſelf, to lead all things to the ſuperceleſtial place, and the ſummit of the firſt intelligibles.

That there being three fathers and kings of which Socrates here makes mention, Saturn alone appears to have received the government from his father, and to have tranſmitted it to Jupiter by violence. Mythologiſts therefore celebrate the ſections of Heaven and Saturn. But the cauſe of this is, that Heaven is of the connective, Saturn of the Titannic, and Jupiter of the demiurgic order. Again, the Titannic genus rejoices in ſeparations and differences, progreſſions and multiplications of powers. Saturn therefore, as a dividing god, ſeparates his kingdom from that of Heaven; but as a pure intellect, he is exempt from a fabricative energy proceeding into matter. Hence alſo the demiurgic genus is again ſeparated from him. Section therefore is on both ſides of him. For ſo far as he is a Titan, he is cut off from the connective cauſes, but ſo far as he does not give himſelf to material fabrication, he is cut off from the demiurgus Jupiter.

That with reſpect to the ſuperceleſtial place, to which Heaven extends his intellectual life, ſome characterize it by ineffable ſymbols; but others, after giving it a name, celebrate it as unknown, neither being able to ſpeak of its form or figure. And proceed-

ing ſomewhat higher than this, they have been able to manifeſt the boundary * of the intelligible gods by name alone. But the natures which are beyond this, they ſignify through analogy alone, theſe natures being ineffable and incomprehenſible. Since that god who cloſes the paternal order, is ſaid by the wiſe to be the only deity among the intelligible gods, that is denominated: and theurgy aſcends as far as to this order. Since therefore the natures prior to Heaven, are allotted ſuch a tranſcendency of uniform ſubſiſtence, that ſome of them are ſaid to be effable, and at the ſame time ineffable; known, and at the ſame time unknown, through their alliance to *the one*, Socrates very properly reſtrains the diſcourſe about them, in conſequence of names not being able to repreſent their hyparxes; and, in ſhort, becauſe it requires a certain wonderful employment, to ſeparate the effable and ineffable, of their hyparxis and power. He accuſes therefore his memory, not as diſbelieving in the fables, which aſſert, that there are certain more antient cauſes beyond Heaven, nor as not thinking it worth while to mention them. For in the Phædrus he himſelf celebrates the ſuperceleſtial place. But he ſays this, becauſe the firſt of beings cannot become known by the exerciſe of memory, and through phantaſy, or opinion, or the dianoëtic part. For we are alone naturally adapted to be conjoined to them, with the flower of intellect and the hyparxis of our eſſence; and through theſe we receive the ſenſation of their unknown nature. Socrates therefore ſays, that what in them is exempt, both from our gnoſtic and recollective life, is the cauſe of our inability to give them a name; for they are not naturally adapted to be known through names. Theologiſts likewiſe would not remotely ſignify them, and through the analogy of things apparent to them, if they could be named, and apprehended by knowledge.

That Homer † does not aſcend beyond the Saturnian order, but evincing that Saturn is the proximate cauſe of the demiurgus, he calls Jupiter, who is the demiurgus, the ſon of Saturn. He alſo calls the divinities coordinate with him, Juno, Neptune, and Mars; and he denominates Jupiter the father of men and gods. But he does not in-

* That is Phanes, intelligible intellect, or in the language of Plato, αυτοζωον, *animal* itself.

† Homer however appears to have aſcended as far as to the goddeſs *Night*, or the ſummit of the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual order. See the extracts from Damaſcius, in the additional notes to the Parmenides.

troduce

troduce Saturn, as either energizing, or saying any thing, but as truly αγκυλομητις, in conſequence of being converted to himſelf.

That Orpheus greatly availed himſelf of the license of fables, and manifeſts every thing prior to Heaven by names, as far as to the firſt cauſe. He alſo denominates the ineffable, who tranſcends the intelligible unities, *Time*; whether becauſe *Time* preſubſiſts as the cauſe of all generation, or becauſe, as delivering the generation of true beings, he thus denominates the ineffable, that he may indicate the order of true beings, and the tranſcendency of the more total to the more partial; that a ſubſiſtence according to Time may be the ſame with a ſubſiſtence according to cauſe; in the ſame manner as generation with an arranged progreſſion. But Heſiod venerates many of the divine natures in ſilence, and does not, in ſhort, name the firſt. For that what is poſterior to the firſt proceeds from ſomething elſe, is evident from the verſe,

"Chaos of all things was the firſt produced."

For it is perfectly impoſſible that it could be produced without a cauſe; but he does not ſay what that is which gave ſubſiſtence to Chaos. He is ſilent indeed with reſpect to both the fathers * of intelligibles, the exempt, and the coordinate; for they are perfectly ineffable. And with reſpect to the two coordinations, the natures which are coordinate with the one, he paſſes by in ſilence, but thoſe alone which are coordinate with the indefinite duad, he unfolds through genealogy. And on this account Plato now thinks Heſiod deſerves to be mentioned, for paſſing by the natures prior to Heaven, as being ineffable. For this alſo is indicated concerning them by the Oracles, which likewiſe add, "they poſſeſs myſtic ſilence," σιγ' εχε μυστικα. And Socrates himſelf, in the Phædrus, calls the intellectual perception of them, μυησις and εποπτειαι, *in which nearly the whole buſineſs is ineffable and unknown.*

That, as a diſcourſe concerning the gods is triple, viz. phantaſtic, like that of Euthyphro†, who irrationally imagined battles and ſtratagems among the gods; ſcientific, like that of Socrates; and doxaſtic, which ſubſiſts between theſe, and which, from the opinion of the founder of names, ſcientifically riſes to the eſſence of the gods;—hence Socrates, perceiving that the conceptions of the multitude about the gods were equally

* That is to say, *the firſt cauſe*, and *bound*, which is called by Orpheus, *Æther*.

† For the character of Euthyphro, see the dialogue which bears his name. See also p. 507 of the Cratylus.

depraved with thoſe of Euthyphro, deſcends from a ſcientific energy to inferior concerns, but at the ſame time elevates thoſe who are detained by phantaſy to a middle habit of apprehenſion concerning the gods. Hence, he aſcribes the cauſe of this deſcent in ſpeculation to Euthyphro; not conſidering him as the leader of this knowledge, but as one who, through the phantaſtically prodigious nature of his diſcourſe, excites to the ſcientific inveſtigation of truth.

That every where, the extremities of a prior, are conjoined with the ſummits of a ſecondary order. Thus, for inſtance, our maſter Hermes (ὁ δεσποτης εμων ερμης), being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as a god. But Plato calls the whole extent between gods and men, dæmons; and they indeed are dæmons by nature. Thoſe dæmons however that are now* mentioned, together with the demigods heroes, are not dæmons and heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the gods; but they are only ſo from habitude, being ſouls who naturally deliver themſelves to generation, ſuch as was the great Hercules, and others of the like kind. But the peculiarity of heroic ſouls is magnitude of operation, the elevated and the magnificent; and ſuch heroes it is neceſſary to honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to the exhortation of the Athenian gueſt. This heroic genus of ſouls therefore does not always follow the gods, but is undefiled and more intellectual than other ſouls. And it deſcends indeed for the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a deſtiny inclining downwards; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly liberated from matter. Hence ſouls of this kind are eaſily led back to the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods; while, on the contrary, the more irrational kind of ſouls are either never led back, or this is accompliſhed with great difficulty, or continues for a very inconſiderable period of time.

That each of the gods is perfectly exempt from ſecondary natures, and the firſt, and more total of dæmons are likewiſe eſtabliſhed above a habitude of this kind. They employ however terreſtrial and partial ſpirits† in the generations of ſome of the human race; not

* See p. 508.

† Some of these spirits, according to Porphyry, are subject to the power of evil dæmons, as is evident from the following passage, preserved by Augustin:

"Sunt spiritus terreni minimi loco terreno quodam malorum dæmonum potestati subjecti. Ab his sapientes Hebræorum ——— * * (vid. August.) sicut audivisti divina Apollonis oracula quæ superius dicta

not phyſically mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, expanding the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables therefore, through the ſimilitude of appellation, conceal the things themſelves. For ſpirits of this kind are ſimilarly denominated with the gods, the leading cauſes of their ſeries. Hence they ſay, either that gods have connexion with women, or men with goddeſſes. But if they were willing to ſpeak plainly and clearly, they would ſay that Venus, Mars, Thetis, and the other divinities, produce their reſpective ſeries, beginning from on high, as far as to the laſt of things; each of which ſeries comprehends in itſelf many eſſences differing from each other; ſuch as the angelical, dæmoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. The lowest powers therefore of theſe orders, have much communion with the human race:

dicta sunt. Ab his ergo *Hebræi* dæmonibus pessimis et minoribus spiritibus vetabant religiosos, et ipsis vacare prohibebant: venerari autem magis cælestes deos, amplius autem venerari deum patrem. Hoc autem et dii præcipiunt, et in superioribus ostendimus, quemadmodum animadvertere ad deum monent, et illum colere ubique imperant. Verum indocti et impiæ naturæ, quibus vere fatum non concessit a diis dona obtinue, neque habere Jovis immortalis notionem, non audientes deos et divinos viros; deos quidem omnes recusaverunt, prohibitos autem dæmones non solum nullis odiis insequi, sed etiam revereri delegerunt. Deum autem simulantes se colere, ea sola per quæ deus adoratur, non agunt. Nam deus quidem utpote omnium pater nullius indiget: sed nobis est bene, cum eum per justitiam et castitatem, aliasque virtutes adoramus, ipsam vitam precem ad ipsum facientes, per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. Inquisitio enim purgat, imitatio deificat affectionem ad ipsum operando." Porphyr. ap. August. de Civit. Dei. lib. xix. cap. 23.

i. e. "There are terrene spirits of the lowest order, who in a certain terrene place are subject to the power of evil dæmons. From these were the wise men of the Hebrews ——— * * (see Augustin), as you have heard the divine oracles of Apollo above mentioned assert. From these worst of dæmons therefore and lesser spirits of *the Hebrew*, the Oracles forbid the religious, and prohibit from paying attention to them; but exhort them rather to venerate the celestial gods, and still more the father of the gods. And we have above shown how the gods admonish us to look to divinity, and every where command us to worship him. But the unlearned, and impious natures, to whom Fate has not granted truly to obtain gifts from the gods, and to have a knowledge of the immortal Jupiter,—these not attending to the gods and divine men, reject indeed all the gods, and are so far from hating prohibited dæmons, that they even choose to reverence them. But pretending that they worship god, they do not perform those things through which alone god is adored. For god indeed, as being the father of all things, is not in want of any thing; but it is well with us, when we adore him through justice and continence, and the other virtues, making our life a prayer to him, through the imitation and investigation of him. For investigation purifies, but imitation deifies the affection by energizing about divinity."

for

for the extremities of firſt, are connaſcent with the ſummits of ſecondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural operations, and to the production of our ſpecies. On this account, it frequently is ſeen that from the mixture of theſe powers with men heroes are generated, who appear to poſſeſs a certain prerogative above human nature. But not only a dæmoniacal genus of this kind, phyſically ſympathizes with men, but a different genus ſympathizes with other animals, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with ſtags, or ſerpents.

But how is it that at one time the gods are ſaid to have connexion with mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the gods. We reply that the communion of gods with goddeſſes gives ſubſiſtence to gods, or dæmons eternally; but heroic ſouls having a two-fold form of life, viz. *doxaſtic* and *dianoëtic*, the former of which is called by Plato in the Timæus *the circle of difference*, and the latter, *the circle of ſameneſs*, and which are characterized by the properties of *male* and *female*;—hence theſe ſouls at one time exhibit a deiform power, by energizing according to the maſculine prerogative of their nature, or *the circle of ſameneſs*, and at another time according to their feminine prerogative, or *the circle of difference*; yet ſo, as that according to both theſe energies they act with rectitude, and without merging themſelves in the darkneſs of body. They likewiſe know the natures prior to their own, and exerciſe a providential care over inferior concerns, without at the ſame time having that propenſity to ſuch concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind. But the ſouls which act erroneouſly according to the energies of both theſe circles, or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate ſpecimens of practical or intellectual virtue—theſe differ in no reſpect from *gregarious* ſouls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the circle of ſameneſs is fettered, and the circle of difference ſuſtains all-various fractures and diſtortions.

As it is impoſſible, therefore, that theſe heroic ſouls can act with equal vigour and perfection, according to both theſe circles at once, ſince this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is neceſſary that they ſhould ſometimes deſcend and energize principally according to their doxaſtic part, and ſometimes according to their more intellectual part. Hence, one of theſe circles muſt energize naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this account heroes are called *demigods* (ημιθεοι), as having only one of their circles illuminated by the gods. Such of theſe therefore as have the circle of ſameneſs unfettered, as are excited to an intellectual life,

and

and are moved about it according to a deific energy,—theſe are ſaid to have a god for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through a defect with reſpect to the doxaſtic form of life. But ſuch, on the contrary, as energize without impediment according to the circle of difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and at the ſame time *enthuſiaſtically*, or, in other words, under the inſpiring influence of divinity,—theſe are ſaid to have a mortal for their father, and a goddeſs for their mother. In ſhort, rectitude of energy in each of theſe circles is to be aſcribed to a divine cauſe *. Hence, when the circle of ſameneſs has dominion, the divine cauſe of illumination is ſaid to be maſculine and paternal; but when the circle of difference predominates, it is ſaid to be maternal. Hence too, Achilles in Homer acts with rectitude in practical affairs, and at the ſame time exhibits ſpecimens of magnificent, vehement, and divinely-inſpired energy, as being the ſon of a goddeſs. And ſuch is his attachment to practical virtue, that even, when in Hades, he deſires a union with body, that he may aſſiſt his father. While, on the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by Jupiter, raiſed themſelves from generation to true being, and meddled with mortal concerns no further than abſolute neceſſity required.

That heroes are very properly denominated from Love, ſince Love is a great dæmon †: and from the cooperation of dæmons, heroes are produced. To which we may add that Love originated from Plenty as the more excellent cauſe, and from Poverty as the recipient and the worſe cauſe; and heroes are analogouſly produced from different genera.

That according to Plato το κομψον ſignifies both *the elegant* and *the appropriate* (τοτε κομψον και οικειον); and again it ſignifies *the perſuaſive* and *the deceitful* (το πιθανον και απατηλον): but το κεκομψευμενον ſignifies μεμιχθαυημενον.

That as in the univerſe angels purify ſouls, freeing them from the ſtains produced by generation, and elevating them to the gods; and as certain material dæmons alſo purify by chaſtiſing ſouls looking to matter, tearing them on thorns, as in the Republic they are repreſented doing to Aridæus;—ſo indeed the miniſters of ſacred rites, angelically

* Let it however be carefully obſerved, that this divine cauſe illuminates, invigorates, and excites theſe circles in the moſt unreſtrained and impaſſive manner, without deſtroying freedom of energy in the circles themſelves, or cauſing any partial affection, ſympathy or tendency in illuminating deity.

† See the ſpeech of Diotima in the Banquet.

remove

remove from us every thing which impedes our perception of more excellent nature; but ſophiſts, through exerciſing us dæmoniacally by arguments on both ſides, cut off the injury which we ſuſtain from falſe opinion; not doing this that they may benefit through doubting thoſe who are confuted, but for the ſake of a life phantaſtic, and converſant with the imitation of opinion. For ſophiſts aſſume the character of thoſe that are truly ſcientific and ſkilled in dialectic. And in like manner the laſt of dæmons afflict ſouls, not that they may make them lovers of real being, but becauſe they are allotted a nature defenſive of material and image-producing boſoms, but puniſhing the ſouls that fall into that place.

That many dæmons have thought fit to unfold the nature of the gods, and have alſo delivered names adapted to the gods. Thus*, too, the gods themſelves not only unfolded the intelligible and intellectual orders to the theurgiſts under the reign of Marcus Antoninus, but alſo delivered names of the divine orders declarative of their characteriſtic properties, by which theurgiſts invoking the gods in the worſhip adapted to them, were favourably heard by the divinities. Many dæmons alſo, in appearing to men of a more fortunate deſtiny, have unfolded to them names connaſcent with things themſelves, through which they have rendered the truth about beings more conſpicuous.

That of names ſome belong to perpetual, and others to corruptible things. And of thoſe which belong to things perpetual, ſome are deviſed by men, but others by more divine cauſes. And of thoſe which are the production of more divine cauſes than men, ſome are eſtabliſhed by the gods themſelves, but others by dæmons. And of thoſe which are deviſed by men, ſome are the offspring of ſcience, but others are effected without ſcience. Again, of names which belong to things corruptible, ſome are produced according to, but others without art; and of thoſe produced without art, and the dianoëtic energy, ſome ſubſiſt according to an unknown divine cauſe, ſuch for inſtance

* Ουτω και τοις επι ΜΑΡΚΟΥ γενομενοις θεουργοις, οι θεοι ὡς νοητας και νοερας ταξεις εφαινοντες, ονοματα των θειων διακοσμων εξαγγελτικα της ιδιοτητος αυτων παραδεδωκασιν, οις καλουντες εκεινοι τους θεους εν ταις προσηκουσαις θεραπειαις της παρ' αυτων ευηκοιας ετυγχανον. This is a very remarkable paſſage, from which the antiquity of the greater part of the Chaldæan Oracles that are now extant may be aſcertained. See my collection of thoſe Oracles, in the Supplement to the 3d volume of the Monthly Magazine.

as the name Oreſtes; but others without ſuch a cauſe. And of thoſe without a cauſe, ſome ſubſiſt according to hope, others according to memory, and others according to neither of theſe. But of thoſe which are denominated according to art, ſome ſubſiſt according to things preſent, others according to things paſt, and others according to things future. Thus according to things preſent Ariſtocles was called Plato; but according to things paſt Antilochus was denominated Philopater, through having encountered danger for the ſake of his father. And names ſubſiſt according to things future, as when ſome one foreknowing through ſkill in aſtrology that his ſon will become renowned, calls him *Pericles*. There is alſo a kind of names mixed from fortune and art, and which through this is twofold. One diviſion of this takes place, when ſome one knows the power of a name, but is ignorant of the nature of the thing of which it is the name. Thus Xanthippus knew that the name *Pericles* ſignifies *renown*, but he did not know that his ſon Pericles would be moſt renowned, and therefore did not in conſequence of this knowledge thus name him. On the contrary, another diviſion of this happens, when ſome one is ignorant of the power of the name, but knows the eſſence of the thing, as in the inſtance of him who denominated Theſeus, Hercules: for he knew that Theſeus reſembled Hercules, but he was ignorant* that the name Hercules was alone adapted to Hercules, in conſequence of Juno becoming the cauſe to him of ſo many labours, and of the renown which he afterwards acquired through thoſe labours.

That with reſpect to the intellections of the ſoul, ſome abide in wholes, and comprehend theſe; but others alone energize on more partial genera; and others are buſily employed about the divine conceptions of eternal individuals. Thoſe who contemplate the Saturnian and defenſive ſeries are the paradigm of the firſt of theſe; thoſe whoſe conceptions are employed about ſuperceleſtial natures, and him† who there drives his winged chariot, are the paradigm of the ſecond; and thoſe who diligently obſerve and judge of the effects proceeding into generation from the ſun and moon, of the third.

That it is the peculiarity of the ſtrange inhabitants of Greece of the preſent time,

* Ηγνοει δε το ηρακλης ονομα, οτι επι μονου ηρμοζε του ηρακλεους, δια το την ηραν αυτω γενεσθαι αιτιαν των τοσουτων αγωνων, και του δια των αγωνων υστερον κλεους.

† Viz. Jupiter. See the Phædrus.

neither to conſider the ſun nor moon as gods*, nor to worſhip the other celeſtials, though they are our ſaviours and guides, leading upwards immortal, and fabricating and giving ſubſiſtence to mortal ſouls. *I ſhould ſay however that thoſe who have the hardineſs to entertain ſuch an audacious and abſurd opinion concerning the celeſtial gods, belong to ſouls who are haſtening to Tartarus, and to that which is moſt dark and diſordered in the univerſe*†. *Let theſe however remain where they are ranked by Juſtice.*

That the name GOD‡ is rationally aſcribed not only to the apparent, but alſo to the ſuperceleſtial, intellectual, and intelligible cauſes. For Socrates in the Republic ſpeaks of *ſwiftneſs* itſelf and ſlowneſs itſelf in intelligible numbers; on which account alſo the liberated rulers of wholes, who are ſuperceleſtial, are celebrated in the Phædrus as driving winged chariots. And theologiſts ſay that prior to theſe the intellectual gods ride in chariots of this kind; that Heaven itſelf, which connectedly comprehends the intellectual gods, poſſeſſes its intelligence in *circulation*; and that the intelligible cauſes prior to this, though theſe are ineffable, have a *rapid motion*, and unattended with time. For the Oracles § alſo call theſe *ſwift*, and ſay that "proceeding from the father they run to him." But Orpheus thus ſpeaks about the occult order of the gods:

"Unwearied, in a boundleſs orb it moves."

This name may alſo be interpreted after another manner; ſince it manifeſts the producing and fabricative cauſes of all things: for Θεναι and Θησω are aſſumed for το ποιειν.

* This alſo has been the peculiarity of what are called the *civilized* nations of the earth for upwards of a thousand years!

† Ψυχων αν εγωγε φαιην εις αυτον τον ταρταρον, και τον αφθεγγεστατον του παντος, και ατακτοτατον επειγομενων, την τοιαυτην τολμαν, και την παραλογον ταυτην οιησιν προς τους ουρανιους υποθρασυνομενων θεους· αλλ' ουτοι μεν εστωσαν οπου περιταχθησαν υπο της δικης. Proclus in ſaying this will doubtleſs appear in the light of a moſt uncharitable bigot, to moſt readers. It muſt however be obſerved that the doctrine of eternal puniſhment has no place in the Pagan creed; and that, according to the ſame creed, divinity benevolently puniſhes the offending ſoul, in order to purify it from guilt.

‡ See page 508.

§ Θοας γαρ αυτας και τα λογια καλει· και προιουσας απο του πατρος θεειν επ' αυτον. By the Oracles, Proclus means the Chaldæan.

That

That there is nothing debile, nothing inefficacious in the gods, but all things there are energies and lives, fervid, and eternally energizing. Of the genera, therefore, poſterior to the gods, and which are indeed their perpetual attendants, but produce in conjunction with them mundane fabrications from on high, as far as to the laſt of things,—of theſe genera ſome unfold generation into light; others are tranſporters of union; others of power; and others call forth the knowledge of the gods and an intellectual eſſence. But of theſe, ſome are called angelic, by thoſe that are ſkilled in divine concerns, in conſequence of being eſtabliſhed according to the hyparxis itſelf of the gods, and making that which is uniform in their nature commenſurate with things of a ſecondary rank. Hence the angelic tribe is *boniform*, as unfolding into light the occult *goodneſs* of the gods. Others among theſe are called by theologiſts dæmoniacal, as binding the middle of all things, and as diſtributing divine power, and producing it as far as to the laſt of things: for δαισται is το μεριται. But this genus poſſeſſes abundance of power, and is multifarious, as giving ſubſiſtence to thoſe laſt dæmons who are material, who draw down ſouls, and proceed to the moſt partial and material form of energy. Others again are denominated by them heroic, who lead human ſouls on high through love, and who are the ſuppliers of an intellectual life, of magnitude of operation, and magnitude of wiſdom. In ſhort, they are allotted a convertive order and providence, and an alliance to a divine intellect, to which they alſo convert ſecondary natures. Hence they are allotted this appellation as being able to *raiſe* and *extend* ſouls to the gods (ως αιρειν και ανατεινειν τας ψυχας επι θεους δυναμενοι). Theſe triple genera poſterior to, are indeed always ſuſpended from the gods, but they are divided from each other. And ſome of them are eſſentially intellectual; others are eſſentialized in rational ſouls; and others ſubſiſt in irrational and phantaſtic lives. It is alſo evident, that ſuch of them as are intellectual, are allotted a prudence tranſcending that of human nature, and which is eternally conjoined with the objects of their intellection. But ſuch of them as are rational, energize diſcurſively according to prudence: and the irrational kind are deſtitute of prudence; for they dwell in matter, and the darkeſt parts of the univerſe. They alſo bind ſouls to ſhadow-producing boſoms (και συνδει τας ψυχας τοις ειδωλοποιοις κολποις), and ſtrangle ſuch as are brought into that region, until they have ſuffered the puniſhment which is their due. Theſe three genera, therefore, which are more excellent than us, Socrates now calls dæmons. But if he diſpleaſes the

material tribe of dæmons by this etymology, you muſt not wonder. For the etymology is tranſcendent, and perhaps το μεριζω is παρα το δαιω, as rejoicing in diviſion.

That the hyparxis of the more excellent genera being triple, viz. intellectual, logical, phantaſtic, the golden* age is analogous to the intellectual genus. For gold, as theologiſts ſay is referred to the firſt of the worlds, the empyrean† and intellectual. But the ſilver age is analogous to the rational genus: for ſilver is referred to the middle and ethereal world. And the brazen age is analogous to the irrational and phantaſtic genus. For the phantaſy is a figured, but not a pure intellect; juſt as braſs appears to have the colour of gold, but poſſeſſes much of the terreſtrial and reſiſting, and a great alliance with things ſolid and ſenſible. Hence this age is analogous to the ſolid and brazen heaven, or, in other words, to the ſenſible world, the proximate demiurgus‡ of which is repreſented as fabricating it from braſs. But the fourth and heroic genus, is ſubordinate to ſome of thoſe natures who belong to the above-mentioned three genera, but is ſuperior to others. For the heroic genus touches upon action, and a providental attention to ſecondary natures, and is inferior to a life which is void of habitude. But it poſſeſſes magnitude of operation, and exhibits the magnificence of its proper virtue. And the fifth and very paſſive human age, is that which is aſſimilated to much-laboured and black iron, through the material and dark condition of its life. It alſo exhibits erroneous actions, and ſuch as are diſtorted and irrational.

That Plato now ſpeculates § about dæmons and heroes, not thoſe which ſubſiſt according to habitude, but thoſe which are beyond our eſſence. He recurs however, through analogy, from thoſe which ſubſiſt according to habitude, to thoſe of a more elevated order. But he paſſes by the material genus of dæmons.

That in the antient tongue *dæmons* were called *damons*, is evident from *a* being then uſed inſtead of *αι* ‖.

* See p. 510.

† According to the Chaldæans there are ſeven worlds, one empyrean and the firſt; after this three ethereal; and then three material worlds, which conſiſt of the inerratic ſphere, the ſeven planetary ſpheres, and the ſublunary region. This laſt is called by them the hater of life, containing likewiſe in itſelf matter, which they call a profundity.

‡ Viz. Vulcan.

§ See p. 510.

‖ Οτι το εν τη αρχαια φωνη τους δαιμονας, δαμονας λεγεσθαι, δηλοι οτι τω ᾱ, αντι της αι εχρωντο.

That

That ſyllables and letters appear to have the relation of eſſence in names, but acute and grave accents are certain powers of names.

That the intellect in us is Dionyſiacal, and is the true image of Bacchus. He therefore who acts erroneouſly with reſpect to it, and Titannically divulſes its impartible nature through manifold falſehood, certainly ſins againſt Bacchus himſelf, and more than thoſe who ſin againſt the external ſtatues of the god, becauſe intellect is more than any thing elſe allied to the gods.

That we are more able to underſtand the more total genera of the gods, than ſuch as are more partial. For in the leading and ruling gods, we can obtain a clearer knowledge of that which is total in their ſubſiſtence, and extends to all things, than in the liberated order of gods. And we more eaſily learn that the mighty Jupiter is the ſupplier of life to all things, and that he is the demiurgus, than we learn the nature of that Jupiter who imparts life to things celeſtial alone. And that there is one whole demiurgus is evident to all; but that there are three demiurgi more partial than this, it is difficult to underſtand.

That each of the gods, ſo far as he knows himſelf, and all the other divine genera, and participates of all things, and is bounded according to his proper hyparxis, ſo far he gives ſubſiſtence to divine names which are to us unknown and ineffable; ſince all intellectual and divine natures ſubſiſt in us pſychically. But if conceptions do not ſubſiſt in the ſoul coordinately to intellect, but after the manner of an image, and in ſubjection, much more muſt the ſoul become perfectly giddy in energizing intellectually about the gods. For it can only receive conceptions about the eſſence and the nomination of divinity, after the manner of an image (εικονικως).

That as he who ſupplies all mundane light from himſelf is called the ſun, ſo the divinity who ſupplies truth from himſelf is called Apollo.

That according to the analogous of eſſences and knowledges in the gods, angels, dæmons, and ſouls, the mutation alſo of divine names ſubſiſts. For the more ſubordinate natures of dæmons, or heroes, or ſouls, do not call the gods and themſelves in a ſuperior and more intellectual manner, as angels do. "Youths celebrate Veſta as the oldeſt of the gods,"

Πρεσβυτατην δε θεων εστιαν κελαδησατε κουροι.

For in prayers they are called upon to celebrate Veſta * before the other gods.

* See p. 515.

That

That Saturn, in conjunction with Rhea, produced Veſta and Juno, who are coordinate to the demiurgic cauſes. For Veſta imparts from herſelf to the gods an uninclining permanency, and ſeat in themſelves, and an indiſſoluble eſſence. But Juno imparts progreſſion, and a multiplication into things ſecondary. She is alſo the vivifying fountain of wholes, and the mother of prolific powers; and on this account ſhe is ſaid to have proceeded together with Jupiter the demiurgus; and through this communion ſhe generates maternally, ſuch things as Jupiter generates paternally. But Veſta abides in herſelf, poſſeſſing an undefiled virginity, and being the cauſe of ſameneſs to all things. Each of theſe divinities however, together with her own proper perfection, poſſeſſes, according to participation, the power of the other. Hence, ſome ſay that Veſta is denominated from eſſence (απο της εστιας), looking to her proper hyparxis. But others looking to her vivific and motive power, which ſhe derives from Juno, ſay that ſhe is thus denominated, ως ωσεως ουσαν αιτιαν, *as being the cauſe of impulſion.* For all divine natures are in all, and particularly ſuch as are coordinate with each other, participate of, and ſubſiſt in each other. Each therefore of the demiurgic and vivific orders, participates the form by which it is characterized, from Veſta. The orbs of the planets likewiſe poſſeſs the ſameneſs of their revolutions from her; and the poles and centres are always allotted from her their reſt.

That Veſta does not manifeſt eſſence, but the abiding and firm eſtabliſhment of eſſence in itſelf; and hence this goddeſs proceeds into light after the mighty Saturn. For the divinities prior to Saturn have not a ſubſiſtence in themſelves and in another*, but this originates from Saturn. And a ſubſiſtence in *ſelf* is the idiom of Veſta, but in *another* of Juno.

That the theology of Heſiod from the monad Rhea produces, according to things which are more excellent in the coordination, Veſta; but, according to thoſe which are ſubordinate, Juno; and according to thoſe which ſubſiſt between, Ceres. But according to Orpheus, Ceres is in a certain reſpect the ſame with the whole of vivification, and in a certain reſpect is not the ſame. For on high ſhe is Rhea, but below, in conjunction with Jupiter, ſhe is Ceres: for here the things begotten are ſimilar to the begetters, and are nearly the ſame.

* See this explained in the notes on the Parmenides.

That

That we ought to receive with caution what is now * ſaid concerning effluxions and motions. For Socrates does not deſcend to the material flowing of Heraclitus; for this is falſe†, and unworthy the dianoëtic conceptions of Plato. But ſince it is lawful to interpret things divine analogouſly, through appropriate images, Socrates very properly aſſimilates fontal and Saturnian deities to ſtreams; in ſo doing jeſting, and at the ſame time acting ſeriouſly, becauſe good is always derived, as it were, in ſtreams from on high, to things below. Hence, according to the image of rivers, after the fontal deities, who eternally devolve ſtreams of good, the deities, who ſubſiſt as principles, are celebrated. For after the *fountain* of a river, the place where it *begins* to flow is ſurveyed.

That thoſe divinities who are peculiarly denominated total intellectual gods, of whom the great Saturn is the father, are properly called fontal. For "from him leap forth the implacable thunders," ſays the Oracle concerning Saturn. But concerning the vivific fountain Rhea, from which all life, divine, intellectual, pſychical, and mundane, is generated, the Chaldæan Oracles thus ſpeak:

Ρειη τοι νοερων μακαρων πηγη τε ροητε.
Παντων γαρ πρωτη δυναμεις κολποισιν αφραστοις
Δεξαμενη, γενεην επι παν προχεει τροχαουσαν.

i. e. "Rhea § is the fountain and river of the bleſſed intellectual gods. For firſt receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable boſoms, ſhe pours running generation into every thing."

For this divinity gives ſubſiſtence to the infinite diffuſion of all life, and to all never-failing powers. She likewiſe moves all things according to the meaſures of divine motions, and converts them to herſelf; eſtabliſhing all things in herſelf, as being coordinate to Saturn. Rhea therefore is ſo called from cauſing a perpetual influx of good, and through being the cauſe of divine *facility*, ſince the life of the gods is attended with *eaſe* (Θεοι ρεια ζωοντες).

* See p. 517.

† That is to say, it is falſe to aſſert of intellectual and divine natures, that they are in a perpetual flux; for they are eternally ſtable themſelves, and are ſources of ſtability to other things.

§ Gesner, misled by Patricius, has inſerted theſe lines among the Orphic fragments, in his edition of the works of Orpheus.

That

That Ocean * is the cauſe to all the gods of acute and vigorous energy, and bounds the ſeparations of the firſt, middle, and laſt orders; converting himſelf to himſelf, and to his proper principles, through ſwiftneſs of intellect, but moving all things from himſelf, to energies accommodated to their natures; perfecting their powers, and cauſing them to have a never-failing ſubſiſtence. But Tethys imparts permanency to the natures which are moved by Ocean, and ſtability to the beings which are excited by him to the generation of ſecondary natures. She is alſo the ſource of purity of eſſence to thoſe beings who perpetually deſire to produce all things: as ſuſtaining every thing in the divine eſſences which, as it were, *leaps forth* and *percolates*. For each of firſt cauſes, though it imparts to ſecondary natures a participation of good, yet, at the ſame time, retains with itſelf that which is undefiled, unmingled, and pure from participation. Thus, for inſtance, intellect is filled with life, being, and intelligence, with which alſo it fills ſoul; but eſtabliſhing in itſelf that which in each of theſe is genuine and exempt, it alſo illuminates from itſelf to beings of a ſubordinate rank, inferior meaſures of theſe goods. And vigour of energy indeed is preſent with more antient natures, through Ocean; but the leaping forth and percolating through Tethys. For every thing which is imparted from ſuperior to ſubordinate natures, whether it be eſſence, life, or intelligence, is *percolated*. And ſuch of theſe as are primary, are eſtabliſhed in themſelves; but ſuch as are more imperfect, are transferred to things of a ſubject order. Juſt as with reſpect to ſtreams of water, ſuch of them as are nearer their ſource are purer, but the more remote are more turbid. Both Ocean and Tethys therefore are fontal gods, according to their firſt ſubſiſtence. Hence Socrates now calls them the fathers of ſtreams. But they alſo proceed into other orders of gods, exhibiting the ſame powers among the gods who rank as principles or rulers, among thoſe of a liberated, and thoſe of a celeſtial characteriſtic; and appropriately in each of theſe. Timæus however celebrates their ſublunary orders, calling them fathers of Saturn and Rhea, but the progeny of Heaven and Earth. But their laſt proceſſions are their diviſible allotments about the earth; both thoſe which are apparent on its ſurface, and thoſe which, under the earth, ſeparate the kingdom of Hades from the dominion of Neptune.

* See p. 517.

That

That Saturn is conjoined both to Rhea and Jupiter, but to the former as father to prolific power, and to the latter, as father to intelligible * intellect.

That Ocean is ſaid to have married Tethys, and Jupiter Juno, and the like, as eſtabliſhing a communion with her, conformably to the generation of ſubordinate natures. For an according coarrangement of the gods, and a connaſcent cooperation in their productions, is called by theologiſts *marriage*.

That Tethys is denominated from *leaping forth* and *ſtraining* or *cleanſing*, being as it were *Diatethys*, and by taking away the firſt two ſyallables, *Tethys* †.

That Saturn is the monad of the Titannic order of the gods, but Jupiter of the demiurgic. This laſt divinity however is two-fold, the one exempt and coordinated with Saturn, being a fontal god, and, in ſhort, ranking with the intellectual fathers, and convolving the extremity of them; but the other being connumerated with the ſons of Saturn, and allotted a Saturnian ſummit and dominion in this triad; concerning which alſo the Homeric Neptune ſays,

Τρεις γαρ τ'εκ Κρονου ειμεν αδελφεοι ους τεκε Ρεη‡.

As brother gods we three from Saturn came,
And Rhea bore us.

And the firſt Jupiter indeed, as being the demiurgus of wholes, is the king of things firſt, middle, and laſt, concerning whom Socrates also had juſt ſaid, that he is the ruler and king of all things; and life and ſalvation are imparted to all things through him. But the ruling Jupiter, who ranks as a principle, and who is coordinate with the three ſons of Saturn, governs the third part of the whole of things, according to that of Homer

Τριχθα δε παντα δεδασται §.

A triple diſtribution all things own.

He is alſo the ſummit of the three, has the ſame name with the fontal Jupiter, is

* Proclus here means that there is the same analogy between Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, as in the intelligible triad, between father, power, and intellect.

† Οτι ωνομασται η Τηθυς παρα το διαττομενον και ηθουμενον, οιον Διατηθυς, και αφαιρησει των πρωτων δυσσυλλαβων Τηθυς.

‡ Iliad xv. ver. 187. § Ibid. 189.

 united

united to him, and is monadically called Jupiter. But the ſecond is called, dyadically, marine Jupiter and Neptune. And the third is triadically denominated, terreſtrial Jupiter, Pluto and Hades. The firſt of theſe alſo preſerves, fabricates, and vivifies ſummits, but the ſecond, things of a ſecond rank, and the third thoſe of a third order. Hence this laſt is ſaid to have raviſhed Proſerpine, that together with her he might animate the extremities of the univerſe.

That the Titannic order dividing itſelf from the connecting order of Heaven, but having alſo ſomething in itſelf abiding, and connaſcent with that order, Saturn is the leader of the ſeparation, and on this account he both arms others againſt his father, and receives the ſcythe * from his mother, through which he divides his own kingdom from that of Heaven. But Ocean is coordinated with thoſe that abide † in the manners of the father, and guards the middle of the two orders; ſo far as a Titan being connumerated with the gods that ſubſiſt with Saturn; but ſo far as rejoicing in a coordination with Heaven conjoining himſelf with the Synoches. For it is fit that he who bounds the firſt and ſecond orders, ſhould be arranged in the middle of the natures that are bounded. But every where this god is allotted a power of this kind, and ſeparates the genera of the gods, the Titannic from the connecting (*των συνοχικων*), and the vivific from the demiurgic. Whence alſo antient rumour calls Ocean the god who ſeparates the apparent part of Heaven from the unapparent; and on this

* See the Theogony of Heſiod, v. 176, &c.

† Proclus here alludes to the following Orphic verſes cited by him in his Commentary on the Timæus, lib. v. p. 296.

Ενθ' ουν τ'ωκεανος μεν, ενι μεγαροισιν εμιμνεν
Ορμαινων ποτερωσε νοον τραποι, ηε πατερα
Ον γυωση τε βιης, και ατασθαλα λωβησαιτο
Συν κρονῳ, ηδ' αλλοις αδελφοις, οι πεπιθοντο
Μητρι φιλῃ, η τους γε λιπων, μενει ενδον εκηλος·
Πολλα δε πορφυρων, μενει ημερος εν μεγαροισι
Σκυζομενος τῃ μητρι, κασιγνητοισι δε μαλλον.

i. e. "But Ocean remained within the ample houſe, conſidering how he ſhould act, whether he ſhould deprive his father of his ſtrength, and baſely injure him, together with Saturn and the reſt of his brethren, who were obedient to their dear mother; or, whether leaving theſe, he ſhould ſtay quietly at home. After much deliberation, he remained quietly at home, being angry with his mother, but more ſo with his brothers."

account

account poets ſay, that the ſun and the other ſtars riſe from the ocean. What is now ſaid, therefore, by Plato, comprehends all the Titannic order through theſe two conjunctions; this order abiding and at the ſame time proceeding. And through the Saturnian order indeed, it comprehends every thing ſeparated from the fathers; but through that of Ocean, every thing conjoined with the connecting gods. Or, if you had rather ſo ſpeak, through the Saturnian order, he comprehends every maternal cauſe, but through the other, every thing ſubſervient to the paternal cauſe. For the female is the cauſe of progreſſion and ſeparation, but the male of union and ſtable permanency.

That of the demiurgic triad* which divides the whole world, and diſtributes the indiviſible, one, and whole fabrication of the firſt Jupiter, the ſummit, and which has the relation of father, is Jupiter, who through union with the whole demiurgic intellect, having the ſame appellation with it, is for this reaſon not mentioned here by Plato. But Neptune† is allotted the middle, and that which binds together both the extremes; being filled indeed from the eſſence of Jupiter, but filling Pluto. For of the whole of this triad, Jupiter indeed is the father, but Neptune the power, and Pluto the intellect. And all indeed are in all; but each receives a different character of ſubſiſtence. Thus Jupiter ſubſiſts according to *being*; but Neptune according to *power*, and Pluto according to *intellect*. And though all theſe divinities are the cauſes of the life of all things, yet one is ſo *eſſentially*, another *vitally*, and another *intellectually*. Whence alſo the theologiſt Orpheus ſays, that the extremes fabricate in conjunction with Proſerpine things firſt and laſt; the middle being coarranged with generative cauſe from his own allotment, without Proſerpine. Hence *violence* is ſaid to have been offered to Proſerpine by Jupiter; but ſhe is ſaid to have been *raviſhed* by Pluto (διο και φασι την κορην υπο μεν του διος βιαζεσθαι, υπο δε του πλουτωνος αρπαζεσθαι). But the middle is ſaid to be the cauſe of motion to all things. Hence alſo, he is called *earth-ſhaker*, as being the origin of motion. And among thoſe who are allotted the kingdom of Saturn, the middle allotment, and the agile ſea (η κινητος θαλασσα) are aſſigned to him. According to every diviſion, therefore, the ſummits are

* That is, of the firſt triad of the ſupermundane, which ſubſiſts immediately after the intellectual order.

† See p. 518.

Jovian, the middles belong to Neptune, and the extremes to Pluto. And, if you look to the centres, ſuch as the eaſt, that of mid-heaven, and the weſt; if alſo you divide the whole world, as for inſtance into the inerratic, planetary, and ſublunary ſpheres; or again, if you divide that which is generated into the fiery, terreſtrial, and that which ſubſiſts between; or the earth into its ſummits, middle and hollow, and ſubterranean parts, this triad every where diſtributes the firſt, middle, and laſt differences of things fabricated in demiurgic boundaries.

That the name Neptune is now triply analyzed. For Neptune is the trident-bearer, and the Tritons and Amphitrite are the familiars of this god. And the firſt analyzation of his name is from the allotment over which he preſides, and from ſouls coming into generation, in whom the circle of ſameneſs is fettered; ſince the ſea is analogous to generation. But the ſecond is from communion with the firſt:

Αλλα ζευς προτερος γεγονει, και πλειονα ηδει *.

But Jove was born the firſt, and more he knew.

For a Jupiter of this kind, is the proximate intelligible of Neptune. But the third analyſis of his name, is from his energy in externals. For he is motive of nature, and vivific of things laſt. He is alſo the guardian of the earth, and excites it to generations.

That Neptune is an intellectual demiurgic god, who receives ſouls deſcending into generation; but Hades is an intellectual demiurgic god, who frees ſouls from generation. For as our whole period receives a triple diviſion, into a life prior to generation, which is Jovian, into a life in generation which is Neptunian, and into a life poſterior to generation which is Plutonian; Pluto, who is characterized by intellect, very properly converts ends to beginnings, effecting a circle without a beginning, and without an end, not only in ſouls, but alſo in every fabrication of bodies, and, in ſhort, of all periods;—which circle alſo he perpetually convolves. Thus, for inſtance, he converts the ends to the beginnings of the ſouls of the ſtars, and the convolutions of ſouls about generation, and the like. And hence Jupiter is the guardian of the life of ſouls prior to generation.

* Hom. Iliad.

That

That ſome badly analyze the name of Pluto into wealth from the earth, through fruits and metals; but Hades into the inviſible, dark, and dreadful. Theſe Socrates now reprobates *, bringing the two names to the ſame ſignification; referring the name of Pluto, as intellect, to the wealth of prudence, but that of Hades to an intellect knowing all things. For this god is a ſophiſt, who purifying ſouls after death, frees them from generation. For Hades is not, as ſome improperly explain it, evil: for neither is death evil; though Hades to ſome appears to be attended with peturbations (εμπαθως); but it is inviſible, and better than the apparent; ſuch as is every thing intelligible. Intellect, therefore, in every triad of beings, convolves itſelf to being, and the paternal cauſe, imitating in its energy the circle.

That men who are lovers of body, badly refer to themſelves the paſſions of the animated nature, and on this account conſider death to be dreadful, as being the cauſe of corruption. The truth however is, that it is much better for man to die, and live in Hades a life according to nature, ſince a life in conjunction with body is contrary to nature, and is an impediment to intellectual energy. Hence it is neceſſary to diveſt ourſelves of the fleſhly garments with which we are clothed, as Ulyſſes did his ragged veſtments, and no longer like a wretched mendicant, together with the indigence of body, put on our rags. For as the Chaldæan oracle ſays, "Things divine cannot be obtained by thoſe whoſe intellectual eye is directed to body; but thoſe only can arrive at the poſſeſſion of them, who, ſtript of their garments, haſten to the ſummit."

That Plato contemplates deſire †, according to each part of the ſoul. For the iraſcible part aſpires after honour or victory, and the rational after virtue. In like manner he wiſhes to ſurvey confidence, good hope, pleaſure, and the contraries of theſe, about each part of the ſoul.

That with the love and will of the gods, the neceſſity which is with them concurs, againſt which no god contends.

That the divine Plato knew that there are three kinds of Sirens ‡: the *celeſtial*, which is under the government of Jupiter; *that which is productive of generation* (γενεσιουργον), and is under the government of Neptune; and that which is *cathartic*, and is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all theſe, to incline all things through an

* See p. 518. † Ibid. 519. ‡ Ibid. 520.

harmonic

harmonic motion to their ruling gods. Hence, when the ſoul is in the Heavens, the Sirens are deſirous of uniting it to the divine life which flouriſhes there. But it is proper that ſouls living in generation ſhould ſail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulyſſes, that they may not be allured by generation, of which the ſea is an image. And when ſouls are in Hades, the Sirens are deſirous of uniting them through intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades there are gods, dæmons, and ſouls, who dance as it were round Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.

That Plato knew how to attribute the name *ſophiſt* * to a venerable thing: for he thus denominates him who is able to convert other things to himſelf, ſuch as Jupiter, Hades, and Love.

That not all ſouls, after being liberated from the body, are thought worthy to aſſociate with Pluto, but ſuch only as are of ſuperior worth: for thoſe that are more corporeal are liberated from vice, by certain cathartic dæmons or angels, laborioufly, and accompanied with pain.

That the demiurgic Jupiter, and who is alſo the ruler of all the demiurgi, wiſhing to ſuſpend all the ſeries of fabricators from the Titannic ſeries, is very properly ſaid to bind Saturn, as being converted to this divinity, and depending from him; and as ſurveying the length and breadth of the Saturnian place of ſurvey (περιωπη), and eſtabliſhing in a Jovian manner Saturn in himſelf. Jupiter therefore binds Saturn in himſelf firmly and ſtably; and Jupiter is in a ſimilar manner bound in Saturn.

That the aſcent of the ſoul is two-fold †; the one according to an elevation to true being, and a purification from things connaſcent with generation, which the bonds of Pluto afford after death; but the other according to the ſoul having now arrived at the intelligible, through the purification of Hades, and revolving according to the life and tranſition of intellections which are there, and which the bonds of Saturn effect through a conjunction with Jupiter. For the ſoul, placing as it were veſtige of her feet in the intelligible, paſſes through the extent of intelligibles which is there, and

* See p. 520.

† That is, the aſcent of the ſoul may either be conſidered as taking place while ſhe is aſcending to true being, or as that ſuperior energy which ſhe exerts after ſhe has aſcended.

ſurveys

ſurveys thoſe bleſſed ſpectacles, as Socrates teaches us in the Phædrus. And this is a poſterior aſcent, greater and more perfect than the former. Not only the bonds of Hades therefore are incapable of holding and elevating to the dominion of Jupiter, ſouls that are aſtoniſhed about body, but neither can the bonds of Saturn effect this, though theſe as being of the father are evidently ſtronger.

That Neptune when compared with Jupiter is ſaid to know *many* things; but Hades compared with ſouls to whom he imparts knowledge is ſaid to know *all* things; though Neptune is more total than Hades.

That as it is neceſſary to analyze Pluto, not only into the obvious wealth from the earth, but alſo into the wealth of wiſdom, ſo likewiſe Ceres muſt be analyzed not only into corporeal nutriment; but, beginning from the gods themſelves, it is requiſite to conceive her to be the ſupplier of aliment, firſt to the gods themſelves, afterwards to the natures poſterior to the gods; and, in the laſt place, that the ſeries of this beneficent energy extends as far as to corporeal nutriment. For the characteriſtic of love ſhines forth firſt of all in the gods: and this is the caſe with the medicinal and prophetic powers of Apollo, and with thoſe of every other divinity. But nutriment, when conſidered with reference to the gods, is the communication of intellectual plenitude from more exalted natures to thoſe of an inferior rank. Gods therefore are nouriſhed, when they view with the eye of intellect gods prior to themſelves; and when they are perfected and view intelligible beauties, ſuch as juſtice itſelf, temperance itſelf, and the like, as it is ſaid in the Phædrus.

That the deſign of the great Plato, in the Cratylus, is not to celebrate the firſt, middle, and laſt orders of the gods, but only thoſe idioms which are apparent in their names.

That, according to Orpheus, Ceres is the ſame with Rhea: for Orpheus ſays, that ſubſiſting on high in unproceeding union with Saturn, ſhe is *Rhea*, but that by emitting and generating Jupiter, ſhe is *Ceres*. For thus he ſpeaks,

Ρειην το πριν ουσαν, επει διος επλετο μητηρ
Γεγονε δημητηρ*.

i. e: The goddeſs who was *Rhea*, when ſhe bore
Jove, became Ceres.

* This Orphic fragment is not to be found in Gesner's collection of the Orphic remains.

But

But Heſiod ſays that Ceres is the daughter of Rhea. It is however evident, that theſe theologiſts harmonize: for whether this goddeſs proceeds from union with Saturn to a ſecondary order, or whether ſhe is the firſt progeny of Rhea, ſhe is ſtill the ſame. Ceres therefore thus ſubſiſting, and receiving the moſt antient and ruling order from the whole vivific Rhea (της ολης ζωογονου ρεας), and comprehending the middle centres of whole vivification (της ολης ζωογονιας), ſhe fills all ſupermundane natures with the rivers of all perfect life, pouring upon all things vitally, indiviſibly, and uniformly.

Prior however to all this, ſhe unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect (Jupiter), and imparts to him the power of vivifying wholes: for, as Saturn ſupplies her from on high with the cauſe of being; ſo Ceres from on high, and from her own prolific boſoms, pours forth vivification to the demiurgus. But poſſeſſing herſelf the middle of all vivific deity, ſhe governs the whole fountains which ſhe contains, and comprehends the one bond of the firſt and laſt powers of life. She ſtably convolves too, and contains all ſecondary fountains. But ſhe leads forth the uniform cauſes of prior natures to the generation of others. This goddeſs too comprehends *Veſta* and *Juno:* in her right hand parts Juno, who pours forth the whole order of ſouls; but in her left hand parts Veſta, who leads forth all the light of virtue. Hence, Ceres is with great propriety called by Plato *, *mother*, and at the ſame time the *ſupplier of aliment:* for, ſo far as ſhe comprehends in herſelf the cauſe of Juno, ſhe is a mother; but as containing Veſta in her eſſence, ſhe is the ſupplier of aliment. But the paradigm of this goddeſs is *Night: for immortal Night is called the nurſe of the gods.* Night however is the cauſe of aliment intelligibly †: for that which is intelligible is, according to the Oracle ‡, the aliment of the intellectual orders of gods. But Ceres firſt of all ſeparates the two kinds of aliment in the gods, as Orpheus ſays:

Μησατο γαρ προπολους, και αμφιπολους, και οπαδους·
Μησατο δ' αμβροσιην, και ερυθρου νεκταρος αρδρον·
Μησατο δ' αγλαα εργα μελισσαων εριβομβων §.

* See page 521.

† Because Night ſubſiſts at the ſummit of *the intelligible and at the ſame time intellectual* order, and is wholly abſorbed in the intelligible.

‡ That is, according to one of the Chaldæan Oracles.

§ These verſes likewiſe are not in Gesner's collection.

i. e. She cares for pow'rs miniſtrant, whether they
Or gods *precede*, or *follow*, or *ſurround*:
Ambroſia, and *tenacious nectar red*,
Are too the objects of her bounteous care.
Laſt to the bee her providence extends,
Who gathers honey with reſounding hum.

Ceres, therefore, our ſovereign miſtreſs (δεσποινα) not only generates life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from ſupernal natures to ſuch as are laſt: *for virtue is the perfection of ſouls.* Hence mothers, who are connected with the circulations of time, bring forth their offspring in imitation of this two-fold and eternal generation of Ceres. For, at the ſame time that they ſend forth their young into the light, they extend to them milk naturally produced as their food.

That the conjunction of the demiurgic intellect with the vivific cauſes is triple: for it is conjoined with the fountains prior to itſelf; is preſent with its kindred coordinate natures; and coenergizes with the orders poſterior to itſelf. For it is preſent with the mother prior to itſelf, *convertively* (επιστρεπτικως); with Proſerpine poſterior to itſelf, *providentially* (προνοητικως); and with Juno coordinate to itſelf with an *amatory energy* (ερασμιως). Hence Jupiter is ſaid to be enamoured of Juno,

Ως σεο νυν ερεομαι *——

As now I love thee——

And this love indeed is legal, but the other two appear to be illegal. This goddeſs, therefore, produces from herſelf, in conjunction with the demiurgus and father, all the genera of ſouls, the ſupermundane and mundane, the celeſtial and ſublunary, the divine, angelic, dæmoniacal, and partial. After a certain manner too, ſhe is divided from the demiurgus, but in a certain reſpect ſhe is united to him: for Jupiter is ſaid, in the Philebus, to contain a royal intellect and a royal ſoul. For he contains uniformly the paternal and maternal cauſe of the world; and the fountain of ſouls is ſaid to be in Jupiter; juſt as again the intelligence of Jupiter is ſaid to be firſt participated by Juno. For no other divinity, ſays Jupiter in Homer, knows my mind prior to Juno. Through

* Iliad. xiv. ver. 329.

this ineffable union, therefore, of theſe divinities, the world participates of intellectual ſouls. They alſo give ſubſiſtence to intellects who are carried in ſouls, and who together with them give completion to the whole fabrication of things.

That the ſeries of our ſovereign miſtreſs Juno* beginning from on high pervades to the laſt of things; and her allotment in the ſublunary region is the air. For *air* is a ſymbol of *ſoul*, according to which alſo ſoul is called a *ſpirit* (πνευμα); juſt as *fire* is an image of *intellect*, but *water* of *nature*, by which the world is nouriſhed (της κοσμοτροφου φυσεως), and through which all nutriment and increaſe are produced. But *earth* is the image of *body*, through its groſs and material nature. Hence Homer, obſcurely ſignifying this, repreſents Juno ſuſpended with two anvils under her feet: for the air is allotted two heavy elements beneath itſelf. For

Ηλιον δ' ακαμαντα βοωπις ποτνια ηρη
Πεμψεν επ' ωκεανοιο ροους——†

i. e. "Fair-eyed venerable Juno ſent the ſun to the ſtreams of the ocean,"—is from the ſame conception: for he calls the thick cloud produced by Juno, the ſetting of the ſun. The aſſertion likewiſe that the end of this name will be conjoined with the beginning, if any one frequently repeats the name of the goddeſs, evinces the converſion of rational ſouls to her which proceed from her; and that voice is ſtruck air. On this account alſo the voice of rational animals is eſpecially dedicated to this goddeſs, who made the horſe of Achilles to become vocal. But Socrates now delivers theſe three vivific monads in a conſequent order; viz. Ceres, Juno, Proſerpine; calling the firſt the mother, the ſecond the ſiſter, and the third the daughter of the demiurgus. All of them however are partakers of the whole of fabrication; the firſt in an exempt manner and intellectually; the ſecond in a fontal manner and at the ſame time in a way adapted to a principle (αρχικως); and the third in a manner adapted to a principle and leader (αρχικως και ηγεμονικως).

Of theſe goddeſſes the laſt is allotted triple powers, and impartibly and uniformly comprehends three monads of gods. But ſhe is called Core (κορη) through the purity of her eſſence, and her undefiled tranſcendency in her generations. She alſo poſſeſſes a firſt, middle, and laſt empire. And according to her ſummit indeed ſhe is called Diana by

* See p. 521.

† Iliad. xviii. ver. 240.

Orpheus;

Orpheus; but according to her middle, Proſerpine; and according to the extremity of the order, Minerva. Likewiſe, according to an hyparxis tranſcending the other powers of this triple vivific order, the dominion of Hecate is eſtabliſhed; but according to a middle power, and which is generative of wholes, that of Soul; and according to intellectual converſion, that of Virtue *. Core, therefore, ſubſiſting on high, and among the ſupermundane gods, uniformly extends this triple order of divinities; and together with Jupiter generates Bacchus, who impartibly preſides over partible fabrication. But beneath, in conjunction with Pluto, ſhe is particularly beheld according to the middle idiom: for it is this which, proceeding every where, imparts vivification to the laſt of things. Hence ſhe is called Proſerpine, becauſe ſhe eſpecially aſſociates with Pluto, and together with him orderly diſtributes the extremities of the univerſe. And according to her extremities indeed ſhe is ſaid to be a virgin, and to remain undefiled; but according to her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, and to beget the Furies in the ſubterranean regions. She therefore is alſo called Core, but after another manner than the ſupermundane and ruling Core. For the one is the connective unity of the three vivific principles; but the other is the middle of them, in herſelf poſſeſſing the idioms of the extremes. Hence in the Proſerpine conjoined with Pluto you will find the idioms of Hecate and Minerva; but theſe extremes ſubſiſt in her occultly, while the idiom of the middle ſhines forth, and that which is characteriſtic of ruling ſoul, which in the ſupermundane Core was of a *ruling*† nature, but here ſubſiſts according to a mundane idiom.

That a lover of piety to the gods ought earneſtly to embrace the rectitude of divine names, leſt, like thoſe who err concerning Proſerpine and Apollo, being ignorant of the analyſis of names, he ſhould be ſubject to the ſame reproof from Socrates.

That Proſerpine is denominated either through judging of forms and ſeparating them from each other, thus obſcurely ſignifying the ablation of ſlaughter (διὰ τὸ κρίνειν τὰ εἴδη καὶ χωρίζειν ἀλλήλων, ὡς τοῦ φόνου τὴν ἀναίρεσιν αἰνιττομένου), or through ſeparating ſouls perfectly from bodies, through a converſion to things on high, which is the moſt fortu-

* Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldæans: for he informs us in his 6th book on the Theology of Plato, p. 372, that, according to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is *Hecate*, the second *Soul*, and the third *Virtue*.

† That is, of a supermundane nature: for the *ruling* are the *supermundane* gods.

nate ſlaughter and death, to ſuch as are worthy of it (η δια το χωριζειν τας ψυχας τελεως εκ των σωματων δια της προς τα ανω επιστροφης, οπερ εστιν ευτυχεστατος φονος και θανατος τοις αξιουμενοις τουτου). But the name Φερεφαττα, *Pherephatta*, according to a contact with generation, is adapted to Proſerpine; but according to wiſdom and counſel, to Minerva. At the ſame time however all the appellations by which ſhe is diſtinguiſhed are adapted to the perfection of ſoul. On this account alſo ſhe is called Proſerpine, and not by the names of the extremes; ſince that which was raviſhed by Pluto is this middle; the extremes at the ſame time being firmly eſtabliſhed in themſelves, according to which Core is ſaid to remain a virgin.

That very rationally after Proſerpine, Plato* now analyzes Apollo: for there is a great communion between the Coric and the Apolloniacal ſeries; ſince the former is the unity of the middle triad of rulers (i. e. of the ſupermundane gods), and emits from herſelf vivific powers; but the latter converts the ſolar principles to one union: and the ſolar principles are allotted a ſubſiſtence immediately after the vivific. Hence, according to Orpheus, when Ceres delivered up the government of Proſerpine, ſhe thus admoniſhed her:

Αυταρ Απολλωνος θαλερον λεχος εισαναβαια,
Τεξεται αγλαεα τεκνα πυριφλεγεθοντα προσωποις†.

That is,

But next Apollo's florid bed aſcend;
For thus the god fam'd offſpring ſhall beget,
Refulgent with the beams of glowing fire.

But how could this be the caſe, unleſs there was a conſiderable degree of communion between theſe divinities?

It is neceſſary, however, to know thus much concerning Apollo, that, according to the firſt and moſt natural conception, his name ſignifies the cauſe of union, and that power which collects multitude into one; and this mode of ſpeculation concerning his name harmonizes with all the orders of the god. But Socrates alone conſiders his more partial powers: for the multitude of the powers of Apollo are not to be

* See p. 522.

† These verſes are not in Gesner's collection of the Orphic fragments.

compre-

comprehended, nor deſcribed by us. For when will man, who is merely rational, be able to comprehend not only all the idioms of Apollo, but all thoſe of any other god? Theologiſts indeed deliver to us a great multitude of Apolloniacal idioms; but Socrates now only mentions four of them. For the world is as it were a decad, being filled from all productive principles, receiving all things into itſelf, and being converted to the proper principle of the decad, of which the tetrad proximately contains the cauſe, but in an exempt manner, the monad. And the former without ſeparation and occultly, but the latter with ſeparation; juſt as Apollo proximately unites the multitude of mundane natures, but the demiurgic intellect exemptly. Why then does Socrates uſe an order of this kind? For, beginning from the *medicinal* power of the god, and proceeding through his *prophetic* and *arrow-darting* powers, he ends in his *harmonic* power. We reply, that all the energies of this god are in all the orders of beings, beginning from on high and proceeding as far as to the laſt of things; but different energies appear to have more or leſs dominion in different orders. Thus, for inſtance, the *medicinal* power of Apollo is moſt apparent in the ſublunary region; for

> There ſlaughter, rage, and countleſs ills beſide,
> Diſeaſe, decay, and rottenneſs reſide *.

And as theſe are moved in an inordinate manner, they require to be reſtored from a condition contrary, into one agreeable to nature, and from incommenſuration and manifold diviſion, into ſymmetry and union.

But the *prophetic* energy of the god is moſt apparent in the heavens; for there his enunciative power ſhines forth, unfolding intelligible good to celeſtial natures, and on this account he revolves together with the ſun, with whom he participates the ſame intellect in common; ſince the ſun alſo illuminates whatever the heavens contain, and extends a unifying power to all their parts. But his *arrow-darting* energy moſtly prevails among the *liberated* † gods; for there, ruling over the wholes which the univerſe

* These lines are from Empedocles, and in the original are as follow:

Ενθα κοτος τε φονος τε και αλλων εθνεα κηρων,
Αυχμηραι τε νοσοι, και σηψεις, εργα τε ρευστα.

† For an account of this order of gods, see the notes on the Parmenides.

contains

contains, he excites their motions by his rays, which are always aſſimilated to arrows, extirpates every thing inordinate, and fills all things with demiurgic gifts. And though he has a ſeparate and exempt ſubſiſtence, he reaches all things by his energies.

Again, his *harmonic* power is more predominant in the *ruling ſupermundane* order; for it is this divinity who, harmonizing the univerſe, eſtabliſhes about himſelf according to one union the choir of the Muſes, and produces by this mean, as a certain theurgiſt says, "*the harmony of exulting light.*" Apollo therefore, as we have ſhown, is *harmonic*, and this is likewiſe the caſe with the other Apollos * which are contained in the earth and the other ſpheres; but this power appears in ſome places more, and in others leſs. Theſe powers too ſubſiſt in the god himſelf in an united manner, and exempt from other natures, but in thoſe attendants of the gods who are ſuperior to us, diviſibly, and according to participation; for there is a great multitude of medicinal, prophetic, harmonic, and arrow-darting angels, dæmons, and heroes, ſuſpended from Apollo, who diſtribute in a partial manner the uniform powers of the god.

But it is neceſſary to conſider each of theſe powers according to one definite characteriſtic; as, for inſtance, his *harmonic* power, according to its binding together ſeparated multitude; his *prophetic* power, according to the enunicative; his *arrow-darting* power, according to its being ſubvertive of an inordinate nature; and his *medicinal* power, according to its perfective energy. We ſhould likewiſe ſpeculate theſe characteriſtics differently in gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, men, animals, and plants; for the powers of the gods extend from on high to the laſt of things, and at the ſame time appear in an accommodated manner in each; and the teleſtic (i. e. myſtic) art endeavours through ſympathy to conjoin theſe ultimate participants with the gods. But in all theſe orders we muſt carefully obſerve, that this god is the cauſe of union to multiplied natures: for his *medicinal* power, which takes away the *multiform* nature of diſeaſe, imparts *uniform* health; ſince health is ſymmetry and a ſubſiſtence according to nature, but that which is contrary to nature is multifarious. Thus too, his *prophetic* power, which unfolds the ſimplicity of truth, takes away the variety of that which is falſe; but his *arrow-darting* power, which exterminates every thing furious and wild, but prepares that which is or-

* See the Introduction to the Timæus.

derly

derly and gentle to exercise dominion, vindicates to itself unity, and exterminates a disordered nature tending to multitude; and his *musical* power, through rhythm and harmony, places a bond, friendship, and union in *wholes*, and subdues the contraries to these.

And all these powers indeed subsist primarily, in an exempt manner, and uniformly in Jupiter the demiurgus of wholes, but secondarily and separately in Apollo. Hence Apollo is not the same with the demiurgic intellect; for this comprehends these powers totally and paternally, but Apollo with subjection, imitating his father; since all the energies and powers of secondary gods are comprehended in the demiurgus according to cause. And the demuirgus fabricates and adorns the universe according to all these powers, and in a collected manner; but the other deities which proceed from him cooperate with their father according to different powers.

That purification being seen not only in the medicinal, but also in the prophetic art, evinces, that the cathartic power of Apollo comprehends the two powers: for it illustrates the world with the glittering splendors of light, and purifies all material immoderation by Pæonian energies; which physicians and prophets among us imitating, the former purify bodies, and the latter through sulphureous preparations render themselves and their associates pure. For, as Timæus says, the gods purify the universe, either by fire or water; and prophets also in this respect imitate the gods. In the most sacred of the mysteries too, purifications are employed prior to initiation into them, in order to take away every thing foreign from the proposed sacred mystery. We may likewise add, that the referring multiform purifications to the one cathartic power of the gods is adapted to him. For Apollo every where unites and elevates multitude to *the one*, and uniformly comprehends all the modes of purification, purifying all heaven, generation, and all mundane lives, and separating partial souls from the grossness of matter. Hence the theurgist, who is the leader of the mysteries of this god, begins from purifications and sprinklings:

Αυτος δ'εν πρωτοις ιερευς πυρος εργα κυβερνων,
Κυματι ρεινεσθω παγερω βαρυηχετος αλμης.

i. e. "The priest in the first place governing the works of fire, must sprinkle with the cold water of the loud-sounding sea," as the Oracle says concerning him. But the assertion that the god presides over simplicity according to knowledge, and unfolds truth

truth into light, preſents him to our view as analogous to *the good*, which Socrates celebrates in the Republic; in which place he calls the ſun the progeny of *the good*, and ſays that the former is analogous to the latter. Apollo therefore being the ſource of union, and this to the mundane gods, is arranged analogous to *the good*; and through *truth*, he unfolds to us his ſimilitude to it, if it be lawful ſo to ſpeak. For *the ſimple* is a manifeſtation of *the one*, and the truth which ſubſiſts according to knowledge is a luminous repreſentation of ſupereſſential truth, which firſt proceeds from *the good*. But *the perpetually prevailing might of the god in the jaculation of arrows*, evinces his dominion, which vanquiſhes every thing in the world. For on high, from the ſuperceleſtial order, he ſcatters the rivers of Jupiter, and pours his rays on the whole world: for his arrows obſcurely ſignify his rays. Again, the aſſertion that he preſides over muſic, repreſents to us that this god is the cauſe of all harmony, both unapparent and apparent, through his ruling ſupermundane powers, according to which he generates, together with Mnemoſyne and Jupiter, the Muſes. But he orderly diſpoſes every thing ſenſible by his *demiurgic powers*, which the ſons of *theurgiſts* denominate *hands*; ſince the energy of the harmony of ſounds is ſuſpended from the motion of the hands. He likewiſe orderly diſpoſes ſouls and bodies through harmonic reaſons, uſing their different powers as if they were ſounds; and he moves all things harmoniouſly and rhythmically by his demiurgic motions. The whole of this celeſtial order too, and motion, exhibit the harmonious work of the god; on which account alſo partial ſouls are no otherwiſe perfected than through an harmonic ſimilitude to the univerſe, and abandoning the diſſonance ariſing from generation; for then they obtain the moſt excellent life, which is propoſed to them by the god.

From diſcourſing about king Apollo, Plato proceeds to the Muſes*, and the name of muſic: for Apollo is celebrated as Muſagetes; and he indeed is a monad with reſpect to the harmony in the world, but the choir of the Muſes is the monad of all the number of the hennead (i. e. nine). From both likewiſe the whole world is bound in indiſſoluble bonds, and is one and all-perfect, through the communications of theſe divinities; poſſeſſing the former through the Apolloniacal monad, but its all-perfect ſubſiſtence through the number of the Muſes. For the number nine, which is generated from the firſt perfect number (that is 3), is, through ſimilitude and fameneſs, accom-

* See p. 527.

modated

modated to the multiform cauſes of the mundane order and harmony; all theſe cauſes at the ſame time being collected into one ſummit for the purpoſe of producing one conſummate perfection. For the Muſes generate the variety of reaſons with which the world is replete; but Apollo comprehends in union all the multitude of theſe. And the Muſes give ſubſiſtence to the harmony of ſoul; but Apollo is the leader of intellectual and impartible harmony. The Muſes diſtribute the phænomena according to harmonical reaſons; but Apollo comprehends unapparent and ſeparate harmony. And though both give ſubſiſtence to the ſame things, yet the Muſes effect this according to number, but Apollo according to union. And the Muſes indeed diſtribute the unity of Apollo; but Apollo unities harmonic multitude, which he alſo converts and comprehends. For the multitude of the Muſes proceeds from the eſſence of *Muſagetes*, which is both ſeparate, and ſubſiſts according to the nature of *the one*; and their number evolves the one and primary cauſe of the harmony of the univerſe.

That ſuch being the etymology of the name of the Muſes, ſince Plato calls philoſophy the greateſt muſic, as cauſing our pſychical powers to be moved harmoniouſly, in ſymphony with real beings, and in conformity to the orderly motions of the celeſtial orbs; and ſince the inveſtigation of our own eſſence and that of the univerſe leads us to this harmony, through a converſion to ourſelves and more excellent natures,—hence alſo we denominate the Muſes from inveſtigation. For Muſagetes himſelf unfolds truth to ſouls according to one intellectual ſimplicity; but the Muſes perfect our various energies, elevating them to an intellectual unity. For inveſtigations have the relation of matter, with reference to the end from invention; juſt as multitude with reſpect to *the one*, and variety with reſpect to ſimplicity. We know, therefore, that the Muſes impart to ſouls the inveſtigation of truth, to bodies the multitude of powers, and that they are every where the ſources of the variety of harmonies.

That Latona* is a vivific fountain comprehended in Ceres: and hence, according to the Grecian rites, ſhe is worſhipped as the ſame with Ceres, theſe rites evincing by this the union of the goddeſſes. But this goddeſs emits the whole of vivific light, illuminating the intellectual eſſences of the gods, and the orders of ſouls: and laſtly, ſhe illuminates

* See p. 527.

the whole ſenſible heaven, generating mundane light, and eſtabliſhing the cauſe of this light in her offspring, Apollo and Diana; and cauſes all things to glitter with intellectual and vivific light. She imparts likewiſe to ſouls the conſummation of virtue, and an illumination which leads them back to the intellectual port of their father (Jupiter), haſtily withdrawing them from the winding paths* of matter, the entanglements of vice, and the roughneſs of the paſſage over the ſea of generation. It appears to me indeed that theologiſts, conſidering this, denominated her λητω, Latona, on account of her extending to ſouls *ſmoothneſs* of manners, a voluntary life, and divine gentleneſs and eaſe. For to ſuch as raiſe themſelves to her divinity, ſhe imparts an ineffable energy, a blameleſs life, gentleneſs of manners, ſerenity, and intellectual tranquillity. Whether, therefore, ſhe is called *Leto*, from a voluntary life; for λω ſignifies το βουλομαι, *I am willing*; or from το λειον, *the ſmooth*; her name will perfectly evince, through both theſe, the powers which ſhe poſſeſſes. For the compelled energies of the ſoul take place through material roughneſs; and the obliquity of a life in generation diminiſhes the ſoul's voluntary life. But an aſcent to the gods imparts a ſmooth and gentle, inſtead of a hard and rough, and a voluntary, inſtead of a compelled life.

Why then is it neceſſary to call, as ſome do, Latona matter, as capable of being eaſily turned, and ſubſiſting as an expreſs reſemblance of all forms, like a mirror receiving the repreſentations of all things; and to ſay that ſhe is the cauſe of oblivion to thoſe that look into her? Why is it neceſſary to call Apollo harmony, as ſubſiſting from Latona and Jupiter? For thus the god would be inſeparable from matter, and not the cauſe of the harmony in the univerſe. It is better, therefore, to ſay, that Latona is not the receptacle of Apollo, but that ſhe is the mother and fountain of all vivific light, which preſerves all things by heat: but that Apollo, who is a ſeparate divinity, is the ſupplier of all harmonic life, and of all thoſe mundane reaſons by which the univerſe is indiſſolubly bound. But you may ſay that Socrates derives her name from *Lethe*, becauſe ſhe peculiarly cauſes in ſouls an oblivion of evils, and of the roughneſs and ſtorms in generation; of which, while the ſoul retains the memory, ſhe cannot poſſibly eſtabliſh herſelf in intelligibles: for memory, ſays Plotinus, leads to the object of memory. And as Mnemoſyne excites the memory of intelligibles, ſo Latona imparts an oblivion of material concerns.

* Of theſe winding paths the Dedalean labyrinth is an image.

That

That of our ſovereign miſtreſs Diana*, Plato delivers three idioms; the undefiled, the mundane, and the anagogic. And through the firſt of theſe indeed the goddeſs is ſaid to be a lover of virginity; but through the ſecond, according to which ſhe is perfective of works (τελεσιουργος), ſhe is ſaid to be the inſpective guardian of virtue; and through the third ſhe is ſaid to hate the impulſes ariſing from generation. Of theſe three likewiſe, the firſt is eſpecially adapted to the progreſſion of the goddeſs, according to which ſhe is allotted an hyparxis in the vivific triad of the ſupermundane gods; whether we call this deity Hecatic, as theurgiſts ſay, or Diana with Orpheus. For there being eſtabliſhed, ſhe is filled with undefiled powers from the gods called *Amilicti*†. But ſhe looks to the fountain of virtue, and embraces its virginity. For the virginity which is there does not proceed forth, as the Oracle ſays, but abiding gives ſubſiſtence to Diana, and to ſupermundane virtue, and is exempt from all communion, conjunction, and progreſſion, according to generation. Hence Core alſo, according to the Diana and Minerva which ſhe contains, is ſaid to remain a virgin; but according to the prolific power of Proſerpine, ſhe is ſaid to proceed forth, and to be conjoined with the third demiurgus, and to bring forth, as Orpheus ſays, "nine azure-eyed, flower-producing daughters,"

Εννεα θυγατερας γλαυκωπιδας ανθεσιουργους·

ſince the Diana and the Minerva which ſhe contains preſerve their virginity always the ſame. For the former of theſe is characterized according to her ſtability, but the latter according to her convertive energy. But that which is generative is allotted in her a middle order. They ſay too, that ſhe aſpires after virginity, ſince the form of her is comprehended in the vivific fountain, and ſhe underſtands fontal virtue, gives ſubſiſtence to ſupermundane and anagogic virtue, and deſpiſes all material ſexual connexion, though ſhe inſpects the fruits ariſing from it. She appears alſo to be averſe to the generations and progreſſions of things, but to introduce perfections to them. And ſhe gives perfection indeed to ſouls through a life according to virtue; but to mortal animals ſhe imparts a reſtitution to form. But that there is a great union between Diana, the mundane Hecate, and Core, is evident to thoſe that are in the leaſt degree converſant with the writings of Orpheus; from

* See page 527. † That is, the Corybantes.

which it appears that Latona is comprehended in Ceres, and together with Jupiter gives ſubſiſtence to Core, and the mundane Hecate. To which we may alſo add that Orpheus * calls Diana Hecate. So that it is nothing wonderful, if we ſhould elſewhere call the Diana contained in Core, Hecate.

That Plato coarranges the mundane Bacchus † with the mundane Venus, in conſequence of her love of Bacchus, and her faſhioning, as an image of him, Adonis much honoured in Cilicia and Cyprus. And it is evident that a love of this kind in Venus, which is thus beneficent and providential, muſt be conſidered as exerted by a ſuperior to an inferior divinity.

That the young man appears to inquire about our ſovereign maſter Bacchus, as if it were about things of ſmall importance, and on this account he is filenced ‡ by Socrates. And he does not indeed hear concerning the occult, but only the laſt and mundane progreſſions of the gods. Theſe indeed the wiſe man venerates, though, as he ſays, they are ſports, through theſe gods being lovers of ſport. For, as he ſays of the terminations of the other gods, that they are terrible, and that they avenge and puniſh, and thus give perfection to ſouls; as, for inſtance, that Juſtice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that this divinity is benevolent to thoſe whoſe manners are orderly, and who live according to intellect, but that ſhe is baneful to thoſe who mingle their life with inſolence and ignorance, until ſhe has entirely ſubverted them, their houſes, and cities;—in like manner, he venerates the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce γλυκυθυμια, *ſweetneſs of ſenſation*; every where purifying our conceptions concerning the gods, and preparing us to underſtand that all things look to the beſt end, whatever it may be. For, becauſe the terminations of theſe divinities ſtrengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and recall corporeal moleſtation, on this account the gods, the cauſes of theſe things, are φιλοπαιγμονες, *lovers of ſport*. Hence, of ſtatues, they make ſome of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation, but others auſtere, aſtoniſhing, and terrible to the view, analogouſly to the mundane allotments of the gods.

* Ηδ' αρα εκαΐη παιδος μελη αυθι λυπουσα
Λητους ευπλοκαμοιο κορη προσεζησαΐ' ολυμπον.

† See p. 527.

‡ This is implied by Socrates telling him that he inquires about *great* things.

That

That theologiſts frequently call Bacchus *wine*, from the laſt of his gifts, as, for inſtance, Orpheus,

Οινου παντα μελη κοσμω λαβε, και μοι ενεικε.

i. e. "Take all the members of wine (that are diſtributed) in the world, and bring them to me."

But if the god is thus denominated, certainly his firſt and middle energies will be thus called, as well as his laſt; ſo that Socrates, now looking to this, calls the god διδουυσος, beginning from wine, which, as we have ſaid, manifeſts all the powers of the god. Thus alſo in the Phædrus, Socrates calls love in common *great*, both that which is divine, and that which is a lover of body. By this epithet *wine* therefore, we muſt underſtand that the idiom of a partial intellect is in common preſented to our view. For the word οιουν, *ſuch as*, is nothing elſe than intellectual form ſeparated from a total intellect, and in conſequence of this becoming participated, *particular* and *alone*. For an all-perfect intellect is all things, and energizes according to all things with invariable ſameneſs; but a partial and participated intellect is indeed all things, but this according to one form, ſuch as a ſolar, lunar, or mercurial form. This therefore, the idiom of which is to be ſeparated from the reſt, wine indicates, ſignifying an intellect *ſuch as*, and *particular* (σημαινων τον οιον και τινος νουν). Since therefore every partial fabrication is ſuſpended from the Dionyſiacal monad, which diſtributes participated mundane intellects from total intellect *, many ſouls from one ſoul, and all ſenſible forms from their proper totalities; on this account theologiſts call both this god and all his fabrications *wine*: for all theſe are the progeny of intellect; and ſome things participate of the partial diſtribution of intellect in a more diſtant, but others in a nearer degree. *Wine* therefore energizes in things analogous to its ſubſiſtence in them: in body, indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a falſe opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an intellectual energy and fabrication; ſince, in the laceration of Bacchus by the Titans, the *heart* of the god is ſaid to have alone remained undiſtributed, i. e. *the indiviſible eſſence of intellect*. Οτι τον δεσποτην ημων Διονυσον, οι θεολογοι πολλακις,

* With reſpect to intellect, it is neceſſary to inform the reader, that one kind is imparticipable and total, ſuch as all intellects unconnected with ſoul; but another participable indeed, but eſſentially ſo, ſuch as the mundane intellect, and the intellects of all the mundane gods and beneficent dæmons; but a third is participable, and ſubſiſts as a *habit*; and to this claſs our intellects belong.

και απο των τελευταιων αυτον δωρων οινον καλουσιν.—Οστις ως ειρηται πασιων εστι δηλωτικος των του Θεου δυναμεων. Ωσπερ και εν Φαιδρω τον μεγαν ερωτα κοινως λεγει, τον τε θειον, και τον φιλοσωματον. Ο ουν οινος ουτος κοινως εξεκκουμενος, την ιδιοτητα του μερικου νου παριστησιν ημιν. Το γαρ οιουν, ουκ αλλο τι εστιν ἢ το διηρημενον απο του ολου, και μετεχομενον ηδη νοερον ειδος, και οιον, και μονον γενομενον. Ο μεν γαρ παντελης νους παντοτ' (lege παντατ') εστι και ενεργει κατα παντα ωσαυτως. Ο δε μεριστος και μετεχομενος παντα μεν, αλλα καθ' εν ειδος, οιον το ηλιακον, ἢ το σεληνιακον, ἢ το ερμαικον. Επειδη τοινυν η μεριστη δημιουργια παντα της διονυσιακης εξηρτηται μοναδος, διαιρουσα τους μεν μεθεκτους εν τω κοσμω νοας απο του ολου νου, τας δε πολλας ψυχας, απο της μιας, τα δ' ειδη τα αισθητα παντα απο των οικειων ολοτητων, δια δη τουτο και αυτον τον Θεον οινον προειρηκασιν οι Θεολογοι, αυτον τε, και παντα τα δημιουργηματα αυτου. Παντα γαρ εγγονα του νου. Και τα μεν πορρωτερον, τα δ' εγγυτερον μετεχει της μεριστης του νου διανομης. Αναλογως ουν εν τοις ουσιν ο οινος εγγινομενος ενεργει. Εν μεν τω σωματι ειδωλικως, κατα αισθησιν, και φαντασιαν ψευδη. Εν δε τοις νοεροις το κατα νουν ενεργειν, και δημιουργειν. Επει και εν τη διασπαραξει των τιτανων μονη η καρδια αδιαιρετος μειναι λεγεται· τουτεστιν η αμερης του νου ουσια.

That from ſportive conceptions about the gods it is poſſible for thoſe to energize entheaſtically, or according to a divinely inſpired energy, who apply themſelves to things in a more intellectual manner. Thus, for inſtance, according to the material conceptions of the multitude, Venus derives her origin from foam; and foam correſponds to ſeed. Hence according to them the pleaſure ariſing from this in coition is Venus. Who, however, is ſo ſtupid *, as not to ſurvey primary and eternal natures, prior to ſuch as are laſt and corruptible? I will therefore unfold the divine conception reſpecting Venus.

They ſay then that the firſt Venus was produced from two-fold cauſes, the one as that *through which* †, cooperating with her progreſſion, as calling forth the prolific power of the father, and imparting it to the intellectual orders; but Heaven as the maker and cauſe unfolding the goddeſs into light, from his own generative abundance. For whence could that which congregates different genera, according to one deſire of beauty, receive

* A countleſs multitude we may ſay, O Proclus, of the preſent day are thus ſtupid; and few, very few indeed, have entertained a different opinion for upwards of a thouſand years.

† This cauſe is Saturn, who according to the fable cut off the genital parts of Heaven. See the Theogony of Heſiod.

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

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